linux-stable.git/drivers/net, branch v4.9.261

xen-netback: respect gnttab_map_refs()'s return value

2021-03-07T10:25:58+00:00

commit 2991397d23ec597405b116d96de3813420bdcbc3 upstream.

Commit 3194a1746e8a ("xen-netback: don't "handle" error by BUG()")
dropped respective a BUG_ON() without noticing that with this the
variable's value wouldn't be consumed anymore. With gnttab_set_map_op()
setting all status fields to a non-zero value, in case of an error no
slot should have a status of GNTST_okay (zero).

This is part of XSA-367.

Cc: 
Reported-by: kernel test robot 
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich 
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d933f495-619a-0086-5fb4-1ec3cf81a8fc@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ath10k: fix wmi mgmt tx queue full due to race condition

2021-03-07T10:25:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit b55379e343a3472c35f4a1245906db5158cab453 ]

Failed to transmit wmi management frames:

[84977.840894] ath10k_snoc a000000.wifi: wmi mgmt tx queue is full
[84977.840913] ath10k_snoc a000000.wifi: failed to transmit packet, dropping: -28
[84977.840924] ath10k_snoc a000000.wifi: failed to submit frame: -28
[84977.840932] ath10k_snoc a000000.wifi: failed to transmit frame: -28

This issue is caused by race condition between skb_dequeue and
__skb_queue_tail. The queue of ‘wmi_mgmt_tx_queue’ is protected by a
different lock: ar->data_lock vs list->lock, the result is no protection.
So when ath10k_mgmt_over_wmi_tx_work() and ath10k_mac_tx_wmi_mgmt()
running concurrently on different CPUs, there appear to be a rare corner
cases when the queue length is 1,

  CPUx (skb_deuque)			CPUy (__skb_queue_tail)
					next=list
					prev=list
  struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(list);	WRITE_ONCE(newsk->next, next);
  WRITE_ONCE(list->qlen, list->qlen - 1);WRITE_ONCE(newsk->prev, prev);
  next       = skb->next;		WRITE_ONCE(next->prev, newsk);
  prev       = skb->prev;		WRITE_ONCE(prev->next, newsk);
  skb->next  = skb->prev = NULL;	list->qlen++;
  WRITE_ONCE(next->prev, prev);
  WRITE_ONCE(prev->next, next);

If the instruction ‘next = skb->next’ is executed before
‘WRITE_ONCE(prev->next, newsk)’, newsk will be lost, as CPUx get the
old ‘next’ pointer, but the length is still added by one. The final
result is the length of the queue will reach the maximum value but
the queue is empty.

So remove ar->data_lock, and use 'skb_queue_tail' instead of
'__skb_queue_tail' to prevent the potential race condition. Also switch
to use skb_queue_len_lockless, in case we queue a few SKBs simultaneously.

Tested-on: WCN3990 hw1.0 SNOC WLAN.HL.3.1.c2-00033-QCAHLSWMTPLZ-1

Signed-off-by: Miaoqing Pan 
Reviewed-by: Brian Norris 
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1608618887-8857-1-git-send-email-miaoqing@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

wlcore: Fix command execute failure 19 for wl12xx

2021-03-07T10:25:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit cb88d01b67383a095e3f7caeb4cdade5a6cf0417 ]

We can currently get a "command execute failure 19" error on beacon loss
if the signal is weak:

wlcore: Beacon loss detected. roles:0xff
wlcore: Connection loss work (role_id: 0).
...
wlcore: ERROR command execute failure 19
...
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1552 at drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/main.c:803
...
(wl12xx_queue_recovery_work.part.0 [wlcore])
(wl12xx_cmd_role_start_sta [wlcore])
(wl1271_op_bss_info_changed [wlcore])
(ieee80211_prep_connection [mac80211])

Error 19 is defined as CMD_STATUS_WRONG_NESTING from the wlcore firmware,
and seems to mean that the firmware no longer wants to see the quirk
handling for WLCORE_QUIRK_START_STA_FAILS done.

This quirk got added with commit 18eab430700d ("wlcore: workaround
start_sta problem in wl12xx fw"), and it seems that this already got fixed
in the firmware long time ago back in 2012 as wl18xx never had this quirk
in place to start with.

As we no longer even support firmware that early, to me it seems that it's
safe to just drop WLCORE_QUIRK_START_STA_FAILS to fix the error. Looks
like earlier firmware got disabled back in 2013 with commit 0e284c074ef9
("wl12xx: increase minimum singlerole firmware version required").

If it turns out we still need WLCORE_QUIRK_START_STA_FAILS with any
firmware that the driver works with, we can simply revert this patch and
add extra checks for firmware version used.

With this fix wlcore reconnects properly after a beacon loss.

Cc: Raz Bouganim 
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren 
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210115065613.7731-1-tony@atomide.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net: usb: qmi_wwan: support ZTE P685M modem

2021-03-07T10:25:55+00:00

commit 88eee9b7b42e69fb622ddb3ff6f37e8e4347f5b2 upstream.

Now that interface 3 in "option" driver is no longer mapped, add device
ID matching it to qmi_wwan.

The modem is used inside ZTE MF283+ router and carriers identify it as
such.
Interface mapping is:
0: QCDM, 1: AT (PCUI), 2: AT (Modem), 3: QMI, 4: ADB

T:  Bus=02 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=05 Cnt=01 Dev#=  3 Spd=480  MxCh= 0
D:  Ver= 2.01 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs=  1
P:  Vendor=19d2 ProdID=1275 Rev=f0.00
S:  Manufacturer=ZTE,Incorporated
S:  Product=ZTE Technologies MSM
S:  SerialNumber=P685M510ZTED0000CP&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&0
C:* #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA
I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
E:  Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
E:  Ad=83(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  10 Ivl=32ms
E:  Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
E:  Ad=85(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  10 Ivl=32ms
E:  Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
E:  Ad=87(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=   8 Ivl=32ms
E:  Ad=86(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none)
E:  Ad=88(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms

Acked-by: Bjørn Mork 
Signed-off-by: Lech Perczak 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210223183456.6377-1-lech.perczak@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: icmp: pass zeroed opts from icmp{,v6}_ndo_send before sending

2021-03-03T16:44:46+00:00

commit ee576c47db60432c37e54b1e2b43a8ca6d3a8dca upstream.

The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, casting
it with IPCB or IP6CB, assuming the skb to have come directly from the
inet layer. But when the packet comes from the ndo layer, especially
when forwarded, there's no telling what might be in skb->cb at that
point. As a result, the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory
contents, which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one
reported by a user:

    panic+0x108/0x2ea
    __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20
    __icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0
    icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160

In icmp_send, skb->cb is cast with IPCB and an ip_options struct is read
from it. The optlen parameter there is of particular note, as it can
induce writes beyond bounds. There are quite a few ways that can happen
in __ip_options_echo. For example:

    // sptr/skb are attacker-controlled skb bytes
    sptr = skb_network_header(skb);
    // dptr/dopt points to stack memory allocated by __icmp_send
    dptr = dopt->__data;
    // sopt is the corrupt skb->cb in question
    if (sopt->rr) {
        optlen  = sptr[sopt->rr+1]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
        soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
	// this now writes potentially attacker-controlled data, over
	// flowing the stack:
        memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen);
    }

In the icmpv6_send case, the story is similar, but not as dire, as only
IP6CB(skb)->iif and IP6CB(skb)->dsthao are used. The dsthao case is
worse than the iif case, but it is passed to ipv6_find_tlv, which does
a bit of bounds checking on the value.

This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41,
sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by
good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've
avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN:

    BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
    Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89
    CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5
    Call Trace:
     dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc
     print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160
     __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38
     kasan_report+0x32/0x40
     check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0
     memcpy+0x39/0x60
     __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
     __icmp_send+0x744/0x1700

Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for
the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the
gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the
shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.

This commit fixes the issue by passing an empty IPCB or IP6CB along to
the functions that actually do the work. For the icmp_send, this was
already trivial, thanks to __icmp_send providing the plumbing function.
For icmpv6_send, this required a tiny bit of refactoring to make it
behave like the v4 case, after which it was straight forward.

Fixes: a2b78e9b2cac ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs")
Reported-by: SinYu 
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAF=yD-LOF116aHub6RMe8vB8ZpnrrnoTdqhobEx+bvoA8AsP0w@mail.gmail.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210223131858.72082-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sunvnet: use icmp_ndo_send helper

2021-03-03T16:44:46+00:00

commit 67c9a7e1e3ac491b5df018803639addc36f154ba upstream.

Because sunvnet is calling icmp from network device context, it should use
the ndo helper so that the rate limiting applies correctly. While we're
at it, doing the additional route lookup before calling icmp_ndo_send is
superfluous, since this is the job of the icmp code in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld 
Cc: Shannon Nelson 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

gtp: use icmp_ndo_send helper

2021-03-03T16:44:46+00:00

commit e0fce6f945a26d4e953a147fe7ca11410322c9fe upstream.

Because gtp is calling icmp from network device context, it should use
the ndo helper so that the rate limiting applies correctly.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld 
Cc: Harald Welte 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net/mlx4_core: Add missed mlx4_free_cmd_mailbox()

2021-03-03T16:44:40+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8eb65fda4a6dbd59cd5de24b106a10b6ee0d2176 ]

mlx4_do_mirror_rule() forgets to call mlx4_free_cmd_mailbox() to
free the memory region allocated by mlx4_alloc_cmd_mailbox() before
an exit.
Add the missed call to fix it.

Fixes: 78efed275117 ("net/mlx4_core: Support mirroring VF DMFS rules on both ports")
Signed-off-by: Chuhong Yuan 
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210221143559.390277-1-hslester96@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

i40e: Fix flow for IPv6 next header (extension header)

2021-03-03T16:44:40+00:00

[ Upstream commit 92c6058024e87087cf1b99b0389d67c0a886360e ]

When a packet contains an IPv6 header with next header which is
an extension header and not a protocol one, the kernel function
skb_transport_header called with such sk_buff will return a
pointer to the extension header and not to the TCP one.

The above explained call caused a problem with packet processing
for skb with encapsulation for tunnel with I40E_TX_CTX_EXT_IP_IPV6.
The extension header was not skipped at all.

The ipv6_skip_exthdr function does check if next header of the IPV6
header is an extension header and doesn't modify the l4_proto pointer
if it points to a protocol header value so its safe to omit the
comparison of exthdr and l4.hdr pointers. The ipv6_skip_exthdr can
return value -1. This means that the skipping process failed
and there is something wrong with the packet so it will be dropped.

Fixes: a3fd9d8876a5 ("i40e/i40evf: Handle IPv6 extension headers in checksum offload")
Signed-off-by: Slawomir Laba 
Signed-off-by: Przemyslaw Patynowski 
Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov 
Tested-by: Tony Brelinski 
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

b43: N-PHY: Fix the update of coef for the PHY revision >= 3case

2021-03-03T16:44:34+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4773acf3d4b50768bf08e9e97a204819e9ea0895 ]

The documentation for the PHY update [1] states:

Loop 4 times with index i

    If PHY Revision >= 3
        Copy table[i] to coef[i]
    Otherwise
        Set coef[i] to 0

the copy of the table to coef is currently implemented the wrong way
around, table is being updated from uninitialized values in coeff.
Fix this by swapping the assignment around.

[1] https://bcm-v4.sipsolutions.net/802.11/PHY/N/RestoreCal/

Fixes: 2f258b74d13c ("b43: N-PHY: implement restoring general configuration")
Addresses-Coverity: ("Uninitialized scalar variable")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King 
Acked-by: Larry Finger 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin