linux-stable.git/drivers, branch v6.18.30

net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted

2026-05-14T13:30:26+00:00

[ Upstream commit 0bb05e6adfa99a2ea1fee1125cc0953409f83ed8 ]

The CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU
allocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns
ownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC
coordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one
descriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer's
physical address and a status flag ("OWN") indicating which side owns
the buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set
the flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move
through the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both
"submissions" and "completions."

In the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring
with the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks
for rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the
network stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the
ring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its
position with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the
descriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops
early (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called.

This means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own):
- `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid)
- `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated)
- `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer NULL)

But because stmmac_rx() only checks OWN, it confuses `full`/`dirty`. In
the past (see 'Fixes:'), there was a bug where the loop could cycle
`cur_rx` all the way back to the first descriptor it dirtied, resulting
in a NULL dereference when mistaken for `full`. The aforementioned
commit resolved that *specific* failure by capping the loop's iteration
limit at `dma_rx_size - 1`, but this is only a partial fix: if the
previous stmmac_rx_refill() didn't complete, then there are leftover
`dirty` descriptors that the loop might encounter without needing to
cycle fully around. The current code therefore panics (see 'Closes:')
when stmmac_rx_refill() is memory-starved long enough for `cur_rx` to
catch up to `dirty_rx`.

Fix this by explicitly checking, before advancing `cur_rx`, if the next
entry is dirty; exit the loop if so. This prevents processing of the
final, used descriptor until stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, but
fully prevents the `cur_rx == dirty_rx` ambiguity as the previous bugfix
intended: so remove the clamp as well. Since stmmac_rx_zc() is a
copy-paste-and-tweak of stmmac_rx() and the code structure is identical,
any fix to stmmac_rx() will also need a corresponding fix for
stmmac_rx_zc(). Therefore, apply the same check there.

In stmmac_rx() (not stmmac_rx_zc()), a related bug remains: after the
MAC sets OWN=0 on the final descriptor, it will be unable to send any
further DMA-complete IRQs until it's given more `empty` descriptors.
Currently, the driver simply *hopes* that the next stmmac_rx_refill()
succeeds, risking an indefinite stall of the receive process if not. But
this is not a regression, so it can be addressed in a future change.

Fixes: b6cb4541853c7 ("net: stmmac: avoid rx queue overrun")
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221010
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: Sam Edwards 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422044503.5349-1-CFSworks@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: stmmac: rename STMMAC_GET_ENTRY() -> STMMAC_NEXT_ENTRY()

2026-05-14T13:30:26+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6b4286e0550814cdc4b897f881ec1fa8b0313227 ]

STMMAC_GET_ENTRY() doesn't describe what this macro is doing - it is
incrementing the provided index for the circular array of descriptors.
Replace "GET" with "NEXT" as this better describes the action here.

Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/E1w2vba-0000000DbWo-1oL5@rmk-PC.armlinux.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Stable-dep-of: 0bb05e6adfa9 ("net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: caam - guard HMAC key hex dumps in hash_digest_key

2026-05-14T13:30:26+00:00

[ Upstream commit 177730a273b18e195263ed953853273e901b5064 ]

Use print_hex_dump_devel() for dumping sensitive HMAC key bytes in
hash_digest_key() to avoid leaking secrets at runtime when
CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG is enabled.

Fixes: 045e36780f11 ("crypto: caam - ahash hmac support")
Fixes: 3f16f6c9d632 ("crypto: caam/qi2 - add support for ahash algorithms")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

firmware: exynos-acpm: Drop fake 'const' on handle pointer

2026-05-14T13:30:25+00:00

[ Upstream commit a2be37eedb52ea26938fa4cc9de1ff84963c57ad ]

All the functions operating on the 'handle' pointer are claiming it is a
pointer to const thus they should not modify the handle.  In fact that's
a false statement, because first thing these functions do is drop the
cast to const with container_of:

  struct acpm_info *acpm = handle_to_acpm_info(handle);

And with such cast the handle is easily writable with simple:

  acpm->handle.ops.pmic_ops.read_reg = NULL;

The code is not correct logically, either, because functions like
acpm_get_by_node() and acpm_handle_put() are meant to modify the handle
reference counting, thus they must modify the handle.  Modification here
happens anyway, even if the reference counting is stored in the
container which the handle is part of.

The code does not have actual visible bug, but incorrect 'const'
annotations could lead to incorrect compiler decisions.

Fixes: a88927b534ba ("firmware: add Exynos ACPM protocol driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260224104203.42950-2-krzysztof.kozlowski@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski 
[ dropped hunks for DVFS/clk-acpm files and `acpm_dvfs_ops` struct that don't exist in 6.18 ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: qat - fix firmware loading failure for GEN6 devices

2026-05-14T13:30:25+00:00

[ Upstream commit e7dcb722bb75bb3f3992f580a8728a794732fd7a ]

QAT GEN6 hardware requires a minimum 3 us delay during the acceleration
engine reset sequence to ensure the hardware fully settles.
Without this delay, the firmware load may fail intermittently.

Add a delay after placing the AE into reset and before clearing the reset,
matching the hardware requirements and ensuring stable firmware loading.
Earlier generations remain unaffected.

Fixes: 17fd7514ae68 ("crypto: qat - add qat_6xxx driver")
Signed-off-by: Suman Kumar Chakraborty 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Cabiddu 
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: qat - fix indentation of macros in qat_hal.c

2026-05-14T13:30:25+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4963b39e3a3feed07fbf4d5cc2b5df8498888285 ]

The macros in qat_hal.c were using a mixture of tabs and spaces.
Update all macro indentation to use tabs consistently, matching the
predominant style.

This does not introduce any functional change.

Signed-off-by: Suman Kumar Chakraborty 
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Cabiddu 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Stable-dep-of: e7dcb722bb75 ("crypto: qat - fix firmware loading failure for GEN6 devices")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mmc: core: Optimize time for secure erase/trim for some Kingston eMMCs

2026-05-14T13:30:25+00:00

[ Upstream commit d6bf2e64dec87322f2b11565ddb59c0e967f96e3 ]

Kingston eMMC IY2964 and IB2932 takes a fixed ~2 seconds for each secure
erase/trim operation regardless of size - that is, a single secure
erase/trim operation of 1MB takes the same time as 1GB. With default
calculated 3.5MB max discard size, secure erase 1GB requires ~300 separate
operations taking ~10 minutes total.

Add a card quirk, MMC_QUIRK_FIXED_SECURE_ERASE_TRIM_TIME, to set maximum
secure erase size for those devices. This allows 1GB secure erase to
complete in a single operation, reducing time from 10 minutes to just 2
seconds.

Signed-off-by: Luke Wang 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mmc: core: Add quirk for incorrect manufacturing date

2026-05-14T13:30:25+00:00

[ Upstream commit 263ff314cc5602599d481b0912a381555fcbad28 ]

Some eMMC vendors need to report manufacturing dates beyond 2025 but are
reluctant to update the EXT_CSD revision from 8 to 9. Changing the
Updating the EXT_CSD revision may involve additional testing or
qualification steps with customers. To ease this transition and avoid a
full re-qualification process, a workaround is needed. This
patch introduces a temporary quirk that re-purposes the year codes
corresponding to 2010, 2011, and 2012 to represent the years 2026, 2027,
and 2028, respectively. This solution is only valid for this three-year
period.

After 2028, vendors must update their firmware to set EXT_CSD_REV=9 to
continue reporting the correct manufacturing date in compliance with the
JEDEC standard.

The `MMC_QUIRK_BROKEN_MDT` is introduced and enabled for all Sandisk
devices to handle this behavior.

Signed-off-by: Avri Altman 
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson 
Stable-dep-of: d6bf2e64dec8 ("mmc: core: Optimize time for secure erase/trim for some Kingston eMMCs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mmc: core: Adjust MDT beyond 2025

2026-05-14T13:30:25+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3e487a634bc019166e452ea276f7522710eda9f4 ]

JEDEC JESD84-B51B which was released in September 2025, increases the
manufacturing year limit for eMMC devices. The eMMC manufacturing year
is stored in a 4-bit field in the CID register. Originally, it covered
1997–2012. Later, with EXT_CSD_REV=8, it was extended up to 2025. Now,
with EXT_CSD_REV=9, the range is rolled over by another 16 years, up to
2038.

The mapping is as follows:
cid[8..11] | rev ≤ 4 | 8 ≥ rev > 4 | rev > 8
---------------------------------------------
0          | 1997    | 2013        | 2029
1          | 1998    | 2014        | 2030
2          | 1999    | 2015        | 2031
3          | 2000    | 2016        | 2032
4          | 2001    | 2017        | 2033
5          | 2002    | 2018        | 2034
6          | 2003    | 2019        | 2035
7          | 2004    | 2020        | 2036
8          | 2005    | 2021        | 2037
9          | 2006    | 2022        | 2038
10         | 2007    | 2023        |
11         | 2008    | 2024        |
12         | 2009    | 2025        |
13         | 2010    |             | 2026
14         | 2011    |             | 2027
15         | 2012    |             | 2028

Signed-off-by: Avri Altman 
Reviewed-by: Shawn Lin 
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson 
Stable-dep-of: d6bf2e64dec8 ("mmc: core: Optimize time for secure erase/trim for some Kingston eMMCs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

octeon_ep_vf: add NULL check for napi_build_skb()

2026-05-14T13:30:25+00:00

[ Upstream commit dd66b42854705e4e4ee7f14d260f86c578bed3e3 ]

napi_build_skb() can return NULL on allocation failure. In
__octep_vf_oq_process_rx(), the result is used directly without a NULL
check in both the single-buffer and multi-fragment paths, leading to a
NULL pointer dereference.

Add NULL checks after both napi_build_skb() calls, properly advancing
descriptors and consuming remaining fragments on failure.

Fixes: 1cd3b407977c ("octeon_ep_vf: add Tx/Rx processing and interrupt support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Carlier 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260409184009.930359-3-devnexen@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
[ inlined missing octep_vf_oq_next_idx() helper as read_idx++ with wraparound ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman