<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/xen, branch v3.15.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'stable/for-linus-3.15-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip</title>
<updated>2014-05-13T02:21:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-13T02:21:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=619b5891903936f3e493bf8cda18a8b6664fcdd7'/>
<id>619b5891903936f3e493bf8cda18a8b6664fcdd7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull xen bug fixes from David Vrabel:
 - Fix arm64 crash on boot.
 - Quiet a noisy arm build warning (virt_to_pfn() redefined).

* tag 'stable/for-linus-3.15-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  arm64: introduce virt_to_pfn
  xen/events/fifo: correctly align bitops
  arm/xen: Remove definiition of virt_to_pfn in asm/xen/page.h
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull xen bug fixes from David Vrabel:
 - Fix arm64 crash on boot.
 - Quiet a noisy arm build warning (virt_to_pfn() redefined).

* tag 'stable/for-linus-3.15-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  arm64: introduce virt_to_pfn
  xen/events/fifo: correctly align bitops
  arm/xen: Remove definiition of virt_to_pfn in asm/xen/page.h
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events/fifo: correctly align bitops</title>
<updated>2014-04-28T10:09:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vladimir Murzin</name>
<email>murzin.v@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-27T09:09:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=05a812ac474d0d6aef6d54b66bb08b81abde79c6'/>
<id>05a812ac474d0d6aef6d54b66bb08b81abde79c6</id>
<content type='text'>
FIFO event channels require bitops on 32-bit aligned values (the event
words).  Linux's bitops require unsigned long alignment which may be
64-bits.

On arm64 an incorrectly unaligned access will fault.

Fix this by aligning the bitops along with an adjustment for bit
position and using an unsigned long for the local copy of the ready
word.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin &lt;murzin.v@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Pranavkumar Sawargaonkar &lt;pranavkumar@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell &lt;ian.campbell@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
FIFO event channels require bitops on 32-bit aligned values (the event
words).  Linux's bitops require unsigned long alignment which may be
64-bits.

On arm64 an incorrectly unaligned access will fault.

Fix this by aligning the bitops along with an adjustment for bit
position and using an unsigned long for the local copy of the ready
word.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin &lt;murzin.v@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Pranavkumar Sawargaonkar &lt;pranavkumar@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell &lt;ian.campbell@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'stable/for-linus-3.15-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip</title>
<updated>2014-04-17T17:54:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-17T17:54:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=88764e0a3ecf655950c4d46b323cf80e2e0ee481'/>
<id>88764e0a3ecf655950c4d46b323cf80e2e0ee481</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull Xen fixes from David Vrabel:
 "Xen regression and bug fixes for 3.15-rc1:

   - fix completely broken 32-bit PV guests caused by x86 refactoring
     32-bit thread_info.
   - only enable ticketlock slow path on Xen (not bare metal)
   - fix two bugs with PV guests not shutting down when requested
   - fix a minor memory leak in xen-pciback error path"

* tag 'stable/for-linus-3.15-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  xen/manage: Poweroff forcefully if user-space is not yet up.
  xen/xenbus: Avoid synchronous wait on XenBus stalling shutdown/restart.
  xen/spinlock: Don't enable them unconditionally.
  xen-pciback: silence an unwanted debug printk
  xen: fix memory leak in __xen_pcibk_add_pci_dev()
  x86/xen: Fix 32-bit PV guests's usage of kernel_stack
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull Xen fixes from David Vrabel:
 "Xen regression and bug fixes for 3.15-rc1:

   - fix completely broken 32-bit PV guests caused by x86 refactoring
     32-bit thread_info.
   - only enable ticketlock slow path on Xen (not bare metal)
   - fix two bugs with PV guests not shutting down when requested
   - fix a minor memory leak in xen-pciback error path"

* tag 'stable/for-linus-3.15-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  xen/manage: Poweroff forcefully if user-space is not yet up.
  xen/xenbus: Avoid synchronous wait on XenBus stalling shutdown/restart.
  xen/spinlock: Don't enable them unconditionally.
  xen-pciback: silence an unwanted debug printk
  xen: fix memory leak in __xen_pcibk_add_pci_dev()
  x86/xen: Fix 32-bit PV guests's usage of kernel_stack
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/manage: Poweroff forcefully if user-space is not yet up.</title>
<updated>2014-04-15T16:41:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-04T18:53:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eb47f71200b7d5b4c8c1f8c75675f592d855aafd'/>
<id>eb47f71200b7d5b4c8c1f8c75675f592d855aafd</id>
<content type='text'>
The user can launch the guest in this sequence:

xl create -p /vm.cfg	[launch, but pause it]
xl shutdown latest	[sets control/shutdown=poweroff]
xl unpause latest
xl console latest	[and see that the guest has completely
ignored the shutdown request]

In reality the guest hasn't ignored it. It registers a watch
and gets a notification that there is value. It then calls
the shutdown_handler which ends up calling orderly_shutdown.

Unfortunately that is so early in the bootup that there
are no user-space. Which means that the orderly_shutdown fails.
But since the force flag was set to false it continues on without
reporting.

What we really want to is to use the force when we are in the
SYSTEM_BOOTING state and not use the 'force' when SYSTEM_RUNNING.

However, if we are in the running state - and the shutdown command
has been given before the user-space has been setup, there is nothing
we can do. Worst yet, we stop ignoring the 'xl shutdown' requests!

As such, the other part of this patch is to only stop ignoring
the 'xl shutdown' when we are truly in the power off sequence.

That means the user can do multiple 'xl shutdown' and we will try
to act on them instead of ignoring them.

Fixes-Bug: http://bugs.xenproject.org/xen/bug/6
Reported-by:  Alex Bligh &lt;alex@alex.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The user can launch the guest in this sequence:

xl create -p /vm.cfg	[launch, but pause it]
xl shutdown latest	[sets control/shutdown=poweroff]
xl unpause latest
xl console latest	[and see that the guest has completely
ignored the shutdown request]

In reality the guest hasn't ignored it. It registers a watch
and gets a notification that there is value. It then calls
the shutdown_handler which ends up calling orderly_shutdown.

Unfortunately that is so early in the bootup that there
are no user-space. Which means that the orderly_shutdown fails.
But since the force flag was set to false it continues on without
reporting.

What we really want to is to use the force when we are in the
SYSTEM_BOOTING state and not use the 'force' when SYSTEM_RUNNING.

However, if we are in the running state - and the shutdown command
has been given before the user-space has been setup, there is nothing
we can do. Worst yet, we stop ignoring the 'xl shutdown' requests!

As such, the other part of this patch is to only stop ignoring
the 'xl shutdown' when we are truly in the power off sequence.

That means the user can do multiple 'xl shutdown' and we will try
to act on them instead of ignoring them.

Fixes-Bug: http://bugs.xenproject.org/xen/bug/6
Reported-by:  Alex Bligh &lt;alex@alex.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/xenbus: Avoid synchronous wait on XenBus stalling shutdown/restart.</title>
<updated>2014-04-15T16:41:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-04T18:53:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=027bd7e89906a076225b23d1ca4b6702c84e72dc'/>
<id>027bd7e89906a076225b23d1ca4b6702c84e72dc</id>
<content type='text'>
The 'read_reply' works with 'process_msg' to read of a reply in XenBus.
'process_msg' is running from within the 'xenbus' thread. Whenever
a message shows up in XenBus it is put on a xs_state.reply_list list
and 'read_reply' picks it up.

The problem is if the backend domain or the xenstored process is killed.
In which case 'xenbus' is still awaiting - and 'read_reply' if called -
stuck forever waiting for the reply_list to have some contents.

This is normally not a problem - as the backend domain can come back
or the xenstored process can be restarted. However if the domain
is in process of being powered off/restarted/halted - there is no
point of waiting on it coming back - as we are effectively being
terminated and should not impede the progress.

This patch solves this problem by checking whether the guest is the
right domain. If it is an initial domain and hurtling towards death -
there is no point of continuing the wait. All other type of guests
continue with their behavior (as Xenstore is expected to still be
running in another domain).

Fixes-Bug: http://bugs.xenproject.org/xen/bug/8
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The 'read_reply' works with 'process_msg' to read of a reply in XenBus.
'process_msg' is running from within the 'xenbus' thread. Whenever
a message shows up in XenBus it is put on a xs_state.reply_list list
and 'read_reply' picks it up.

The problem is if the backend domain or the xenstored process is killed.
In which case 'xenbus' is still awaiting - and 'read_reply' if called -
stuck forever waiting for the reply_list to have some contents.

This is normally not a problem - as the backend domain can come back
or the xenstored process can be restarted. However if the domain
is in process of being powered off/restarted/halted - there is no
point of waiting on it coming back - as we are effectively being
terminated and should not impede the progress.

This patch solves this problem by checking whether the guest is the
right domain. If it is an initial domain and hurtling towards death -
there is no point of continuing the wait. All other type of guests
continue with their behavior (as Xenstore is expected to still be
running in another domain).

Fixes-Bug: http://bugs.xenproject.org/xen/bug/8
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen-pciback: silence an unwanted debug printk</title>
<updated>2014-04-15T16:41:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-28T08:24:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c0914e61660fa7d501ef9394b26f4847ef3dc98e'/>
<id>c0914e61660fa7d501ef9394b26f4847ef3dc98e</id>
<content type='text'>
There is a missing curly brace here so we might print some extra debug
information.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There is a missing curly brace here so we might print some extra debug
information.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: fix memory leak in __xen_pcibk_add_pci_dev()</title>
<updated>2014-04-15T16:32:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daeseok Youn</name>
<email>daeseok.youn@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-01T10:15:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cea37f87519ca3172a4e8ddd3ffcd2b4232b341f'/>
<id>cea37f87519ca3172a4e8ddd3ffcd2b4232b341f</id>
<content type='text'>
It need to free dev_entry when it failed to assign to a new
slot on the virtual PCI bus.

smatch says:
 drivers/xen/xen-pciback/vpci.c:142 __xen_pcibk_add_pci_dev() warn:
possible memory leak of 'dev_entry'

Signed-off-by: Daeseok Youn &lt;daeseok.youn@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It need to free dev_entry when it failed to assign to a new
slot on the virtual PCI bus.

smatch says:
 drivers/xen/xen-pciback/vpci.c:142 __xen_pcibk_add_pci_dev() warn:
possible memory leak of 'dev_entry'

Signed-off-by: Daeseok Youn &lt;daeseok.youn@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'stable/for-linus-3.15-tag2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip</title>
<updated>2014-04-08T00:50:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-08T00:50:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c8d9762affa0a97e299be2cabfec861515ef1580'/>
<id>c8d9762affa0a97e299be2cabfec861515ef1580</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull Xen build fix from David Vrabel:
 "Fix arm build of drivers/xen/events/

  The merge of irq-core-for-linus branch broke it"

* tag 'stable/for-linus-3.15-tag2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  Xen: do hv callback accounting only on x86
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull Xen build fix from David Vrabel:
 "Fix arm build of drivers/xen/events/

  The merge of irq-core-for-linus branch broke it"

* tag 'stable/for-linus-3.15-tag2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  Xen: do hv callback accounting only on x86
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'cpu-hotplug-3.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm</title>
<updated>2014-04-07T21:55:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-07T21:55:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=467a9e1633043810259a7f5368fbcc1e84746137'/>
<id>467a9e1633043810259a7f5368fbcc1e84746137</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull CPU hotplug notifiers registration fixes from Rafael Wysocki:
 "The purpose of this single series of commits from Srivatsa S Bhat
  (with a small piece from Gautham R Shenoy) touching multiple
  subsystems that use CPU hotplug notifiers is to provide a way to
  register them that will not lead to deadlocks with CPU online/offline
  operations as described in the changelog of commit 93ae4f978ca7f ("CPU
  hotplug: Provide lockless versions of callback registration
  functions").

  The first three commits in the series introduce the API and document
  it and the rest simply goes through the users of CPU hotplug notifiers
  and converts them to using the new method"

* tag 'cpu-hotplug-3.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm: (52 commits)
  net/iucv/iucv.c: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  net/core/flow.c: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  mm, zswap: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  mm, vmstat: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  profile: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  trace, ring-buffer: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  xen, balloon: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  hwmon, via-cputemp: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  hwmon, coretemp: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  thermal, x86-pkg-temp: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  octeon, watchdog: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  oprofile, nmi-timer: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  intel-idle: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  clocksource, dummy-timer: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  drivers/base/topology.c: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  acpi-cpufreq: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  zsmalloc: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  scsi, fcoe: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  scsi, bnx2fc: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  scsi, bnx2i: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull CPU hotplug notifiers registration fixes from Rafael Wysocki:
 "The purpose of this single series of commits from Srivatsa S Bhat
  (with a small piece from Gautham R Shenoy) touching multiple
  subsystems that use CPU hotplug notifiers is to provide a way to
  register them that will not lead to deadlocks with CPU online/offline
  operations as described in the changelog of commit 93ae4f978ca7f ("CPU
  hotplug: Provide lockless versions of callback registration
  functions").

  The first three commits in the series introduce the API and document
  it and the rest simply goes through the users of CPU hotplug notifiers
  and converts them to using the new method"

* tag 'cpu-hotplug-3.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm: (52 commits)
  net/iucv/iucv.c: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  net/core/flow.c: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  mm, zswap: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  mm, vmstat: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  profile: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  trace, ring-buffer: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  xen, balloon: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  hwmon, via-cputemp: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  hwmon, coretemp: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  thermal, x86-pkg-temp: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  octeon, watchdog: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  oprofile, nmi-timer: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  intel-idle: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  clocksource, dummy-timer: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  drivers/base/topology.c: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  acpi-cpufreq: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  zsmalloc: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  scsi, fcoe: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  scsi, bnx2fc: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  scsi, bnx2i: Fix CPU hotplug callback registration
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Xen: do hv callback accounting only on x86</title>
<updated>2014-04-07T13:12:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-25T15:52:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d06eb3ee9b09d753dc0883cc388d9a503839d6ca'/>
<id>d06eb3ee9b09d753dc0883cc388d9a503839d6ca</id>
<content type='text'>
Patch 99c8b79d3c1 "xen: Add proper irq accounting for HYPERCALL vector"
added a call to inc_irq_stat(irq_hv_callback_count) in common Xen code,
however both the inc_irq_stat function and the irq_hv_callback_count
counter are architecture specific.

This makes the code build again on ARM by moving the call into the
existing #ifdef CONFIG_X86. We may want to later do the same implementation
on ARM that x86 has though.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Xen &lt;xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Patch 99c8b79d3c1 "xen: Add proper irq accounting for HYPERCALL vector"
added a call to inc_irq_stat(irq_hv_callback_count) in common Xen code,
however both the inc_irq_stat function and the irq_hv_callback_count
counter are architecture specific.

This makes the code build again on ARM by moving the call into the
existing #ifdef CONFIG_X86. We may want to later do the same implementation
on ARM that x86 has though.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Xen &lt;xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org&gt;
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