linux-stable.git/drivers/net/can, branch linux-5.4.y Linux kernel stable tree can: gs_usb: increase max interface to U8_MAX 2025-12-03T11:45:06+00:00 Celeste Liu uwu@coelacanthus.name 2025-10-27T13:11:57+00:00 12afe2c625fb2698597c3beab383f235eb1538a9 commit 2a27f6a8fb5722223d526843040f747e9b0e8060 upstream This issue was found by Runcheng Lu when develop HSCanT USB to CAN FD converter[1]. The original developers may have only 3 interfaces device to test so they write 3 here and wait for future change. During the HSCanT development, we actually used 4 interfaces, so the limitation of 3 is not enough now. But just increase one is not future-proofed. Since the channel index type in gs_host_frame is u8, just make canch[] become a flexible array with a u8 index, so it naturally constraint by U8_MAX and avoid statically allocate 256 pointer for every gs_usb device. [1]: https://github.com/cherry-embedded/HSCanT-hardware Fixes: d08e973a77d1 ("can: gs_usb: Added support for the GS_USB CAN devices") Reported-by: Runcheng Lu <runcheng.lu@hpmicro.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Celeste Liu <uwu@coelacanthus.name> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250930-gs-usb-max-if-v5-1-863330bf6666@coelacanthus.name Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 2a27f6a8fb5722223d526843040f747e9b0e8060 upstream

This issue was found by Runcheng Lu when develop HSCanT USB to CAN FD
converter[1]. The original developers may have only 3 interfaces
device to test so they write 3 here and wait for future change.

During the HSCanT development, we actually used 4 interfaces, so the
limitation of 3 is not enough now. But just increase one is not
future-proofed. Since the channel index type in gs_host_frame is u8,
just make canch[] become a flexible array with a u8 index, so it
naturally constraint by U8_MAX and avoid statically allocate 256
pointer for every gs_usb device.

[1]: https://github.com/cherry-embedded/HSCanT-hardware

Fixes: d08e973a77d1 ("can: gs_usb: Added support for the GS_USB CAN devices")
Reported-by: Runcheng Lu <runcheng.lu@hpmicro.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Celeste Liu <uwu@coelacanthus.name>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250930-gs-usb-max-if-v5-1-863330bf6666@coelacanthus.name
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
can: peak_usb: fix shift-out-of-bounds issue 2025-10-02T11:34:33+00:00 Stéphane Grosjean stephane.grosjean@hms-networks.com 2025-09-18T13:23:57+00:00 572c656802781cc57f4a3231eefa83547e75ed78 [ Upstream commit c443be70aaee42c2d1d251e0329e0a69dd96ae54 ] Explicitly uses a 64-bit constant when the number of bits used for its shifting is 32 (which is the case for PC CAN FD interfaces supported by this driver). Signed-off-by: Stéphane Grosjean <stephane.grosjean@hms-networks.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918132413.30071-1-stephane.grosjean@free.fr Reported-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/20250917-aboriginal-refined-honeybee-82b1aa-mkl@pengutronix.de Fixes: bb4785551f64 ("can: usb: PEAK-System Technik USB adapters driver core") [mkl: update subject, apply manually] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit c443be70aaee42c2d1d251e0329e0a69dd96ae54 ]

Explicitly uses a 64-bit constant when the number of bits used for its
shifting is 32 (which is the case for PC CAN FD interfaces supported by
this driver).

Signed-off-by: Stéphane Grosjean <stephane.grosjean@hms-networks.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918132413.30071-1-stephane.grosjean@free.fr
Reported-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/20250917-aboriginal-refined-honeybee-82b1aa-mkl@pengutronix.de
Fixes: bb4785551f64 ("can: usb: PEAK-System Technik USB adapters driver core")
[mkl: update subject, apply manually]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
can: mcba_usb: populate ndo_change_mtu() to prevent buffer overflow 2025-10-02T11:34:33+00:00 Vincent Mailhol mailhol@kernel.org 2025-09-18T09:00:27+00:00 0fa9303c4b9493727e0d3a6ac3729300e3013930 [ Upstream commit 17c8d794527f01def0d1c8b7dc2d7b8d34fed0e6 ] Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that skb->len fits the interface's MTU. Unfortunately, because the mcba_usb driver does not populate its net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example: $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999 After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the ETH_P_CANXL protocol: socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL)) to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example: struct canxl_frame frame = { .flags = 0xff, .len = 2048, }; The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks: 1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the function does not check the actual device capabilities). 2. the length is a valid CAN XL length. And so, mcba_usb_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame. This can result in a buffer overflow. The driver will consume cf->len as-is with no further checks on these lines: usb_msg.dlc = cf->len; memcpy(usb_msg.data, cf->data, usb_msg.dlc); Here, cf->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs! Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow. Fixes: 51f3baad7de9 ("can: mcba_usb: Add support for Microchip CAN BUS Analyzer") Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-4-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 17c8d794527f01def0d1c8b7dc2d7b8d34fed0e6 ]

Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to
directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check
which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that
skb->len fits the interface's MTU.

Unfortunately, because the mcba_usb driver does not populate its
net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to
configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example:

  $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999

After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the
ETH_P_CANXL protocol:

	socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL))

to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example:

	struct canxl_frame frame = {
		.flags = 0xff,
		.len = 2048,
	};

The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to
check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the
malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks:

  1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the
     function does not check the actual device capabilities).

  2. the length is a valid CAN XL length.

And so, mcba_usb_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not
able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame.

This can result in a buffer overflow. The driver will consume cf->len
as-is with no further checks on these lines:

	usb_msg.dlc = cf->len;

	memcpy(usb_msg.data, cf->data, usb_msg.dlc);

Here, cf->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In
our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the
maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs!

Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the
interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By
fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow.

Fixes: 51f3baad7de9 ("can: mcba_usb: Add support for Microchip CAN BUS Analyzer")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-4-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
can: sun4i_can: populate ndo_change_mtu() to prevent buffer overflow 2025-10-02T11:34:33+00:00 Vincent Mailhol mailhol@kernel.org 2025-09-18T09:00:26+00:00 063539db42203b29d5aa2adf0cae3d68c646a6b6 [ Upstream commit 61da0bd4102c459823fbe6b8b43b01fb6ace4a22 ] Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that skb->len fits the interface's MTU. Unfortunately, because the sun4i_can driver does not populate its net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example: $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999 After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the ETH_P_CANXL protocol: socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL)) to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example: struct canxl_frame frame = { .flags = 0xff, .len = 2048, }; The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks: 1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the function does not check the actual device capabilities). 2. the length is a valid CAN XL length. And so, sun4ican_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame. This can result in a buffer overflow. The driver will consume cf->len as-is with no further checks on this line: dlc = cf->len; Here, cf->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs a couple line below when doing: for (i = 0; i < dlc; i++) writel(cf->data[i], priv->base + (dreg + i * 4)); Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow. Fixes: 0738eff14d81 ("can: Allwinner A10/A20 CAN Controller support - Kernel module") Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-3-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 61da0bd4102c459823fbe6b8b43b01fb6ace4a22 ]

Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to
directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check
which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that
skb->len fits the interface's MTU.

Unfortunately, because the sun4i_can driver does not populate its
net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to
configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example:

  $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999

After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the
ETH_P_CANXL protocol:

	socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL))

to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example:

	struct canxl_frame frame = {
		.flags = 0xff,
		.len = 2048,
	};

The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to
check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the
malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks:

  1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the
     function does not check the actual device capabilities).

  2. the length is a valid CAN XL length.

And so, sun4ican_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not
able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame.

This can result in a buffer overflow. The driver will consume cf->len
as-is with no further checks on this line:

	dlc = cf->len;

Here, cf->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In
our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the
maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs a
couple line below when doing:

	for (i = 0; i < dlc; i++)
		writel(cf->data[i], priv->base + (dreg + i * 4));

Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the
interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By
fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow.

Fixes: 0738eff14d81 ("can: Allwinner A10/A20 CAN Controller support - Kernel module")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-3-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
can: hi311x: populate ndo_change_mtu() to prevent buffer overflow 2025-10-02T11:34:33+00:00 Vincent Mailhol mailhol@kernel.org 2025-09-18T09:00:25+00:00 f2c247e9581024d8b3dd44cbe086bf2bebbef42c [ Upstream commit ac1c7656fa717f29fac3ea073af63f0b9919ec9a ] Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that skb->len fits the interface's MTU. Unfortunately, because the sun4i_can driver does not populate its net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example: $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999 After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the ETH_P_CANXL protocol: socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL)) to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example: struct canxl_frame frame = { .flags = 0xff, .len = 2048, }; The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks: 1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the function does not check the actual device capabilities). 2. the length is a valid CAN XL length. And so, hi3110_hard_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame. The driver will consume frame->len as-is with no further checks. This can result in a buffer overflow later on in hi3110_hw_tx() on this line: memcpy(buf + HI3110_FIFO_EXT_DATA_OFF, frame->data, frame->len); Here, frame->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs! Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow. Fixes: 57e83fb9b746 ("can: hi311x: Add Holt HI-311x CAN driver") Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-2-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit ac1c7656fa717f29fac3ea073af63f0b9919ec9a ]

Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to
directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check
which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that
skb->len fits the interface's MTU.

Unfortunately, because the sun4i_can driver does not populate its
net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to
configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example:

  $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999

After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the
ETH_P_CANXL protocol:

	socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL))

to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example:

	struct canxl_frame frame = {
		.flags = 0xff,
		.len = 2048,
	};

The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to
check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the
malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks:

  1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the
     function does not check the actual device capabilities).

  2. the length is a valid CAN XL length.

And so, hi3110_hard_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is
not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN
frame. The driver will consume frame->len as-is with no further
checks.

This can result in a buffer overflow later on in hi3110_hw_tx() on
this line:

	memcpy(buf + HI3110_FIFO_EXT_DATA_OFF,
	       frame->data, frame->len);

Here, frame->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame.
In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because
the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes
occurs!

Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the
interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By
fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow.

Fixes: 57e83fb9b746 ("can: hi311x: Add Holt HI-311x CAN driver")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-2-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
can: rcar_can: rcar_can_resume(): fix s2ram with PSCI 2025-10-02T11:34:33+00:00 Geert Uytterhoeven geert+renesas@glider.be 2025-08-14T11:26:37+00:00 967c5ab21a4e64d07d20d806607a2b35ae14e968 [ Upstream commit 5c793afa07da6d2d4595f6c73a2a543a471bb055 ] On R-Car Gen3 using PSCI, s2ram powers down the SoC. After resume, the CAN interface no longer works, until it is brought down and up again. Fix this by calling rcar_can_start() from the PM resume callback, to fully initialize the controller instead of just restarting it. Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/699b2f7fcb60b31b6f976a37f08ce99c5ffccb31.1755165227.git.geert+renesas@glider.be Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 5c793afa07da6d2d4595f6c73a2a543a471bb055 ]

On R-Car Gen3 using PSCI, s2ram powers down the SoC.  After resume, the
CAN interface no longer works, until it is brought down and up again.

Fix this by calling rcar_can_start() from the PM resume callback, to
fully initialize the controller instead of just restarting it.

Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/699b2f7fcb60b31b6f976a37f08ce99c5ffccb31.1755165227.git.geert+renesas@glider.be
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
can: kvaser_usb: Assign netdev.dev_port based on device channel index 2025-08-28T14:21:20+00:00 Jimmy Assarsson extja@kvaser.com 2025-07-25T12:34:44+00:00 caf0f743dd64d5ca1a213f31f7766d32b5f23f2e [ Upstream commit c151b06a087a61c7a1790b75ee2f1d6edb6a8a45 ] Assign netdev.dev_port based on the device channel index, to indicate the port number of the network device. While this driver already uses netdev.dev_id for that purpose, dev_port is more appropriate. However, retain dev_id to avoid potential regressions. Fixes: 3e66d0138c05 ("can: populate netdev::dev_id for udev discrimination") Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr> Signed-off-by: Jimmy Assarsson <extja@kvaser.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250725123452.41-4-extja@kvaser.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit c151b06a087a61c7a1790b75ee2f1d6edb6a8a45 ]

Assign netdev.dev_port based on the device channel index, to indicate the
port number of the network device.
While this driver already uses netdev.dev_id for that purpose, dev_port is
more appropriate. However, retain dev_id to avoid potential regressions.

Fixes: 3e66d0138c05 ("can: populate netdev::dev_id for udev discrimination")
Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jimmy Assarsson <extja@kvaser.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250725123452.41-4-extja@kvaser.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
can: kvaser_pciefd: Store device channel index 2025-08-28T14:21:20+00:00 Jimmy Assarsson extja@kvaser.com 2025-07-25T12:32:25+00:00 0fa86e3c919ed55c3a8fa2ccb4cebac188a5da7f [ Upstream commit d54b16b40ddadb7d0a77fff48af7b319a0cd6aae ] Store device channel index in netdev.dev_port. Fixes: 26ad340e582d ("can: kvaser_pciefd: Add driver for Kvaser PCIEcan devices") Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr> Signed-off-by: Jimmy Assarsson <extja@kvaser.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250725123230.8-6-extja@kvaser.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit d54b16b40ddadb7d0a77fff48af7b319a0cd6aae ]

Store device channel index in netdev.dev_port.

Fixes: 26ad340e582d ("can: kvaser_pciefd: Add driver for Kvaser PCIEcan devices")
Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jimmy Assarsson <extja@kvaser.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250725123230.8-6-extja@kvaser.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
can: m_can: m_can_handle_lost_msg(): downgrade msg lost in rx message to debug level 2025-07-17T16:25:05+00:00 Sean Nyekjaer sean@geanix.com 2025-07-11T10:12:02+00:00 6807ef101b2e6a691d2254de5109783c41defb46 [ Upstream commit 58805e9cbc6f6a28f35d90e740956e983a0e036e ] Downgrade the "msg lost in rx" message to debug level, to prevent flooding the kernel log with error messages. Fixes: e0d1f4816f2a ("can: m_can: add Bosch M_CAN controller support") Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr> Signed-off-by: Sean Nyekjaer <sean@geanix.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250711-mcan_ratelimit-v3-1-7413e8e21b84@geanix.com [mkl: enhance commit message] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 58805e9cbc6f6a28f35d90e740956e983a0e036e ]

Downgrade the "msg lost in rx" message to debug level, to prevent
flooding the kernel log with error messages.

Fixes: e0d1f4816f2a ("can: m_can: add Bosch M_CAN controller support")
Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Sean Nyekjaer <sean@geanix.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250711-mcan_ratelimit-v3-1-7413e8e21b84@geanix.com
[mkl: enhance commit message]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
can: flexcan: only change CAN state when link up in system PM 2025-04-10T12:29:43+00:00 Haibo Chen haibo.chen@nxp.com 2025-03-14T11:01:44+00:00 a1ef4447b82bc74ce5a61e69708270ba61feb7dc [ Upstream commit fd99d6ed20234b83d65b9c5417794343577cf3e5 ] After a suspend/resume cycle on a down interface, it will come up as ERROR-ACTIVE. $ ip -details -s -s a s dev flexcan0 3: flexcan0: <NOARP,ECHO> mtu 16 qdisc pfifo_fast state DOWN group default qlen 10 link/can promiscuity 0 allmulti 0 minmtu 0 maxmtu 0 can state STOPPED (berr-counter tx 0 rx 0) restart-ms 1000 $ sudo systemctl suspend $ ip -details -s -s a s dev flexcan0 3: flexcan0: <NOARP,ECHO> mtu 16 qdisc pfifo_fast state DOWN group default qlen 10 link/can promiscuity 0 allmulti 0 minmtu 0 maxmtu 0 can state ERROR-ACTIVE (berr-counter tx 0 rx 0) restart-ms 1000 And only set CAN state to CAN_STATE_ERROR_ACTIVE when resume process has no issue, otherwise keep in CAN_STATE_SLEEPING as suspend did. Fixes: 4de349e786a3 ("can: flexcan: fix resume function") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Haibo Chen <haibo.chen@nxp.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250314110145.899179-1-haibo.chen@nxp.com Reported-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250314-married-polar-elephant-b15594-mkl@pengutronix.de [mkl: add newlines] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit fd99d6ed20234b83d65b9c5417794343577cf3e5 ]

After a suspend/resume cycle on a down interface, it will come up as
ERROR-ACTIVE.

$ ip -details -s -s a s dev flexcan0
3: flexcan0: <NOARP,ECHO> mtu 16 qdisc pfifo_fast state DOWN group default qlen 10
    link/can  promiscuity 0 allmulti 0 minmtu 0 maxmtu 0
    can state STOPPED (berr-counter tx 0 rx 0) restart-ms 1000

$ sudo systemctl suspend

$ ip -details -s -s a s dev flexcan0
3: flexcan0: <NOARP,ECHO> mtu 16 qdisc pfifo_fast state DOWN group default qlen 10
    link/can  promiscuity 0 allmulti 0 minmtu 0 maxmtu 0
    can state ERROR-ACTIVE (berr-counter tx 0 rx 0) restart-ms 1000

And only set CAN state to CAN_STATE_ERROR_ACTIVE when resume process
has no issue, otherwise keep in CAN_STATE_SLEEPING as suspend did.

Fixes: 4de349e786a3 ("can: flexcan: fix resume function")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haibo Chen <haibo.chen@nxp.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250314110145.899179-1-haibo.chen@nxp.com
Reported-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250314-married-polar-elephant-b15594-mkl@pengutronix.de
[mkl: add newlines]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>