linux-stable.git/drivers/staging, branch v6.12.96 Linux kernel stable tree staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler() 2026-07-18T14:52:02+00:00 Alexandru Hossu hossu.alexandru@gmail.com 2026-05-22T00:45:28+00:00 918537a0fbed85aab61fa28ad75e6279070610c9 commit f8001e1a516ba3b495728c65b61f799cbfad6bd0 upstream. HT_caps_handler() iterates pIE->length bytes and writes into HT_caps.u.HT_cap[], which is a fixed 26-byte array (sizeof struct HT_caps_element). Because pIE->length is a raw u8 from an over-the-air 802.11 AssocResponse frame and is never validated, a malicious AP can set it up to 255, causing up to 229 bytes of out-of-bounds writes into adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info. Truncate the iteration count to the size of HT_caps.u.HT_cap using umin() so that data from a longer-than-expected IE is silently ignored rather than written out of bounds, preserving interoperability with APs that pad the element. An early return on oversized IEs was considered but rejected: it would bypass the pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1 assignment that precedes the loop, silently disabling HT mode for APs that append extra bytes to the HT Capabilities IE. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-5-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit f8001e1a516ba3b495728c65b61f799cbfad6bd0 upstream.

HT_caps_handler() iterates pIE->length bytes and writes into
HT_caps.u.HT_cap[], which is a fixed 26-byte array (sizeof struct
HT_caps_element). Because pIE->length is a raw u8 from an over-the-air
802.11 AssocResponse frame and is never validated, a malicious AP can
set it up to 255, causing up to 229 bytes of out-of-bounds writes into
adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info.

Truncate the iteration count to the size of HT_caps.u.HT_cap using
umin() so that data from a longer-than-expected IE is silently ignored
rather than written out of bounds, preserving interoperability with APs
that pad the element. An early return on oversized IEs was considered
but rejected: it would bypass the pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1
assignment that precedes the loop, silently disabling HT mode for APs
that append extra bytes to the HT Capabilities IE.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-5-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in is_ap_in_tkip() IE loop 2026-07-18T14:52:02+00:00 Alexandru Hossu hossu.alexandru@gmail.com 2026-05-22T00:45:30+00:00 204b22c8df115370037248859bf0fa62db73a396 commit 3bf39f711ff27c64be8680a8938bcc5001982e81 upstream. The loop in is_ap_in_tkip() iterates over IEs without verifying that enough bytes remain before dereferencing the IE header or its payload: - pIE->element_id and pIE->length are read without checking that i + sizeof(*pIE) <= ie_length, so a truncated IE at the end of the buffer causes an OOB read. - For WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC the code compares pIE->data + 12, which requires pIE->length >= 16. For WLAN_EID_RSN it compares pIE->data + 8, requiring pIE->length >= 12. Neither requirement is checked. Add the missing IE header and payload bounds checks and guard each data access with an explicit pIE->length minimum, matching the pattern established in update_beacon_info(). Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-7-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 3bf39f711ff27c64be8680a8938bcc5001982e81 upstream.

The loop in is_ap_in_tkip() iterates over IEs without verifying that
enough bytes remain before dereferencing the IE header or its payload:

- pIE->element_id and pIE->length are read without checking that
  i + sizeof(*pIE) <= ie_length, so a truncated IE at the end of the
  buffer causes an OOB read.

- For WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC the code compares pIE->data + 12,
  which requires pIE->length >= 16.  For WLAN_EID_RSN it compares
  pIE->data + 8, requiring pIE->length >= 12.  Neither requirement
  is checked.

Add the missing IE header and payload bounds checks and guard each
data access with an explicit pIE->length minimum, matching the
pattern established in update_beacon_info().

Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-7-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl() 2026-07-18T14:52:01+00:00 Alexandru Hossu hossu.alexandru@gmail.com 2026-05-22T00:45:26+00:00 ad2637c46ef8b8ae0894372a2d39fdfcdc420a1e commit ef61d628dfad38fead1fd2e08979ae9126d011d5 upstream. Two IE parsing loops are missing the header bounds checks before they dereference pIE->length: - issue_assocreq() walks pmlmeinfo->network.ies to build the association request. If the stored IE data ends with only an element_id byte and no length byte, pIE->length is read one byte past the end of the buffer. - join_cmd_hdl() walks pnetwork->ies during station join and has the same problem under the same conditions. Both buffers are filled from AP beacon and probe-response frames, so a malicious AP that sends a truncated final IE can trigger the issue. Apply the two-guard pattern established in update_beacon_info(): 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain. 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past the buffer end. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-3-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit ef61d628dfad38fead1fd2e08979ae9126d011d5 upstream.

Two IE parsing loops are missing the header bounds checks before they
dereference pIE->length:

 - issue_assocreq() walks pmlmeinfo->network.ies to build the
   association request. If the stored IE data ends with only an
   element_id byte and no length byte, pIE->length is read one byte
   past the end of the buffer.

 - join_cmd_hdl() walks pnetwork->ies during station join and has
   the same problem under the same conditions.

Both buffers are filled from AP beacon and probe-response frames, so a
malicious AP that sends a truncated final IE can trigger the issue.

Apply the two-guard pattern established in update_beacon_info():
  1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain.
  2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past the buffer end.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-3-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in update_beacon_info() IE loop 2026-07-18T14:52:01+00:00 Alexandru Hossu hossu.alexandru@gmail.com 2026-05-22T00:45:25+00:00 bd953d52d587d42365e399b96c52dbdb13032070 commit ed51de4a86e173c3b0ef78e039c2e49e08b11f16 upstream. The IE parsing loop in update_beacon_info() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < len. When a malicious AP sends a Beacon whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at len-1), the loop reads pIE->length from one byte past the allocated receive buffer. Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length itself can extend the data window beyond len, passing a truncated IE to the handler functions. Add two guards at the top of the loop body: 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header). 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past len. Also replace i += (pIE->length + 2) with i += sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length for consistency with the sizeof(*pIE) guards added above. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-2-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit ed51de4a86e173c3b0ef78e039c2e49e08b11f16 upstream.

The IE parsing loop in update_beacon_info() advances by
(pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < len.
When a malicious AP sends a Beacon whose last IE has only one byte
remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at len-1), the loop
reads pIE->length from one byte past the allocated receive buffer.

Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length
itself can extend the data window beyond len, passing a truncated IE
to the handler functions.

Add two guards at the top of the loop body:
  1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header).
  2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past len.

Also replace i += (pIE->length + 2) with i += sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length
for consistency with the sizeof(*pIE) guards added above.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-2-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop 2026-07-18T14:52:01+00:00 Alexandru Hossu hossu.alexandru@gmail.com 2026-05-22T00:45:29+00:00 0970dd47726a57e52013594e9fbf667586eb3673 commit f9654207e92283e0acac5d64fe5f8835383b5a23 upstream. The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE->length from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer. Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a truncated IE to the handler functions. Add two guards at the top of the loop body: 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header). 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past pkt_len. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-6-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit f9654207e92283e0acac5d64fe5f8835383b5a23 upstream.

The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each
iteration but only guards on i < pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an
AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame
(the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE->length
from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer.

Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length
itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a
truncated IE to the handler functions.

Add two guards at the top of the loop body:
  1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header).
  2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past pkt_len.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-6-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth() 2026-07-18T14:52:01+00:00 Alexandru Hossu hossu.alexandru@gmail.com 2026-05-22T00:46:05+00:00 3e44a7665f3abd320a80d9c64ee4a93317041b8b commit a1fc19d61f661d47204f095b593de507884849f7 upstream. OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path. When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as: length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing the IV field and calling the decryption path. When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128 bytes regardless of ie_len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching the check already applied to OnAuthClient(). Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004605.1039209-1-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit a1fc19d61f661d47204f095b593de507884849f7 upstream.

OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path.

When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without
verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and
ICV.  Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as:

    length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len

and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le().  If len is less than
WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative
and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far
beyond the frame buffer.  Add a minimum length check before accessing
the IV field and calling the decryption path.

When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge
Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128
bytes regardless of ie_len.  IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of
exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching
the check already applied to OnAuthClient().

Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004605.1039209-1-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie() 2026-07-18T14:52:01+00:00 Alexandru Hossu hossu.alexandru@gmail.com 2026-05-22T00:45:27+00:00 46f66c16a95191d9aca07a72ae6b1252a244e26c commit 5a752a616e756844388a1a45404db9fc29fec655 upstream. supplicant_ie is a 256-byte array in struct security_priv. The WPA and WPA2 IE copy paths use: memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.supplicant_ie, &pwpa[0], wpa_ielen + 2); where wpa_ielen is the raw IE length field (u8, 0-255). When a local user supplies a connect request via nl80211 with a crafted WPA IE of length 255, wpa_ielen + 2 equals 257, overflowing the 256-byte buffer by one byte into the adjacent last_mic_err_time field. rtw_parse_wpa_ie() does not prevent this: its length consistency check compares *(wpa_ie+1) against (u8)(wpa_ie_len-2), which is (u8)(255) == 255 when wpa_ie_len = 257, so the check passes silently. Add explicit bounds checks for both the WPA and WPA2 paths before the memcpy, rejecting any IE whose total size (wpa_ielen + 2) exceeds the supplicant_ie buffer. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-4-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 5a752a616e756844388a1a45404db9fc29fec655 upstream.

supplicant_ie is a 256-byte array in struct security_priv. The WPA and
WPA2 IE copy paths use:

    memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.supplicant_ie, &pwpa[0], wpa_ielen + 2);

where wpa_ielen is the raw IE length field (u8, 0-255). When a local user
supplies a connect request via nl80211 with a crafted WPA IE of length 255,
wpa_ielen + 2 equals 257, overflowing the 256-byte buffer by one byte into
the adjacent last_mic_err_time field.

rtw_parse_wpa_ie() does not prevent this: its length consistency check
compares *(wpa_ie+1) against (u8)(wpa_ie_len-2), which is (u8)(255) == 255
when wpa_ie_len = 257, so the check passes silently.

Add explicit bounds checks for both the WPA and WPA2 paths before the
memcpy, rejecting any IE whose total size (wpa_ielen + 2) exceeds the
supplicant_ie buffer.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-4-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
staging: media: atomisp: reduce load_primary_binaries() stack usage 2026-07-18T14:52:01+00:00 Arnd Bergmann arnd@arndb.de 2026-03-25T12:59:43+00:00 e024cf507bb83978e9d3603a24ea411beaa852a9 commit f4d51e55dd47ef467fbe37d8575e20eee41b092d upstream. The load_primary_binaries() function is overly complex and has som large variables on the stack, which can cause warnings depending on CONFIG_FRAME_WARN setting: drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/sh_css.c: In function 'load_primary_binaries': drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/sh_css.c:5260:1: error: the frame size of 1560 bytes is larger than 1536 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=] Half of the stack usage is for the prim_descr[] array, but only one member of the array is used at any given time. Reduce the stack usage by turning the array into a single structure. Fixes: a49d25364dfb ("staging/atomisp: Add support for the Intel IPU v2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit f4d51e55dd47ef467fbe37d8575e20eee41b092d upstream.

The load_primary_binaries() function is overly complex and has som large
variables on the stack, which can cause warnings depending on CONFIG_FRAME_WARN
setting:

drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/sh_css.c: In function 'load_primary_binaries':
drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/sh_css.c:5260:1: error: the frame size of 1560 bytes is larger than 1536 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]

Half of the stack usage is for the prim_descr[] array, but only one
member of the array is used at any given time.

Reduce the stack usage by turning the array into a single structure.

Fixes: a49d25364dfb ("staging/atomisp: Add support for the Intel IPU v2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
media: staging: ipu3-imgu: Add range check for imgu_css_cfg_acc_stripe 2026-07-18T14:52:01+00:00 Ricardo Ribalda ribalda@chromium.org 2026-05-07T20:58:10+00:00 cacbe2173801c225941d457bc15f71224dcca7b8 commit c32fe4c4918c9aa49f61359e3b42619c4d8686de upstream. If the driver's stripe information is invalid it can result in an integer underflow. Add a range check to avoid this kind of error. This patch fixes the following smatch error: drivers/staging/media/ipu3/ipu3-css-params.c:1792 imgu_css_cfg_acc_stripe() warn: 'acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[0]->width - 2 * f' 4294967168 can't fit into 65535 'acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[1]->offset' Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e11110a5b744 ("media: staging/intel-ipu3: css: Compute and program ccs") Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil+cisco@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit c32fe4c4918c9aa49f61359e3b42619c4d8686de upstream.

If the driver's stripe information is invalid it can result in an integer
underflow. Add a range check to avoid this kind of error.

This patch fixes the following smatch error:
drivers/staging/media/ipu3/ipu3-css-params.c:1792 imgu_css_cfg_acc_stripe() warn: 'acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[0]->width - 2 * f' 4294967168 can't fit into 65535 'acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[1]->offset'

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e11110a5b744 ("media: staging/intel-ipu3: css: Compute and program ccs")
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil+cisco@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
staging: vme_user: fix location monitor leak in tsi148 bridge 2026-07-18T14:52:01+00:00 Hao-Qun Huang alvinhuang0603@gmail.com 2026-07-04T06:58:16+00:00 36902ab588ccc2fa07994adf6c5f51cbfe379177 commit 151edde741f8bc7f2931c5f44ab376d32b0c8beb upstream. tsi148_probe() allocates a location monitor resource and links it into tsi148_bridge->lm_resources. The probe error path frees this list, but tsi148_remove() only frees the dma, slave and master resource lists, so the location monitor resource is leaked on device unbind or module unload. Free the lm_resources list in tsi148_remove() as well, before tsi148_bridge is freed. Fixes: d22b8ed9a3b0 ("Staging: vme: add Tundra TSI148 VME-PCI Bridge driver") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Cc: Martyn Welch <martyn@welchs.me.uk> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5 Signed-off-by: Hao-Qun Huang <alvinhuang0603@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704065817.403111-2-alvinhuang0603@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 151edde741f8bc7f2931c5f44ab376d32b0c8beb upstream.

tsi148_probe() allocates a location monitor resource and links it into
tsi148_bridge->lm_resources. The probe error path frees this list, but
tsi148_remove() only frees the dma, slave and master resource lists, so
the location monitor resource is leaked on device unbind or module
unload.

Free the lm_resources list in tsi148_remove() as well, before
tsi148_bridge is freed.

Fixes: d22b8ed9a3b0 ("Staging: vme: add Tundra TSI148 VME-PCI Bridge driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Martyn Welch <martyn@welchs.me.uk>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5
Signed-off-by: Hao-Qun Huang <alvinhuang0603@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704065817.403111-2-alvinhuang0603@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>