linux-stable.git/drivers/target, branch v4.14.73

scsi: target: iscsi: Use bin2hex instead of a re-implementation

2018-09-29T10:06:04+00:00

commit 8c39e2699f8acb2e29782a834e56306da24937fe upstream.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier 
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: target: iscsi: Use hex2bin instead of a re-implementation

2018-09-29T10:06:04+00:00

commit 1816494330a83f2a064499d8ed2797045641f92c upstream.

This change has the following effects, in order of descreasing importance:

1) Prevent a stack buffer overflow

2) Do not append an unnecessary NULL to an anyway binary buffer, which
   is writing one byte past client_digest when caller is:
   chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r));

The latter was found by KASAN (see below) when input value hes expected size
(32 hex chars), and further analysis revealed a stack buffer overflow can
happen when network-received value is longer, allowing an unauthenticated
remote attacker to smash up to 17 bytes after destination buffer (16 bytes
attacker-controlled and one null).  As switching to hex2bin requires
specifying destination buffer length, and does not internally append any null,
it solves both issues.

This addresses CVE-2018-14633.

Beyond this:

- Validate received value length and check hex2bin accepted the input, to log
  this rejection reason instead of just failing authentication.

- Only log received CHAP_R and CHAP_C values once they passed sanity checks.

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801090ef7c8 by task kworker/0:0/1021

CPU: 0 PID: 1021 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G           O      4.17.8kasan.sess.connops+ #2
Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 05/19/2014
Workqueue: events iscsi_target_do_login_rx [iscsi_target_mod]
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x71/0xac
 print_address_description+0x65/0x22e
 ? chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
 kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd
 chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
 chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x2cb/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex.constprop.5+0x50/0x50 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? ftrace_caller_op_ptr+0xe/0xe
 ? __orc_find+0x6f/0xc0
 ? unwind_next_frame+0x231/0x850
 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? deref_stack_reg+0xd0/0xd0
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? is_module_text_address+0xa/0x11
 ? kernel_text_address+0x4c/0x110
 ? __save_stack_trace+0x82/0x100
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? save_stack+0x8c/0xb0
 ? 0xffffffffc1660000
 ? iscsi_target_do_login+0x155/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? process_one_work+0x35c/0x640
 ? worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0
 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? iscsi_update_param_value+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsit_release_cmd+0x170/0x170 [iscsi_target_mod]
 chap_main_loop+0x172/0x570 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x860/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? rx_data+0xd6/0x120 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsit_print_session_params+0xd0/0xd0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? cyc2ns_read_begin.part.2+0x90/0x90
 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50
 ? memcmp+0x45/0x70
 iscsi_target_do_login+0x875/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_check_first_request.isra.5+0x1a0/0x1a0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? del_timer+0xe0/0xe0
 ? memset+0x1f/0x40
 ? flush_sigqueue+0x29/0xd0
 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_nego_release+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_restore_sock_callbacks+0x130/0x130 [iscsi_target_mod]
 process_one_work+0x35c/0x640
 worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0
 ? flush_rcu_work+0x40/0x40
 kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0004243bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
flags: 0x17fffc000000000()
raw: 017fffc000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff
raw: ffffea0004243c20 ffffea0004243ba0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8801090ef680: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
 ffff8801090ef700: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
>ffff8801090ef780: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
                                              ^
 ffff8801090ef800: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2
 ffff8801090ef880: f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier 
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: target: fix __transport_register_session locking

2018-09-19T20:43:39+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6a64f6e1591322beb8ce16e952a53582caf2a15c ]

When __transport_register_session is called from transport_register_session
irqs will already have been disabled, so we do not want the unlock irq call
to enable them until the higher level has done the final
spin_unlock_irqrestore/ spin_unlock_irq.

This has __transport_register_session use the save/restore call.

Signed-off-by: Mike Christie 
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche 
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

iscsi target: fix session creation failure handling

2018-09-05T07:26:41+00:00

commit 26abc916a898d34c5ad159315a2f683def3c5555 upstream.

The problem is that iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s1 sets conn->sess early in
iscsi_login_set_conn_values. If the function fails later like when we
alloc the idr it does kfree(sess) and leaves the conn->sess pointer set.
iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s1 then returns -Exyz and we then call
iscsi_target_login_sess_out and access the freed memory.

This patch has iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s1 either completely setup the
session or completely tear it down, so later in
iscsi_target_login_sess_out we can just check for it being set to the
connection.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0957627a9960 ("iscsi-target: Fix sess allocation leak in...")
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie 
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: target: iscsi: cxgbit: fix max iso npdu calculation

2018-09-05T07:26:24+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1b350ea0c2f4df9aa30426614c8eb755a8c32814 ]

- rounddown CXGBIT_MAX_ISO_PAYLOAD by csk->emss before calculating
  max_iso_npdu to get max TCP payload in multiple of mss.

- call cxgbit_set_digest() before cxgbit_set_iso_npdu() to set
  csk->submode, it is used in calculating number of iso pdus.

Signed-off-by: Varun Prakash 
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: target: Fix truncated PR-in ReadKeys response

2018-07-11T14:29:14+00:00

commit 63ce3c384db26494615e3c8972bcd419ed71f4c4 upstream.

SPC5r17 states that the contents of the ADDITIONAL LENGTH field are not
altered based on the allocation length, so always calculate and pack the
full key list length even if the list itself is truncated.

According to Maged:

  Yes it fixes the "Storage Spaces Persistent Reservation" test in the
  Windows 2016 Server Failover Cluster validation suites when having
  many connections that result in more than 8 registrations. I tested
  your patch on 4.17 with iblock.

This behaviour can be tested using the libiscsi PrinReadKeys.Truncate test.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp 
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie 
Tested-by: Maged Mokhtar 
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: target: fix crash with iscsi target and dvd

2018-06-20T19:02:43+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8e1ceafe50ec4d1bcfae154dd70e7cb6946a6177 ]

When the current page can't be added to bio, one new bio should be
created for adding this page again, instead of ignoring this page.

This patch fixes kernel crash with iscsi target and dvd, as reported by
Wakko.

Cc: Wakko Warner 
Cc: Bart Van Assche 
Cc: target-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Nicholas A. Bellinger" 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Fixes: 84c8590646d5b35804 ("target: avoid accessing .bi_vcnt directly")
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei 
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

scsi: target: Fix fortify_panic kernel exception

2018-05-09T07:51:51+00:00

commit f5957dade4f373b04fa1f5315a489f18cc2c4cb4 upstream.

memcmp() requires the two buffers passed as arguments to be at least
'size' bytes long, otherwise a fortify_panic will trigger.

Use memchr_inv() instead of memcmp() to determine whether the received
payload is zeroed or not.

The bug was found by running a block backstore via LIO.

[  496.212958] Call Trace:
[  496.212960] [c0000007e58e3800] [c000000000cbbefc] fortify_panic+0x24/0x38 (unreliable)
[  496.212965] [c0000007e58e3860] [d00000000f150c28] iblock_execute_write_same+0x3b8/0x3c0 [target_core_iblock]
[  496.212976] [c0000007e58e3910] [d000000006c737d4] __target_execute_cmd+0x54/0x150 [target_core_mod]
[  496.212982] [c0000007e58e3940] [d000000006d32ce4] ibmvscsis_write_pending+0x74/0xe0 [ibmvscsis]
[  496.212991] [c0000007e58e39b0] [d000000006c74fc8] transport_generic_new_cmd+0x318/0x370 [target_core_mod]
[  496.213001] [c0000007e58e3a30] [d000000006c75084] transport_handle_cdb_direct+0x64/0xd0 [target_core_mod]
[  496.213011] [c0000007e58e3aa0] [d000000006c75298] target_submit_cmd_map_sgls+0x1a8/0x320 [target_core_mod]
[  496.213021] [c0000007e58e3b30] [d000000006c75458] target_submit_cmd+0x48/0x60 [target_core_mod]
[  496.213026] [c0000007e58e3bd0] [d000000006d34c20] ibmvscsis_scheduler+0x370/0x600 [ibmvscsis]
[  496.213031] [c0000007e58e3c90] [c00000000013135c] process_one_work+0x1ec/0x580
[  496.213035] [c0000007e58e3d20] [c000000000131798] worker_thread+0xa8/0x600
[  496.213039] [c0000007e58e3dc0] [c00000000013a468] kthread+0x168/0x1b0
[  496.213044] [c0000007e58e3e30] [c00000000000b528] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0xb4

[mkp: tweaked commit message]

Fixes: 2237498f0b5c ("target/iblock: Convert WRITE_SAME to blkdev_issue_zeroout")
Signed-off-by: Bryant G. Ly 
Reviewed-by: Steven Royer 
Tested-by: Taylor Jakobson 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger 
Cc:  # v4.13+
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcmu: release blocks for partially setup cmds

2018-04-12T10:32:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit 810b8153c4243d2012a6ec002ddd3bbc9a9ae8c2 ]

If we cannot setup a cmd because we run out of ring space
or global pages release the blocks before sleeping. This
prevents a deadlock where dev0 has waiting_blocks set and
needs N blocks, but dev1 to devX have each allocated N / X blocks
and also hit the global block limit so they went to sleep.

find_free_blocks is not able to take the sleeping dev's
blocks becaause their waiting_blocks is set and even
if it was not the block returned by find_last_bit could equal
dbi_max. The latter will probably never happen because
DATA_BLOCK_BITS is so high but in the next patches
DATA_BLOCK_BITS and TCMU_GLOBAL_MAX_BLOCKS will be settable so
it might be lower and could happen.

Signed-off-by: Mike Christie 
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

iscsi-target: make sure to wake up sleeping login worker

2018-02-22T14:42:29+00:00

commit 1c130ae00b769a2e2df41bad3d6051ee8234b636 upstream.

Mike Christie reports:
  Starting in 4.14 iscsi logins will fail around 50% of the time.

Problem appears to be that iscsi_target_sk_data_ready() callback may
return without doing anything in case it finds the login work queue
is still blocked in sock_recvmsg().

Nicholas Bellinger says:
  It would indicate users providing their own ->sk_data_ready() callback
  must be responsible for waking up a kthread context blocked on
  sock_recvmsg(..., MSG_WAITALL), when a second ->sk_data_ready() is
  received before the first sock_recvmsg(..., MSG_WAITALL) completes.

So, do this and invoke the original data_ready() callback -- in
case of tcp sockets this takes care of waking the thread.

Disclaimer: I do not understand why this problem did not show up before
tcp prequeue removal.

(Drop WARN_ON usage - nab)

Reported-by: Mike Christie 
Bisected-by: Mike Christie 
Tested-by: Mike Christie 
Diagnosed-by: Nicholas Bellinger 
Fixes: e7942d0633c4 ("tcp: remove prequeue support")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman