<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/xen, branch linux-3.4.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>xen/pciback: Save the number of MSI-X entries to be copied later.</title>
<updated>2016-10-26T15:15:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-11T21:10:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=658ba629ae9263312ea373c5f9faac0b2dabf070'/>
<id>658ba629ae9263312ea373c5f9faac0b2dabf070</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d159457b84395927b5a52adb72f748dd089ad5e5 upstream.

Commit 8135cf8b092723dbfcc611fe6fdcb3a36c9951c5 (xen/pciback: Save
xen_pci_op commands before processing it) broke enabling MSI-X because
it would never copy the resulting vectors into the response.  The
number of vectors requested was being overwritten by the return value
(typically zero for success).

Save the number of vectors before processing the op, so the correct
number of vectors are copied afterwards.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d159457b84395927b5a52adb72f748dd089ad5e5 upstream.

Commit 8135cf8b092723dbfcc611fe6fdcb3a36c9951c5 (xen/pciback: Save
xen_pci_op commands before processing it) broke enabling MSI-X because
it would never copy the resulting vectors into the response.  The
number of vectors requested was being overwritten by the return value
(typically zero for success).

Save the number of vectors before processing the op, so the correct
number of vectors are copied afterwards.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/pciback: Don't allow MSI-X ops if PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY is not set.</title>
<updated>2016-10-26T15:15:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-02T23:13:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c053c997ce9d19dc079ad23c482233bf3614e662'/>
<id>c053c997ce9d19dc079ad23c482233bf3614e662</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 408fb0e5aa7fda0059db282ff58c3b2a4278baa0 upstream.

commit f598282f51 ("PCI: Fix the NIU MSI-X problem in a better way")
teaches us that dealing with MSI-X can be troublesome.

Further checks in the MSI-X architecture shows that if the
PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY bit is turned of in the PCI_COMMAND we
may not be able to access the BAR (since they are memory regions).

Since the MSI-X tables are located in there.. that can lead
to us causing PCIe errors. Inhibit us performing any
operation on the MSI-X unless the MEMORY bit is set.

Note that Xen hypervisor with:
"x86/MSI-X: access MSI-X table only after having enabled MSI-X"
will return:
xen_pciback: 0000:0a:00.1: error -6 enabling MSI-X for guest 3!

When the generic MSI code tries to setup the PIRQ without
MEMORY bit set. Which means with later versions of Xen
(4.6) this patch is not neccessary.

This is part of XSA-157

Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 408fb0e5aa7fda0059db282ff58c3b2a4278baa0 upstream.

commit f598282f51 ("PCI: Fix the NIU MSI-X problem in a better way")
teaches us that dealing with MSI-X can be troublesome.

Further checks in the MSI-X architecture shows that if the
PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY bit is turned of in the PCI_COMMAND we
may not be able to access the BAR (since they are memory regions).

Since the MSI-X tables are located in there.. that can lead
to us causing PCIe errors. Inhibit us performing any
operation on the MSI-X unless the MEMORY bit is set.

Note that Xen hypervisor with:
"x86/MSI-X: access MSI-X table only after having enabled MSI-X"
will return:
xen_pciback: 0000:0a:00.1: error -6 enabling MSI-X for guest 3!

When the generic MSI code tries to setup the PIRQ without
MEMORY bit set. Which means with later versions of Xen
(4.6) this patch is not neccessary.

This is part of XSA-157

Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/pciback: For XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi[|x] only disable if device has MSI(X) enabled.</title>
<updated>2016-10-26T15:15:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-01T14:49:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7e8c20ac766e4403b9b5277403112b77f916c2cf'/>
<id>7e8c20ac766e4403b9b5277403112b77f916c2cf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7cfb905b9638982862f0331b36ccaaca5d383b49 upstream.

Otherwise just continue on, returning the same values as
previously (return of 0, and op-&gt;result has the PIRQ value).

This does not change the behavior of XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi[|x].

The pci_disable_msi or pci_disable_msix have the checks for
msi_enabled or msix_enabled so they will error out immediately.

However the guest can still call these operations and cause
us to disable the 'ack_intr'. That means the backend IRQ handler
for the legacy interrupt will not respond to interrupts anymore.

This will lead to (if the device is causing an interrupt storm)
for the Linux generic code to disable the interrupt line.

Naturally this will only happen if the device in question
is plugged in on the motherboard on shared level interrupt GSI.

This is part of XSA-157

Reviewed-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7cfb905b9638982862f0331b36ccaaca5d383b49 upstream.

Otherwise just continue on, returning the same values as
previously (return of 0, and op-&gt;result has the PIRQ value).

This does not change the behavior of XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi[|x].

The pci_disable_msi or pci_disable_msix have the checks for
msi_enabled or msix_enabled so they will error out immediately.

However the guest can still call these operations and cause
us to disable the 'ack_intr'. That means the backend IRQ handler
for the legacy interrupt will not respond to interrupts anymore.

This will lead to (if the device is causing an interrupt storm)
for the Linux generic code to disable the interrupt line.

Naturally this will only happen if the device in question
is plugged in on the motherboard on shared level interrupt GSI.

This is part of XSA-157

Reviewed-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/pciback: Do not install an IRQ handler for MSI interrupts.</title>
<updated>2016-10-26T15:15:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-02T22:24:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=073a5ac1cb93623e71cda2510929dcffd0b9554b'/>
<id>073a5ac1cb93623e71cda2510929dcffd0b9554b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a396f3a210c3a61e94d6b87ec05a75d0be2a60d0 upstream.

Otherwise an guest can subvert the generic MSI code to trigger
an BUG_ON condition during MSI interrupt freeing:

 for (i = 0; i &lt; entry-&gt;nvec_used; i++)
        BUG_ON(irq_has_action(entry-&gt;irq + i));

Xen PCI backed installs an IRQ handler (request_irq) for
the dev-&gt;irq whenever the guest writes PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY
(or PCI_COMMAND_IO) to the PCI_COMMAND register. This is
done in case the device has legacy interrupts the GSI line
is shared by the backend devices.

To subvert the backend the guest needs to make the backend
to change the dev-&gt;irq from the GSI to the MSI interrupt line,
make the backend allocate an interrupt handler, and then command
the backend to free the MSI interrupt and hit the BUG_ON.

Since the backend only calls 'request_irq' when the guest
writes to the PCI_COMMAND register the guest needs to call
XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi before any other operation. This will
cause the generic MSI code to setup an MSI entry and
populate dev-&gt;irq with the new PIRQ value.

Then the guest can write to PCI_COMMAND PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY
and cause the backend to setup an IRQ handler for dev-&gt;irq
(which instead of the GSI value has the MSI pirq). See
'xen_pcibk_control_isr'.

Then the guest disables the MSI: XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi
which ends up triggering the BUG_ON condition in 'free_msi_irqs'
as there is an IRQ handler for the entry-&gt;irq (dev-&gt;irq).

Note that this cannot be done using MSI-X as the generic
code does not over-write dev-&gt;irq with the MSI-X PIRQ values.

The patch inhibits setting up the IRQ handler if MSI or
MSI-X (for symmetry reasons) code had been called successfully.

P.S.
Xen PCIBack when it sets up the device for the guest consumption
ends up writting 0 to the PCI_COMMAND (see xen_pcibk_reset_device).
XSA-120 addendum patch removed that - however when upstreaming said
addendum we found that it caused issues with qemu upstream. That
has now been fixed in qemu upstream.

This is part of XSA-157

Reviewed-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a396f3a210c3a61e94d6b87ec05a75d0be2a60d0 upstream.

Otherwise an guest can subvert the generic MSI code to trigger
an BUG_ON condition during MSI interrupt freeing:

 for (i = 0; i &lt; entry-&gt;nvec_used; i++)
        BUG_ON(irq_has_action(entry-&gt;irq + i));

Xen PCI backed installs an IRQ handler (request_irq) for
the dev-&gt;irq whenever the guest writes PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY
(or PCI_COMMAND_IO) to the PCI_COMMAND register. This is
done in case the device has legacy interrupts the GSI line
is shared by the backend devices.

To subvert the backend the guest needs to make the backend
to change the dev-&gt;irq from the GSI to the MSI interrupt line,
make the backend allocate an interrupt handler, and then command
the backend to free the MSI interrupt and hit the BUG_ON.

Since the backend only calls 'request_irq' when the guest
writes to the PCI_COMMAND register the guest needs to call
XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi before any other operation. This will
cause the generic MSI code to setup an MSI entry and
populate dev-&gt;irq with the new PIRQ value.

Then the guest can write to PCI_COMMAND PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY
and cause the backend to setup an IRQ handler for dev-&gt;irq
(which instead of the GSI value has the MSI pirq). See
'xen_pcibk_control_isr'.

Then the guest disables the MSI: XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi
which ends up triggering the BUG_ON condition in 'free_msi_irqs'
as there is an IRQ handler for the entry-&gt;irq (dev-&gt;irq).

Note that this cannot be done using MSI-X as the generic
code does not over-write dev-&gt;irq with the MSI-X PIRQ values.

The patch inhibits setting up the IRQ handler if MSI or
MSI-X (for symmetry reasons) code had been called successfully.

P.S.
Xen PCIBack when it sets up the device for the guest consumption
ends up writting 0 to the PCI_COMMAND (see xen_pcibk_reset_device).
XSA-120 addendum patch removed that - however when upstreaming said
addendum we found that it caused issues with qemu upstream. That
has now been fixed in qemu upstream.

This is part of XSA-157

Reviewed-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/pciback: Return error on XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix when device has MSI or MSI-X enabled</title>
<updated>2016-10-26T15:15:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-02T23:07:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8f805deca3407ad322f66fce2f5bc111e848879a'/>
<id>8f805deca3407ad322f66fce2f5bc111e848879a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5e0ce1455c09dd61d029b8ad45d82e1ac0b6c4c9 upstream.

The guest sequence of:

  a) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix
  b) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix

results in hitting an NULL pointer due to using freed pointers.

The device passed in the guest MUST have MSI-X capability.

The a) constructs and SysFS representation of MSI and MSI groups.
The b) adds a second set of them but adding in to SysFS fails (duplicate entry).
'populate_msi_sysfs' frees the newly allocated msi_irq_groups (note that
in a) pdev-&gt;msi_irq_groups is still set) and also free's ALL of the
MSI-X entries of the device (the ones allocated in step a) and b)).

The unwind code: 'free_msi_irqs' deletes all the entries and tries to
delete the pdev-&gt;msi_irq_groups (which hasn't been set to NULL).
However the pointers in the SysFS are already freed and we hit an
NULL pointer further on when 'strlen' is attempted on a freed pointer.

The patch adds a simple check in the XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix to guard
against that. The check for msi_enabled is not stricly neccessary.

This is part of XSA-157

Reviewed-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5e0ce1455c09dd61d029b8ad45d82e1ac0b6c4c9 upstream.

The guest sequence of:

  a) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix
  b) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix

results in hitting an NULL pointer due to using freed pointers.

The device passed in the guest MUST have MSI-X capability.

The a) constructs and SysFS representation of MSI and MSI groups.
The b) adds a second set of them but adding in to SysFS fails (duplicate entry).
'populate_msi_sysfs' frees the newly allocated msi_irq_groups (note that
in a) pdev-&gt;msi_irq_groups is still set) and also free's ALL of the
MSI-X entries of the device (the ones allocated in step a) and b)).

The unwind code: 'free_msi_irqs' deletes all the entries and tries to
delete the pdev-&gt;msi_irq_groups (which hasn't been set to NULL).
However the pointers in the SysFS are already freed and we hit an
NULL pointer further on when 'strlen' is attempted on a freed pointer.

The patch adds a simple check in the XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix to guard
against that. The check for msi_enabled is not stricly neccessary.

This is part of XSA-157

Reviewed-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/pciback: Return error on XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi when device has MSI or MSI-X enabled</title>
<updated>2016-10-26T15:15:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-03T15:08:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d3ec88675e4e82f6b520e3d1ca974dc3418e0410'/>
<id>d3ec88675e4e82f6b520e3d1ca974dc3418e0410</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 56441f3c8e5bd45aab10dd9f8c505dd4bec03b0d upstream.

The guest sequence of:

 a) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi
 b) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi
 c) XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi

results in hitting an BUG_ON condition in the msi.c code.

The MSI code uses an dev-&gt;msi_list to which it adds MSI entries.
Under the above conditions an BUG_ON() can be hit. The device
passed in the guest MUST have MSI capability.

The a) adds the entry to the dev-&gt;msi_list and sets msi_enabled.
The b) adds a second entry but adding in to SysFS fails (duplicate entry)
and deletes all of the entries from msi_list and returns (with msi_enabled
is still set).  c) pci_disable_msi passes the msi_enabled checks and hits:

BUG_ON(list_empty(dev_to_msi_list(&amp;dev-&gt;dev)));

and blows up.

The patch adds a simple check in the XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi to guard
against that. The check for msix_enabled is not stricly neccessary.

This is part of XSA-157.

Reviewed-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 56441f3c8e5bd45aab10dd9f8c505dd4bec03b0d upstream.

The guest sequence of:

 a) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi
 b) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi
 c) XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi

results in hitting an BUG_ON condition in the msi.c code.

The MSI code uses an dev-&gt;msi_list to which it adds MSI entries.
Under the above conditions an BUG_ON() can be hit. The device
passed in the guest MUST have MSI capability.

The a) adds the entry to the dev-&gt;msi_list and sets msi_enabled.
The b) adds a second entry but adding in to SysFS fails (duplicate entry)
and deletes all of the entries from msi_list and returns (with msi_enabled
is still set).  c) pci_disable_msi passes the msi_enabled checks and hits:

BUG_ON(list_empty(dev_to_msi_list(&amp;dev-&gt;dev)));

and blows up.

The patch adds a simple check in the XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi to guard
against that. The check for msix_enabled is not stricly neccessary.

This is part of XSA-157.

Reviewed-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/pciback: Save xen_pci_op commands before processing it</title>
<updated>2016-10-26T15:15:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk</name>
<email>konrad.wilk@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-16T17:40:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=550fe2571866702ec3951ad67574175fcd0bf9e7'/>
<id>550fe2571866702ec3951ad67574175fcd0bf9e7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8135cf8b092723dbfcc611fe6fdcb3a36c9951c5 upstream.

Double fetch vulnerabilities that happen when a variable is
fetched twice from shared memory but a security check is only
performed the first time.

The xen_pcibk_do_op function performs a switch statements on the op-&gt;cmd
value which is stored in shared memory. Interestingly this can result
in a double fetch vulnerability depending on the performed compiler
optimization.

This patch fixes it by saving the xen_pci_op command before
processing it. We also use 'barrier' to make sure that the
compiler does not perform any optimization.

This is part of XSA155.

Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;JBeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8135cf8b092723dbfcc611fe6fdcb3a36c9951c5 upstream.

Double fetch vulnerabilities that happen when a variable is
fetched twice from shared memory but a security check is only
performed the first time.

The xen_pcibk_do_op function performs a switch statements on the op-&gt;cmd
value which is stored in shared memory. Interestingly this can result
in a double fetch vulnerability depending on the performed compiler
optimization.

This patch fixes it by saving the xen_pci_op command before
processing it. We also use 'barrier' to make sure that the
compiler does not perform any optimization.

This is part of XSA155.

Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich &lt;JBeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: don't bind non-percpu VIRQs with percpu chip</title>
<updated>2015-09-18T01:20:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Vrabel</name>
<email>david.vrabel@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-19T17:40:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0b80fa4b24f50a87c796970661e45d6edc524a08'/>
<id>0b80fa4b24f50a87c796970661e45d6edc524a08</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 77bb3dfdc0d554befad58fdefbc41be5bc3ed38a upstream.

A non-percpu VIRQ (e.g., VIRQ_CONSOLE) may be freed on a different
VCPU than it is bound to.  This can result in a race between
handle_percpu_irq() and removing the action in __free_irq() because
handle_percpu_irq() does not take desc-&gt;lock.  The interrupt handler
sees a NULL action and oopses.

Only use the percpu chip/handler for per-CPU VIRQs (like VIRQ_TIMER).

  # cat /proc/interrupts | grep virq
   40:      87246          0  xen-percpu-virq      timer0
   44:          0          0  xen-percpu-virq      debug0
   47:          0      20995  xen-percpu-virq      timer1
   51:          0          0  xen-percpu-virq      debug1
   69:          0          0   xen-dyn-virq      xen-pcpu
   74:          0          0   xen-dyn-virq      mce
   75:         29          0   xen-dyn-virq      hvc_console

Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
[lizf: Backported to 3.4: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
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<pre>
commit 77bb3dfdc0d554befad58fdefbc41be5bc3ed38a upstream.

A non-percpu VIRQ (e.g., VIRQ_CONSOLE) may be freed on a different
VCPU than it is bound to.  This can result in a race between
handle_percpu_irq() and removing the action in __free_irq() because
handle_percpu_irq() does not take desc-&gt;lock.  The interrupt handler
sees a NULL action and oopses.

Only use the percpu chip/handler for per-CPU VIRQs (like VIRQ_TIMER).

  # cat /proc/interrupts | grep virq
   40:      87246          0  xen-percpu-virq      timer0
   44:          0          0  xen-percpu-virq      debug0
   47:          0      20995  xen-percpu-virq      timer1
   51:          0          0  xen-percpu-virq      debug1
   69:          0          0   xen-dyn-virq      xen-pcpu
   74:          0          0   xen-dyn-virq      mce
   75:         29          0   xen-dyn-virq      hvc_console

Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
[lizf: Backported to 3.4: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: Set irq_info-&gt;evtchn before binding the channel to CPU in __startup_pirq()</title>
<updated>2015-09-18T01:20:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Boris Ostrovsky</name>
<email>boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-29T21:10:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=95f92efede0bece7fa9eaaf4329e5445eb927739'/>
<id>95f92efede0bece7fa9eaaf4329e5445eb927739</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 16e6bd5970c88a2ac018b84a5f1dd5c2ff1fdf2c upstream.

.. because bind_evtchn_to_cpu(evtchn, cpu) will map evtchn to
'info' and pass 'info' down to xen_evtchn_port_bind_to_cpu().

Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Annie Li &lt;annie.li@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
[lizf: Backported to 3.4: adjust filename and context]
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
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<pre>
commit 16e6bd5970c88a2ac018b84a5f1dd5c2ff1fdf2c upstream.

.. because bind_evtchn_to_cpu(evtchn, cpu) will map evtchn to
'info' and pass 'info' down to xen_evtchn_port_bind_to_cpu().

Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Annie Li &lt;annie.li@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
[lizf: Backported to 3.4: adjust filename and context]
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen-pciback: Add name prefix to global 'permissive' variable</title>
<updated>2015-06-19T03:40:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-12T23:26:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cb990484af9902b4acdb892668441e11f3df8923'/>
<id>cb990484af9902b4acdb892668441e11f3df8923</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8014bcc86ef112eab9ee1db312dba4e6b608cf89 upstream.

The variable for the 'permissive' module parameter used to be static
but was recently changed to be extern.  This puts it in the kernel
global namespace if the driver is built-in, so its name should begin
with a prefix identifying the driver.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Fixes: af6fc858a35b ("xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register")
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8014bcc86ef112eab9ee1db312dba4e6b608cf89 upstream.

The variable for the 'permissive' module parameter used to be static
but was recently changed to be extern.  This puts it in the kernel
global namespace if the driver is built-in, so its name should begin
with a prefix identifying the driver.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Fixes: af6fc858a35b ("xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register")
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel &lt;david.vrabel@citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
