linux-stable.git/drivers/target, branch v4.14.95

scsi: target: iscsi: cxgbit: fix csk leak

2019-01-23T07:09:46+00:00

[ Upstream commit ed076c55b359cc9982ca8b065bcc01675f7365f6 ]

In case of arp failure call cxgbit_put_csk() to free csk.

Signed-off-by: Varun Prakash 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Revert "scsi: target: iscsi: cxgbit: fix csk leak"

2019-01-23T07:09:46+00:00

This reverts commit b831528038e3cad0d745c53bcaeedb642f5cbc1f.

A wrong commit message was used for the stable commit because of a human
error (and duplicate commit subject lines).

This patch reverts this error, and the following patches add the two
upstream commits.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

scsi: target: iscsi: cxgbit: add missing spin_lock_init()

2019-01-13T09:00:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9e6371d3c6913ff1707fb2c0274c9925f7aaef80 ]

Add missing spin_lock_init() for cdev->np_lock.

Signed-off-by: Varun Prakash 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

scsi: target: iscsi: cxgbit: fix csk leak

2019-01-13T09:00:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 801df68d617e3cb831f531c99fa6003620e6b343 ]

csk leak can happen if a new TCP connection gets established after
cxgbit_accept_np() returns, to fix this leak free remaining csk in
cxgbit_free_np().

Signed-off-by: Varun Prakash 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

scsi: iscsi: target: Don't use stack buffer for scatterlist

2018-10-18T07:16:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit 679fcae46c8b2352bba3485d521da070cfbe68e6 ]

Fedora got a bug report of a crash with iSCSI:

kernel BUG at include/linux/scatterlist.h:143!
...
RIP: 0010:iscsit_do_crypto_hash_buf+0x154/0x180 [iscsi_target_mod]
...
 Call Trace:
  ? iscsi_target_tx_thread+0x200/0x200 [iscsi_target_mod]
  iscsit_get_rx_pdu+0x4cd/0xa90 [iscsi_target_mod]
  ? native_sched_clock+0x3e/0xa0
  ? iscsi_target_tx_thread+0x200/0x200 [iscsi_target_mod]
  iscsi_target_rx_thread+0x81/0xf0 [iscsi_target_mod]
  kthread+0x120/0x140
  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

This is a BUG_ON for using a stack buffer with a scatterlist.  There
are two cases that trigger this bug. Switch to using a dynamically
allocated buffer for one case and do not assign a NULL buffer in
another case.

Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott 
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: iscsi: target: Set conn->sess to NULL when iscsi_login_set_conn_values fails

2018-10-10T06:54:23+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7915919bb94e12460c58e27c708472e6f85f6699 ]

Fixes a use-after-free reported by KASAN when later
iscsi_target_login_sess_out gets called and it tries to access
conn->sess->se_sess:

Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
iSCSI Login timeout on Network Portal [::]:3260
iSCSI Login negotiation failed.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in
iscsi_target_login_sess_out.cold.12+0x58/0xff [iscsi_target_mod]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff880109d070c8 by task iscsi_np/980

CPU: 1 PID: 980 Comm: iscsi_np Tainted: G           O
4.17.8kasan.sess.connops+ #4
Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB,
BIOS 5.6.5 05/19/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x71/0xac
 print_address_description+0x65/0x22e
 ? iscsi_target_login_sess_out.cold.12+0x58/0xff [iscsi_target_mod]
 kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd
 iscsi_target_login_sess_out.cold.12+0x58/0xff [iscsi_target_mod]
 iscsi_target_login_thread+0x1086/0x1710 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
 ? iscsi_target_login_sess_out+0x250/0x250 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? __kthread_parkme+0xcc/0x100
 ? parse_args.cold.14+0xd3/0xd3
 ? iscsi_target_login_sess_out+0x250/0x250 [iscsi_target_mod]
 kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

Allocated by task 980:
 kasan_kmalloc+0xbf/0xe0
 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x112/0x210
 iscsi_target_login_thread+0x816/0x1710 [iscsi_target_mod]
 kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

Freed by task 980:
 __kasan_slab_free+0x125/0x170
 kfree+0x90/0x1d0
 iscsi_target_login_thread+0x1577/0x1710 [iscsi_target_mod]
 kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880109d06f00
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 456 bytes inside of
 512-byte region [ffff880109d06f00, ffff880109d07100)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0004274180 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x17fffc000008100(slab|head)
raw: 017fffc000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001000c000c
raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88011b002e00 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff880109d06f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff880109d07000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880109d07080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                              ^
 ffff880109d07100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff880109d07180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier 
[rebased against idr/ida changes and to handle ret review comments from Matthew]
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie 
Cc: Matthew Wilcox 
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion

2018-10-04T00:00:49+00:00

[ Upstream commit 36d4cb460bcbe2a1323732a6e4bb9dd783284368 ]

The approach for adding a device to the devices_idr data structure and for
removing it is as follows:

* &dev->dev_group.cg_item is initialized before a device is added to
  devices_idr.

* If the reference count of a device drops to zero then
  target_free_device() removes the device from devices_idr.

* All devices_idr manipulations are protected by device_mutex.

This means that increasing the reference count of a device is sufficient to
prevent removal from devices_idr and also that it is safe access
dev_group.cg_item for any device that is referenced by devices_idr. Use
this to modify target_find_device() and target_for_each_device() such that
these functions no longer introduce a dependency between device_mutex and
the configfs root inode mutex.

Note: it is safe to pass a NULL pointer to config_item_put() and also to
config_item_get_unless_zero().

This patch prevents that lockdep reports the following complaint:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
4.12.0-rc1-dbg+ #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
rmdir/12053 is trying to acquire lock:
 (device_mutex#2){+.+.+.}, at: []
target_free_device+0xae/0xf0 [target_core_mod]

but task is already holding lock:
 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#14){++++++}, at: []
vfs_rmdir+0x50/0x140

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#14){++++++}:
       lock_acquire+0x59/0x80
       down_write+0x36/0x70
       configfs_depend_item+0x3a/0xb0 [configfs]
       target_depend_item+0x13/0x20 [target_core_mod]
       target_xcopy_locate_se_dev_e4_iter+0x87/0x100 [target_core_mod]
       target_devices_idr_iter+0x16/0x20 [target_core_mod]
       idr_for_each+0x39/0xc0
       target_for_each_device+0x36/0x50 [target_core_mod]
       target_xcopy_locate_se_dev_e4+0x28/0x80 [target_core_mod]
       target_xcopy_do_work+0x2e9/0xdd0 [target_core_mod]
       process_one_work+0x1ca/0x3f0
       worker_thread+0x49/0x3b0
       kthread+0x109/0x140
       ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40

-> #0 (device_mutex#2){+.+.+.}:
       __lock_acquire+0x101f/0x11d0
       lock_acquire+0x59/0x80
       __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x950
       mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20
       target_free_device+0xae/0xf0 [target_core_mod]
       target_core_dev_release+0x10/0x20 [target_core_mod]
       config_item_put+0x6e/0xb0 [configfs]
       configfs_rmdir+0x1a6/0x300 [configfs]
       vfs_rmdir+0xb7/0x140
       do_rmdir+0x1f4/0x200
       SyS_rmdir+0x11/0x20
       entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#14);
                               lock(device_mutex#2);
                               lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#14);
  lock(device_mutex#2);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by rmdir/12053:
 #0:  (sb_writers#10){.+.+.+}, at: []
mnt_want_write+0x1f/0x50
 #1:  (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#14/1){+.+.+.}, at: []
do_rmdir+0x15e/0x200
 #2:  (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#14){++++++}, at: []
vfs_rmdir+0x50/0x140

stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 PID: 12053 Comm: rmdir Not tainted 4.12.0-rc1-dbg+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x86/0xcf
 print_circular_bug+0x1c7/0x220
 __lock_acquire+0x101f/0x11d0
 lock_acquire+0x59/0x80
 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x950
 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20
 target_free_device+0xae/0xf0 [target_core_mod]
 target_core_dev_release+0x10/0x20 [target_core_mod]
 config_item_put+0x6e/0xb0 [configfs]
 configfs_rmdir+0x1a6/0x300 [configfs]
 vfs_rmdir+0xb7/0x140
 do_rmdir+0x1f4/0x200
 SyS_rmdir+0x11/0x20
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2

Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche 
[Rebased to handle conflict withe target_find_device removal]
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie 

Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: target/iscsi: Make iscsit_ta_authentication() respect the output buffer size

2018-10-04T00:00:48+00:00

[ Upstream commit 35bea5c84fd13c643cce63f0b5cd4b148f8c901d ]

Fixes: e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche 
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie 
Cc: Mike Christie 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Hannes Reinecke 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: target: iscsi: Use bin2hex instead of a re-implementation

2018-09-29T10:06:04+00:00

commit 8c39e2699f8acb2e29782a834e56306da24937fe upstream.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier 
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: target: iscsi: Use hex2bin instead of a re-implementation

2018-09-29T10:06:04+00:00

commit 1816494330a83f2a064499d8ed2797045641f92c upstream.

This change has the following effects, in order of descreasing importance:

1) Prevent a stack buffer overflow

2) Do not append an unnecessary NULL to an anyway binary buffer, which
   is writing one byte past client_digest when caller is:
   chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r));

The latter was found by KASAN (see below) when input value hes expected size
(32 hex chars), and further analysis revealed a stack buffer overflow can
happen when network-received value is longer, allowing an unauthenticated
remote attacker to smash up to 17 bytes after destination buffer (16 bytes
attacker-controlled and one null).  As switching to hex2bin requires
specifying destination buffer length, and does not internally append any null,
it solves both issues.

This addresses CVE-2018-14633.

Beyond this:

- Validate received value length and check hex2bin accepted the input, to log
  this rejection reason instead of just failing authentication.

- Only log received CHAP_R and CHAP_C values once they passed sanity checks.

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801090ef7c8 by task kworker/0:0/1021

CPU: 0 PID: 1021 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G           O      4.17.8kasan.sess.connops+ #2
Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 05/19/2014
Workqueue: events iscsi_target_do_login_rx [iscsi_target_mod]
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x71/0xac
 print_address_description+0x65/0x22e
 ? chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
 kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd
 chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
 chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x2cb/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex.constprop.5+0x50/0x50 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? ftrace_caller_op_ptr+0xe/0xe
 ? __orc_find+0x6f/0xc0
 ? unwind_next_frame+0x231/0x850
 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? deref_stack_reg+0xd0/0xd0
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? is_module_text_address+0xa/0x11
 ? kernel_text_address+0x4c/0x110
 ? __save_stack_trace+0x82/0x100
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? save_stack+0x8c/0xb0
 ? 0xffffffffc1660000
 ? iscsi_target_do_login+0x155/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? process_one_work+0x35c/0x640
 ? worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0
 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? iscsi_update_param_value+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsit_release_cmd+0x170/0x170 [iscsi_target_mod]
 chap_main_loop+0x172/0x570 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x860/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? rx_data+0xd6/0x120 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsit_print_session_params+0xd0/0xd0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? cyc2ns_read_begin.part.2+0x90/0x90
 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50
 ? memcmp+0x45/0x70
 iscsi_target_do_login+0x875/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_check_first_request.isra.5+0x1a0/0x1a0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? del_timer+0xe0/0xe0
 ? memset+0x1f/0x40
 ? flush_sigqueue+0x29/0xd0
 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_nego_release+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_restore_sock_callbacks+0x130/0x130 [iscsi_target_mod]
 process_one_work+0x35c/0x640
 worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0
 ? flush_rcu_work+0x40/0x40
 kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0004243bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
flags: 0x17fffc000000000()
raw: 017fffc000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff
raw: ffffea0004243c20 ffffea0004243ba0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8801090ef680: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
 ffff8801090ef700: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
>ffff8801090ef780: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
                                              ^
 ffff8801090ef800: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2
 ffff8801090ef880: f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier 
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman