linux-stable.git/drivers/target, branch v4.9.166 Linux kernel stable tree scsi: target/iscsi: Avoid iscsit_release_commands_from_conn() deadlock 2019-03-23T12:19:47+00:00 Bart Van Assche bvanassche@acm.org 2019-01-25T18:34:56+00:00 1ef34b9063fdfb5a490f10382828f43d99ff9e99 commit 32e36bfbcf31452a854263e7c7f32fbefc4b44d8 upstream. When using SCSI passthrough in combination with the iSCSI target driver then cmd->t_state_lock may be obtained from interrupt context. Hence, all code that obtains cmd->t_state_lock from thread context must disable interrupts first. This patch avoids that lockdep reports the following: WARNING: inconsistent lock state 4.18.0-dbg+ #1 Not tainted -------------------------------- inconsistent {HARDIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-HARDIRQ-W} usage. iscsi_ttx/1800 [HC1[1]:SC0[2]:HE0:SE0] takes: 000000006e7b0ceb (&(&cmd->t_state_lock)->rlock){?...}, at: target_complete_cmd+0x47/0x2c0 [target_core_mod] {HARDIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: lock_acquire+0xd2/0x260 _raw_spin_lock+0x32/0x50 iscsit_close_connection+0x97e/0x1020 [iscsi_target_mod] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit+0x108/0x200 [iscsi_target_mod] iscsi_target_rx_thread+0x180/0x190 [iscsi_target_mod] kthread+0x1cf/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 irq event stamp: 1281 hardirqs last enabled at (1279): [<ffffffff970ade79>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa9/0x160 hardirqs last disabled at (1281): [<ffffffff97a008a5>] interrupt_entry+0xb5/0xd0 softirqs last enabled at (1278): [<ffffffff977cd9a1>] lock_sock_nested+0x51/0xc0 softirqs last disabled at (1280): [<ffffffffc07a6e04>] ip6_finish_output2+0x124/0xe40 [ipv6] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&cmd->t_state_lock)->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&cmd->t_state_lock)->rlock); 
commit 32e36bfbcf31452a854263e7c7f32fbefc4b44d8 upstream.

When using SCSI passthrough in combination with the iSCSI target driver
then cmd->t_state_lock may be obtained from interrupt context. Hence, all
code that obtains cmd->t_state_lock from thread context must disable
interrupts first. This patch avoids that lockdep reports the following:

WARNING: inconsistent lock state
4.18.0-dbg+ #1 Not tainted
--------------------------------
inconsistent {HARDIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-HARDIRQ-W} usage.
iscsi_ttx/1800 [HC1[1]:SC0[2]:HE0:SE0] takes:
000000006e7b0ceb (&(&cmd->t_state_lock)->rlock){?...}, at: target_complete_cmd+0x47/0x2c0 [target_core_mod]
{HARDIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
 lock_acquire+0xd2/0x260
 _raw_spin_lock+0x32/0x50
 iscsit_close_connection+0x97e/0x1020 [iscsi_target_mod]
 iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit+0x108/0x200 [iscsi_target_mod]
 iscsi_target_rx_thread+0x180/0x190 [iscsi_target_mod]
 kthread+0x1cf/0x1f0
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
irq event stamp: 1281
hardirqs last  enabled at (1279): [<ffffffff970ade79>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa9/0x160
hardirqs last disabled at (1281): [<ffffffff97a008a5>] interrupt_entry+0xb5/0xd0
softirqs last  enabled at (1278): [<ffffffff977cd9a1>] lock_sock_nested+0x51/0xc0
softirqs last disabled at (1280): [<ffffffffc07a6e04>] ip6_finish_output2+0x124/0xe40 [ipv6]

other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:

      CPU0
      ----
 lock(&(&cmd->t_state_lock)->rlock);
 <Interrupt>
   lock(&(&cmd->t_state_lock)->rlock);
scsi: target: use consistent left-aligned ASCII INQUIRY data 2019-01-26T08:38:34+00:00 David Disseldorp ddiss@suse.de 2018-12-05T12:18:34+00:00 e562057290b8be55f4eb26ad3a44be3193985e10 [ Upstream commit 0de263577de5d5e052be5f4f93334e63cc8a7f0b ] spc5r17.pdf specifies: 4.3.1 ASCII data field requirements ASCII data fields shall contain only ASCII printable characters (i.e., code values 20h to 7Eh) and may be terminated with one or more ASCII null (00h) characters. ASCII data fields described as being left-aligned shall have any unused bytes at the end of the field (i.e., highest offset) and the unused bytes shall be filled with ASCII space characters (20h). LIO currently space-pads the T10 VENDOR IDENTIFICATION and PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION fields in the standard INQUIRY data. However, the PRODUCT REVISION LEVEL field in the standard INQUIRY data as well as the T10 VENDOR IDENTIFICATION field in the INQUIRY Device Identification VPD Page are zero-terminated/zero-padded. Fix this inconsistency by using space-padding for all of the above fields. Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Bryant G. Ly <bly@catalogicsoftware.com> Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 0de263577de5d5e052be5f4f93334e63cc8a7f0b ]

spc5r17.pdf specifies:

  4.3.1 ASCII data field requirements
  ASCII data fields shall contain only ASCII printable characters (i.e.,
  code values 20h to 7Eh) and may be terminated with one or more ASCII null
  (00h) characters.  ASCII data fields described as being left-aligned
  shall have any unused bytes at the end of the field (i.e., highest
  offset) and the unused bytes shall be filled with ASCII space characters
  (20h).

LIO currently space-pads the T10 VENDOR IDENTIFICATION and PRODUCT
IDENTIFICATION fields in the standard INQUIRY data. However, the PRODUCT
REVISION LEVEL field in the standard INQUIRY data as well as the T10 VENDOR
IDENTIFICATION field in the INQUIRY Device Identification VPD Page are
zero-terminated/zero-padded.

Fix this inconsistency by using space-padding for all of the above fields.

Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Bryant G. Ly <bly@catalogicsoftware.com>
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
scsi: target: iscsi: cxgbit: fix csk leak 2019-01-23T07:10:53+00:00 Varun Prakash varun@chelsio.com 2018-11-09T15:29:01+00:00 2d9e05ba09c0a8ce647d769b2804647dbbca9ac2 [ Upstream commit ed076c55b359cc9982ca8b065bcc01675f7365f6 ] In case of arp failure call cxgbit_put_csk() to free csk. Signed-off-by: Varun Prakash <varun@chelsio.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit ed076c55b359cc9982ca8b065bcc01675f7365f6 ]

In case of arp failure call cxgbit_put_csk() to free csk.

Signed-off-by: Varun Prakash <varun@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Revert "scsi: target: iscsi: cxgbit: fix csk leak" 2019-01-23T07:10:53+00:00 Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org 2019-01-14T15:01:30+00:00 9c86678f67b8080e827829d22d6b6ec41acad62c This reverts commit 8323aafe67b31c7f73d18747604ba1cc6c3e4f3a. A wrong commit message was used for the stable commit because of a human error (and duplicate commit subject lines). This patch reverts this error, and the following patches add the two upstream commits. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
This reverts commit 8323aafe67b31c7f73d18747604ba1cc6c3e4f3a.

A wrong commit message was used for the stable commit because of a human
error (and duplicate commit subject lines).

This patch reverts this error, and the following patches add the two
upstream commits.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
scsi: target: iscsi: cxgbit: add missing spin_lock_init() 2019-01-13T09:03:49+00:00 Varun Prakash varun@chelsio.com 2018-11-09T15:29:46+00:00 eb7bd2fdb6b0b160c1c91cec828efd0c7d115985 [ Upstream commit 9e6371d3c6913ff1707fb2c0274c9925f7aaef80 ] Add missing spin_lock_init() for cdev->np_lock. Signed-off-by: Varun Prakash <varun@chelsio.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 9e6371d3c6913ff1707fb2c0274c9925f7aaef80 ]

Add missing spin_lock_init() for cdev->np_lock.

Signed-off-by: Varun Prakash <varun@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
scsi: target: iscsi: cxgbit: fix csk leak 2019-01-13T09:03:49+00:00 Varun Prakash varun@chelsio.com 2018-11-09T15:29:01+00:00 8323aafe67b31c7f73d18747604ba1cc6c3e4f3a [ Upstream commit 801df68d617e3cb831f531c99fa6003620e6b343 ] csk leak can happen if a new TCP connection gets established after cxgbit_accept_np() returns, to fix this leak free remaining csk in cxgbit_free_np(). Signed-off-by: Varun Prakash <varun@chelsio.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 801df68d617e3cb831f531c99fa6003620e6b343 ]

csk leak can happen if a new TCP connection gets established after
cxgbit_accept_np() returns, to fix this leak free remaining csk in
cxgbit_free_np().

Signed-off-by: Varun Prakash <varun@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
scsi: iscsi: target: Don't use stack buffer for scatterlist 2018-10-18T07:13:20+00:00 Laura Abbott labbott@redhat.com 2018-09-04T18:47:40+00:00 1a5d197564ba649df02a9ec472352917cf6f1072 [ Upstream commit 679fcae46c8b2352bba3485d521da070cfbe68e6 ] Fedora got a bug report of a crash with iSCSI: kernel BUG at include/linux/scatterlist.h:143! ... RIP: 0010:iscsit_do_crypto_hash_buf+0x154/0x180 [iscsi_target_mod] ... Call Trace: ? iscsi_target_tx_thread+0x200/0x200 [iscsi_target_mod] iscsit_get_rx_pdu+0x4cd/0xa90 [iscsi_target_mod] ? native_sched_clock+0x3e/0xa0 ? iscsi_target_tx_thread+0x200/0x200 [iscsi_target_mod] iscsi_target_rx_thread+0x81/0xf0 [iscsi_target_mod] kthread+0x120/0x140 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 This is a BUG_ON for using a stack buffer with a scatterlist. There are two cases that trigger this bug. Switch to using a dynamically allocated buffer for one case and do not assign a NULL buffer in another case. Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 679fcae46c8b2352bba3485d521da070cfbe68e6 ]

Fedora got a bug report of a crash with iSCSI:

kernel BUG at include/linux/scatterlist.h:143!
...
RIP: 0010:iscsit_do_crypto_hash_buf+0x154/0x180 [iscsi_target_mod]
...
 Call Trace:
  ? iscsi_target_tx_thread+0x200/0x200 [iscsi_target_mod]
  iscsit_get_rx_pdu+0x4cd/0xa90 [iscsi_target_mod]
  ? native_sched_clock+0x3e/0xa0
  ? iscsi_target_tx_thread+0x200/0x200 [iscsi_target_mod]
  iscsi_target_rx_thread+0x81/0xf0 [iscsi_target_mod]
  kthread+0x120/0x140
  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

This is a BUG_ON for using a stack buffer with a scatterlist.  There
are two cases that trigger this bug. Switch to using a dynamically
allocated buffer for one case and do not assign a NULL buffer in
another case.

Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
scsi: target: iscsi: Use bin2hex instead of a re-implementation 2018-10-04T00:01:51+00:00 Vincent Pelletier plr.vincent@gmail.com 2018-09-09T04:09:27+00:00 3d04174b0bcfe5d0cb6ee8ba7458b0d4c1293257 commit 8c39e2699f8acb2e29782a834e56306da24937fe upstream. Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> [plr.vincent@gmail.com: hunk context change for 4.4 and 4.9, no code change] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 8c39e2699f8acb2e29782a834e56306da24937fe upstream.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
[plr.vincent@gmail.com: hunk context change for 4.4 and 4.9, no code change]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
scsi: target/iscsi: Make iscsit_ta_authentication() respect the output buffer size 2018-10-04T00:01:45+00:00 Bart Van Assche bart.vanassche@wdc.com 2018-06-22T21:53:01+00:00 54cbe6e25b2b68ace2fff2fd4576057d759fe012 [ Upstream commit 35bea5c84fd13c643cce63f0b5cd4b148f8c901d ] Fixes: e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 35bea5c84fd13c643cce63f0b5cd4b148f8c901d ]

Fixes: e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
scsi: target: iscsi: Use hex2bin instead of a re-implementation 2018-09-29T10:07:33+00:00 Vincent Pelletier plr.vincent@gmail.com 2018-09-09T04:09:26+00:00 5eeb39743ba17bd36db8d86d0047181ee0b9ff71 commit 1816494330a83f2a064499d8ed2797045641f92c upstream. This change has the following effects, in order of descreasing importance: 1) Prevent a stack buffer overflow 2) Do not append an unnecessary NULL to an anyway binary buffer, which is writing one byte past client_digest when caller is: chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r)); The latter was found by KASAN (see below) when input value hes expected size (32 hex chars), and further analysis revealed a stack buffer overflow can happen when network-received value is longer, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to smash up to 17 bytes after destination buffer (16 bytes attacker-controlled and one null). As switching to hex2bin requires specifying destination buffer length, and does not internally append any null, it solves both issues. This addresses CVE-2018-14633. Beyond this: - Validate received value length and check hex2bin accepted the input, to log this rejection reason instead of just failing authentication. - Only log received CHAP_R and CHAP_C values once they passed sanity checks. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801090ef7c8 by task kworker/0:0/1021 CPU: 0 PID: 1021 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G O 4.17.8kasan.sess.connops+ #2 Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 05/19/2014 Workqueue: events iscsi_target_do_login_rx [iscsi_target_mod] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x71/0xac print_address_description+0x65/0x22e ? chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod] chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x2cb/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod] ? chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex.constprop.5+0x50/0x50 [iscsi_target_mod] ? ftrace_caller_op_ptr+0xe/0xe ? __orc_find+0x6f/0xc0 ? unwind_next_frame+0x231/0x850 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? deref_stack_reg+0xd0/0xd0 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? is_module_text_address+0xa/0x11 ? kernel_text_address+0x4c/0x110 ? __save_stack_trace+0x82/0x100 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? save_stack+0x8c/0xb0 ? 0xffffffffc1660000 ? iscsi_target_do_login+0x155/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? process_one_work+0x35c/0x640 ? worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ? iscsi_update_param_value+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsit_release_cmd+0x170/0x170 [iscsi_target_mod] chap_main_loop+0x172/0x570 [iscsi_target_mod] ? chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x860/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod] ? rx_data+0xd6/0x120 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsit_print_session_params+0xd0/0xd0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? cyc2ns_read_begin.part.2+0x90/0x90 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50 ? memcmp+0x45/0x70 iscsi_target_do_login+0x875/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_check_first_request.isra.5+0x1a0/0x1a0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? del_timer+0xe0/0xe0 ? memset+0x1f/0x40 ? flush_sigqueue+0x29/0xd0 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_nego_release+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod] ? iscsi_target_restore_sock_callbacks+0x130/0x130 [iscsi_target_mod] process_one_work+0x35c/0x640 worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0 ? flush_rcu_work+0x40/0x40 kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0 ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0004243bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0x17fffc000000000() raw: 017fffc000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff raw: ffffea0004243c20 ffffea0004243ba0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8801090ef680: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ffff8801090ef700: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 >ffff8801090ef780: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ^ ffff8801090ef800: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 ffff8801090ef880: f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 1816494330a83f2a064499d8ed2797045641f92c upstream.

This change has the following effects, in order of descreasing importance:

1) Prevent a stack buffer overflow

2) Do not append an unnecessary NULL to an anyway binary buffer, which
   is writing one byte past client_digest when caller is:
   chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r));

The latter was found by KASAN (see below) when input value hes expected size
(32 hex chars), and further analysis revealed a stack buffer overflow can
happen when network-received value is longer, allowing an unauthenticated
remote attacker to smash up to 17 bytes after destination buffer (16 bytes
attacker-controlled and one null).  As switching to hex2bin requires
specifying destination buffer length, and does not internally append any null,
it solves both issues.

This addresses CVE-2018-14633.

Beyond this:

- Validate received value length and check hex2bin accepted the input, to log
  this rejection reason instead of just failing authentication.

- Only log received CHAP_R and CHAP_C values once they passed sanity checks.

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801090ef7c8 by task kworker/0:0/1021

CPU: 0 PID: 1021 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G           O      4.17.8kasan.sess.connops+ #2
Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 05/19/2014
Workqueue: events iscsi_target_do_login_rx [iscsi_target_mod]
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x71/0xac
 print_address_description+0x65/0x22e
 ? chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
 kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd
 chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
 chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x2cb/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex.constprop.5+0x50/0x50 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? ftrace_caller_op_ptr+0xe/0xe
 ? __orc_find+0x6f/0xc0
 ? unwind_next_frame+0x231/0x850
 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? deref_stack_reg+0xd0/0xd0
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? is_module_text_address+0xa/0x11
 ? kernel_text_address+0x4c/0x110
 ? __save_stack_trace+0x82/0x100
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? save_stack+0x8c/0xb0
 ? 0xffffffffc1660000
 ? iscsi_target_do_login+0x155/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? process_one_work+0x35c/0x640
 ? worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0
 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? iscsi_update_param_value+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsit_release_cmd+0x170/0x170 [iscsi_target_mod]
 chap_main_loop+0x172/0x570 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x860/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? rx_data+0xd6/0x120 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsit_print_session_params+0xd0/0xd0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? cyc2ns_read_begin.part.2+0x90/0x90
 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50
 ? memcmp+0x45/0x70
 iscsi_target_do_login+0x875/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_check_first_request.isra.5+0x1a0/0x1a0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? del_timer+0xe0/0xe0
 ? memset+0x1f/0x40
 ? flush_sigqueue+0x29/0xd0
 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_nego_release+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_restore_sock_callbacks+0x130/0x130 [iscsi_target_mod]
 process_one_work+0x35c/0x640
 worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0
 ? flush_rcu_work+0x40/0x40
 kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0004243bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
flags: 0x17fffc000000000()
raw: 017fffc000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff
raw: ffffea0004243c20 ffffea0004243ba0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8801090ef680: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
 ffff8801090ef700: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
>ffff8801090ef780: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
                                              ^
 ffff8801090ef800: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2
 ffff8801090ef880: f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>