<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/tty/hvc, branch linux-5.4.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>tty: hvc_console: Call hvc_kick in hvc_write unconditionally</title>
<updated>2025-10-02T11:34:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fabian Vogt</name>
<email>fvogt@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-15T11:33:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=931ee3272119dbca3b674902e979d6ee78d1f463'/>
<id>931ee3272119dbca3b674902e979d6ee78d1f463</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cfd956dcb101aa3d25bac321fae923323a47c607 upstream.

After hvc_write completes, call hvc_kick also in the case the output
buffer has been drained, to ensure tty_wakeup gets called.

This fixes that functions which wait for a drained buffer got stuck
occasionally.

Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Closes: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1230062
Signed-off-by: Fabian Vogt &lt;fvogt@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2011735.PYKUYFuaPT@fvogt-thinkpad
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit cfd956dcb101aa3d25bac321fae923323a47c607 upstream.

After hvc_write completes, call hvc_kick also in the case the output
buffer has been drained, to ensure tty_wakeup gets called.

This fixes that functions which wait for a drained buffer got stuck
occasionally.

Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Closes: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1230062
Signed-off-by: Fabian Vogt &lt;fvogt@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2011735.PYKUYFuaPT@fvogt-thinkpad
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hvc/xen: fix error path in xen_hvc_init() to always register frontend driver</title>
<updated>2023-11-28T16:50:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Woodhouse</name>
<email>dwmw@amazon.co.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-20T16:15:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=78d3487b5b876a7290b29b99ec0c1ae9da3df3c3'/>
<id>78d3487b5b876a7290b29b99ec0c1ae9da3df3c3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2704c9a5593f4a47620c12dad78838ca62b52f48 upstream.

The xen_hvc_init() function should always register the frontend driver,
even when there's no primary console — as there may be secondary consoles.
(Qemu can always add secondary consoles, but only the toolstack can add
the primary because it's special.)

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231020161529.355083-3-dwmw2@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2704c9a5593f4a47620c12dad78838ca62b52f48 upstream.

The xen_hvc_init() function should always register the frontend driver,
even when there's no primary console — as there may be secondary consoles.
(Qemu can always add secondary consoles, but only the toolstack can add
the primary because it's special.)

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw@amazon.co.uk&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231020161529.355083-3-dwmw2@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hvc/xen: prevent concurrent accesses to the shared ring</title>
<updated>2023-04-05T09:16:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roger Pau Monne</name>
<email>roger.pau@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-30T15:09:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=707335918f734fd30e704d2b8c3fdd7a9d5141b2'/>
<id>707335918f734fd30e704d2b8c3fdd7a9d5141b2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6214894f49a967c749ee6c07cb00f9cede748df4 ]

The hvc machinery registers both a console and a tty device based on
the hv ops provided by the specific implementation.  Those two
interfaces however have different locks, and there's no single locks
that's shared between the tty and the console implementations, hence
the driver needs to protect itself against concurrent accesses.
Otherwise concurrent calls using the split interfaces are likely to
corrupt the ring indexes, leaving the console unusable.

Introduce a lock to xencons_info to serialize accesses to the shared
ring.  This is only required when using the shared memory console,
concurrent accesses to the hypercall based console implementation are
not an issue.

Note the conditional logic in domU_read_console() is slightly modified
so the notify_daemon() call can be done outside of the locked region:
it's an hypercall and there's no need for it to be done with the lock
held.

Fixes: b536b4b96230 ('xen: use the hvc console infrastructure for Xen console')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné &lt;roger.pau@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130150919.13935-1-roger.pau@citrix.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6214894f49a967c749ee6c07cb00f9cede748df4 ]

The hvc machinery registers both a console and a tty device based on
the hv ops provided by the specific implementation.  Those two
interfaces however have different locks, and there's no single locks
that's shared between the tty and the console implementations, hence
the driver needs to protect itself against concurrent accesses.
Otherwise concurrent calls using the split interfaces are likely to
corrupt the ring indexes, leaving the console unusable.

Introduce a lock to xencons_info to serialize accesses to the shared
ring.  This is only required when using the shared memory console,
concurrent accesses to the hypercall based console implementation are
not an issue.

Note the conditional logic in domU_read_console() is slightly modified
so the notify_daemon() call can be done outside of the locked region:
it's an hypercall and there's no need for it to be done with the lock
held.

Fixes: b536b4b96230 ('xen: use the hvc console infrastructure for Xen console')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné &lt;roger.pau@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130150919.13935-1-roger.pau@citrix.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hvc/xen: lock console list traversal</title>
<updated>2023-01-18T10:42:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roger Pau Monne</name>
<email>roger.pau@citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-30T16:36:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=576eadef2c8d61545e279fcfb54c456cee108ea6'/>
<id>576eadef2c8d61545e279fcfb54c456cee108ea6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c0dccad87cf68fc6012aec7567e354353097ec1a ]

The currently lockless access to the xen console list in
vtermno_to_xencons() is incorrect, as additions and removals from the
list can happen anytime, and as such the traversal of the list to get
the private console data for a given termno needs to happen with the
lock held.  Note users that modify the list already do so with the
lock taken.

Adjust current lock takers to use the _irq{save,restore} helpers,
since the context in which vtermno_to_xencons() is called can have
interrupts disabled.  Use the _irq{save,restore} set of helpers to
switch the current callers to disable interrupts in the locked region.
I haven't checked if existing users could instead use the _irq
variant, as I think it's safer to use _irq{save,restore} upfront.

While there switch from using list_for_each_entry_safe to
list_for_each_entry: the current entry cursor won't be removed as
part of the code in the loop body, so using the _safe variant is
pointless.

Fixes: 02e19f9c7cac ('hvc_xen: implement multiconsole support')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné &lt;roger.pau@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130163611.14686-1-roger.pau@citrix.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c0dccad87cf68fc6012aec7567e354353097ec1a ]

The currently lockless access to the xen console list in
vtermno_to_xencons() is incorrect, as additions and removals from the
list can happen anytime, and as such the traversal of the list to get
the private console data for a given termno needs to happen with the
lock held.  Note users that modify the list already do so with the
lock taken.

Adjust current lock takers to use the _irq{save,restore} helpers,
since the context in which vtermno_to_xencons() is called can have
interrupts disabled.  Use the _irq{save,restore} set of helpers to
switch the current callers to disable interrupts in the locked region.
I haven't checked if existing users could instead use the _irq
variant, as I think it's safer to use _irq{save,restore} upfront.

While there switch from using list_for_each_entry_safe to
list_for_each_entry: the current entry cursor won't be removed as
part of the code in the loop body, so using the _safe variant is
pointless.

Fixes: 02e19f9c7cac ('hvc_xen: implement multiconsole support')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné &lt;roger.pau@citrix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130163611.14686-1-roger.pau@citrix.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tty: hvc: fix return value of __setup handler</title>
<updated>2022-04-15T12:18:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-08T02:42:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7c617cb38c192ab86526613444bdffe9b21e9085'/>
<id>7c617cb38c192ab86526613444bdffe9b21e9085</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 53819a0d97aace1425bb042829e3446952a9e8a9 ]

__setup() handlers should return 1 to indicate that the boot option
has been handled or 0 to indicate that it was not handled.
Add a pr_warn() message if the option value is invalid and then
always return 1.

Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Fixes: 86b40567b917 ("tty: replace strict_strtoul() with kstrtoul()")
Cc: Jingoo Han &lt;jg1.han@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jirislaby@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Julian Wiedmann &lt;jwi@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov &lt;i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308024228.20477-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 53819a0d97aace1425bb042829e3446952a9e8a9 ]

__setup() handlers should return 1 to indicate that the boot option
has been handled or 0 to indicate that it was not handled.
Add a pr_warn() message if the option value is invalid and then
always return 1.

Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Fixes: 86b40567b917 ("tty: replace strict_strtoul() with kstrtoul()")
Cc: Jingoo Han &lt;jg1.han@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jirislaby@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Julian Wiedmann &lt;jwi@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov &lt;i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308024228.20477-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xen/console: harden hvc_xen against event channel storms</title>
<updated>2021-12-22T08:29:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-16T07:24:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=560e64413b4a6d9bd6630e350d5f2e6a05f6ffe3'/>
<id>560e64413b4a6d9bd6630e350d5f2e6a05f6ffe3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fe415186b43df0db1f17fa3a46275fd92107fe71 upstream.

The Xen console driver is still vulnerable for an attack via excessive
number of events sent by the backend. Fix that by using a lateeoi event
channel.

For the normal domU initial console this requires the introduction of
bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi() as there is no xenbus device available
at the time the event channel is bound to the irq.

As the decision whether an interrupt was spurious or not requires to
test for bytes having been read from the backend, move sending the
event into the if statement, as sending an event without having found
any bytes to be read is making no sense at all.

This is part of XSA-391

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fe415186b43df0db1f17fa3a46275fd92107fe71 upstream.

The Xen console driver is still vulnerable for an attack via excessive
number of events sent by the backend. Fix that by using a lateeoi event
channel.

For the normal domU initial console this requires the introduction of
bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi() as there is no xenbus device available
at the time the event channel is bound to the irq.

As the decision whether an interrupt was spurious or not requires to
test for bytes having been read from the backend, move sending the
event into the if statement, as sending an event without having found
any bytes to be read is making no sense at all.

This is part of XSA-391

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tty: hvc: replace BUG_ON() with negative return value</title>
<updated>2021-12-01T08:23:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-29T08:10:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6c728efe164fbb2613ee4dee5f803e441c5d371c'/>
<id>6c728efe164fbb2613ee4dee5f803e441c5d371c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e679004dec37566f658a255157d3aed9d762a2b7 upstream.

Xen frontends shouldn't BUG() in case of illegal data received from
their backends. So replace the BUG_ON()s when reading illegal data from
the ring page with negative return values.

This is commit e679004dec37566f upstream.

Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210707091045.460-1-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e679004dec37566f658a255157d3aed9d762a2b7 upstream.

Xen frontends shouldn't BUG() in case of illegal data received from
their backends. So replace the BUG_ON()s when reading illegal data from
the ring page with negative return values.

This is commit e679004dec37566f upstream.

Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210707091045.460-1-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hvsi: don't panic on tty_register_driver failure</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T10:26:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Slaby</name>
<email>jslaby@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-23T07:43:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4beadefea85791e3a0a58f247e9c75810ccfa68d'/>
<id>4beadefea85791e3a0a58f247e9c75810ccfa68d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7ccbdcc4d08a6d7041e4849219bbb12ffa45db4c ]

The alloc_tty_driver failure is handled gracefully in hvsi_init. But
tty_register_driver is not. panic is called if that one fails.

So handle the failure of tty_register_driver gracefully too. This will
keep at least the console functional as it was enabled earlier by
console_initcall in hvsi_console_init. Instead of shooting down the
whole system.

This means, we disable interrupts and restore hvsi_wait back to
poll_for_state().

Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210723074317.32690-3-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7ccbdcc4d08a6d7041e4849219bbb12ffa45db4c ]

The alloc_tty_driver failure is handled gracefully in hvsi_init. But
tty_register_driver is not. panic is called if that one fails.

So handle the failure of tty_register_driver gracefully too. This will
keep at least the console functional as it was enabled earlier by
console_initcall in hvsi_console_init. Instead of shooting down the
whole system.

This means, we disable interrupts and restore hvsi_wait back to
poll_for_state().

Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210723074317.32690-3-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tty: hvcs: Don't NULL tty-&gt;driver_data until hvcs_cleanup()</title>
<updated>2020-10-29T08:57:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyrel Datwyler</name>
<email>tyreld@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-20T23:46:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bf94a8754f2a2ab3eea82a25a2ccef933df5533f'/>
<id>bf94a8754f2a2ab3eea82a25a2ccef933df5533f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 63ffcbdad738e3d1c857027789a2273df3337624 ]

The code currently NULLs tty-&gt;driver_data in hvcs_close() with the
intent of informing the next call to hvcs_open() that device needs to be
reconfigured. However, when hvcs_cleanup() is called we copy hvcsd from
tty-&gt;driver_data which was previoulsy NULLed by hvcs_close() and our
call to tty_port_put(&amp;hvcsd-&gt;port) doesn't actually do anything since
&amp;hvcsd-&gt;port ends up translating to NULL by chance. This has the side
effect that when hvcs_remove() is called we have one too many port
references preventing hvcs_destuct_port() from ever being called. This
also prevents us from reusing the /dev/hvcsX node in a future
hvcs_probe() and we can eventually run out of /dev/hvcsX devices.

Fix this by waiting to NULL tty-&gt;driver_data in hvcs_cleanup().

Fixes: 27bf7c43a19c ("TTY: hvcs, add tty install")
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler &lt;tyreld@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820234643.70412-1-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 63ffcbdad738e3d1c857027789a2273df3337624 ]

The code currently NULLs tty-&gt;driver_data in hvcs_close() with the
intent of informing the next call to hvcs_open() that device needs to be
reconfigured. However, when hvcs_cleanup() is called we copy hvcsd from
tty-&gt;driver_data which was previoulsy NULLed by hvcs_close() and our
call to tty_port_put(&amp;hvcsd-&gt;port) doesn't actually do anything since
&amp;hvcsd-&gt;port ends up translating to NULL by chance. This has the side
effect that when hvcs_remove() is called we have one too many port
references preventing hvcs_destuct_port() from ever being called. This
also prevents us from reusing the /dev/hvcsX node in a future
hvcs_probe() and we can eventually run out of /dev/hvcsX devices.

Fix this by waiting to NULL tty-&gt;driver_data in hvcs_cleanup().

Fixes: 27bf7c43a19c ("TTY: hvcs, add tty install")
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler &lt;tyreld@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820234643.70412-1-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "tty: hvc: Fix data abort due to race in hvc_open"</title>
<updated>2020-06-30T19:37:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-12T08:22:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a160afebd779bd2fdb0b21dd1680490b1e248d5d'/>
<id>a160afebd779bd2fdb0b21dd1680490b1e248d5d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cf9c94456ebafc6d75a834e58dfdc8ae71a3acbc upstream.

This reverts commit e2bd1dcbe1aa34ff5570b3427c530e4332ecf0fe.

In discussion on the mailing list, it has been determined that this is
not the correct type of fix for this issue.  Revert it so that we can do
this correctly.

Reported-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200428032601.22127-1-rananta@codeaurora.org
Cc: Raghavendra Rao Ananta &lt;rananta@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit cf9c94456ebafc6d75a834e58dfdc8ae71a3acbc upstream.

This reverts commit e2bd1dcbe1aa34ff5570b3427c530e4332ecf0fe.

In discussion on the mailing list, it has been determined that this is
not the correct type of fix for this issue.  Revert it so that we can do
this correctly.

Reported-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200428032601.22127-1-rananta@codeaurora.org
Cc: Raghavendra Rao Ananta &lt;rananta@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
