<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/xen, branch v4.4.296</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>xen: detect uninitialized xenbus in xenbus_init</title>
<updated>2021-12-08T07:44:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefano Stabellini</name>
<email>stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-23T21:07:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6b7de637b1efd5d7b0a74951be85c0b6320ae2fe'/>
<id>6b7de637b1efd5d7b0a74951be85c0b6320ae2fe</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 36e8f60f0867d3b70d398d653c17108459a04efe upstream.

If the xenstore page hasn't been allocated properly, reading the value
of the related hvm_param (HVM_PARAM_STORE_PFN) won't actually return
error. Instead, it will succeed and return zero. Instead of attempting
to xen_remap a bad guest physical address, detect this condition and
return early.

Note that although a guest physical address of zero for
HVM_PARAM_STORE_PFN is theoretically possible, it is not a good choice
and zero has never been validly used in that capacity.

Also recognize all bits set as an invalid value.

For 32-bit Linux, any pfn above ULONG_MAX would get truncated. Pfns
above ULONG_MAX should never be passed by the Xen tools to HVM guests
anyway, so check for this condition and return early.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211123210748.1910236-1-sstabellini@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 36e8f60f0867d3b70d398d653c17108459a04efe upstream.

If the xenstore page hasn't been allocated properly, reading the value
of the related hvm_param (HVM_PARAM_STORE_PFN) won't actually return
error. Instead, it will succeed and return zero. Instead of attempting
to xen_remap a bad guest physical address, detect this condition and
return early.

Note that although a guest physical address of zero for
HVM_PARAM_STORE_PFN is theoretically possible, it is not a good choice
and zero has never been validly used in that capacity.

Also recognize all bits set as an invalid value.

For 32-bit Linux, any pfn above ULONG_MAX would get truncated. Pfns
above ULONG_MAX should never be passed by the Xen tools to HVM guests
anyway, so check for this condition and return early.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211123210748.1910236-1-sstabellini@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: don't continue xenstore initialization in case of errors</title>
<updated>2021-12-08T07:44:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefano Stabellini</name>
<email>stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-15T22:27:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=93befd849d83e506891b8fad58b63df9d67b3eac'/>
<id>93befd849d83e506891b8fad58b63df9d67b3eac</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 08f6c2b09ebd4b326dbe96d13f94fee8f9814c78 upstream.

In case of errors in xenbus_init (e.g. missing xen_store_gfn parameter),
we goto out_error but we forget to reset xen_store_domain_type to
XS_UNKNOWN. As a consequence xenbus_probe_initcall and other initcalls
will still try to initialize xenstore resulting into a crash at boot.

[    2.479830] Call trace:
[    2.482314]  xb_init_comms+0x18/0x150
[    2.486354]  xs_init+0x34/0x138
[    2.489786]  xenbus_probe+0x4c/0x70
[    2.498432]  xenbus_probe_initcall+0x2c/0x7c
[    2.503944]  do_one_initcall+0x54/0x1b8
[    2.507358]  kernel_init_freeable+0x1ac/0x210
[    2.511617]  kernel_init+0x28/0x130
[    2.516112]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Cc: &lt;Stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: jbeulich@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211115222719.2558207-1-sstabellini@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 08f6c2b09ebd4b326dbe96d13f94fee8f9814c78 upstream.

In case of errors in xenbus_init (e.g. missing xen_store_gfn parameter),
we goto out_error but we forget to reset xen_store_domain_type to
XS_UNKNOWN. As a consequence xenbus_probe_initcall and other initcalls
will still try to initialize xenstore resulting into a crash at boot.

[    2.479830] Call trace:
[    2.482314]  xb_init_comms+0x18/0x150
[    2.486354]  xs_init+0x34/0x138
[    2.489786]  xenbus_probe+0x4c/0x70
[    2.498432]  xenbus_probe_initcall+0x2c/0x7c
[    2.503944]  do_one_initcall+0x54/0x1b8
[    2.507358]  kernel_init_freeable+0x1ac/0x210
[    2.511617]  kernel_init+0x28/0x130
[    2.516112]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Cc: &lt;Stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: jbeulich@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211115222719.2558207-1-sstabellini@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen-pciback: Fix return in pm_ctrl_init()</title>
<updated>2021-11-26T10:58:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>YueHaibing</name>
<email>yuehaibing@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-08T07:44:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b27356689344fa2706c71405be49dba0685bdffd'/>
<id>b27356689344fa2706c71405be49dba0685bdffd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4745ea2628bb43a7ec34b71763b5a56407b33990 ]

Return NULL instead of passing to ERR_PTR while err is zero,
this fix smatch warnings:
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c:163
 pm_ctrl_init() warn: passing zero to 'ERR_PTR'

Fixes: a92336a1176b ("xen/pciback: Drop two backends, squash and cleanup some code.")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing &lt;yuehaibing@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211008074417.8260-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4745ea2628bb43a7ec34b71763b5a56407b33990 ]

Return NULL instead of passing to ERR_PTR while err is zero,
this fix smatch warnings:
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c:163
 pm_ctrl_init() warn: passing zero to 'ERR_PTR'

Fixes: a92336a1176b ("xen/pciback: Drop two backends, squash and cleanup some code.")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing &lt;yuehaibing@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211008074417.8260-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: Fix race in set_evtchn_to_irq</title>
<updated>2021-08-26T12:37:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maximilian Heyne</name>
<email>mheyne@amazon.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-12T13:09:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a5d8667ebac2f866e98b948cfb9c115462fc90d6'/>
<id>a5d8667ebac2f866e98b948cfb9c115462fc90d6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 88ca2521bd5b4e8b83743c01a2d4cb09325b51e9 ]

There is a TOCTOU issue in set_evtchn_to_irq. Rows in the evtchn_to_irq
mapping are lazily allocated in this function. The check whether the row
is already present and the row initialization is not synchronized. Two
threads can at the same time allocate a new row for evtchn_to_irq and
add the irq mapping to the their newly allocated row. One thread will
overwrite what the other has set for evtchn_to_irq[row] and therefore
the irq mapping is lost. This will trigger a BUG_ON later in
bind_evtchn_to_cpu:

  INFO: pci 0000:1a:15.4: [1d0f:8061] type 00 class 0x010802
  INFO: nvme 0000:1a:12.1: enabling device (0000 -&gt; 0002)
  INFO: nvme nvme77: 1/0/0 default/read/poll queues
  CRIT: kernel BUG at drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:427!
  WARN: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  WARN: Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work [nvme]
  WARN: RIP: e030:bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xc2/0xd0
  WARN: Call Trace:
  WARN:  set_affinity_irq+0x121/0x150
  WARN:  irq_do_set_affinity+0x37/0xe0
  WARN:  irq_setup_affinity+0xf6/0x170
  WARN:  irq_startup+0x64/0xe0
  WARN:  __setup_irq+0x69e/0x740
  WARN:  ? request_threaded_irq+0xad/0x160
  WARN:  request_threaded_irq+0xf5/0x160
  WARN:  ? nvme_timeout+0x2f0/0x2f0 [nvme]
  WARN:  pci_request_irq+0xa9/0xf0
  WARN:  ? pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xbb/0x130
  WARN:  queue_request_irq+0x4c/0x70 [nvme]
  WARN:  nvme_reset_work+0x82d/0x1550 [nvme]
  WARN:  ? check_preempt_wakeup+0x14f/0x230
  WARN:  ? check_preempt_curr+0x29/0x80
  WARN:  ? nvme_irq_check+0x30/0x30 [nvme]
  WARN:  process_one_work+0x18e/0x3c0
  WARN:  worker_thread+0x30/0x3a0
  WARN:  ? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0
  WARN:  kthread+0x113/0x130
  WARN:  ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
  WARN:  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

This patch sets evtchn_to_irq rows via a cmpxchg operation so that they
will be set only once. The row is now cleared before writing it to
evtchn_to_irq in order to not create a race once the row is visible for
other threads.

While at it, do not require the page to be zeroed, because it will be
overwritten with -1's in clear_evtchn_to_irq_row anyway.

Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne &lt;mheyne@amazon.de&gt;
Fixes: d0b075ffeede ("xen/events: Refactor evtchn_to_irq array to be dynamically allocated")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210812130930.127134-1-mheyne@amazon.de
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 88ca2521bd5b4e8b83743c01a2d4cb09325b51e9 ]

There is a TOCTOU issue in set_evtchn_to_irq. Rows in the evtchn_to_irq
mapping are lazily allocated in this function. The check whether the row
is already present and the row initialization is not synchronized. Two
threads can at the same time allocate a new row for evtchn_to_irq and
add the irq mapping to the their newly allocated row. One thread will
overwrite what the other has set for evtchn_to_irq[row] and therefore
the irq mapping is lost. This will trigger a BUG_ON later in
bind_evtchn_to_cpu:

  INFO: pci 0000:1a:15.4: [1d0f:8061] type 00 class 0x010802
  INFO: nvme 0000:1a:12.1: enabling device (0000 -&gt; 0002)
  INFO: nvme nvme77: 1/0/0 default/read/poll queues
  CRIT: kernel BUG at drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:427!
  WARN: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  WARN: Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work [nvme]
  WARN: RIP: e030:bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xc2/0xd0
  WARN: Call Trace:
  WARN:  set_affinity_irq+0x121/0x150
  WARN:  irq_do_set_affinity+0x37/0xe0
  WARN:  irq_setup_affinity+0xf6/0x170
  WARN:  irq_startup+0x64/0xe0
  WARN:  __setup_irq+0x69e/0x740
  WARN:  ? request_threaded_irq+0xad/0x160
  WARN:  request_threaded_irq+0xf5/0x160
  WARN:  ? nvme_timeout+0x2f0/0x2f0 [nvme]
  WARN:  pci_request_irq+0xa9/0xf0
  WARN:  ? pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xbb/0x130
  WARN:  queue_request_irq+0x4c/0x70 [nvme]
  WARN:  nvme_reset_work+0x82d/0x1550 [nvme]
  WARN:  ? check_preempt_wakeup+0x14f/0x230
  WARN:  ? check_preempt_curr+0x29/0x80
  WARN:  ? nvme_irq_check+0x30/0x30 [nvme]
  WARN:  process_one_work+0x18e/0x3c0
  WARN:  worker_thread+0x30/0x3a0
  WARN:  ? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0
  WARN:  kthread+0x113/0x130
  WARN:  ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
  WARN:  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

This patch sets evtchn_to_irq rows via a cmpxchg operation so that they
will be set only once. The row is now cleared before writing it to
evtchn_to_irq in order to not create a race once the row is visible for
other threads.

While at it, do not require the page to be zeroed, because it will be
overwritten with -1's in clear_evtchn_to_irq_row anyway.

Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne &lt;mheyne@amazon.de&gt;
Fixes: d0b075ffeede ("xen/events: Refactor evtchn_to_irq array to be dynamically allocated")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210812130930.127134-1-mheyne@amazon.de
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: reset active flag for lateeoi events later</title>
<updated>2021-07-11T10:45:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-23T13:09:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=478791754649395287a5a8e3048784f4b2cc79a6'/>
<id>478791754649395287a5a8e3048784f4b2cc79a6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3de218ff39b9e3f0d453fe3154f12a174de44b25 upstream.

In order to avoid a race condition for user events when changing
cpu affinity reset the active flag only when EOI-ing the event.

This is working fine as all user events are lateeoi events. Note that
lateeoi_ack_mask_dynirq() is not modified as there is no explicit call
to xen_irq_lateeoi() expected later.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien@xen.org&gt;
Fixes: b6622798bc50b62 ("xen/events: avoid handling the same event on two cpus at the same time")
Tested-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrvsky@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210623130913.9405-1-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3de218ff39b9e3f0d453fe3154f12a174de44b25 upstream.

In order to avoid a race condition for user events when changing
cpu affinity reset the active flag only when EOI-ing the event.

This is working fine as all user events are lateeoi events. Note that
lateeoi_ack_mask_dynirq() is not modified as there is no explicit call
to xen_irq_lateeoi() expected later.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien@xen.org&gt;
Fixes: b6622798bc50b62 ("xen/events: avoid handling the same event on two cpus at the same time")
Tested-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrvsky@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210623130913.9405-1-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen-pciback: redo VF placement in the virtual topology</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:41:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Beulich</name>
<email>jbeulich@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-18T16:13:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bbd9b5f5c852e7881e3f511160ae8b6a36d07188'/>
<id>bbd9b5f5c852e7881e3f511160ae8b6a36d07188</id>
<content type='text'>
The commit referenced below was incomplete: It merely affected what
would get written to the vdev-&lt;N&gt; xenstore node. The guest would still
find the function at the original function number as long as
__xen_pcibk_get_pci_dev() wouldn't be in sync. The same goes for AER wrt
__xen_pcibk_get_pcifront_dev().

Undo overriding the function to zero and instead make sure that VFs at
function zero remain alone in their slot. This has the added benefit of
improving overall capacity, considering that there's only a total of 32
slots available right now (PCI segment and bus can both only ever be
zero at present).

This is upstream commit 4ba50e7c423c29639878c00573288869aa627068.

Fixes: 8a5248fe10b1 ("xen PV passthru: assign SR-IOV virtual functions to 
separate virtual slots")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8def783b-404c-3452-196d-3f3fd4d72c9e@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The commit referenced below was incomplete: It merely affected what
would get written to the vdev-&lt;N&gt; xenstore node. The guest would still
find the function at the original function number as long as
__xen_pcibk_get_pci_dev() wouldn't be in sync. The same goes for AER wrt
__xen_pcibk_get_pcifront_dev().

Undo overriding the function to zero and instead make sure that VFs at
function zero remain alone in their slot. This has the added benefit of
improving overall capacity, considering that there's only a total of 32
slots available right now (PCI segment and bus can both only ever be
zero at present).

This is upstream commit 4ba50e7c423c29639878c00573288869aa627068.

Fixes: 8a5248fe10b1 ("xen PV passthru: assign SR-IOV virtual functions to 
separate virtual slots")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8def783b-404c-3452-196d-3f3fd4d72c9e@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen-pciback: reconfigure also from backend watch handler</title>
<updated>2021-05-26T09:27:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Beulich</name>
<email>jbeulich@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-18T16:14:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3e01c5c20452a385e70888cfb465e0359ffa54ad'/>
<id>3e01c5c20452a385e70888cfb465e0359ffa54ad</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c81d3d24602540f65256f98831d0a25599ea6b87 upstream.

When multiple PCI devices get assigned to a guest right at boot, libxl
incrementally populates the backend tree. The writes for the first of
the devices trigger the backend watch. In turn xen_pcibk_setup_backend()
will set the XenBus state to Initialised, at which point no further
reconfigures would happen unless a device got hotplugged. Arrange for
reconfigure to also get triggered from the backend watch handler.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2337cbd6-94b9-4187-9862-c03ea12e0c61@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c81d3d24602540f65256f98831d0a25599ea6b87 upstream.

When multiple PCI devices get assigned to a guest right at boot, libxl
incrementally populates the backend tree. The writes for the first of
the devices trigger the backend watch. In turn xen_pcibk_setup_backend()
will set the XenBus state to Initialised, at which point no further
reconfigures would happen unless a device got hotplugged. Arrange for
reconfigure to also get triggered from the backend watch handler.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2337cbd6-94b9-4187-9862-c03ea12e0c61@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: fix setting irq affinity</title>
<updated>2021-04-16T10:00:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-12T06:28:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b6bf35aaf5d297eabccaabe77b41cd42691a9607'/>
<id>b6bf35aaf5d297eabccaabe77b41cd42691a9607</id>
<content type='text'>
The backport of upstream patch 25da4618af240fbec61 ("xen/events: don't
unmask an event channel when an eoi is pending") introduced a
regression for stable kernels 5.10 and older: setting IRQ affinity for
IRQs related to interdomain events would no longer work, as moving the
IRQ to its new cpu was not included in the irq_ack callback for those
events.

Fix that by adding the needed call.

Note that kernels 5.11 and later don't need the explicit moving of the
IRQ to the target cpu in the irq_ack callback, due to a rework of the
affinity setting in kernel 5.11.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The backport of upstream patch 25da4618af240fbec61 ("xen/events: don't
unmask an event channel when an eoi is pending") introduced a
regression for stable kernels 5.10 and older: setting IRQ affinity for
IRQs related to interdomain events would no longer work, as moving the
IRQ to its new cpu was not included in the irq_ack callback for those
events.

Fix that by adding the needed call.

Note that kernels 5.11 and later don't need the explicit moving of the
IRQ to the target cpu in the irq_ack callback, due to a rework of the
affinity setting in kernel 5.11.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/evtchn: Change irq_info lock to raw_spinlock_t</title>
<updated>2021-04-16T10:00:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luca Fancellu</name>
<email>luca.fancellu@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-06T10:51:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=77de34b9f5029d68a47c00d9b462e425c546d679'/>
<id>77de34b9f5029d68a47c00d9b462e425c546d679</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d120198bd5ff1d41808b6914e1eb89aff937415c upstream.

Unmask operation must be called with interrupt disabled,
on preempt_rt spin_lock_irqsave/spin_unlock_irqrestore
don't disable/enable interrupts, so use raw_* implementation
and change lock variable in struct irq_info from spinlock_t
to raw_spinlock_t

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 25da4618af24 ("xen/events: don't unmask an event channel when an eoi is pending")
Signed-off-by: Luca Fancellu &lt;luca.fancellu@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall &lt;jgrall@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210406105105.10141-1-luca.fancellu@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d120198bd5ff1d41808b6914e1eb89aff937415c upstream.

Unmask operation must be called with interrupt disabled,
on preempt_rt spin_lock_irqsave/spin_unlock_irqrestore
don't disable/enable interrupts, so use raw_* implementation
and change lock variable in struct irq_info from spinlock_t
to raw_spinlock_t

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 25da4618af24 ("xen/events: don't unmask an event channel when an eoi is pending")
Signed-off-by: Luca Fancellu &lt;luca.fancellu@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall &lt;jgrall@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210406105105.10141-1-luca.fancellu@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: avoid handling the same event on two cpus at the same time</title>
<updated>2021-03-17T15:07:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-15T09:06:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3bc0f698829167d2281957322a73e76aee2b83e9'/>
<id>3bc0f698829167d2281957322a73e76aee2b83e9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b6622798bc50b625a1e62f82c7190df40c1f5b21 upstream.

When changing the cpu affinity of an event it can happen today that
(with some unlucky timing) the same event will be handled on the old
and the new cpu at the same time.

Avoid that by adding an "event active" flag to the per-event data and
call the handler only if this flag isn't set.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall &lt;jgrall@amazon.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210306161833.4552-4-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b6622798bc50b625a1e62f82c7190df40c1f5b21 upstream.

When changing the cpu affinity of an event it can happen today that
(with some unlucky timing) the same event will be handled on the old
and the new cpu at the same time.

Avoid that by adding an "event active" flag to the per-event data and
call the handler only if this flag isn't set.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall &lt;jgrall@amazon.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210306161833.4552-4-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
