<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/xen, branch linux-5.17.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>xen: unexport __init-annotated xen_xlate_map_ballooned_pages()</title>
<updated>2022-06-14T16:41:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>masahiroy@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-06T04:59:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b43387364d8291190fd4ea1322b65c337802baa2'/>
<id>b43387364d8291190fd4ea1322b65c337802baa2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dbac14a5a05ff8e1ce7c0da0e1f520ce39ec62ea ]

EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text
section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot
use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up
with kernel panic.

modpost used to detect it, but it has been broken for a decade.

Recently, I fixed modpost so it started to warn it again, then this
showed up in linux-next builds.

There are two ways to fix it:

  - Remove __init
  - Remove EXPORT_SYMBOL

I chose the latter for this case because none of the in-tree call-sites
(arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c, arch/x86/xen/grant-table.c) is compiled as
modular.

Fixes: 243848fc018c ("xen/grant-table: Move xlated_setup_gnttab_pages to common place")
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko &lt;oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606045920.4161881-1-masahiroy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit dbac14a5a05ff8e1ce7c0da0e1f520ce39ec62ea ]

EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text
section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot
use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up
with kernel panic.

modpost used to detect it, but it has been broken for a decade.

Recently, I fixed modpost so it started to warn it again, then this
showed up in linux-next builds.

There are two ways to fix it:

  - Remove __init
  - Remove EXPORT_SYMBOL

I chose the latter for this case because none of the in-tree call-sites
(arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c, arch/x86/xen/grant-table.c) is compiled as
modular.

Fixes: 243848fc018c ("xen/grant-table: Move xlated_setup_gnttab_pages to common place")
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko &lt;oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606045920.4161881-1-masahiroy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/gnttab: fix gnttab_end_foreign_access() without page specified</title>
<updated>2022-03-07T08:48:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-07T08:48:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=42baefac638f06314298087394b982ead9ec444b'/>
<id>42baefac638f06314298087394b982ead9ec444b</id>
<content type='text'>
gnttab_end_foreign_access() is used to free a grant reference and
optionally to free the associated page. In case the grant is still in
use by the other side processing is being deferred. This leads to a
problem in case no page to be freed is specified by the caller: the
caller doesn't know that the page is still mapped by the other side
and thus should not be used for other purposes.

The correct way to handle this situation is to take an additional
reference to the granted page in case handling is being deferred and
to drop that reference when the grant reference could be freed
finally.

This requires that there are no users of gnttab_end_foreign_access()
left directly repurposing the granted page after the call, as this
might result in clobbered data or information leaks via the not yet
freed grant reference.

This is part of CVE-2022-23041 / XSA-396.

Reported-by: Simon Gaiser &lt;simon@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
---
V4:
- expand comment in header
V5:
- get page ref in case of kmalloc() failure, too
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
gnttab_end_foreign_access() is used to free a grant reference and
optionally to free the associated page. In case the grant is still in
use by the other side processing is being deferred. This leads to a
problem in case no page to be freed is specified by the caller: the
caller doesn't know that the page is still mapped by the other side
and thus should not be used for other purposes.

The correct way to handle this situation is to take an additional
reference to the granted page in case handling is being deferred and
to drop that reference when the grant reference could be freed
finally.

This requires that there are no users of gnttab_end_foreign_access()
left directly repurposing the granted page after the call, as this
might result in clobbered data or information leaks via the not yet
freed grant reference.

This is part of CVE-2022-23041 / XSA-396.

Reported-by: Simon Gaiser &lt;simon@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
---
V4:
- expand comment in header
V5:
- get page ref in case of kmalloc() failure, too
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/pvcalls: use alloc/free_pages_exact()</title>
<updated>2022-03-07T08:48:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-07T08:48:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b0576cc9c6b843d99c6982888d59a56209341888'/>
<id>b0576cc9c6b843d99c6982888d59a56209341888</id>
<content type='text'>
Instead of __get_free_pages() and free_pages() use alloc_pages_exact()
and free_pages_exact(). This is in preparation of a change of
gnttab_end_foreign_access() which will prohibit use of high-order
pages.

This is part of CVE-2022-23041 / XSA-396.

Reported-by: Simon Gaiser &lt;simon@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
---
V4:
- new patch
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Instead of __get_free_pages() and free_pages() use alloc_pages_exact()
and free_pages_exact(). This is in preparation of a change of
gnttab_end_foreign_access() which will prohibit use of high-order
pages.

This is part of CVE-2022-23041 / XSA-396.

Reported-by: Simon Gaiser &lt;simon@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
---
V4:
- new patch
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen: remove gnttab_query_foreign_access()</title>
<updated>2022-03-07T08:48:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-07T08:48:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1dbd11ca75fe664d3e54607547771d021f531f59'/>
<id>1dbd11ca75fe664d3e54607547771d021f531f59</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove gnttab_query_foreign_access(), as it is unused and unsafe to
use.

All previous use cases assumed a grant would not be in use after
gnttab_query_foreign_access() returned 0. This information is useless
in best case, as it only refers to a situation in the past, which could
have changed already.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Remove gnttab_query_foreign_access(), as it is unused and unsafe to
use.

All previous use cases assumed a grant would not be in use after
gnttab_query_foreign_access() returned 0. This information is useless
in best case, as it only refers to a situation in the past, which could
have changed already.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/gntalloc: don't use gnttab_query_foreign_access()</title>
<updated>2022-03-07T08:48:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-07T08:48:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d3b6372c5881cb54925212abb62c521df8ba4809'/>
<id>d3b6372c5881cb54925212abb62c521df8ba4809</id>
<content type='text'>
Using gnttab_query_foreign_access() is unsafe, as it is racy by design.

The use case in the gntalloc driver is not needed at all. While at it
replace the call of gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() with a call of
gnttab_end_foreign_access(), which is what is really wanted there. In
case the grant wasn't used due to an allocation failure, just free the
grant via gnttab_free_grant_reference().

This is CVE-2022-23039 / part of XSA-396.

Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour &lt;demi@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
---
V3:
- fix __del_gref() (Jan Beulich)
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Using gnttab_query_foreign_access() is unsafe, as it is racy by design.

The use case in the gntalloc driver is not needed at all. While at it
replace the call of gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() with a call of
gnttab_end_foreign_access(), which is what is really wanted there. In
case the grant wasn't used due to an allocation failure, just free the
grant via gnttab_free_grant_reference().

This is CVE-2022-23039 / part of XSA-396.

Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour &lt;demi@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
---
V3:
- fix __del_gref() (Jan Beulich)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/grant-table: add gnttab_try_end_foreign_access()</title>
<updated>2022-03-07T08:48:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-07T08:48:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6b1775f26a2da2b05a6dc8ec2b5d14e9a4701a1a'/>
<id>6b1775f26a2da2b05a6dc8ec2b5d14e9a4701a1a</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a new grant table function gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(), which
will remove and free a grant if it is not in use.

Its main use case is to either free a grant if it is no longer in use,
or to take some other action if it is still in use. This other action
can be an error exit, or (e.g. in the case of blkfront persistent grant
feature) some special handling.

This is CVE-2022-23036, CVE-2022-23038 / part of XSA-396.

Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour &lt;demi@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
---
V2:
- new patch
V4:
- add comments to header (Jan Beulich)
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a new grant table function gnttab_try_end_foreign_access(), which
will remove and free a grant if it is not in use.

Its main use case is to either free a grant if it is no longer in use,
or to take some other action if it is still in use. This other action
can be an error exit, or (e.g. in the case of blkfront persistent grant
feature) some special handling.

This is CVE-2022-23036, CVE-2022-23038 / part of XSA-396.

Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour &lt;demi@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
---
V2:
- new patch
V4:
- add comments to header (Jan Beulich)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/xenbus: don't let xenbus_grant_ring() remove grants in error case</title>
<updated>2022-03-07T08:48:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-07T08:48:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3777ea7bac3113005b7180e6b9dadf16d19a5827'/>
<id>3777ea7bac3113005b7180e6b9dadf16d19a5827</id>
<content type='text'>
Letting xenbus_grant_ring() tear down grants in the error case is
problematic, as the other side could already have used these grants.
Calling gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() without checking success is
resulting in an unclear situation for any caller of xenbus_grant_ring()
as in the error case the memory pages of the ring page might be
partially mapped. Freeing them would risk unwanted foreign access to
them, while not freeing them would leak memory.

In order to remove the need to undo any gnttab_grant_foreign_access()
calls, use gnttab_alloc_grant_references() to make sure no further
error can occur in the loop granting access to the ring pages.

It should be noted that this way of handling removes leaking of
grant entries in the error case, too.

This is CVE-2022-23040 / part of XSA-396.

Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour &lt;demi@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Letting xenbus_grant_ring() tear down grants in the error case is
problematic, as the other side could already have used these grants.
Calling gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() without checking success is
resulting in an unclear situation for any caller of xenbus_grant_ring()
as in the error case the memory pages of the ring page might be
partially mapped. Freeing them would risk unwanted foreign access to
them, while not freeing them would leak memory.

In order to remove the need to undo any gnttab_grant_foreign_access()
calls, use gnttab_alloc_grant_references() to make sure no further
error can occur in the loop granting access to the ring pages.

It should be noted that this way of handling removes leaking of
grant entries in the error case, too.

This is CVE-2022-23040 / part of XSA-396.

Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour &lt;demi@invisiblethingslab.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/pci: Make use of the helper macro LIST_HEAD()</title>
<updated>2022-02-10T10:10:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cai Huoqing</name>
<email>cai.huoqing@linux.dev</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-09T03:28:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f66edf684edcb85c1db0b0aa8cf1a9392ba68a9d'/>
<id>f66edf684edcb85c1db0b0aa8cf1a9392ba68a9d</id>
<content type='text'>
Replace "struct list_head head = LIST_HEAD_INIT(head)" with
"LIST_HEAD(head)" to simplify the code.

Signed-off-by: Cai Huoqing &lt;cai.huoqing@linux.dev&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220209032842.38818-1-cai.huoqing@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Replace "struct list_head head = LIST_HEAD_INIT(head)" with
"LIST_HEAD(head)" to simplify the code.

Signed-off-by: Cai Huoqing &lt;cai.huoqing@linux.dev&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220209032842.38818-1-cai.huoqing@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm/xen: Read extended regions from DT and init Xen resource</title>
<updated>2022-01-06T08:53:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleksandr Tyshchenko</name>
<email>oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-09T20:05:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b2371587fe0c02657db89b67b72efc581bd3f7a0'/>
<id>b2371587fe0c02657db89b67b72efc581bd3f7a0</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch implements arch_xen_unpopulated_init() on Arm where
the extended regions (if any) are gathered from DT and inserted
into specific Xen resource to be used as unused address space
for Xen scratch pages by unpopulated-alloc code.

The extended region (safe range) is a region of guest physical
address space which is unused and could be safely used to create
grant/foreign mappings instead of wasting real RAM pages from
the domain memory for establishing these mappings.

The extended regions are chosen by the hypervisor at the domain
creation time and advertised to it via "reg" property under
hypervisor node in the guest device-tree. As region 0 is reserved
for grant table space (always present), the indexes for extended
regions are 1...N.

If arch_xen_unpopulated_init() fails for some reason the default
behaviour will be restored (allocate xenballooned pages).

This patch also removes XEN_UNPOPULATED_ALLOC dependency on x86.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko &lt;oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1639080336-26573-6-git-send-email-olekstysh@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch implements arch_xen_unpopulated_init() on Arm where
the extended regions (if any) are gathered from DT and inserted
into specific Xen resource to be used as unused address space
for Xen scratch pages by unpopulated-alloc code.

The extended region (safe range) is a region of guest physical
address space which is unused and could be safely used to create
grant/foreign mappings instead of wasting real RAM pages from
the domain memory for establishing these mappings.

The extended regions are chosen by the hypervisor at the domain
creation time and advertised to it via "reg" property under
hypervisor node in the guest device-tree. As region 0 is reserved
for grant table space (always present), the indexes for extended
regions are 1...N.

If arch_xen_unpopulated_init() fails for some reason the default
behaviour will be restored (allocate xenballooned pages).

This patch also removes XEN_UNPOPULATED_ALLOC dependency on x86.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko &lt;oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1639080336-26573-6-git-send-email-olekstysh@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/unpopulated-alloc: Add mechanism to use Xen resource</title>
<updated>2022-01-06T08:53:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleksandr Tyshchenko</name>
<email>oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-09T20:05:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d1a928eac72962b562162c25baf45ce147e27247'/>
<id>d1a928eac72962b562162c25baf45ce147e27247</id>
<content type='text'>
The main reason of this change is that unpopulated-alloc
code cannot be used in its current form on Arm, but there
is a desire to reuse it to avoid wasting real RAM pages
for the grant/foreign mappings.

The problem is that system "iomem_resource" is used for
the address space allocation, but the really unallocated
space can't be figured out precisely by the domain on Arm
without hypervisor involvement. For example, not all device
I/O regions are known by the time domain starts creating
grant/foreign mappings. And following the advise from
"iomem_resource" we might end up reusing these regions by
a mistake. So, the hypervisor which maintains the P2M for
the domain is in the best position to provide unused regions
of guest physical address space which could be safely used
to create grant/foreign mappings.

Introduce new helper arch_xen_unpopulated_init() which purpose
is to create specific Xen resource based on the memory regions
provided by the hypervisor to be used as unused space for Xen
scratch pages. If arch doesn't define arch_xen_unpopulated_init()
the default "iomem_resource" will be used.

Update the arguments list of allocate_resource() in fill_list()
to always allocate a region from the hotpluggable range
(maximum possible addressable physical memory range for which
the linear mapping could be created). If arch doesn't define
arch_get_mappable_range() the default range (0,-1) will be used.

The behaviour on x86 won't be changed by current patch as both
arch_xen_unpopulated_init() and arch_get_mappable_range()
are not implemented for it.

Also fallback to allocate xenballooned pages (balloon out RAM
pages) if we do not have any suitable resource to work with
(target_resource is invalid) and as the result we won't be able
to provide unpopulated pages on a request.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko &lt;oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1639080336-26573-5-git-send-email-olekstysh@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The main reason of this change is that unpopulated-alloc
code cannot be used in its current form on Arm, but there
is a desire to reuse it to avoid wasting real RAM pages
for the grant/foreign mappings.

The problem is that system "iomem_resource" is used for
the address space allocation, but the really unallocated
space can't be figured out precisely by the domain on Arm
without hypervisor involvement. For example, not all device
I/O regions are known by the time domain starts creating
grant/foreign mappings. And following the advise from
"iomem_resource" we might end up reusing these regions by
a mistake. So, the hypervisor which maintains the P2M for
the domain is in the best position to provide unused regions
of guest physical address space which could be safely used
to create grant/foreign mappings.

Introduce new helper arch_xen_unpopulated_init() which purpose
is to create specific Xen resource based on the memory regions
provided by the hypervisor to be used as unused space for Xen
scratch pages. If arch doesn't define arch_xen_unpopulated_init()
the default "iomem_resource" will be used.

Update the arguments list of allocate_resource() in fill_list()
to always allocate a region from the hotpluggable range
(maximum possible addressable physical memory range for which
the linear mapping could be created). If arch doesn't define
arch_get_mappable_range() the default range (0,-1) will be used.

The behaviour on x86 won't be changed by current patch as both
arch_xen_unpopulated_init() and arch_get_mappable_range()
are not implemented for it.

Also fallback to allocate xenballooned pages (balloon out RAM
pages) if we do not have any suitable resource to work with
(target_resource is invalid) and as the result we won't be able
to provide unpopulated pages on a request.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko &lt;oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1639080336-26573-5-git-send-email-olekstysh@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
