linux-stable.git/drivers, branch v3.16.64 Linux kernel stable tree HID: debug: fix the ring buffer implementation 2019-03-25T17:32:34+00:00 Vladis Dronov vdronov@redhat.com 2019-01-29T10:58:35+00:00 7c7839e0f66ae0119b2e4d3d9465adbaba1df4b4 commit 13054abbaa4f1fd4e6f3b4b63439ec033b4c8035 upstream. Ring buffer implementation in hid_debug_event() and hid_debug_events_read() is strange allowing lost or corrupted data. After commit 717adfdaf147 ("HID: debug: check length before copy_to_user()") it is possible to enter an infinite loop in hid_debug_events_read() by providing 0 as count, this locks up a system. Fix this by rewriting the ring buffer implementation with kfifo and simplify the code. This fixes CVE-2019-3819. v2: fix an execution logic and add a comment v3: use __set_current_state() instead of set_current_state() Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1669187 Fixes: cd667ce24796 ("HID: use debugfs for events/reports dumping") Fixes: 717adfdaf147 ("HID: debug: check length before copy_to_user()") Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit 13054abbaa4f1fd4e6f3b4b63439ec033b4c8035 upstream.

Ring buffer implementation in hid_debug_event() and hid_debug_events_read()
is strange allowing lost or corrupted data. After commit 717adfdaf147
("HID: debug: check length before copy_to_user()") it is possible to enter
an infinite loop in hid_debug_events_read() by providing 0 as count, this
locks up a system. Fix this by rewriting the ring buffer implementation
with kfifo and simplify the code.

This fixes CVE-2019-3819.

v2: fix an execution logic and add a comment
v3: use __set_current_state() instead of set_current_state()

Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1669187
Fixes: cd667ce24796 ("HID: use debugfs for events/reports dumping")
Fixes: 717adfdaf147 ("HID: debug: check length before copy_to_user()")
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
HID: debug: improve hid_debug_event() 2019-03-25T17:32:34+00:00 Rasmus Villemoes linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk 2015-11-24T12:33:47+00:00 9e23e2c5535a8e7c77ab3a01f92fa4ab5f15e91e commit 92529623d242cea4440958d7bcebdf291f4ab15e upstream. The code in hid_debug_event() causes horrible code generation. First, we do a strlen() call for every byte we copy (we're doing a store to global memory, so gcc has no way of proving that strlen(buf) doesn't change). Second, since both i, list->tail and HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE have signed type, the modulo computation has to take into account the possibility that list->tail+i is negative, so it's not just a simple and. Fix the former by simply not doing strlen() at all (we have to load buf[i] anyway, so testing it is almost free) and the latter by changing i to unsigned. This cuts 29% (69 bytes) of the size of the function. Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit 92529623d242cea4440958d7bcebdf291f4ab15e upstream.

The code in hid_debug_event() causes horrible code generation. First,
we do a strlen() call for every byte we copy (we're doing a store to
global memory, so gcc has no way of proving that strlen(buf) doesn't
change). Second, since both i, list->tail and HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE have
signed type, the modulo computation has to take into account the
possibility that list->tail+i is negative, so it's not just a simple
and.

Fix the former by simply not doing strlen() at all (we have to load
buf[i] anyway, so testing it is almost free) and the latter by
changing i to unsigned. This cuts 29% (69 bytes) of the size of the
function.

Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
HID: debug: fix error handling in hid_debug_events_read() 2019-03-25T17:32:33+00:00 Jiri Kosina jkosina@suse.cz 2015-04-09T11:32:35+00:00 f9d19815c8092240f168275e29bd16ad321eeee8 commit 8fec02a73e31407e14986fca67dab48d4f777f0e upstream. In the unlikely case of hdev vanishing while hid_debug_events_read() was sleeping, we can't really break out of the case switch as with other cases, as on the way out we'll try to remove ourselves from the hdev waitqueue. Fix this by taking a shortcut exit path and avoiding cleanup that doesn't make sense in case hdev doesn't exist any more anyway. Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit 8fec02a73e31407e14986fca67dab48d4f777f0e upstream.

In the unlikely case of hdev vanishing while hid_debug_events_read() was
sleeping, we can't really break out of the case switch as with other cases,
as on the way out we'll try to remove ourselves from the hdev waitqueue.

Fix this by taking a shortcut exit path and avoiding cleanup that doesn't
make sense in case hdev doesn't exist any more anyway.

Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
net/appletalk: fix minor pointer leak to userspace in SIOCFINDIPDDPRT 2019-03-25T17:32:33+00:00 Willy Tarreau w@1wt.eu 2018-09-12T05:36:35+00:00 0c4d7b52773b227211d311858f3c3b56f7c44874 commit 9824dfae5741275473a23a7ed5756c7b6efacc9d upstream. Fields ->dev and ->next of struct ipddp_route may be copied to userspace on the SIOCFINDIPDDPRT ioctl. This is only accessible to CAP_NET_ADMIN though. Let's manually copy the relevant fields instead of using memcpy(). BugLink: http://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2018/09/linux-kernel-infoleaks.html Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit 9824dfae5741275473a23a7ed5756c7b6efacc9d upstream.

Fields ->dev and ->next of struct ipddp_route may be copied to
userspace on the SIOCFINDIPDDPRT ioctl. This is only accessible
to CAP_NET_ADMIN though. Let's manually copy the relevant fields
instead of using memcpy().

BugLink: http://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2018/09/linux-kernel-infoleaks.html
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
USB: hso: Fix OOB memory access in hso_probe/hso_get_config_data 2019-03-25T17:32:32+00:00 Hui Peng benquike@gmail.com 2018-12-12T11:42:24+00:00 2d955f32f4ab31294447a01cf401cec2cef9013e commit 5146f95df782b0ac61abde36567e718692725c89 upstream. The function hso_probe reads if_num from the USB device (as an u8) and uses it without a length check to index an array, resulting in an OOB memory read in hso_probe or hso_get_config_data. Add a length check for both locations and updated hso_probe to bail on error. This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-19985. Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com> Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net> Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit 5146f95df782b0ac61abde36567e718692725c89 upstream.

The function hso_probe reads if_num from the USB device (as an u8) and uses
it without a length check to index an array, resulting in an OOB memory read
in hso_probe or hso_get_config_data.

Add a length check for both locations and updated hso_probe to bail on
error.

This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-19985.

Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
mm: cma: fix incorrect type conversion for size during dma allocation 2019-03-25T17:32:32+00:00 Rohit Vaswani rvaswani@codeaurora.org 2015-10-22T20:32:11+00:00 cc12c0099168b416f6c3eff1cd560a771f4b7c3f commit 67a2e213e7e937c41c52ab5bc46bf3f4de469f6e upstream. This was found during userspace fuzzing test when a large size dma cma allocation is made by driver(like ion) through userspace. show_stack+0x10/0x1c dump_stack+0x74/0xc8 kasan_report_error+0x2b0/0x408 kasan_report+0x34/0x40 __asan_storeN+0x15c/0x168 memset+0x20/0x44 __dma_alloc_coherent+0x114/0x18c Signed-off-by: Rohit Vaswani <rvaswani@codeaurora.org> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: cma_alloc() does not exist so only dma_alloc_from_contiguous() needs to be changed] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit 67a2e213e7e937c41c52ab5bc46bf3f4de469f6e upstream.

This was found during userspace fuzzing test when a large size dma cma
allocation is made by driver(like ion) through userspace.

  show_stack+0x10/0x1c
  dump_stack+0x74/0xc8
  kasan_report_error+0x2b0/0x408
  kasan_report+0x34/0x40
  __asan_storeN+0x15c/0x168
  memset+0x20/0x44
  __dma_alloc_coherent+0x114/0x18c

Signed-off-by: Rohit Vaswani <rvaswani@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: cma_alloc() does not exist so only
 dma_alloc_from_contiguous() needs to be changed]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
gpio: max7301: fix driver for use with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK 2019-02-11T17:54:30+00:00 Christophe Leroy christophe.leroy@c-s.fr 2018-12-07T13:07:55+00:00 106fc089cca4b77756c58d23078e32b92005659d commit abf221d2f51b8ce7b9959a8953f880a8b0a1400d upstream. spi_read() and spi_write() require DMA-safe memory. When CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is selected, those functions cannot be used with buffers on stack. This patch replaces calls to spi_read() and spi_write() by spi_write_then_read() which doesn't require DMA-safe buffers. Fixes: 0c36ec314735 ("gpio: gpio driver for max7301 SPI GPIO expander") Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit abf221d2f51b8ce7b9959a8953f880a8b0a1400d upstream.

spi_read() and spi_write() require DMA-safe memory. When
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is selected, those functions cannot be used
with buffers on stack.

This patch replaces calls to spi_read() and spi_write() by
spi_write_then_read() which doesn't require DMA-safe buffers.

Fixes: 0c36ec314735 ("gpio: gpio driver for max7301 SPI GPIO expander")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
drm/ioctl: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerabilities 2019-02-11T17:54:30+00:00 Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavo@embeddedor.com 2018-12-20T00:00:15+00:00 abc60edcfc87771ff244763d4d19c67766f5dd0f commit 505b5240329b922f21f91d5b5d1e535c805eca6d upstream. nr is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:805 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->driver->ioctls' [r] drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:810 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap) drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:892 drm_ioctl_flags() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing nr before using it to index dev->driver->ioctls and drm_ioctls. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20181220000015.GA18973@embeddedor [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit 505b5240329b922f21f91d5b5d1e535c805eca6d upstream.

nr is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a
potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:805 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->driver->ioctls' [r]
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:810 drm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioctl.c:892 drm_ioctl_flags() warn: potential spectre issue 'drm_ioctls' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing nr before using it to index dev->driver->ioctls
and drm_ioctls.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20181220000015.GA18973@embeddedor
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
drm: Rewrite drm_ioctl_flags() to resemble the new drm_ioctl() code 2019-02-11T17:54:30+00:00 Ville Syrjälä ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com 2015-03-27T13:52:00+00:00 170bf24fcee972ac0aed7cc526fd8700485403d5 commit 7ef5f82b100716b23de7d2da6ff602b0842e5804 upstream. Use the same logic when checking for valid ioctl range in drm_ioctl_flags() that is used in drm_ioctl() to avoid confusion. Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit 7ef5f82b100716b23de7d2da6ff602b0842e5804 upstream.

Use the same logic when checking for valid ioctl range in
drm_ioctl_flags() that is used in drm_ioctl() to avoid
confusion.

Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
vxge: ensure data0 is initialized in when fetching firmware version information 2019-02-11T17:54:30+00:00 Colin Ian King colin.king@canonical.com 2018-12-18T15:19:47+00:00 88d736da9d048419370acff19eef9db2ba1d4c87 commit f7db2beb4c2c6cc8111f5ab90fc7363ca91107b6 upstream. Currently variable data0 is not being initialized so a garbage value is being passed to vxge_hw_vpath_fw_api and this value is being written to the rts_access_steer_data0 register. There are other occurrances where data0 is being initialized to zero (e.g. in function vxge_hw_upgrade_read_version) so I think it makes sense to ensure data0 is initialized likewise to 0. Detected by CoverityScan, CID#140696 ("Uninitialized scalar variable") Fixes: 8424e00dfd52 ("vxge: serialize access to steering control register") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> 
commit f7db2beb4c2c6cc8111f5ab90fc7363ca91107b6 upstream.

Currently variable data0 is not being initialized so a garbage value is
being passed to vxge_hw_vpath_fw_api and this value is being written to
the rts_access_steer_data0 register.  There are other occurrances where
data0 is being initialized to zero (e.g. in function
vxge_hw_upgrade_read_version) so I think it makes sense to ensure data0
is initialized likewise to 0.

Detected by CoverityScan, CID#140696 ("Uninitialized scalar variable")

Fixes: 8424e00dfd52 ("vxge: serialize access to steering control register")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>