<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/xen, branch v3.18.35</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: Don't move disabled irqs</title>
<updated>2016-06-06T23:11:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ross Lagerwall</name>
<email>ross.lagerwall@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-10T15:11:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5bad4ec6c67659ea53ed08112ce9af2fa998008f'/>
<id>5bad4ec6c67659ea53ed08112ce9af2fa998008f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f0f393877c71ad227d36705d61d1e4062bc29cf5 ]

Commit ff1e22e7a638 ("xen/events: Mask a moving irq") open-coded
irq_move_irq() but left out checking if the IRQ is disabled. This broke
resuming from suspend since it tries to move a (disabled) irq without
holding the IRQ's desc-&gt;lock. Fix it by adding in a check for disabled
IRQs.

The resulting stacktrace was:
kernel BUG at /build/linux-UbQGH5/linux-4.4.0/kernel/irq/migration.c:31!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: xenfs xen_privcmd ...
CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: migration/0 Not tainted 4.4.0-22-generic #39-Ubuntu
Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.6.1-xs125180 05/04/2016
task: ffff88003d75ee00 ti: ffff88003d7bc000 task.ti: ffff88003d7bc000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff810e26e2&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff810e26e2&gt;] irq_move_masked_irq+0xd2/0xe0
RSP: 0018:ffff88003d7bfc50  EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88003d40ba00 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000100 RDI: ffff88003d40bad8
RBP: ffff88003d7bfc68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88003d000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000000000000023c R12: ffff88003d40bad0
R13: ffffffff81f3a4a0 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: 00000000ffffffff
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88003da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fd4264de624 CR3: 0000000037922000 CR4: 00000000003406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Stack:
 ffff88003d40ba38 0000000000000024 0000000000000000 ffff88003d7bfca0
 ffffffff814c8d92 00000010813ef89d 00000000805ea732 0000000000000009
 0000000000000024 ffff88003cc39b80 ffff88003d7bfce0 ffffffff814c8f66
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff814c8d92&gt;] eoi_pirq+0xb2/0xf0
 [&lt;ffffffff814c8f66&gt;] __startup_pirq+0xe6/0x150
 [&lt;ffffffff814ca659&gt;] xen_irq_resume+0x319/0x360
 [&lt;ffffffff814c7e75&gt;] xen_suspend+0xb5/0x180
 [&lt;ffffffff81120155&gt;] multi_cpu_stop+0xb5/0xe0
 [&lt;ffffffff811200a0&gt;] ? cpu_stop_queue_work+0x80/0x80
 [&lt;ffffffff811203d0&gt;] cpu_stopper_thread+0xb0/0x140
 [&lt;ffffffff810a94e6&gt;] ? finish_task_switch+0x76/0x220
 [&lt;ffffffff810ca731&gt;] ? __raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock+0x11/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffff810a3935&gt;] smpboot_thread_fn+0x105/0x160
 [&lt;ffffffff810a3830&gt;] ? sort_range+0x30/0x30
 [&lt;ffffffff810a0588&gt;] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
 [&lt;ffffffff810a04b0&gt;] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1e0/0x1e0
 [&lt;ffffffff8182568f&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff810a04b0&gt;] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1e0/0x1e0

Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall &lt;ross.lagerwall@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f0f393877c71ad227d36705d61d1e4062bc29cf5 ]

Commit ff1e22e7a638 ("xen/events: Mask a moving irq") open-coded
irq_move_irq() but left out checking if the IRQ is disabled. This broke
resuming from suspend since it tries to move a (disabled) irq without
holding the IRQ's desc-&gt;lock. Fix it by adding in a check for disabled
IRQs.

The resulting stacktrace was:
kernel BUG at /build/linux-UbQGH5/linux-4.4.0/kernel/irq/migration.c:31!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: xenfs xen_privcmd ...
CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: migration/0 Not tainted 4.4.0-22-generic #39-Ubuntu
Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.6.1-xs125180 05/04/2016
task: ffff88003d75ee00 ti: ffff88003d7bc000 task.ti: ffff88003d7bc000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff810e26e2&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff810e26e2&gt;] irq_move_masked_irq+0xd2/0xe0
RSP: 0018:ffff88003d7bfc50  EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88003d40ba00 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000100 RDI: ffff88003d40bad8
RBP: ffff88003d7bfc68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88003d000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000000000000023c R12: ffff88003d40bad0
R13: ffffffff81f3a4a0 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: 00000000ffffffff
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88003da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fd4264de624 CR3: 0000000037922000 CR4: 00000000003406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Stack:
 ffff88003d40ba38 0000000000000024 0000000000000000 ffff88003d7bfca0
 ffffffff814c8d92 00000010813ef89d 00000000805ea732 0000000000000009
 0000000000000024 ffff88003cc39b80 ffff88003d7bfce0 ffffffff814c8f66
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff814c8d92&gt;] eoi_pirq+0xb2/0xf0
 [&lt;ffffffff814c8f66&gt;] __startup_pirq+0xe6/0x150
 [&lt;ffffffff814ca659&gt;] xen_irq_resume+0x319/0x360
 [&lt;ffffffff814c7e75&gt;] xen_suspend+0xb5/0x180
 [&lt;ffffffff81120155&gt;] multi_cpu_stop+0xb5/0xe0
 [&lt;ffffffff811200a0&gt;] ? cpu_stop_queue_work+0x80/0x80
 [&lt;ffffffff811203d0&gt;] cpu_stopper_thread+0xb0/0x140
 [&lt;ffffffff810a94e6&gt;] ? finish_task_switch+0x76/0x220
 [&lt;ffffffff810ca731&gt;] ? __raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock+0x11/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffff810a3935&gt;] smpboot_thread_fn+0x105/0x160
 [&lt;ffffffff810a3830&gt;] ? sort_range+0x30/0x30
 [&lt;ffffffff810a0588&gt;] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
 [&lt;ffffffff810a04b0&gt;] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1e0/0x1e0
 [&lt;ffffffff8182568f&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff810a04b0&gt;] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1e0/0x1e0

Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall &lt;ross.lagerwall@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: Mask a moving irq</title>
<updated>2016-04-20T05:31:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Boris Ostrovsky</name>
<email>boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-18T14:11:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1491937f7897c398121ac284a3bc17203c992a12'/>
<id>1491937f7897c398121ac284a3bc17203c992a12</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ff1e22e7a638a0782f54f81a6c9cb139aca2da35 ]

Moving an unmasked irq may result in irq handler being invoked on both
source and target CPUs.

With 2-level this can happen as follows:

On source CPU:
        evtchn_2l_handle_events() -&gt;
            generic_handle_irq() -&gt;
                handle_edge_irq() -&gt;
                   eoi_pirq():
                       irq_move_irq(data);

                       /***** WE ARE HERE *****/

                       if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
                           clear_evtchn(evtchn);

If at this moment target processor is handling an unrelated event in
evtchn_2l_handle_events()'s loop it may pick up our event since target's
cpu_evtchn_mask claims that this event belongs to it *and* the event is
unmasked and still pending. At the same time, source CPU will continue
executing its own handle_edge_irq().

With FIFO interrupt the scenario is similar: irq_move_irq() may result
in a EVTCHNOP_unmask hypercall which, in turn, may make the event
pending on the target CPU.

We can avoid this situation by moving and clearing the event while
keeping event masked.

Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ff1e22e7a638a0782f54f81a6c9cb139aca2da35 ]

Moving an unmasked irq may result in irq handler being invoked on both
source and target CPUs.

With 2-level this can happen as follows:

On source CPU:
        evtchn_2l_handle_events() -&gt;
            generic_handle_irq() -&gt;
                handle_edge_irq() -&gt;
                   eoi_pirq():
                       irq_move_irq(data);

                       /***** WE ARE HERE *****/

                       if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
                           clear_evtchn(evtchn);

If at this moment target processor is handling an unrelated event in
evtchn_2l_handle_events()'s loop it may pick up our event since target's
cpu_evtchn_mask claims that this event belongs to it *and* the event is
unmasked and still pending. At the same time, source CPU will continue
executing its own handle_edge_irq().

With FIFO interrupt the scenario is similar: irq_move_irq() may result
in a EVTCHNOP_unmask hypercall which, in turn, may make the event
pending on the target CPU.

We can avoid this situation by moving and clearing the event while
keeping event masked.

Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/pciback: Don't allow MSI-X ops if PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY is not set.</title>
<updated>2016-03-08T02:15:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-02T23:13:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3d0ec7c06a1994f71ef7820185a71b7c1d8bbb42'/>
<id>3d0ec7c06a1994f71ef7820185a71b7c1d8bbb42</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 408fb0e5aa7fda0059db282ff58c3b2a4278baa0 ]

commit f598282f51 ("PCI: Fix the NIU MSI-X problem in a better way")
teaches us that dealing with MSI-X can be troublesome.

Further checks in the MSI-X architecture shows that if the
PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY bit is turned of in the PCI_COMMAND we
may not be able to access the BAR (since they are memory regions).

Since the MSI-X tables are located in there.. that can lead
to us causing PCIe errors. Inhibit us performing any
operation on the MSI-X unless the MEMORY bit is set.

Note that Xen hypervisor with:
"x86/MSI-X: access MSI-X table only after having enabled MSI-X"
will return:
xen_pciback: 0000:0a:00.1: error -6 enabling MSI-X for guest 3!

When the generic MSI code tries to setup the PIRQ without
MEMORY bit set. Which means with later versions of Xen
(4.6) this patch is not neccessary.

This is part of XSA-157

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 408fb0e5aa7fda0059db282ff58c3b2a4278baa0 ]

commit f598282f51 ("PCI: Fix the NIU MSI-X problem in a better way")
teaches us that dealing with MSI-X can be troublesome.

Further checks in the MSI-X architecture shows that if the
PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY bit is turned of in the PCI_COMMAND we
may not be able to access the BAR (since they are memory regions).

Since the MSI-X tables are located in there.. that can lead
to us causing PCIe errors. Inhibit us performing any
operation on the MSI-X unless the MEMORY bit is set.

Note that Xen hypervisor with:
"x86/MSI-X: access MSI-X table only after having enabled MSI-X"
will return:
xen_pciback: 0000:0a:00.1: error -6 enabling MSI-X for guest 3!

When the generic MSI code tries to setup the PIRQ without
MEMORY bit set. Which means with later versions of Xen
(4.6) this patch is not neccessary.

This is part of XSA-157

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/pciback: Return error on XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix when device has MSI or MSI-X enabled</title>
<updated>2016-03-08T02:15:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-02T23:07:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f4993f38b40ae9d974c3dff06654c84d9d20894c'/>
<id>f4993f38b40ae9d974c3dff06654c84d9d20894c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5e0ce1455c09dd61d029b8ad45d82e1ac0b6c4c9 ]

The guest sequence of:

  a) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix
  b) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix

results in hitting an NULL pointer due to using freed pointers.

The device passed in the guest MUST have MSI-X capability.

The a) constructs and SysFS representation of MSI and MSI groups.
The b) adds a second set of them but adding in to SysFS fails (duplicate entry).
'populate_msi_sysfs' frees the newly allocated msi_irq_groups (note that
in a) pdev-&gt;msi_irq_groups is still set) and also free's ALL of the
MSI-X entries of the device (the ones allocated in step a) and b)).

The unwind code: 'free_msi_irqs' deletes all the entries and tries to
delete the pdev-&gt;msi_irq_groups (which hasn't been set to NULL).
However the pointers in the SysFS are already freed and we hit an
NULL pointer further on when 'strlen' is attempted on a freed pointer.

The patch adds a simple check in the XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix to guard
against that. The check for msi_enabled is not stricly neccessary.

This is part of XSA-157

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5e0ce1455c09dd61d029b8ad45d82e1ac0b6c4c9 ]

The guest sequence of:

  a) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix
  b) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix

results in hitting an NULL pointer due to using freed pointers.

The device passed in the guest MUST have MSI-X capability.

The a) constructs and SysFS representation of MSI and MSI groups.
The b) adds a second set of them but adding in to SysFS fails (duplicate entry).
'populate_msi_sysfs' frees the newly allocated msi_irq_groups (note that
in a) pdev-&gt;msi_irq_groups is still set) and also free's ALL of the
MSI-X entries of the device (the ones allocated in step a) and b)).

The unwind code: 'free_msi_irqs' deletes all the entries and tries to
delete the pdev-&gt;msi_irq_groups (which hasn't been set to NULL).
However the pointers in the SysFS are already freed and we hit an
NULL pointer further on when 'strlen' is attempted on a freed pointer.

The patch adds a simple check in the XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix to guard
against that. The check for msi_enabled is not stricly neccessary.

This is part of XSA-157

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/pciback: Save xen_pci_op commands before processing it</title>
<updated>2016-03-08T02:15:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-16T17:40:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c801e64a896b0e6d338dbd72ea027ba21c05e702'/>
<id>c801e64a896b0e6d338dbd72ea027ba21c05e702</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8135cf8b092723dbfcc611fe6fdcb3a36c9951c5 ]

Double fetch vulnerabilities that happen when a variable is
fetched twice from shared memory but a security check is only
performed the first time.

The xen_pcibk_do_op function performs a switch statements on the op-&gt;cmd
value which is stored in shared memory. Interestingly this can result
in a double fetch vulnerability depending on the performed compiler
optimization.

This patch fixes it by saving the xen_pci_op command before
processing it. We also use 'barrier' to make sure that the
compiler does not perform any optimization.

This is part of XSA155.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;JBeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8135cf8b092723dbfcc611fe6fdcb3a36c9951c5 ]

Double fetch vulnerabilities that happen when a variable is
fetched twice from shared memory but a security check is only
performed the first time.

The xen_pcibk_do_op function performs a switch statements on the op-&gt;cmd
value which is stored in shared memory. Interestingly this can result
in a double fetch vulnerability depending on the performed compiler
optimization.

This patch fixes it by saving the xen_pci_op command before
processing it. We also use 'barrier' to make sure that the
compiler does not perform any optimization.

This is part of XSA155.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;JBeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/scsiback: correct frontend counting</title>
<updated>2016-03-08T02:12:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-08T14:30:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e95f19161db42962a6a9cc3e3761ea5bc663a0a3'/>
<id>e95f19161db42962a6a9cc3e3761ea5bc663a0a3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f285aa8db7cc4432c1a03f8b55ff34fe96317c11 ]

When adding a new frontend to xen-scsiback don't decrement the number
of active frontends in case of no error. Doing so results in a failure
when trying to remove the xen-pvscsi nexus even if no domain is using
it.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f285aa8db7cc4432c1a03f8b55ff34fe96317c11 ]

When adding a new frontend to xen-scsiback don't decrement the number
of active frontends in case of no error. Doing so results in a failure
when trying to remove the xen-pvscsi nexus even if no domain is using
it.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/gntdevt: Fix race condition in gntdev_release()</title>
<updated>2015-08-27T17:25:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marek Marczykowski-Górecki</name>
<email>marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-26T01:28:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=728757eda0dcdfac1f8d46548849cbf2597fe5da'/>
<id>728757eda0dcdfac1f8d46548849cbf2597fe5da</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 30b03d05e07467b8c6ec683ea96b5bffcbcd3931 ]

While gntdev_release() is called the MMU notifier is still registered
and can traverse priv-&gt;maps list even if no pages are mapped (which is
the case -- gntdev_release() is called after all). But
gntdev_release() will clear that list, so make sure that only one of
those things happens at the same time.

Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki &lt;marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 30b03d05e07467b8c6ec683ea96b5bffcbcd3931 ]

While gntdev_release() is called the MMU notifier is still registered
and can traverse priv-&gt;maps list even if no pages are mapped (which is
the case -- gntdev_release() is called after all). But
gntdev_release() will clear that list, so make sure that only one of
those things happens at the same time.

Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki &lt;marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/gntdev: convert priv-&gt;lock to a mutex</title>
<updated>2015-08-27T17:25:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Vrabel</name>
<email>david.vrabel@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-09T18:06:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6b4cd0635d2cd27836ab5f534990073e0ee1a2dd'/>
<id>6b4cd0635d2cd27836ab5f534990073e0ee1a2dd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1401c00e59ea021c575f74612fe2dbba36d6a4ee ]

Unmapping may require sleeping and we unmap while holding priv-&gt;lock, so
convert it to a mutex.

Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1401c00e59ea021c575f74612fe2dbba36d6a4ee ]

Unmapping may require sleeping and we unmap while holding priv-&gt;lock, so
convert it to a mutex.

Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/xen: allow privcmd hypercalls to be preempted</title>
<updated>2015-07-21T01:12:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Vrabel</name>
<email>david.vrabel@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-19T15:23:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=54f642ea6676705893c34a0bf53880aea29a1363'/>
<id>54f642ea6676705893c34a0bf53880aea29a1363</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit db0e2aa47f0a45fc56592c25ad370f8836cbb128 ]

Hypercalls submitted by user space tools via the privcmd driver can
take a long time (potentially many 10s of seconds) if the hypercall
has many sub-operations.

A fully preemptible kernel may deschedule such as task in any upcall
called from a hypercall continuation.

However, in a kernel with voluntary or no preemption, hypercall
continuations in Xen allow event handlers to be run but the task
issuing the hypercall will not be descheduled until the hypercall is
complete and the ioctl returns to user space.  These long running
tasks may also trigger the kernel's soft lockup detection.

Add xen_preemptible_hcall_begin() and xen_preemptible_hcall_end() to
bracket hypercalls that may be preempted.  Use these in the privcmd
driver.

When returning from an upcall, call xen_maybe_preempt_hcall() which
adds a schedule point if if the current task was within a preemptible
hypercall.

Since _cond_resched() can move the task to a different CPU, clear and
set xen_in_preemptible_hcall around the call.

Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit db0e2aa47f0a45fc56592c25ad370f8836cbb128 ]

Hypercalls submitted by user space tools via the privcmd driver can
take a long time (potentially many 10s of seconds) if the hypercall
has many sub-operations.

A fully preemptible kernel may deschedule such as task in any upcall
called from a hypercall continuation.

However, in a kernel with voluntary or no preemption, hypercall
continuations in Xen allow event handlers to be run but the task
issuing the hypercall will not be descheduled until the hypercall is
complete and the ioctl returns to user space.  These long running
tasks may also trigger the kernel's soft lockup detection.

Add xen_preemptible_hcall_begin() and xen_preemptible_hcall_end() to
bracket hypercalls that may be preempted.  Use these in the privcmd
driver.

When returning from an upcall, call xen_maybe_preempt_hcall() which
adds a schedule point if if the current task was within a preemptible
hypercall.

Since _cond_resched() can move the task to a different CPU, clear and
set xen_in_preemptible_hcall around the call.

Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: don't bind non-percpu VIRQs with percpu chip</title>
<updated>2015-06-09T17:43:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Vrabel</name>
<email>david.vrabel@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-19T17:40:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=da9888ac0e1a4c923ad3c4978d310bbf7c32f0d7'/>
<id>da9888ac0e1a4c923ad3c4978d310bbf7c32f0d7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 77bb3dfdc0d554befad58fdefbc41be5bc3ed38a ]

A non-percpu VIRQ (e.g., VIRQ_CONSOLE) may be freed on a different
VCPU than it is bound to.  This can result in a race between
handle_percpu_irq() and removing the action in __free_irq() because
handle_percpu_irq() does not take desc-&gt;lock.  The interrupt handler
sees a NULL action and oopses.

Only use the percpu chip/handler for per-CPU VIRQs (like VIRQ_TIMER).

  # cat /proc/interrupts | grep virq
   40:      87246          0  xen-percpu-virq      timer0
   44:          0          0  xen-percpu-virq      debug0
   47:          0      20995  xen-percpu-virq      timer1
   51:          0          0  xen-percpu-virq      debug1
   69:          0          0   xen-dyn-virq      xen-pcpu
   74:          0          0   xen-dyn-virq      mce
   75:         29          0   xen-dyn-virq      hvc_console

Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 77bb3dfdc0d554befad58fdefbc41be5bc3ed38a ]

A non-percpu VIRQ (e.g., VIRQ_CONSOLE) may be freed on a different
VCPU than it is bound to.  This can result in a race between
handle_percpu_irq() and removing the action in __free_irq() because
handle_percpu_irq() does not take desc-&gt;lock.  The interrupt handler
sees a NULL action and oopses.

Only use the percpu chip/handler for per-CPU VIRQs (like VIRQ_TIMER).

  # cat /proc/interrupts | grep virq
   40:      87246          0  xen-percpu-virq      timer0
   44:          0          0  xen-percpu-virq      debug0
   47:          0      20995  xen-percpu-virq      timer1
   51:          0          0  xen-percpu-virq      debug1
   69:          0          0   xen-dyn-virq      xen-pcpu
   74:          0          0   xen-dyn-virq      mce
   75:         29          0   xen-dyn-virq      hvc_console

Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
