<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/tty/vt, branch v5.4.26</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>vt: selection, push sel_lock up</title>
<updated>2020-03-12T12:00:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Slaby</name>
<email>jslaby@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-28T11:54:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9a9c13ad21a8220cb70c9807a920f43520515f94'/>
<id>9a9c13ad21a8220cb70c9807a920f43520515f94</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e8c75a30a23c6ba63f4ef6895cbf41fd42f21aa2 upstream.

sel_lock cannot nest in the console lock. Thanks to syzkaller, the
kernel states firmly:

&gt; WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
&gt; 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
&gt; ------------------------------------------------------
&gt; syz-executor.4/20336 is trying to acquire lock:
&gt; ffff8880a2e952a0 (&amp;tty-&gt;termios_rwsem){++++}, at: tty_unthrottle+0x22/0x100 drivers/tty/tty_ioctl.c:136
&gt;
&gt; but task is already holding lock:
&gt; ffffffff89462e70 (sel_lock){+.+.}, at: paste_selection+0x118/0x470 drivers/tty/vt/selection.c:374
&gt;
&gt; which lock already depends on the new lock.
&gt;
&gt; the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
&gt;
&gt; -&gt; #2 (sel_lock){+.+.}:
&gt;        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1118
&gt;        set_selection_kernel+0x3b8/0x18a0 drivers/tty/vt/selection.c:217
&gt;        set_selection_user+0x63/0x80 drivers/tty/vt/selection.c:181
&gt;        tioclinux+0x103/0x530 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3050
&gt;        vt_ioctl+0x3f1/0x3a30 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:364

This is ioctl(TIOCL_SETSEL).
Locks held on the path: console_lock -&gt; sel_lock

&gt; -&gt; #1 (console_lock){+.+.}:
&gt;        console_lock+0x46/0x70 kernel/printk/printk.c:2289
&gt;        con_flush_chars+0x50/0x650 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3223
&gt;        n_tty_write+0xeae/0x1200 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2350
&gt;        do_tty_write drivers/tty/tty_io.c:962 [inline]
&gt;        tty_write+0x5a1/0x950 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1046

This is write().
Locks held on the path: termios_rwsem -&gt; console_lock

&gt; -&gt; #0 (&amp;tty-&gt;termios_rwsem){++++}:
&gt;        down_write+0x57/0x140 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1534
&gt;        tty_unthrottle+0x22/0x100 drivers/tty/tty_ioctl.c:136
&gt;        mkiss_receive_buf+0x12aa/0x1340 drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c:902
&gt;        tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0x12f/0x170 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:465
&gt;        paste_selection+0x346/0x470 drivers/tty/vt/selection.c:389
&gt;        tioclinux+0x121/0x530 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3055
&gt;        vt_ioctl+0x3f1/0x3a30 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:364

This is ioctl(TIOCL_PASTESEL).
Locks held on the path: sel_lock -&gt; termios_rwsem

&gt; other info that might help us debug this:
&gt;
&gt; Chain exists of:
&gt;   &amp;tty-&gt;termios_rwsem --&gt; console_lock --&gt; sel_lock

Clearly. From the above, we have:
 console_lock -&gt; sel_lock
 sel_lock -&gt; termios_rwsem
 termios_rwsem -&gt; console_lock

Fix this by reversing the console_lock -&gt; sel_lock dependency in
ioctl(TIOCL_SETSEL). First, lock sel_lock, then console_lock.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+26183d9746e62da329b8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 07e6124a1a46 ("vt: selection, close sel_buffer race")
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200228115406.5735-2-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e8c75a30a23c6ba63f4ef6895cbf41fd42f21aa2 upstream.

sel_lock cannot nest in the console lock. Thanks to syzkaller, the
kernel states firmly:

&gt; WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
&gt; 5.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
&gt; ------------------------------------------------------
&gt; syz-executor.4/20336 is trying to acquire lock:
&gt; ffff8880a2e952a0 (&amp;tty-&gt;termios_rwsem){++++}, at: tty_unthrottle+0x22/0x100 drivers/tty/tty_ioctl.c:136
&gt;
&gt; but task is already holding lock:
&gt; ffffffff89462e70 (sel_lock){+.+.}, at: paste_selection+0x118/0x470 drivers/tty/vt/selection.c:374
&gt;
&gt; which lock already depends on the new lock.
&gt;
&gt; the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
&gt;
&gt; -&gt; #2 (sel_lock){+.+.}:
&gt;        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1118
&gt;        set_selection_kernel+0x3b8/0x18a0 drivers/tty/vt/selection.c:217
&gt;        set_selection_user+0x63/0x80 drivers/tty/vt/selection.c:181
&gt;        tioclinux+0x103/0x530 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3050
&gt;        vt_ioctl+0x3f1/0x3a30 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:364

This is ioctl(TIOCL_SETSEL).
Locks held on the path: console_lock -&gt; sel_lock

&gt; -&gt; #1 (console_lock){+.+.}:
&gt;        console_lock+0x46/0x70 kernel/printk/printk.c:2289
&gt;        con_flush_chars+0x50/0x650 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3223
&gt;        n_tty_write+0xeae/0x1200 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2350
&gt;        do_tty_write drivers/tty/tty_io.c:962 [inline]
&gt;        tty_write+0x5a1/0x950 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1046

This is write().
Locks held on the path: termios_rwsem -&gt; console_lock

&gt; -&gt; #0 (&amp;tty-&gt;termios_rwsem){++++}:
&gt;        down_write+0x57/0x140 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1534
&gt;        tty_unthrottle+0x22/0x100 drivers/tty/tty_ioctl.c:136
&gt;        mkiss_receive_buf+0x12aa/0x1340 drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c:902
&gt;        tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0x12f/0x170 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:465
&gt;        paste_selection+0x346/0x470 drivers/tty/vt/selection.c:389
&gt;        tioclinux+0x121/0x530 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3055
&gt;        vt_ioctl+0x3f1/0x3a30 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:364

This is ioctl(TIOCL_PASTESEL).
Locks held on the path: sel_lock -&gt; termios_rwsem

&gt; other info that might help us debug this:
&gt;
&gt; Chain exists of:
&gt;   &amp;tty-&gt;termios_rwsem --&gt; console_lock --&gt; sel_lock

Clearly. From the above, we have:
 console_lock -&gt; sel_lock
 sel_lock -&gt; termios_rwsem
 termios_rwsem -&gt; console_lock

Fix this by reversing the console_lock -&gt; sel_lock dependency in
ioctl(TIOCL_SETSEL). First, lock sel_lock, then console_lock.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+26183d9746e62da329b8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 07e6124a1a46 ("vt: selection, close sel_buffer race")
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200228115406.5735-2-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vt: selection, push console lock down</title>
<updated>2020-03-12T12:00:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Slaby</name>
<email>jslaby@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-28T11:54:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=119ee545581a8d39b8fa692bd6805f560ae962c9'/>
<id>119ee545581a8d39b8fa692bd6805f560ae962c9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4b70dd57a15d2f4685ac6e38056bad93e81e982f upstream.

We need to nest the console lock in sel_lock, so we have to push it down
a bit. Fortunately, the callers of set_selection_* just lock the console
lock around the function call. So moving it down is easy.

In the next patch, we switch the order.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Fixes: 07e6124a1a46 ("vt: selection, close sel_buffer race")
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200228115406.5735-1-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4b70dd57a15d2f4685ac6e38056bad93e81e982f upstream.

We need to nest the console lock in sel_lock, so we have to push it down
a bit. Fortunately, the callers of set_selection_* just lock the console
lock around the function call. So moving it down is easy.

In the next patch, we switch the order.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Fixes: 07e6124a1a46 ("vt: selection, close sel_buffer race")
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200228115406.5735-1-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vt: selection, close sel_buffer race</title>
<updated>2020-03-12T12:00:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Slaby</name>
<email>jslaby@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-10T08:11:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4387bfa605206b57451e6f77af1287960981ffa2'/>
<id>4387bfa605206b57451e6f77af1287960981ffa2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 07e6124a1a46b4b5a9b3cacc0c306b50da87abf5 upstream.

syzkaller reported this UAF:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in n_tty_receive_buf_common+0x2481/0x2940 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:1741
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880089e40e9 by task syz-executor.1/13184

CPU: 0 PID: 13184 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.4.7 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
...
 kasan_report+0xe/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:634
 n_tty_receive_buf_common+0x2481/0x2940 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:1741
 tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0xac/0x190 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:461
 paste_selection+0x297/0x400 drivers/tty/vt/selection.c:372
 tioclinux+0x20d/0x4e0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3044
 vt_ioctl+0x1bcf/0x28d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:364
 tty_ioctl+0x525/0x15a0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2657
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:47 [inline]

It is due to a race between parallel paste_selection (TIOCL_PASTESEL)
and set_selection_user (TIOCL_SETSEL) invocations. One uses sel_buffer,
while the other frees it and reallocates a new one for another
selection. Add a mutex to close this race.

The mutex takes care properly of sel_buffer and sel_buffer_lth only. The
other selection global variables (like sel_start, sel_end, and sel_cons)
are protected only in set_selection_user. The other functions need quite
some more work to close the races of the variables there. This is going
to happen later.

This likely fixes (I am unsure as there is no reproducer provided) bug
206361 too. It was marked as CVE-2020-8648.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+59997e8d5cbdc486e6f6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
References: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206361
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210081131.23572-2-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 07e6124a1a46b4b5a9b3cacc0c306b50da87abf5 upstream.

syzkaller reported this UAF:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in n_tty_receive_buf_common+0x2481/0x2940 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:1741
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880089e40e9 by task syz-executor.1/13184

CPU: 0 PID: 13184 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.4.7 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
...
 kasan_report+0xe/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:634
 n_tty_receive_buf_common+0x2481/0x2940 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:1741
 tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0xac/0x190 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:461
 paste_selection+0x297/0x400 drivers/tty/vt/selection.c:372
 tioclinux+0x20d/0x4e0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3044
 vt_ioctl+0x1bcf/0x28d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:364
 tty_ioctl+0x525/0x15a0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2657
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:47 [inline]

It is due to a race between parallel paste_selection (TIOCL_PASTESEL)
and set_selection_user (TIOCL_SETSEL) invocations. One uses sel_buffer,
while the other frees it and reallocates a new one for another
selection. Add a mutex to close this race.

The mutex takes care properly of sel_buffer and sel_buffer_lth only. The
other selection global variables (like sel_start, sel_end, and sel_cons)
are protected only in set_selection_user. The other functions need quite
some more work to close the races of the variables there. This is going
to happen later.

This likely fixes (I am unsure as there is no reproducer provided) bug
206361 too. It was marked as CVE-2020-8648.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+59997e8d5cbdc486e6f6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
References: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206361
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210081131.23572-2-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vt: vt_ioctl: fix race in VT_RESIZEX</title>
<updated>2020-02-28T16:22:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-10T19:07:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=897d5aaf3397e64a56274f2176d9e1b13adcb92e'/>
<id>897d5aaf3397e64a56274f2176d9e1b13adcb92e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6cd1ed50efd88261298577cd92a14f2768eddeeb upstream.

We need to make sure vc_cons[i].d is not NULL after grabbing
console_lock(), or risk a crash.

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000068: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000340-0x0000000000000347]
CPU: 1 PID: 19462 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.5.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:vt_ioctl+0x1f96/0x26d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:883
Code: 74 41 e8 bd a6 84 fd 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 e4 04 00 00 48 8b 03 48 8d b8 40 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 &lt;42&gt; 0f b6 14 2a 84 d2 74 09 80 fa 03 0f 8e b1 05 00 00 44 89 b8 40
RSP: 0018:ffffc900086d7bb0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8c34ee88 RCX: ffffc9001415c000
RDX: 0000000000000068 RSI: ffffffff83f0e6e3 RDI: 0000000000000340
RBP: ffffc900086d7cd0 R08: ffff888054ce0100 R09: fffffbfff16a2f6d
R10: ffff888054ce0998 R11: ffff888054ce0100 R12: 000000000000001d
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 1ffff920010daf79 R15: 000000000000ff7f
FS:  00007f7d13c12700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffd477e3c38 CR3: 0000000095d0a000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 tty_ioctl+0xa37/0x14f0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2660
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:47 [inline]
 ksys_ioctl+0x123/0x180 fs/ioctl.c:763
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:772 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:770 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:770
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x45b399
Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f7d13c11c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7d13c126d4 RCX: 000000000045b399
RDX: 0000000020000080 RSI: 000000000000560a RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000000666 R14: 00000000004c7f04 R15: 000000000075bf2c
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 80970faf7a67eb77 ]---
RIP: 0010:vt_ioctl+0x1f96/0x26d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:883
Code: 74 41 e8 bd a6 84 fd 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 e4 04 00 00 48 8b 03 48 8d b8 40 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 &lt;42&gt; 0f b6 14 2a 84 d2 74 09 80 fa 03 0f 8e b1 05 00 00 44 89 b8 40
RSP: 0018:ffffc900086d7bb0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8c34ee88 RCX: ffffc9001415c000
RDX: 0000000000000068 RSI: ffffffff83f0e6e3 RDI: 0000000000000340
RBP: ffffc900086d7cd0 R08: ffff888054ce0100 R09: fffffbfff16a2f6d
R10: ffff888054ce0998 R11: ffff888054ce0100 R12: 000000000000001d
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 1ffff920010daf79 R15: 000000000000ff7f
FS:  00007f7d13c12700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffd477e3c38 CR3: 0000000095d0a000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210190721.200418-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6cd1ed50efd88261298577cd92a14f2768eddeeb upstream.

We need to make sure vc_cons[i].d is not NULL after grabbing
console_lock(), or risk a crash.

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000068: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000340-0x0000000000000347]
CPU: 1 PID: 19462 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.5.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:vt_ioctl+0x1f96/0x26d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:883
Code: 74 41 e8 bd a6 84 fd 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 e4 04 00 00 48 8b 03 48 8d b8 40 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 &lt;42&gt; 0f b6 14 2a 84 d2 74 09 80 fa 03 0f 8e b1 05 00 00 44 89 b8 40
RSP: 0018:ffffc900086d7bb0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8c34ee88 RCX: ffffc9001415c000
RDX: 0000000000000068 RSI: ffffffff83f0e6e3 RDI: 0000000000000340
RBP: ffffc900086d7cd0 R08: ffff888054ce0100 R09: fffffbfff16a2f6d
R10: ffff888054ce0998 R11: ffff888054ce0100 R12: 000000000000001d
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 1ffff920010daf79 R15: 000000000000ff7f
FS:  00007f7d13c12700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffd477e3c38 CR3: 0000000095d0a000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 tty_ioctl+0xa37/0x14f0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2660
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:47 [inline]
 ksys_ioctl+0x123/0x180 fs/ioctl.c:763
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:772 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:770 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:770
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x45b399
Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f7d13c11c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7d13c126d4 RCX: 000000000045b399
RDX: 0000000020000080 RSI: 000000000000560a RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000000666 R14: 00000000004c7f04 R15: 000000000075bf2c
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 80970faf7a67eb77 ]---
RIP: 0010:vt_ioctl+0x1f96/0x26d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:883
Code: 74 41 e8 bd a6 84 fd 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 e4 04 00 00 48 8b 03 48 8d b8 40 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 &lt;42&gt; 0f b6 14 2a 84 d2 74 09 80 fa 03 0f 8e b1 05 00 00 44 89 b8 40
RSP: 0018:ffffc900086d7bb0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8c34ee88 RCX: ffffc9001415c000
RDX: 0000000000000068 RSI: ffffffff83f0e6e3 RDI: 0000000000000340
RBP: ffffc900086d7cd0 R08: ffff888054ce0100 R09: fffffbfff16a2f6d
R10: ffff888054ce0998 R11: ffff888054ce0100 R12: 000000000000001d
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 1ffff920010daf79 R15: 000000000000ff7f
FS:  00007f7d13c12700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffd477e3c38 CR3: 0000000095d0a000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210190721.200418-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vt: selection, handle pending signals in paste_selection</title>
<updated>2020-02-28T16:22:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Slaby</name>
<email>jslaby@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-10T08:11:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=21275a431289a6b29996771063cec0ce4bcc3885'/>
<id>21275a431289a6b29996771063cec0ce4bcc3885</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 687bff0cd08f790d540cfb7b2349f0d876cdddec upstream.

When pasting a selection to a vt, the task is set as INTERRUPTIBLE while
waiting for a tty to unthrottle. But signals are not handled at all.
Normally, this is not a problem as tty_ldisc_receive_buf receives all
the goods and a user has no reason to interrupt the task.

There are two scenarios where this matters:
1) when the tty is throttled and a signal is sent to the process, it
   spins on a CPU until the tty is unthrottled. schedule() does not
   really echedule, but returns immediately, of course.
2) when the sel_buffer becomes invalid, KASAN prevents any reads from it
   and the loop simply does not proceed and spins forever (causing the
   tty to throttle, but the code never sleeps, the same as above). This
   sometimes happens as there is a race in the sel_buffer handling code.

So add signal handling to this ioctl (TIOCL_PASTESEL) and return -EINTR
in case a signal is pending.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210081131.23572-1-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 687bff0cd08f790d540cfb7b2349f0d876cdddec upstream.

When pasting a selection to a vt, the task is set as INTERRUPTIBLE while
waiting for a tty to unthrottle. But signals are not handled at all.
Normally, this is not a problem as tty_ldisc_receive_buf receives all
the goods and a user has no reason to interrupt the task.

There are two scenarios where this matters:
1) when the tty is throttled and a signal is sent to the process, it
   spins on a CPU until the tty is unthrottled. schedule() does not
   really echedule, but returns immediately, of course.
2) when the sel_buffer becomes invalid, KASAN prevents any reads from it
   and the loop simply does not proceed and spins forever (causing the
   tty to throttle, but the code never sleeps, the same as above). This
   sometimes happens as there is a race in the sel_buffer handling code.

So add signal handling to this ioctl (TIOCL_PASTESEL) and return -EINTR
in case a signal is pending.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210081131.23572-1-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vt: fix scrollback flushing on background consoles</title>
<updated>2020-02-28T16:22:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicolas Pitre</name>
<email>nico@fluxnic.net</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-28T17:50:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a2c3858faf3a9f9217041d52ff761642878264c2'/>
<id>a2c3858faf3a9f9217041d52ff761642878264c2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3f4ef485be9d54040b695f32ec76d0f1ea50bbf3 upstream.

Commit a6dbe4427559 ("vt: perform safe console erase in the right
order") provided fixes to an earlier commit by gathering all console
scrollback flushing operations in a function of its own. This includes
the invocation of vc_sw-&gt;con_switch() as previously done through a
update_screen() call. That commit failed to carry over the
con_is_visible() conditional though, as well as cursor handling, which
caused problems when "\e[3J" was written to a background console.

One could argue for preserving the call to update_screen(). However
this does far more than we need, and it is best to remove scrollback
assumptions from it. Instead let's gather the minimum needed to actually
perform scrollback flushing properly in that one place.

While at it, let's document the vc_sw-&gt;con_switch() side effect being
relied upon.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nico@fluxnic.net&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: Lukas Wunner &lt;lukas@wunner.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YSQ.7.76.2001281205560.1655@knanqh.ubzr
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3f4ef485be9d54040b695f32ec76d0f1ea50bbf3 upstream.

Commit a6dbe4427559 ("vt: perform safe console erase in the right
order") provided fixes to an earlier commit by gathering all console
scrollback flushing operations in a function of its own. This includes
the invocation of vc_sw-&gt;con_switch() as previously done through a
update_screen() call. That commit failed to carry over the
con_is_visible() conditional though, as well as cursor handling, which
caused problems when "\e[3J" was written to a background console.

One could argue for preserving the call to update_screen(). However
this does far more than we need, and it is best to remove scrollback
assumptions from it. Instead let's gather the minimum needed to actually
perform scrollback flushing properly in that one place.

While at it, let's document the vc_sw-&gt;con_switch() side effect being
relied upon.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nico@fluxnic.net&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: Lukas Wunner &lt;lukas@wunner.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YSQ.7.76.2001281205560.1655@knanqh.ubzr
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vcs: prevent write access to vcsu devices</title>
<updated>2019-12-13T07:43:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicolas Pitre</name>
<email>nico@fluxnic.net</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-05T09:33:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0b0923bb6d2808bc6f3b03028fec685144227ba8'/>
<id>0b0923bb6d2808bc6f3b03028fec685144227ba8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0c9acb1af77a3cb8707e43f45b72c95266903cee upstream.

Commit d21b0be246bf ("vt: introduce unicode mode for /dev/vcs") guarded
against using devices containing attributes as this is not yet
implemented. It however failed to guard against writes to any devices
as this is also unimplemented.

Reported-by: Or Cohen &lt;orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre &lt;npitre@baylibre.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.19+
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.com&gt;
Fixes: d21b0be246bf ("vt: introduce unicode mode for /dev/vcs")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YSQ.7.76.1911051030580.30289@knanqh.ubzr
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0c9acb1af77a3cb8707e43f45b72c95266903cee upstream.

Commit d21b0be246bf ("vt: introduce unicode mode for /dev/vcs") guarded
against using devices containing attributes as this is not yet
implemented. It however failed to guard against writes to any devices
as this is also unimplemented.

Reported-by: Or Cohen &lt;orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre &lt;npitre@baylibre.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.19+
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.com&gt;
Fixes: d21b0be246bf ("vt: introduce unicode mode for /dev/vcs")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YSQ.7.76.1911051030580.30289@knanqh.ubzr
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tty: vt: keyboard: reject invalid keycodes</title>
<updated>2019-12-13T07:42:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Torokhov</name>
<email>dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-22T20:42:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a3812fe7a4388f048fe56b8be9444f4443660188'/>
<id>a3812fe7a4388f048fe56b8be9444f4443660188</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b2b2dd71e0859436d4e05b2f61f86140250ed3f8 upstream.

Do not try to handle keycodes that are too big, otherwise we risk doing
out-of-bounds writes:

BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in clear_bit include/asm-generic/bitops-instrumented.h:56 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in kbd_keycode drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1411 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in kbd_event+0xe6b/0x3790 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1495
Write of size 8 at addr ffffffff89a1b2d8 by task syz-executor108/1722
...
 kbd_keycode drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1411 [inline]
 kbd_event+0xe6b/0x3790 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1495
 input_to_handler+0x3b6/0x4c0 drivers/input/input.c:118
 input_pass_values.part.0+0x2e3/0x720 drivers/input/input.c:145
 input_pass_values drivers/input/input.c:949 [inline]
 input_set_keycode+0x290/0x320 drivers/input/input.c:954
 evdev_handle_set_keycode_v2+0xc4/0x120 drivers/input/evdev.c:882
 evdev_do_ioctl drivers/input/evdev.c:1150 [inline]

In this case we were dealing with a fuzzed HID device that declared over
12K buttons, and while HID layer should not be reporting to us such big
keycodes, we should also be defensive and reject invalid data ourselves as
well.

Reported-by: syzbot+19340dff067c2d3835c0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191122204220.GA129459@dtor-ws
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b2b2dd71e0859436d4e05b2f61f86140250ed3f8 upstream.

Do not try to handle keycodes that are too big, otherwise we risk doing
out-of-bounds writes:

BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in clear_bit include/asm-generic/bitops-instrumented.h:56 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in kbd_keycode drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1411 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in kbd_event+0xe6b/0x3790 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1495
Write of size 8 at addr ffffffff89a1b2d8 by task syz-executor108/1722
...
 kbd_keycode drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1411 [inline]
 kbd_event+0xe6b/0x3790 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1495
 input_to_handler+0x3b6/0x4c0 drivers/input/input.c:118
 input_pass_values.part.0+0x2e3/0x720 drivers/input/input.c:145
 input_pass_values drivers/input/input.c:949 [inline]
 input_set_keycode+0x290/0x320 drivers/input/input.c:954
 evdev_handle_set_keycode_v2+0xc4/0x120 drivers/input/evdev.c:882
 evdev_do_ioctl drivers/input/evdev.c:1150 [inline]

In this case we were dealing with a fuzzed HID device that declared over
12K buttons, and while HID layer should not be reporting to us such big
keycodes, we should also be defensive and reject invalid data ourselves as
well.

Reported-by: syzbot+19340dff067c2d3835c0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191122204220.GA129459@dtor-ws
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vt: Grab console_lock around con_is_bound in show_bind</title>
<updated>2019-07-25T11:47:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Vetter</name>
<email>daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-18T08:09:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=61d51456f35760a09e8aa1e6ddd247f1547015d3'/>
<id>61d51456f35760a09e8aa1e6ddd247f1547015d3</id>
<content type='text'>
Not really harmful not to, but also not harm in grabbing the lock. And
this shuts up a new WARNING I introduced in commit ddde3c18b700 ("vt:
More locking checks").

Reported-by: Jens Remus &lt;jremus@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nicolas.pitre@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Martin Hostettler &lt;textshell@uchuujin.de&gt;
Cc: Adam Borowski &lt;kilobyte@angband.pl&gt;
Cc: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch&gt;
Cc: Sam Ravnborg &lt;sam@ravnborg.org&gt;
Fixes: ddde3c18b700 ("vt: More locking checks")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel.vetter@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jens Remus &lt;jremus@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg &lt;sam@ravnborg.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190718080903.22622-1-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Not really harmful not to, but also not harm in grabbing the lock. And
this shuts up a new WARNING I introduced in commit ddde3c18b700 ("vt:
More locking checks").

Reported-by: Jens Remus &lt;jremus@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nicolas.pitre@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Martin Hostettler &lt;textshell@uchuujin.de&gt;
Cc: Adam Borowski &lt;kilobyte@angband.pl&gt;
Cc: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch&gt;
Cc: Sam Ravnborg &lt;sam@ravnborg.org&gt;
Fixes: ddde3c18b700 ("vt: More locking checks")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel.vetter@intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jens Remus &lt;jremus@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg &lt;sam@ravnborg.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190718080903.22622-1-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vt: More locking checks</title>
<updated>2019-06-12T18:27:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Vetter</name>
<email>daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-28T09:02:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ddde3c18b70061cc09b84a52624909349c212822'/>
<id>ddde3c18b70061cc09b84a52624909349c212822</id>
<content type='text'>
I honestly have no idea what the subtle differences between
con_is_visible, con_is_fg (internal to vt.c) and con_is_bound are. But
it looks like both vc-&gt;vc_display_fg and con_driver_map are protected
by the console_lock, so probably better if we hold that when checking
this.

To do that I had to deinline the con_is_visible function.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel.vetter@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sam Ravnborg &lt;sam@ravnborg.org&gt;
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Maarten Lankhorst &lt;maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nicolas.pitre@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Martin Hostettler &lt;textshell@uchuujin.de&gt;
Cc: Adam Borowski &lt;kilobyte@angband.pl&gt;
Cc: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch&gt;
Cc: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190528090304.9388-5-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
I honestly have no idea what the subtle differences between
con_is_visible, con_is_fg (internal to vt.c) and con_is_bound are. But
it looks like both vc-&gt;vc_display_fg and con_driver_map are protected
by the console_lock, so probably better if we hold that when checking
this.

To do that I had to deinline the con_is_visible function.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel.vetter@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sam Ravnborg &lt;sam@ravnborg.org&gt;
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Maarten Lankhorst &lt;maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nicolas.pitre@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Martin Hostettler &lt;textshell@uchuujin.de&gt;
Cc: Adam Borowski &lt;kilobyte@angband.pl&gt;
Cc: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch&gt;
Cc: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190528090304.9388-5-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
