<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers, branch v6.1.185</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>HID: hyperv: validate initial device info bounds</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-10T02:28:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8614c043b11cc35ffebd35542ab4da275f8f923d'/>
<id>8614c043b11cc35ffebd35542ab4da275f8f923d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 934b7778aa7b7c8f6bb073d2a73ba3674885bae0 upstream.

The Hyper-V synthetic HID host supplies SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO
messages that contain a HID descriptor followed by the report descriptor
bytes. mousevsc_on_receive_device_info() trusts bLength and
wDescriptorLength without checking that the received packet contains both
byte ranges.

A malformed host or backend message can therefore make the guest read
past the received VMBus packet while copying the report descriptor. Pass
the received initial-device-info size into the parser and reject
descriptor lengths that exceed the packet.

Impact: A malicious Hyper-V host or backend can crash a guest by sending
a short initial device-info message with an oversized HID report
descriptor length.

Fixes: b95f5bcb811e ("HID: Move the hid-hyperv driver out of staging")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 934b7778aa7b7c8f6bb073d2a73ba3674885bae0 upstream.

The Hyper-V synthetic HID host supplies SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO
messages that contain a HID descriptor followed by the report descriptor
bytes. mousevsc_on_receive_device_info() trusts bLength and
wDescriptorLength without checking that the received packet contains both
byte ranges.

A malformed host or backend message can therefore make the guest read
past the received VMBus packet while copying the report descriptor. Pass
the received initial-device-info size into the parser and reject
descriptor lengths that exceed the packet.

Impact: A malicious Hyper-V host or backend can crash a guest by sending
a short initial device-info message with an oversized HID report
descriptor length.

Fixes: b95f5bcb811e ("HID: Move the hid-hyperv driver out of staging")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: sensor: custom: Fix use-after-free in enable_sensor</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Haoxiang Li</name>
<email>haoxiang_li2024@163.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-07T07:15:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d37ff4e3635c18af907f25712596f8ccec323751'/>
<id>d37ff4e3635c18af907f25712596f8ccec323751</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ad8fb82b04422f49530d2aa2753cc81d1c60102c upstream.

enable_sensor_store() can call set_power_report_state(), which
dereferences sensor_inst-&gt;power_state and sensor_inst-&gt;report_state.
These pointers refer to entries in sensor_inst-&gt;fields.

Create the field attributes before exposing the enable_sensor sysfs
attribute, so enable_sensor cannot be accessed before the state it
depends on has been initialized.

On remove, delete enable_sensor before freeing the field attributes,
so a concurrent sysfs write cannot dereference freed memory through
power_state or report_state.

Reported-by: Sashiko AI Review &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260623021950.1736413-1-haoxiang_li2024@163.com?part=1
Fixes: 4a7de0519df5 ("HID: sensor: Custom and Generic sensor support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li &lt;haoxiang_li2024@163.com&gt;
Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada &lt;srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ad8fb82b04422f49530d2aa2753cc81d1c60102c upstream.

enable_sensor_store() can call set_power_report_state(), which
dereferences sensor_inst-&gt;power_state and sensor_inst-&gt;report_state.
These pointers refer to entries in sensor_inst-&gt;fields.

Create the field attributes before exposing the enable_sensor sysfs
attribute, so enable_sensor cannot be accessed before the state it
depends on has been initialized.

On remove, delete enable_sensor before freeing the field attributes,
so a concurrent sysfs write cannot dereference freed memory through
power_state or report_state.

Reported-by: Sashiko AI Review &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260623021950.1736413-1-haoxiang_li2024@163.com?part=1
Fixes: 4a7de0519df5 ("HID: sensor: Custom and Generic sensor support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li &lt;haoxiang_li2024@163.com&gt;
Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada &lt;srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: core: fix number/pointer type confusion on long items</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-03T18:30:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=634f498ea5d5e8e01f8d9414d4f45eeaf9ee1996'/>
<id>634f498ea5d5e8e01f8d9414d4f45eeaf9ee1996</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 28abce951343fcec26e397610868efa4e1395c3f upstream.

When fetch_item() is called by hid_scan_report() on an item with
HID_ITEM_TAG_LONG, it stores a pointer to the item data in
item-&gt;data.longdata instead of storing a value directly in
item-&gt;data.{u8/u16/u32}.

When item_udata() or item_sdata() encounters such an item, it incorrectly
assumes that the item is in short format, and therefore returns the lower
part of a kernel pointer reinterpreted as a number.

When a HID device is connected whose descriptor contains a
HID_GLOBAL_ITEM_TAG_REPORT_SIZE encoded in long format with size=4, this
causes the lower half of a kernel pointer to be printed into dmesg as a
number, like this:

    hid (null): invalid report_size 107953555

To fix it, let item_udata() and item_sdata() verify that the item is in
short format.

Note that this bug only affects hid_scan_report(), while the main parsing
pass hid_parse_collections() will always bail out when encountering a long
item.

Sidenote: There are currently no users of data.longdata; maybe we should
just remove any parsing of long-format descriptors as a follow-up.

Fixes: 3dc8fc083dbf ("HID: Use hid_parser for pre-scanning the report descriptors")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 28abce951343fcec26e397610868efa4e1395c3f upstream.

When fetch_item() is called by hid_scan_report() on an item with
HID_ITEM_TAG_LONG, it stores a pointer to the item data in
item-&gt;data.longdata instead of storing a value directly in
item-&gt;data.{u8/u16/u32}.

When item_udata() or item_sdata() encounters such an item, it incorrectly
assumes that the item is in short format, and therefore returns the lower
part of a kernel pointer reinterpreted as a number.

When a HID device is connected whose descriptor contains a
HID_GLOBAL_ITEM_TAG_REPORT_SIZE encoded in long format with size=4, this
causes the lower half of a kernel pointer to be printed into dmesg as a
number, like this:

    hid (null): invalid report_size 107953555

To fix it, let item_udata() and item_sdata() verify that the item is in
short format.

Note that this bug only affects hid_scan_report(), while the main parsing
pass hid_parse_collections() will always bail out when encountering a long
item.

Sidenote: There are currently no users of data.longdata; maybe we should
just remove any parsing of long-format descriptors as a follow-up.

Fixes: 3dc8fc083dbf ("HID: Use hid_parser for pre-scanning the report descriptors")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler()</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ibrahim Hashimov</name>
<email>security@auditcode.ai</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-15T11:52:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=33ea29f8b6141f2d265de807e110a6435b355cb0'/>
<id>33ea29f8b6141f2d265de807e110a6435b355cb0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 27b376b945c0aac46fcdfcc950b14a85b874b557 upstream.

joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to
struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a
12-byte length check:

	if (size &gt;= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */
		joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data);

struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a
union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report()
-&gt; joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48),
so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes
the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The
over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and
forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking
driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a
malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller.

Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an
over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded
bytes still reach userspace.

The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the
same cast correctly:

	if (size &lt; sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) ||
	    data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY)
		break;

Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.

Fixes: 2af16c1f846b ("HID: nintendo: add nintendo switch controller driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov &lt;security@auditcode.ai&gt;
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Reviewed-by: Silvan Jegen &lt;s.jegen@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 27b376b945c0aac46fcdfcc950b14a85b874b557 upstream.

joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to
struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a
12-byte length check:

	if (size &gt;= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */
		joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data);

struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a
union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report()
-&gt; joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48),
so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes
the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The
over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and
forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking
driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a
malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller.

Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an
over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded
bytes still reach userspace.

The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the
same cast correctly:

	if (size &lt; sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) ||
	    data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY)
		break;

Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.

Fixes: 2af16c1f846b ("HID: nintendo: add nintendo switch controller driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov &lt;security@auditcode.ai&gt;
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Reviewed-by: Silvan Jegen &lt;s.jegen@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>misc: fastrpc: Fix double free of 'buf' in error path</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sukrut Bellary</name>
<email>sukrut.bellary@linux.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-02T14:14:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4753cc37b6606ef9a7ec22861d380d45e2707f9a'/>
<id>4753cc37b6606ef9a7ec22861d380d45e2707f9a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e8c276d4dc0e19ee48385f74426aebc855b49aaf upstream.

smatch warning:
drivers/misc/fastrpc.c:1926 fastrpc_req_mmap() error: double free of 'buf'

In fastrpc_req_mmap() error path, the fastrpc buffer is freed in
fastrpc_req_munmap_impl() if unmap is successful.

But in the end, there is an unconditional call to fastrpc_buf_free().
So the above case triggers the double free of fastrpc buf.

Fixes: 72fa6f7820c4 ("misc: fastrpc: Rework fastrpc_req_munmap")
Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Srinivas Kandagatla &lt;srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sukrut Bellary &lt;sukrut.bellary@linux.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla &lt;srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240902141409.70371-2-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e8c276d4dc0e19ee48385f74426aebc855b49aaf upstream.

smatch warning:
drivers/misc/fastrpc.c:1926 fastrpc_req_mmap() error: double free of 'buf'

In fastrpc_req_mmap() error path, the fastrpc buffer is freed in
fastrpc_req_munmap_impl() if unmap is successful.

But in the end, there is an unconditional call to fastrpc_buf_free().
So the above case triggers the double free of fastrpc buf.

Fixes: 72fa6f7820c4 ("misc: fastrpc: Rework fastrpc_req_munmap")
Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Srinivas Kandagatla &lt;srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sukrut Bellary &lt;sukrut.bellary@linux.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla &lt;srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240902141409.70371-2-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: use skb hash instead of private variable in headroom</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oliver Hartkopp</name>
<email>socketcan@hartkopp.net</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-25T12:27:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cadee54a8691e40bf04f2ac4a108b413b8c88ef8'/>
<id>cadee54a8691e40bf04f2ac4a108b413b8c88ef8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d4fb6514ff8ed6912a71294e6b66a5d59ee88007 upstream.

The can_skb_priv::skbcnt variable is used to identify CAN skbs in the RX
path analogue to the skb-&gt;hash.

As the skb hash is not filled in CAN skbs move the private skbcnt value to
skb-&gt;hash and set skb-&gt;sw_hash accordingly. The skb-&gt;hash is a value used
for RPS to identify skbs. Use it as intended.

Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260201-can_skb_ext-v8-1-3635d790fe8b@hartkopp.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d4fb6514ff8ed6912a71294e6b66a5d59ee88007 upstream.

The can_skb_priv::skbcnt variable is used to identify CAN skbs in the RX
path analogue to the skb-&gt;hash.

As the skb hash is not filled in CAN skbs move the private skbcnt value to
skb-&gt;hash and set skb-&gt;sw_hash accordingly. The skb-&gt;hash is a value used
for RPS to identify skbs. Use it as intended.

Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260201-can_skb_ext-v8-1-3635d790fe8b@hartkopp.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Input: atkbd - skip deactivate for HONOR ZQC-P</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Donglin Lyu</name>
<email>DongLin_Lyu@outlook.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-24T15:34:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eb6b7753e8f75ffe14602ee2afd45ad6363abf57'/>
<id>eb6b7753e8f75ffe14602ee2afd45ad6363abf57</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 410c44b1096789d0c40fbee706520e981dba7bc1 ]

The internal keyboard on the HONOR ZQC-P (HONOR MagicBook Pro 14 2026)
does not work after boot.

Using the kernel command line 'i8042.dumbkbd=1' makes the keyboard
functional, but the CapsLock LED does not work. Adding the
'atkbd_deactivate_fixup' quirk fixes the keyboard and CapsLock LED
natively without requiring boot parameters.

DMI: HONOR ZQC-P/ZQC-P-PCB, BIOS 1.09 03/19/2026

Fixes: 9cf6e24c9fbf ("Input: atkbd - do not skip atkbd_deactivate() when skipping ATKBD_CMD_GETID")
Signed-off-by: Donglin Lyu &lt;donglin_lyu@outlook.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ruslan Shevchenko &lt;adefka@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260801151115.52709-1-donglin_lyu@outlook.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[dtor: keep all HONOR entries together]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 410c44b1096789d0c40fbee706520e981dba7bc1 ]

The internal keyboard on the HONOR ZQC-P (HONOR MagicBook Pro 14 2026)
does not work after boot.

Using the kernel command line 'i8042.dumbkbd=1' makes the keyboard
functional, but the CapsLock LED does not work. Adding the
'atkbd_deactivate_fixup' quirk fixes the keyboard and CapsLock LED
natively without requiring boot parameters.

DMI: HONOR ZQC-P/ZQC-P-PCB, BIOS 1.09 03/19/2026

Fixes: 9cf6e24c9fbf ("Input: atkbd - do not skip atkbd_deactivate() when skipping ATKBD_CMD_GETID")
Signed-off-by: Donglin Lyu &lt;donglin_lyu@outlook.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ruslan Shevchenko &lt;adefka@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260801151115.52709-1-donglin_lyu@outlook.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[dtor: keep all HONOR entries together]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Input: atkbd - skip deactivate for HONOR FMB-P's internal keyboard</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cryolitia PukNgae</name>
<email>cryolitia.pukngae@linux.dev</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-24T15:34:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d7d4a8a75cd3f160c089e808433241c3c5bf75b9'/>
<id>d7d4a8a75cd3f160c089e808433241c3c5bf75b9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2aaf33c6e1e82561d7dce2345298a985a2483266 ]

After commit 9cf6e24c9fbf17e52de9fff07f12be7565ea6d61 ("Input: atkbd -
do not skip atkbd_deactivate() when skipping ATKBD_CMD_GETID"), HONOR
FMB-P, aka HONOR MagicBook Pro 14 2025's internal keyboard stops
working. Adding the atkbd_deactivate_fixup quirk fixes it.

DMI: HONOR FMB-P/FMB-P-PCB, BIOS 1.13 05/08/2025

Fixes: 9cf6e24c9fbf17e52de9fff07f12be7565ea6d61 ("Input: atkbd - do not skip atkbd_deactivate() when skipping ATKBD_CMD_GETID")
Reported-by: Mikura Kyouka &lt;mikurakyouka@aosc.io&gt;
Reported-by: foad.elkhattabi &lt;foad.elkhattabi@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cryolitia PukNgae &lt;cryolitia.pukngae@linux.dev&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede &lt;hansg@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251022-honor-v1-1-ff894ed271a9@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 410c44b10967 ("Input: atkbd - skip deactivate for HONOR ZQC-P")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2aaf33c6e1e82561d7dce2345298a985a2483266 ]

After commit 9cf6e24c9fbf17e52de9fff07f12be7565ea6d61 ("Input: atkbd -
do not skip atkbd_deactivate() when skipping ATKBD_CMD_GETID"), HONOR
FMB-P, aka HONOR MagicBook Pro 14 2025's internal keyboard stops
working. Adding the atkbd_deactivate_fixup quirk fixes it.

DMI: HONOR FMB-P/FMB-P-PCB, BIOS 1.13 05/08/2025

Fixes: 9cf6e24c9fbf17e52de9fff07f12be7565ea6d61 ("Input: atkbd - do not skip atkbd_deactivate() when skipping ATKBD_CMD_GETID")
Reported-by: Mikura Kyouka &lt;mikurakyouka@aosc.io&gt;
Reported-by: foad.elkhattabi &lt;foad.elkhattabi@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cryolitia PukNgae &lt;cryolitia.pukngae@linux.dev&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede &lt;hansg@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251022-honor-v1-1-ff894ed271a9@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 410c44b10967 ("Input: atkbd - skip deactivate for HONOR ZQC-P")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/vfio_ccw: Free all memory if cp_init() fails</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Farman</name>
<email>farman@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-28T03:30:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=17e01e342af74de12899c206dcc9ec90684703aa'/>
<id>17e01e342af74de12899c206dcc9ec90684703aa</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 74186c2968f8f756ac3226b545b598457c910c75 ]

The routine cp_free() is called to unpin/free any memory once an I/O
is completed successfully, or if cp_prefetch() fails. But if cp_init()
fails, and cp-&gt;initialized is not enabled, the same routine cannot be
used to free all the memory.

An attempt to address this exists in ccwchain_handle_ccw(), where a
single call to ccwchain_free() is made for the currently-processed
CCW segment. But this will leak other segments (created as a result
of a Transfer in Channel) that had been allocated as part of the same
channel program.

Address this by performing the cleanup outside of the recursive
ccwchain_handle_ccw()/ccwchain_loop_tic() logic.

Fixes: 8b515be512a2 ("vfio-ccw: Fix memory leak and don't call cp_free in cp_init")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali &lt;alifm@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matthew Rosato &lt;mjrosato@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Farman &lt;farman@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
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<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 74186c2968f8f756ac3226b545b598457c910c75 ]

The routine cp_free() is called to unpin/free any memory once an I/O
is completed successfully, or if cp_prefetch() fails. But if cp_init()
fails, and cp-&gt;initialized is not enabled, the same routine cannot be
used to free all the memory.

An attempt to address this exists in ccwchain_handle_ccw(), where a
single call to ccwchain_free() is made for the currently-processed
CCW segment. But this will leak other segments (created as a result
of a Transfer in Channel) that had been allocated as part of the same
channel program.

Address this by performing the cleanup outside of the recursive
ccwchain_handle_ccw()/ccwchain_loop_tic() logic.

Fixes: 8b515be512a2 ("vfio-ccw: Fix memory leak and don't call cp_free in cp_init")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali &lt;alifm@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matthew Rosato &lt;mjrosato@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Farman &lt;farman@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: core: fix OOB read of field-&gt;usage in hid_set_field()</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Baul Lee</name>
<email>baul.lee@xbow.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-26T06:50:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=313ead1abed945544703b100a12c5a10fdf78409'/>
<id>313ead1abed945544703b100a12c5a10fdf78409</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a13cdb19fcb223ed41bdab3bab42b98dba87e90b upstream.

hid_set_field() hands field-&gt;usage + offset to hid_dump_input() before
the guard that bounds offset:

	hid_dump_input(field-&gt;report-&gt;device, field-&gt;usage + offset, value);

	if (offset &gt;= field-&gt;report_count) {
		hid_err(...);
		return -1;
	}

Under CONFIG_DEBUG_FS hid_dump_input() dereferences that pointer, with
buf = hid_resolv_usage(usage-&gt;hid, NULL).  The usage[] array is
allocated inline with the hid_field in hid_register_field() and holds
field-&gt;maxusage entries, so an offset past it reads off the end of the
kvzalloc()ed allocation and into a neighbouring object.  Had the guard
run first, offset &lt; report_count &lt;= maxusage would already have confined
the pointer to the array.

A caller supplies such an offset today.  picolcd_fb_send_tile()
validates only report-&gt;maxfield before issuing
hid_set_field(report-&gt;field[0], 11 + i, ...) for i = 0..31, so its
offsets are fixed at 11..42 and are never checked against the bound
field.  When the device registers that field with fewer usages, the
framebuffer deferred-io work drives the read on every tile.  KASAN
reports a 4-byte slab-out-of-bounds read in hid_dump_input() below
hid_set_field(), and the same boot logs "offset (1) exceeds
report_count (1)" from the guard that runs only afterwards.

Move the hid_dump_input() call below the guard.  Because
field-&gt;maxusage &gt;= field-&gt;report_count, the guard then establishes that
field-&gt;usage + offset lies inside the array before it is dereferenced,
for every caller and without changing behaviour on the valid path.

Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee &lt;baul.lee@xbow.com&gt;

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Federico Kirschbaum &lt;federico.kirschbaum@xbow.com&gt;
Reported-by: Baul Lee &lt;baul.lee@xbow.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Baul Lee &lt;baul.lee@xbow.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a13cdb19fcb223ed41bdab3bab42b98dba87e90b upstream.

hid_set_field() hands field-&gt;usage + offset to hid_dump_input() before
the guard that bounds offset:

	hid_dump_input(field-&gt;report-&gt;device, field-&gt;usage + offset, value);

	if (offset &gt;= field-&gt;report_count) {
		hid_err(...);
		return -1;
	}

Under CONFIG_DEBUG_FS hid_dump_input() dereferences that pointer, with
buf = hid_resolv_usage(usage-&gt;hid, NULL).  The usage[] array is
allocated inline with the hid_field in hid_register_field() and holds
field-&gt;maxusage entries, so an offset past it reads off the end of the
kvzalloc()ed allocation and into a neighbouring object.  Had the guard
run first, offset &lt; report_count &lt;= maxusage would already have confined
the pointer to the array.

A caller supplies such an offset today.  picolcd_fb_send_tile()
validates only report-&gt;maxfield before issuing
hid_set_field(report-&gt;field[0], 11 + i, ...) for i = 0..31, so its
offsets are fixed at 11..42 and are never checked against the bound
field.  When the device registers that field with fewer usages, the
framebuffer deferred-io work drives the read on every tile.  KASAN
reports a 4-byte slab-out-of-bounds read in hid_dump_input() below
hid_set_field(), and the same boot logs "offset (1) exceeds
report_count (1)" from the guard that runs only afterwards.

Move the hid_dump_input() call below the guard.  Because
field-&gt;maxusage &gt;= field-&gt;report_count, the guard then establishes that
field-&gt;usage + offset lies inside the array before it is dereferenced,
for every caller and without changing behaviour on the valid path.

Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee &lt;baul.lee@xbow.com&gt;

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Federico Kirschbaum &lt;federico.kirschbaum@xbow.com&gt;
Reported-by: Baul Lee &lt;baul.lee@xbow.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Baul Lee &lt;baul.lee@xbow.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
