linux-stable.git/drivers/net, branch v6.14.2

wifi: mt76: mt7921: fix kernel panic due to null pointer dereference

2025-04-10T12:44:47+00:00

commit adc3fd2a2277b7cc0b61692463771bf9bd298036 upstream.

Address a kernel panic caused by a null pointer dereference in the
`mt792x_rx_get_wcid` function. The issue arises because the `deflink` structure
is not properly initialized with the `sta` context. This patch ensures that the
`deflink` structure is correctly linked to the `sta` context, preventing the
null pointer dereference.

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000400
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 PGD 0 P4D 0
 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 470 Comm: mt76-usb-rx phy Not tainted 6.12.13-gentoo-dist #1
 Hardware name:  /AMD HUDSON-M1, BIOS 4.6.4 11/15/2011
 RIP: 0010:mt792x_rx_get_wcid+0x48/0x140 [mt792x_lib]
 RSP: 0018:ffffa147c055fd98 EFLAGS: 00010202
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8e9ecb652000 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e9ecb652000
 RBP: 0000000000000685 R08: ffff8e9ec6570000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: ffff8e9ecd2ca000 R11: ffff8e9f22a217c0 R12: 0000000038010119
 R13: 0000000080843801 R14: ffff8e9ec6570000 R15: ffff8e9ecb652000
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e9f22a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000400 CR3: 000000000d2ea000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
 Call Trace:
  
  ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
  ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x2f0
  ? search_module_extables+0x19/0x60
  ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80
  ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
  ? mt792x_rx_get_wcid+0x48/0x140 [mt792x_lib]
  mt7921_queue_rx_skb+0x1c6/0xaa0 [mt7921_common]
  mt76u_alloc_queues+0x784/0x810 [mt76_usb]
  ? __pfx___mt76_worker_fn+0x10/0x10 [mt76]
  __mt76_worker_fn+0x4f/0x80 [mt76]
  kthread+0xd2/0x100
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Reported-by: Nick Morrow 
Closes: https://github.com/morrownr/USB-WiFi/issues/577
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 90c10286b176 ("wifi: mt76: mt7925: Update mt792x_rx_get_wcid for per-link STA")
Signed-off-by: Ming Yen Hsieh 
Tested-by: Salah Coronya 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250218033343.1999648-1-mingyen.hsieh@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

wifi: mt76: mt7925: remove unused acpi function for clc

2025-04-10T12:44:45+00:00

commit b4ea6fdfc08375aae59c7e7059653b9877171fe4 upstream.

The code for handling ACPI configuration in CLC was copied from the mt7921
driver but is not utilized in the mt7925 implementation. So removes the
unused functionality to clean up the codebase.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c948b5da6bbe ("wifi: mt76: mt7925: add Mediatek Wi-Fi7 driver for mt7925 chips")
Signed-off-by: Ming Yen Hsieh 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250304113649.867387-4-mingyen.hsieh@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

usbnet:fix NPE during rx_complete

2025-04-10T12:44:43+00:00

commit 51de3600093429e3b712e5f091d767babc5dd6df upstream.

Missing usbnet_going_away Check in Critical Path.
The usb_submit_urb function lacks a usbnet_going_away
validation, whereas __usbnet_queue_skb includes this check.

This inconsistency creates a race condition where:
A URB request may succeed, but the corresponding SKB data
fails to be queued.

Subsequent processes:
(e.g., rx_complete → defer_bh → __skb_unlink(skb, list))
attempt to access skb->next, triggering a NULL pointer
dereference (Kernel Panic).

Fixes: 04e906839a05 ("usbnet: fix cyclical race on disconnect with work queue")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ying Lu 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4c9ef2efaa07eb7f9a5042b74348a67e5a3a7aea.1743584159.git.luying1@xiaomi.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: ibmveth: make veth_pool_store stop hanging

2025-04-10T12:44:42+00:00

[ Upstream commit 053f3ff67d7feefc75797863f3d84b47ad47086f ]

v2:
- Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store
- Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text

Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself,
ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to
napi_disable.

Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through
writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily
with a little shell script. This causes a hang.

I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new
kernel. I ran this test again and saw:

    Setting pool0/active to 0
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    [   73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    Setting pool1/active to 0
    [   73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    [   73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete
    [   73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting
    [  110.808564][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  230.808495][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  243.683786][  T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
    [  243.683827][  T123]       Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8
    [  243.683833][  T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
    [  243.683838][  T123] task:stress.sh       state:D stack:28096 pid:4365  tgid:4365  ppid:4364   task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000
    [  243.683852][  T123] Call Trace:
    [  243.683857][  T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
    [  243.683868][  T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0
    [  243.683878][  T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0
    [  243.683888][  T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210
    [  243.683896][  T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50
    [  243.683904][  T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0
    [  243.683913][  T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.683921][  T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc
    [  243.683928][  T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270
    [  243.683936][  T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0
    [  243.683944][  T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0
    [  243.683951][  T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650
    [  243.683958][  T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.683966][  T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340
    [  243.683973][  T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    ...
    [  243.684087][  T123] Showing all locks held in the system:
    [  243.684095][  T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123:
    [  243.684099][  T123]  #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248
    [  243.684114][  T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365:
    [  243.684119][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684132][  T123]  #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684143][  T123]  #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684155][  T123]  #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684166][  T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366:
    [  243.684170][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684183][  T123]  #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684194][  T123]  #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684205][  T123]  #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684216][  T123]  #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0

From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which
calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence:

  T4365             T4366
  ----------------- ----------------- ---------
  veth_pool_store   veth_pool_store
                    ibmveth_close
  ibmveth_close
  napi_disable
                    napi_disable
  ibmveth_open
  napi_enable                         <- HANG

ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls
napi_enable at the top.

https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says

  The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe
  against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of
  control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race
  conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a
  row will deadlock.

In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent
other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in
veth_pool_store fixes these hangs.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt 
Fixes: 860f242eb534 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically")
Reviewed-by: Nick Child 
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402154403.386744-1-davemarq@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

arcnet: Add NULL check in com20020pci_probe()

2025-04-10T12:44:42+00:00

[ Upstream commit fda8c491db2a90ff3e6fbbae58e495b4ddddeca3 ]

devm_kasprintf() returns NULL when memory allocation fails. Currently,
com20020pci_probe() does not check for this case, which results in a
NULL pointer dereference.

Add NULL check after devm_kasprintf() to prevent this issue and ensure
no resources are left allocated.

Fixes: 6b17a597fc2f ("arcnet: restoring support for multiple Sohard Arcnet cards")
Signed-off-by: Henry Martin 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402135036.44697-1-bsdhenrymartin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: propperly shutdown PPU re-enable timer on destroy

2025-04-10T12:44:41+00:00

[ Upstream commit a58d882841a0750da3c482cd3d82432b1c7edb77 ]

The mv88e6xxx has an internal PPU that polls PHY state. If we want to
access the internal PHYs, we need to disable the PPU first. Because
that is a slow operation, a 10ms timer is used to re-enable it,
canceled with every access, so bulk operations effectively only
disable it once and re-enable it some 10ms after the last access.

If a PHY is accessed and then the mv88e6xxx module is removed before
the 10ms are up, the PPU re-enable ends up accessing a dangling pointer.

This especially affects probing during bootup. The MDIO bus and PHY
registration may succeed, but registration with the DSA framework
may fail later on (e.g. because the CPU port depends on another,
very slow device that isn't done probing yet, returning -EPROBE_DEFER).
In this case, probe() fails, but the MDIO subsystem may already have
accessed the MIDO bus or PHYs, arming the timer.

This is fixed as follows:
 - If probe fails after mv88e6xxx_phy_init(), make sure we also call
   mv88e6xxx_phy_destroy() before returning
 - In mv88e6xxx_remove(), make sure we do the teardown in the correct
   order, calling mv88e6xxx_phy_destroy() after unregistering the
   switch device.
 - In mv88e6xxx_phy_destroy(), destroy both the timer and the work item
   that the timer might schedule, synchronously waiting in case one of
   the callbacks already fired and destroying the timer first, before
   waiting for the work item.
 - Access to the PPU is guarded by a mutex, the worker acquires it
   with a mutex_trylock(), not proceeding with the expensive shutdown
   if that fails. We grab the mutex in mv88e6xxx_phy_destroy() to make
   sure the slow PPU shutdown is already done or won't even enter, when
   we wait for the work item.

Fixes: 2e5f032095ff ("dsa: add support for the Marvell 88E6131 switch chip")
Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer 
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250401135705.92760-1-david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

sfc: fix NULL dereferences in ef100_process_design_param()

2025-04-10T12:44:41+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8241ecec1cdc6699ae197d52d58e76bddd995fa5 ]

Since cited commit, ef100_probe_main() and hence also
 ef100_check_design_params() run before efx->net_dev is created;
 consequently, we cannot netif_set_tso_max_size() or _segs() at this
 point.
Move those netif calls to ef100_probe_netdev(), and also replace
 netif_err within the design params code with pci_err.

Reported-by: Kyungwook Boo 
Fixes: 98ff4c7c8ac7 ("sfc: Separate netdev probe/remove from PCI probe/remove")
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree 
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250401225439.2401047-1-edward.cree@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

sfc: rip out MDIO support

2025-04-10T12:44:41+00:00

[ Upstream commit c339fcdd738be78c540407ae78fef5601ba5092a ]

Unlike Siena, no EF10 board ever had an external PHY, and consequently
 MDIO handling isn't even built into the firmware.  Since Siena has
 been split out into its own driver, the MDIO code can be deleted from
 the sfc driver.

Signed-off-by: Edward Cree 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aa689d192ddaef7abe82709316c2be648a7bd66e.1742493017.git.ecree.xilinx@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Stable-dep-of: 8241ecec1cdc ("sfc: fix NULL dereferences in ef100_process_design_param()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net: mvpp2: Prevent parser TCAM memory corruption

2025-04-10T12:44:40+00:00

[ Upstream commit 96844075226b49af25a69a1d084b648ec2d9b08d ]

Protect the parser TCAM/SRAM memory, and the cached (shadow) SRAM
information, from concurrent modifications.

Both the TCAM and SRAM tables are indirectly accessed by configuring
an index register that selects the row to read or write to. This means
that operations must be atomic in order to, e.g., avoid spreading
writes across multiple rows. Since the shadow SRAM array is used to
find free rows in the hardware table, it must also be protected in
order to avoid TOCTOU errors where multiple cores allocate the same
row.

This issue was detected in a situation where `mvpp2_set_rx_mode()` ran
concurrently on two CPUs. In this particular case the
MVPP2_PE_MAC_UC_PROMISCUOUS entry was corrupted, causing the
classifier unit to drop all incoming unicast - indicated by the
`rx_classifier_drops` counter.

Fixes: 3f518509dedc ("ethernet: Add new driver for Marvell Armada 375 network unit")
Signed-off-by: Tobias Waldekranz 
Reviewed-by: Maxime Chevallier 
Tested-by: Maxime Chevallier 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250401065855.3113635-1-tobias@waldekranz.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net: airoha: Fix ETS priomap validation

2025-04-10T12:44:40+00:00

[ Upstream commit 367579274f60cb23c570ae5348966ab51e1509a4 ]

ETS Qdisc schedules SP bands in a priority order assigning band-0 the
highest priority (band-0 > band-1 > .. > band-n) while EN7581 arranges
SP bands in a priority order assigning band-7 the highest priority
(band-7 > band-6, .. > band-n).
Fix priomap check in airoha_qdma_set_tx_ets_sched routine in order to
align ETS Qdisc and airoha_eth driver SP priority ordering.

Fixes: b56e4d660a96 ("net: airoha: Enforce ETS Qdisc priomap")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi 
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman 
Reviewed-by: Davide Caratti 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250331-airoha-ets-validate-priomap-v1-1-60a524488672@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin