<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/xen, branch v4.4.185</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>fs: stream_open - opener for stream-like files so that read and write can run simultaneously without deadlock</title>
<updated>2019-06-11T10:24:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill Smelkov</name>
<email>kirr@nexedi.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-26T22:20:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3bf0c459615ab0db33638cc64613bf682ffe9436'/>
<id>3bf0c459615ab0db33638cc64613bf682ffe9436</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 10dce8af34226d90fa56746a934f8da5dcdba3df upstream.

Commit 9c225f2655e3 ("vfs: atomic f_pos accesses as per POSIX") added
locking for file.f_pos access and in particular made concurrent read and
write not possible - now both those functions take f_pos lock for the
whole run, and so if e.g. a read is blocked waiting for data, write will
deadlock waiting for that read to complete.

This caused regression for stream-like files where previously read and
write could run simultaneously, but after that patch could not do so
anymore. See e.g. commit 581d21a2d02a ("xenbus: fix deadlock on writes
to /proc/xen/xenbus") which fixes such regression for particular case of
/proc/xen/xenbus.

The patch that added f_pos lock in 2014 did so to guarantee POSIX thread
safety for read/write/lseek and added the locking to file descriptors of
all regular files. In 2014 that thread-safety problem was not new as it
was already discussed earlier in 2006.

However even though 2006'th version of Linus's patch was adding f_pos
locking "only for files that are marked seekable with FMODE_LSEEK (thus
avoiding the stream-like objects like pipes and sockets)", the 2014
version - the one that actually made it into the tree as 9c225f2655e3 -
is doing so irregardless of whether a file is seekable or not.

See

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/53022DB1.4070805@gmail.com/
    https://lwn.net/Articles/180387
    https://lwn.net/Articles/180396

for historic context.

The reason that it did so is, probably, that there are many files that
are marked non-seekable, but e.g. their read implementation actually
depends on knowing current position to correctly handle the read. Some
examples:

	kernel/power/user.c		snapshot_read
	fs/debugfs/file.c		u32_array_read
	fs/fuse/control.c		fuse_conn_waiting_read + ...
	drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c	atk_debugfs_ggrp_read
	arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c		hypfs_read_iter
	...

Despite that, many nonseekable_open users implement read and write with
pure stream semantics - they don't depend on passed ppos at all. And for
those cases where read could wait for something inside, it creates a
situation similar to xenbus - the write could be never made to go until
read is done, and read is waiting for some, potentially external, event,
for potentially unbounded time -&gt; deadlock.

Besides xenbus, there are 14 such places in the kernel that I've found
with semantic patch (see below):

	drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:400:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:985:7-23: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()

In addition to the cases above another regression caused by f_pos
locking is that now FUSE filesystems that implement open with
FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, can no longer implement bidirectional
stream-like files - for the same reason as above e.g. read can deadlock
write locking on file.f_pos in the kernel.

FUSE's FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE was added in 2008 in a7c1b990f715 ("fuse:
implement nonseekable open") to support OSSPD. OSSPD implements /dev/dsp
in userspace with FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, with corresponding read and
write routines not depending on current position at all, and with both
read and write being potentially blocking operations:

See

    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd
    https://lwn.net/Articles/308445

    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1406
    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1438-L1477
    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1479-L1510

Corresponding libfuse example/test also describes FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE as
"somewhat pipe-like files ..." with read handler not using offset.
However that test implements only read without write and cannot exercise
the deadlock scenario:

    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L124-L131
    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L146-L163
    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L209-L216

I've actually hit the read vs write deadlock for real while implementing
my FUSE filesystem where there is /head/watch file, for which open
creates separate bidirectional socket-like stream in between filesystem
and its user with both read and write being later performed
simultaneously. And there it is semantically not easy to split the
stream into two separate read-only and write-only channels:

    https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/wendelin.core/blob/f13aa600/wcfs/wcfs.go#L88-169

Let's fix this regression. The plan is:

1. We can't change nonseekable_open to include &amp;~FMODE_ATOMIC_POS -
   doing so would break many in-kernel nonseekable_open users which
   actually use ppos in read/write handlers.

2. Add stream_open() to kernel to open stream-like non-seekable file
   descriptors. Read and write on such file descriptors would never use
   nor change ppos. And with that property on stream-like files read and
   write will be running without taking f_pos lock - i.e. read and write
   could be running simultaneously.

3. With semantic patch search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel
   nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not
   depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations
   which assume @offset access.

4. Add FOPEN_STREAM to fs/fuse/ and open in-kernel file-descriptors via
   steam_open if that bit is present in filesystem open reply.

   It was tempting to change fs/fuse/ open handler to use stream_open
   instead of nonseekable_open on just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flags, but
   grepping through Debian codesearch shows users of FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE,
   and in particular GVFS which actually uses offset in its read and
   write handlers

	https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=-%3Enonseekable+%3D
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1080
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1247-1346
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1399-1481

   so if we would do such a change it will break a real user.

5. Add stream_open and FOPEN_STREAM handling to stable kernels starting
   from v3.14+ (the kernel where 9c225f2655 first appeared).

   This will allow to patch OSSPD and other FUSE filesystems that
   provide stream-like files to return FOPEN_STREAM | FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE
   in their open handler and this way avoid the deadlock on all kernel
   versions. This should work because fs/fuse/ ignores unknown open
   flags returned from a filesystem and so passing FOPEN_STREAM to a
   kernel that is not aware of this flag cannot hurt. In turn the kernel
   that is not aware of FOPEN_STREAM will be &lt; v3.14 where just
   FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE is sufficient to implement streams without read vs
   write deadlock.

This patch adds stream_open, converts /proc/xen/xenbus to it and adds
semantic patch to automatically locate in-kernel places that are either
required to be converted due to read vs write deadlock, or that are just
safe to be converted because read and write do not use ppos and there
are no other funky methods in file_operations.

Regarding semantic patch I've verified each generated change manually -
that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance
left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not
converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations.

The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert,
but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for
unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g.
drivers/input/mousedev.c)

Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Yongzhi Pan &lt;panyongzhi@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Julia Lawall &lt;Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr&gt;
Cc: Nikolaus Rath &lt;Nikolaus@rath.org&gt;
Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys &lt;hanwen@google.com&gt;
[ backport to 4.4: actually fixed deadlock on /proc/xen/xenbus as 581d21a2d02a was not backported to 4.4 ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov &lt;kirr@nexedi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 10dce8af34226d90fa56746a934f8da5dcdba3df upstream.

Commit 9c225f2655e3 ("vfs: atomic f_pos accesses as per POSIX") added
locking for file.f_pos access and in particular made concurrent read and
write not possible - now both those functions take f_pos lock for the
whole run, and so if e.g. a read is blocked waiting for data, write will
deadlock waiting for that read to complete.

This caused regression for stream-like files where previously read and
write could run simultaneously, but after that patch could not do so
anymore. See e.g. commit 581d21a2d02a ("xenbus: fix deadlock on writes
to /proc/xen/xenbus") which fixes such regression for particular case of
/proc/xen/xenbus.

The patch that added f_pos lock in 2014 did so to guarantee POSIX thread
safety for read/write/lseek and added the locking to file descriptors of
all regular files. In 2014 that thread-safety problem was not new as it
was already discussed earlier in 2006.

However even though 2006'th version of Linus's patch was adding f_pos
locking "only for files that are marked seekable with FMODE_LSEEK (thus
avoiding the stream-like objects like pipes and sockets)", the 2014
version - the one that actually made it into the tree as 9c225f2655e3 -
is doing so irregardless of whether a file is seekable or not.

See

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/53022DB1.4070805@gmail.com/
    https://lwn.net/Articles/180387
    https://lwn.net/Articles/180396

for historic context.

The reason that it did so is, probably, that there are many files that
are marked non-seekable, but e.g. their read implementation actually
depends on knowing current position to correctly handle the read. Some
examples:

	kernel/power/user.c		snapshot_read
	fs/debugfs/file.c		u32_array_read
	fs/fuse/control.c		fuse_conn_waiting_read + ...
	drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c	atk_debugfs_ggrp_read
	arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c		hypfs_read_iter
	...

Despite that, many nonseekable_open users implement read and write with
pure stream semantics - they don't depend on passed ppos at all. And for
those cases where read could wait for something inside, it creates a
situation similar to xenbus - the write could be never made to go until
read is done, and read is waiting for some, potentially external, event,
for potentially unbounded time -&gt; deadlock.

Besides xenbus, there are 14 such places in the kernel that I've found
with semantic patch (see below):

	drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:400:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:985:7-23: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
	drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()

In addition to the cases above another regression caused by f_pos
locking is that now FUSE filesystems that implement open with
FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, can no longer implement bidirectional
stream-like files - for the same reason as above e.g. read can deadlock
write locking on file.f_pos in the kernel.

FUSE's FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE was added in 2008 in a7c1b990f715 ("fuse:
implement nonseekable open") to support OSSPD. OSSPD implements /dev/dsp
in userspace with FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, with corresponding read and
write routines not depending on current position at all, and with both
read and write being potentially blocking operations:

See

    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd
    https://lwn.net/Articles/308445

    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1406
    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1438-L1477
    https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1479-L1510

Corresponding libfuse example/test also describes FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE as
"somewhat pipe-like files ..." with read handler not using offset.
However that test implements only read without write and cannot exercise
the deadlock scenario:

    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L124-L131
    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L146-L163
    https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L209-L216

I've actually hit the read vs write deadlock for real while implementing
my FUSE filesystem where there is /head/watch file, for which open
creates separate bidirectional socket-like stream in between filesystem
and its user with both read and write being later performed
simultaneously. And there it is semantically not easy to split the
stream into two separate read-only and write-only channels:

    https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/wendelin.core/blob/f13aa600/wcfs/wcfs.go#L88-169

Let's fix this regression. The plan is:

1. We can't change nonseekable_open to include &amp;~FMODE_ATOMIC_POS -
   doing so would break many in-kernel nonseekable_open users which
   actually use ppos in read/write handlers.

2. Add stream_open() to kernel to open stream-like non-seekable file
   descriptors. Read and write on such file descriptors would never use
   nor change ppos. And with that property on stream-like files read and
   write will be running without taking f_pos lock - i.e. read and write
   could be running simultaneously.

3. With semantic patch search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel
   nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not
   depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations
   which assume @offset access.

4. Add FOPEN_STREAM to fs/fuse/ and open in-kernel file-descriptors via
   steam_open if that bit is present in filesystem open reply.

   It was tempting to change fs/fuse/ open handler to use stream_open
   instead of nonseekable_open on just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flags, but
   grepping through Debian codesearch shows users of FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE,
   and in particular GVFS which actually uses offset in its read and
   write handlers

	https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=-%3Enonseekable+%3D
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1080
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1247-1346
	https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1399-1481

   so if we would do such a change it will break a real user.

5. Add stream_open and FOPEN_STREAM handling to stable kernels starting
   from v3.14+ (the kernel where 9c225f2655 first appeared).

   This will allow to patch OSSPD and other FUSE filesystems that
   provide stream-like files to return FOPEN_STREAM | FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE
   in their open handler and this way avoid the deadlock on all kernel
   versions. This should work because fs/fuse/ ignores unknown open
   flags returned from a filesystem and so passing FOPEN_STREAM to a
   kernel that is not aware of this flag cannot hurt. In turn the kernel
   that is not aware of FOPEN_STREAM will be &lt; v3.14 where just
   FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE is sufficient to implement streams without read vs
   write deadlock.

This patch adds stream_open, converts /proc/xen/xenbus to it and adds
semantic patch to automatically locate in-kernel places that are either
required to be converted due to read vs write deadlock, or that are just
safe to be converted because read and write do not use ppos and there
are no other funky methods in file_operations.

Regarding semantic patch I've verified each generated change manually -
that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance
left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not
converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations.

The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert,
but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for
unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g.
drivers/input/mousedev.c)

Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Yongzhi Pan &lt;panyongzhi@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Julia Lawall &lt;Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr&gt;
Cc: Nikolaus Rath &lt;Nikolaus@rath.org&gt;
Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys &lt;hanwen@google.com&gt;
[ backport to 4.4: actually fixed deadlock on /proc/xen/xenbus as 581d21a2d02a was not backported to 4.4 ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov &lt;kirr@nexedi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/pciback: Don't disable PCI_COMMAND on PCI device reset.</title>
<updated>2019-06-11T10:24:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-13T23:21:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f1613a9e1bdc3d6bb71b6390ed5d6c8d5f4d7f56'/>
<id>f1613a9e1bdc3d6bb71b6390ed5d6c8d5f4d7f56</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7681f31ec9cdacab4fd10570be924f2cef6669ba upstream.

There is no need for this at all. Worst it means that if
the guest tries to write to BARs it could lead (on certain
platforms) to PCI SERR errors.

Please note that with af6fc858a35b90e89ea7a7ee58e66628c55c776b
"xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register"
a guest is still allowed to enable those control bits (safely), but
is not allowed to disable them and that therefore a well behaved
frontend which enables things before using them will still
function correctly.

This is done via an write to the configuration register 0x4 which
triggers on the backend side:
command_write
  \- pci_enable_device
     \- pci_enable_device_flags
        \- do_pci_enable_device
           \- pcibios_enable_device
              \-pci_enable_resourcess
                [which enables the PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY|PCI_COMMAND_IO]

However guests (and drivers) which don't do this could cause
problems, including the security issues which XSA-120 sought
to address.

Reported-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7681f31ec9cdacab4fd10570be924f2cef6669ba upstream.

There is no need for this at all. Worst it means that if
the guest tries to write to BARs it could lead (on certain
platforms) to PCI SERR errors.

Please note that with af6fc858a35b90e89ea7a7ee58e66628c55c776b
"xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register"
a guest is still allowed to enable those control bits (safely), but
is not allowed to disable them and that therefore a well behaved
frontend which enables things before using them will still
function correctly.

This is done via an write to the configuration register 0x4 which
triggers on the backend side:
command_write
  \- pci_enable_device
     \- pci_enable_device_flags
        \- do_pci_enable_device
           \- pcibios_enable_device
              \-pci_enable_resourcess
                [which enables the PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY|PCI_COMMAND_IO]

However guests (and drivers) which don't do this could cause
problems, including the security issues which XSA-120 sought
to address.

Reported-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: xlate_mmu: add missing header to fix 'W=1' warning</title>
<updated>2018-12-17T20:55:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Srikanth Boddepalli</name>
<email>boddepalli.srikanth@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-27T14:23:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=26e081481506908e75a202ac91d15b484be7b27c'/>
<id>26e081481506908e75a202ac91d15b484be7b27c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 72791ac854fea36034fa7976b748fde585008e78 ]

Add a missing header otherwise compiler warns about missed prototype:

drivers/xen/xlate_mmu.c:183:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'xen_xlate_unmap_gfn_range?' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
  int xen_xlate_unmap_gfn_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Signed-off-by: Srikanth Boddepalli &lt;boddepalli.srikanth@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joey Pabalinas &lt;joeypabalinas@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 72791ac854fea36034fa7976b748fde585008e78 ]

Add a missing header otherwise compiler warns about missed prototype:

drivers/xen/xlate_mmu.c:183:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'xen_xlate_unmap_gfn_range?' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
  int xen_xlate_unmap_gfn_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Signed-off-by: Srikanth Boddepalli &lt;boddepalli.srikanth@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joey Pabalinas &lt;joeypabalinas@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen-swiotlb: use actually allocated size on check physical continuous</title>
<updated>2018-11-21T08:27:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Jin</name>
<email>joe.jin@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-16T22:21:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cf9e0f77f54a18775516de808195cb57439be98a'/>
<id>cf9e0f77f54a18775516de808195cb57439be98a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7250f422da0480d8512b756640f131b9b893ccda upstream.

xen_swiotlb_{alloc,free}_coherent() allocate/free memory based on the
order of the pages and not size argument (bytes). This is inconsistent with
range_straddles_page_boundary and memset which use the 'size' value,
which may lead to not exchanging memory with Xen (range_straddles_page_boundary()
returned true). And then the call to xen_swiotlb_free_coherent() would
actually try to exchange the memory with Xen, leading to the kernel
hitting an BUG (as the hypercall returned an error).

This patch fixes it by making the 'size' variable be of the same size
as the amount of memory allocated.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Joe Jin &lt;joe.jin@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Helwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Dongli Zhang &lt;dongli.zhang@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: John Sobecki &lt;john.sobecki@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7250f422da0480d8512b756640f131b9b893ccda upstream.

xen_swiotlb_{alloc,free}_coherent() allocate/free memory based on the
order of the pages and not size argument (bytes). This is inconsistent with
range_straddles_page_boundary and memset which use the 'size' value,
which may lead to not exchanging memory with Xen (range_straddles_page_boundary()
returned true). And then the call to xen_swiotlb_free_coherent() would
actually try to exchange the memory with Xen, leading to the kernel
hitting an BUG (as the hypercall returned an error).

This patch fixes it by making the 'size' variable be of the same size
as the amount of memory allocated.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Joe Jin &lt;joe.jin@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Helwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Dongli Zhang &lt;dongli.zhang@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: John Sobecki &lt;john.sobecki@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: fix GCC warning and remove duplicate EVTCHN_ROW/EVTCHN_COL usage</title>
<updated>2018-10-10T06:52:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Abraham</name>
<email>j.abraham1776@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-13T01:13:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=17a6446ac75dba5c9f7d9f2775d7a9956b9486f9'/>
<id>17a6446ac75dba5c9f7d9f2775d7a9956b9486f9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4dca864b59dd150a221730775e2f21f49779c135 ]

This patch removes duplicate macro useage in events_base.c.

It also fixes gcc warning:
variable ‘col’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]

Signed-off-by: Joshua Abraham &lt;j.abraham1776@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4dca864b59dd150a221730775e2f21f49779c135 ]

This patch removes duplicate macro useage in events_base.c.

It also fixes gcc warning:
variable ‘col’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]

Signed-off-by: Joshua Abraham &lt;j.abraham1776@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: avoid crash in disable_hotplug_cpu</title>
<updated>2018-10-10T06:52:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Olaf Hering</name>
<email>olaf@aepfle.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-07T14:31:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3ff6443780f19de31827528e9486a6d4b8441e1e'/>
<id>3ff6443780f19de31827528e9486a6d4b8441e1e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3366cdb6d350d95466ee430ac50f3c8415ca8f46 ]

The command 'xl vcpu-set 0 0', issued in dom0, will crash dom0:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000002d8
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 7 PID: 65 Comm: xenwatch Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2-1.ga9462db-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased)
Hardware name: Intel Corporation S5520UR/S5520UR, BIOS S5500.86B.01.00.0050.050620101605 05/06/2010
RIP: e030:device_offline+0x9/0xb0
Code: 77 24 00 e9 ce fe ff ff 48 8b 13 e9 68 ff ff ff 48 8b 13 e9 29 ff ff ff 48 8b 13 e9 ea fe ff ff 90 66 66 66 66 90 41 54 55 53 &lt;f6&gt; 87 d8 02 00 00 01 0f 85 88 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 20 09 60 81 31 f6
RSP: e02b:ffffc90040f27e80 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8801f3800000 RSI: ffffc90040f27e70 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff820e47b3 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000007ff0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff822e6d30
R13: dead000000000200 R14: dead000000000100 R15: ffffffff8158b4e0
FS:  00007ffa595158c0(0000) GS:ffff8801f39c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000002d8 CR3: 00000001d9602000 CR4: 0000000000002660
Call Trace:
 handle_vcpu_hotplug_event+0xb5/0xc0
 xenwatch_thread+0x80/0x140
 ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80
 kthread+0x112/0x130
 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

This happens because handle_vcpu_hotplug_event is called twice. In the
first iteration cpu_present is still true, in the second iteration
cpu_present is false which causes get_cpu_device to return NULL.
In case of cpu#0, cpu_online is apparently always true.

Fix this crash by checking if the cpu can be hotplugged, which is false
for a cpu that was just removed.

Also check if the cpu was actually offlined by device_remove, otherwise
leave the cpu_present state as it is.

Rearrange to code to do all work with device_hotplug_lock held.

Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering &lt;olaf@aepfle.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3366cdb6d350d95466ee430ac50f3c8415ca8f46 ]

The command 'xl vcpu-set 0 0', issued in dom0, will crash dom0:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000002d8
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 7 PID: 65 Comm: xenwatch Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2-1.ga9462db-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased)
Hardware name: Intel Corporation S5520UR/S5520UR, BIOS S5500.86B.01.00.0050.050620101605 05/06/2010
RIP: e030:device_offline+0x9/0xb0
Code: 77 24 00 e9 ce fe ff ff 48 8b 13 e9 68 ff ff ff 48 8b 13 e9 29 ff ff ff 48 8b 13 e9 ea fe ff ff 90 66 66 66 66 90 41 54 55 53 &lt;f6&gt; 87 d8 02 00 00 01 0f 85 88 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 20 09 60 81 31 f6
RSP: e02b:ffffc90040f27e80 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8801f3800000 RSI: ffffc90040f27e70 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff820e47b3 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000007ff0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff822e6d30
R13: dead000000000200 R14: dead000000000100 R15: ffffffff8158b4e0
FS:  00007ffa595158c0(0000) GS:ffff8801f39c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000002d8 CR3: 00000001d9602000 CR4: 0000000000002660
Call Trace:
 handle_vcpu_hotplug_event+0xb5/0xc0
 xenwatch_thread+0x80/0x140
 ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80
 kthread+0x112/0x130
 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

This happens because handle_vcpu_hotplug_event is called twice. In the
first iteration cpu_present is still true, in the second iteration
cpu_present is false which causes get_cpu_device to return NULL.
In case of cpu#0, cpu_online is apparently always true.

Fix this crash by checking if the cpu can be hotplugged, which is false
for a cpu that was just removed.

Also check if the cpu was actually offlined by device_remove, otherwise
leave the cpu_present state as it is.

Rearrange to code to do all work with device_hotplug_lock held.

Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering &lt;olaf@aepfle.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/manage: don't complain about an empty value in control/sysrq node</title>
<updated>2018-10-10T06:52:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vitaly Kuznetsov</name>
<email>vkuznets@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-06T11:26:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6899f2fe641c66569327284ce02242f9cc4f7b8d'/>
<id>6899f2fe641c66569327284ce02242f9cc4f7b8d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 87dffe86d406bee8782cac2db035acb9a28620a7 ]

When guest receives a sysrq request from the host it acknowledges it by
writing '\0' to control/sysrq xenstore node. This, however, make xenstore
watch fire again but xenbus_scanf() fails to parse empty value with "%c"
format string:

 sysrq: SysRq : Emergency Sync
 Emergency Sync complete
 xen:manage: Error -34 reading sysrq code in control/sysrq

Ignore -ERANGE the same way we already ignore -ENOENT, empty value in
control/sysrq is totally legal.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov &lt;vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu2@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 87dffe86d406bee8782cac2db035acb9a28620a7 ]

When guest receives a sysrq request from the host it acknowledges it by
writing '\0' to control/sysrq xenstore node. This, however, make xenstore
watch fire again but xenbus_scanf() fails to parse empty value with "%c"
format string:

 sysrq: SysRq : Emergency Sync
 Emergency Sync complete
 xen:manage: Error -34 reading sysrq code in control/sysrq

Ignore -ERANGE the same way we already ignore -ENOENT, empty value in
control/sysrq is totally legal.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov &lt;vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu2@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: Remove unnecessary BUG_ON from __unbind_from_irq()</title>
<updated>2018-07-03T09:21:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Boris Ostrovsky</name>
<email>boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-21T17:29:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=009aa1cd676e7d5b88368c0951a5894a5cad4766'/>
<id>009aa1cd676e7d5b88368c0951a5894a5cad4766</id>
<content type='text'>
commit eef04c7b3786ff0c9cb1019278b6c6c2ea0ad4ff upstream.

Commit 910f8befdf5b ("xen/pirq: fix error path cleanup when binding
MSIs") fixed a couple of errors in error cleanup path of
xen_bind_pirq_msi_to_irq(). This cleanup allowed a call to
__unbind_from_irq() with an unbound irq, which would result in
triggering the BUG_ON there.

Since there is really no reason for the BUG_ON (xen_free_irq() can
operate on unbound irqs) we can remove it.

Reported-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit eef04c7b3786ff0c9cb1019278b6c6c2ea0ad4ff upstream.

Commit 910f8befdf5b ("xen/pirq: fix error path cleanup when binding
MSIs") fixed a couple of errors in error cleanup path of
xen_bind_pirq_msi_to_irq(). This cleanup allowed a call to
__unbind_from_irq() with an unbound irq, which would result in
triggering the BUG_ON there.

Since there is really no reason for the BUG_ON (xen_free_irq() can
operate on unbound irqs) we can remove it.

Reported-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/acpi: off by one in read_acpi_id()</title>
<updated>2018-05-30T05:49:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-29T09:01:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a1b03156db8a686f8bacae91de635b9df81b436d'/>
<id>a1b03156db8a686f8bacae91de635b9df81b436d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c37a3c94775855567b90f91775b9691e10bd2806 ]

If acpi_id is == nr_acpi_bits, then we access one element beyond the end
of the acpi_psd[] array or we set one bit beyond the end of the bit map
when we do __set_bit(acpi_id, acpi_id_present);

Fixes: 59a568029181 ("xen/acpi-processor: C and P-state driver that uploads said data to hypervisor.")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joao Martins &lt;joao.m.martins@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c37a3c94775855567b90f91775b9691e10bd2806 ]

If acpi_id is == nr_acpi_bits, then we access one element beyond the end
of the acpi_psd[] array or we set one bit beyond the end of the bit map
when we do __set_bit(acpi_id, acpi_id_present);

Fixes: 59a568029181 ("xen/acpi-processor: C and P-state driver that uploads said data to hypervisor.")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joao Martins &lt;joao.m.martins@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: xenbus: use put_device() instead of kfree()</title>
<updated>2018-05-30T05:49:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arvind Yadav</name>
<email>arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-06T10:10:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8c9c7530390dc4774f429c44c0f2fe4da1f4159a'/>
<id>8c9c7530390dc4774f429c44c0f2fe4da1f4159a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 351b2bccede1cb673ec7957b35ea997ea24c8884 ]

Never directly free @dev after calling device_register(), even
if it returned an error! Always use put_device() to give up the
reference initialized.

Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav &lt;arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 351b2bccede1cb673ec7957b35ea997ea24c8884 ]

Never directly free @dev after calling device_register(), even
if it returned an error! Always use put_device() to give up the
reference initialized.

Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav &lt;arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
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