linux-stable.git/drivers/misc, branch v7.0.4 Linux kernel stable tree mei: me: add nova lake point H DID 2026-05-07T04:14:16+00:00 Alexander Usyskin alexander.usyskin@intel.com 2026-04-28T09:37:29+00:00 2216ce85ea42d6a568ef6a6e5e524018b3fefea3 [ Upstream commit a5a1804332afc7035d5c5b880548262e81d796bc ] Add Nova Lake H device id. Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Co-developed-by: Tomas Winkler <tomasw@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomasw@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260405141758.1634556-1-alexander.usyskin@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit a5a1804332afc7035d5c5b880548262e81d796bc ]

Add Nova Lake H device id.

Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Tomas Winkler <tomasw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomasw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260405141758.1634556-1-alexander.usyskin@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mei: me: use PCI_DEVICE_DATA macro 2026-05-07T04:14:15+00:00 Alexander Usyskin alexander.usyskin@intel.com 2026-04-28T09:37:28+00:00 9c58e985dc7b74000db0c35bbbdb02ad1bad3da5 [ Upstream commit 9e7a2409ecf4d411b7cc91615b08f6a7576f0aaa ] Drop old local MEI_PCI_DEVICE macro and use common PCI_DEVICE_DATA instead. Update defines to adhere to current naming convention. Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260201094358.1440593-2-alexander.usyskin@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Stable-dep-of: a5a1804332af ("mei: me: add nova lake point H DID") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 9e7a2409ecf4d411b7cc91615b08f6a7576f0aaa ]

Drop old local MEI_PCI_DEVICE macro and use common
PCI_DEVICE_DATA instead.
Update defines to adhere to current naming convention.

Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260201094358.1440593-2-alexander.usyskin@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: a5a1804332af ("mei: me: add nova lake point H DID")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message() 2026-05-07T04:13:42+00:00 Tyllis Xu livelycarpet87@gmail.com 2026-03-14T16:58:05+00:00 9e8f6c9d4ecddda2f28baa1678340286cff3969c commit 9aad71144fa3682cca3837a06c8623016790e7ec upstream. The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8, data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size. A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor over MMIO. Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning failure. Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware frame from the controller's free pool, and returning without a corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it. Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame, consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size() for the header field. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tyllis Xu <LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260314165805.548293-1-LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 9aad71144fa3682cca3837a06c8623016790e7ec upstream.

The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to
compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from
user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8,
data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size.
A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing
memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into
adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor
over MMIO.

Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields
claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose
own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause
the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning
failure.

Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking
an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware
frame from the controller's free pool, and returning without a
corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it.

Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the
memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame,
consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size()
for the header field.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyllis Xu <LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260314165805.548293-1-LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ibmasm: fix OOB reads in command_file_write due to missing size checks 2026-05-07T04:13:42+00:00 Tyllis Xu livelycarpet87@gmail.com 2026-03-14T16:53:54+00:00 d0fb4d1dc43f8d5179917a2daaa82680993d4cdf commit 0eb09f737428e482a32a2e31e5e223f2b35a71d3 upstream. The command_file_write() handler allocates a kernel buffer of exactly count bytes and copies user data into it, but does not validate the buffer against the dot command protocol before passing it to get_dot_command_size() and get_dot_command_timeout(). Since both the allocation size (count) and the header fields (command_size, data_size) are independently user-controlled, an attacker can cause get_dot_command_size() to return a value exceeding the allocation, triggering OOB reads in get_dot_command_timeout() and an out-of-bounds memcpy_toio() that leaks kernel heap memory to the service processor. Fix with two guards: reject writes smaller than sizeof(struct dot_command_header) before allocation, then after copying user data reject commands where the buffer is smaller than the total size declared by the header (sizeof(header) + command_size + data_size). This ensures all subsequent header and payload field accesses stay within the buffer. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tyllis Xu <LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260314165355.548119-1-LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 0eb09f737428e482a32a2e31e5e223f2b35a71d3 upstream.

The command_file_write() handler allocates a kernel buffer of exactly
count bytes and copies user data into it, but does not validate the
buffer against the dot command protocol before passing it to
get_dot_command_size() and get_dot_command_timeout().

Since both the allocation size (count) and the header fields (command_size,
data_size) are independently user-controlled, an attacker can cause
get_dot_command_size() to return a value exceeding the allocation,
triggering OOB reads in get_dot_command_timeout() and an out-of-bounds
memcpy_toio() that leaks kernel heap memory to the service processor.

Fix with two guards: reject writes smaller than sizeof(struct
dot_command_header) before allocation, then after copying user data
reject commands where the buffer is smaller than the total size declared
by the header (sizeof(header) + command_size + data_size). This ensures
all subsequent header and payload field accesses stay within the buffer.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyllis Xu <LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260314165355.548119-1-LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
misc: ibmasm: fix OOB MMIO read in ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt() 2026-05-07T04:13:42+00:00 Tyllis Xu livelycarpet87@gmail.com 2026-03-08T06:21:08+00:00 1ca75f6b74ec7f685464e5745ecfcf3a76d284e9 commit 4b6e6ead556734bdc14024c5f837132b1e7a4b84 upstream. ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt() performs an out-of-bounds MMIO read when the queue reader or writer index from hardware exceeds REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE (60). A compromised service processor can trigger this by writing an out-of-range value to the reader or writer MMIO register before asserting an interrupt. Since writer is re-read from hardware on every loop iteration, it can also be set to an out-of-range value after the loop has already started. The root cause is that get_queue_reader() and get_queue_writer() return raw readl() values that are passed directly into get_queue_entry(), which computes: queue_begin + reader * sizeof(struct remote_input) with no bounds check. This unchecked MMIO address is then passed to memcpy_fromio(), reading 8 bytes from unintended device registers. For sufficiently large values the address falls outside the PCI BAR mapping entirely, triggering a machine check exception. Fix by checking both indices against REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE at the top of the loop body, before any call to get_queue_entry(). On an out-of-range value, reset the reader register to 0 via set_queue_reader() before breaking, so that normal queue operation can resume if the corrupted hardware state is transient. Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com> Fixes: 278d72ae8803 ("[PATCH] ibmasm driver: redesign handling of remote control events") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: ychen@northwestern.edu Signed-off-by: Tyllis Xu <LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260308062108.258940-1-LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 4b6e6ead556734bdc14024c5f837132b1e7a4b84 upstream.

ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt() performs an out-of-bounds MMIO read
when the queue reader or writer index from hardware exceeds
REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE (60).

A compromised service processor can trigger this by writing an
out-of-range value to the reader or writer MMIO register before
asserting an interrupt. Since writer is re-read from hardware on
every loop iteration, it can also be set to an out-of-range value
after the loop has already started.

The root cause is that get_queue_reader() and get_queue_writer() return
raw readl() values that are passed directly into get_queue_entry(),
which computes:

  queue_begin + reader * sizeof(struct remote_input)

with no bounds check. This unchecked MMIO address is then passed to
memcpy_fromio(), reading 8 bytes from unintended device registers.
For sufficiently large values the address falls outside the PCI BAR
mapping entirely, triggering a machine check exception.

Fix by checking both indices against REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE at the top of
the loop body, before any call to get_queue_entry(). On an out-of-range
value, reset the reader register to 0 via set_queue_reader() before
breaking, so that normal queue operation can resume if the corrupted
hardware state is transient.

Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com>
Fixes: 278d72ae8803 ("[PATCH] ibmasm driver: redesign handling of remote control events")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ychen@northwestern.edu
Signed-off-by: Tyllis Xu <LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260308062108.258940-1-LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
misc: fastrpc: check qcom_scm_assign_mem() return in rpmsg_probe 2026-04-02T12:42:19+00:00 Xingjing Deng micro6947@gmail.com 2026-01-31T06:55:39+00:00 6a502776f4a4f80fb839b22f12aeaf0267fca344 In the SDSP probe path, qcom_scm_assign_mem() is used to assign the reserved memory to the configured VMIDs, but its return value was not checked. Fail the probe if the SCM call fails to avoid continuing with an unexpected/incorrect memory permission configuration. This issue was found by an in-house analysis workflow that extracts AST-based information and runs static checks, with LLM assistance for triage, and was confirmed by manual code review. No hardware testing was performed. Fixes: c3c0363bc72d4 ("misc: fastrpc: support complete DMA pool access to the DSP") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.11-rc1 Signed-off-by: Xingjing Deng <xjdeng@buaa.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260131065539.2124047-1-xjdeng@buaa.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
In the SDSP probe path, qcom_scm_assign_mem() is used to assign the
reserved memory to the configured VMIDs, but its return value was not checked.

Fail the probe if the SCM call fails to avoid continuing with an
unexpected/incorrect memory permission configuration.

This issue was found by an in-house analysis workflow that extracts AST-based
information and runs static checks, with LLM assistance for triage, and was
confirmed by manual code review.
No hardware testing was performed.

Fixes: c3c0363bc72d4 ("misc: fastrpc: support complete DMA pool access to the DSP")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.11-rc1
Signed-off-by: Xingjing Deng <xjdeng@buaa.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260131065539.2124047-1-xjdeng@buaa.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
misc: fastrpc: possible double-free of cctx->remote_heap 2026-04-02T12:42:03+00:00 Xingjing Deng micro6947@gmail.com 2026-01-29T23:41:40+00:00 ba2c83167b215da30fa2aae56b140198cf8d8408 fastrpc_init_create_static_process() may free cctx->remote_heap on the err_map path but does not clear the pointer. Later, fastrpc_rpmsg_remove() frees cctx->remote_heap again if it is non-NULL, which can lead to a double-free if the INIT_CREATE_STATIC ioctl hits the error path and the rpmsg device is subsequently removed/unbound. Clear cctx->remote_heap after freeing it in the error path to prevent the later cleanup from freeing it again. This issue was found by an in-house analysis workflow that extracts AST-based information and runs static checks, with LLM assistance for triage, and was confirmed by manual code review. No hardware testing was performed. Fixes: 0871561055e66 ("misc: fastrpc: Add support for audiopd") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.2+ Signed-off-by: Xingjing Deng <xjdeng@buaa.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260129234140.410983-1-xjdeng@buaa.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
fastrpc_init_create_static_process() may free cctx->remote_heap on the
err_map path but does not clear the pointer. Later, fastrpc_rpmsg_remove()
frees cctx->remote_heap again if it is non-NULL, which can lead to a
double-free if the INIT_CREATE_STATIC ioctl hits the error path and the rpmsg
device is subsequently removed/unbound.
Clear cctx->remote_heap after freeing it in the error path to prevent the
later cleanup from freeing it again.

This issue was found by an in-house analysis workflow that extracts AST-based
information and runs static checks, with LLM assistance for triage, and was
confirmed by manual code review.
No hardware testing was performed.

Fixes: 0871561055e66 ("misc: fastrpc: Add support for audiopd")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.2+
Signed-off-by: Xingjing Deng <xjdeng@buaa.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260129234140.410983-1-xjdeng@buaa.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
lis3lv02d: Omit IRQF_ONESHOT if no threaded handler is provided 2026-04-01T08:19:43+00:00 Ard Biesheuvel ardb@kernel.org 2026-03-26T18:04:36+00:00 f40b1401b6ad0f4dadfca4e7a69744352a2e4f8f The lis3lv02d started triggering a WARN in the IRQ code because it passes IRQF_ONESHOT to request_threaded_irq() even when thread_fn is NULL, which is an invalid combination. So set the flag only if thread_fn is non-NULL. Cc: Eric Piel <eric.piel@tremplin-utc.net> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326180436.14968-2-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
The lis3lv02d started triggering a WARN in the IRQ code because it
passes IRQF_ONESHOT to request_threaded_irq() even when thread_fn is
NULL, which is an invalid combination.

So set the flag only if thread_fn is non-NULL.

Cc: Eric Piel <eric.piel@tremplin-utc.net>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326180436.14968-2-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
misc/mei: INTEL_MEI should depend on X86 or DRM_XE 2026-03-31T12:59:20+00:00 Geert Uytterhoeven geert+renesas@glider.be 2026-01-27T19:11:05+00:00 69335152910b775e7835939d5c863c580c605275 The Intel Management Engine Interface is only present on x86 platforms and Intel Xe graphics cards. Hence add a dependency on X86 or DRM_XE, to prevent asking the user about this driver when configuring a kernel for a non-x86 architecture and without Xe graphics support. Fixes: 25f9b0d35155 ("misc/mei: Allow building Intel ME interface on non-x86") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8e2646fb71b148b3d38beb13f19b14e3634a1e1a.1769541024.git.geert+renesas@glider.be Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
The Intel Management Engine Interface is only present on x86 platforms
and Intel Xe graphics cards.  Hence add a dependency on X86 or DRM_XE,
to prevent asking the user about this driver when configuring a kernel
for a non-x86 architecture and without Xe graphics support.

Fixes: 25f9b0d35155 ("misc/mei: Allow building Intel ME interface on non-x86")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8e2646fb71b148b3d38beb13f19b14e3634a1e1a.1769541024.git.geert+renesas@glider.be
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mei: me: reduce the scope on unexpected reset 2026-03-31T12:59:09+00:00 Alexander Usyskin alexander.usyskin@intel.com 2026-03-30T08:38:30+00:00 8c27b1bce059a11a8d3c8682984e13866f0714af After commit 2cedb296988c ("mei: me: trigger link reset if hw ready is unexpected") some devices started to show long resume times (5-7 seconds). This happens as mei falsely detects unready hardware, starts parallel link reset flow and triggers link reset timeouts in the resume callback. Address it by performing detection of unready hardware only when driver is in the MEI_DEV_ENABLED state instead of blacklisting states as done in the original patch. This eliminates active waitqueue check as in MEI_DEV_ENABLED state there will be no active waitqueue. Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki (Intel) <rafael@kernel.org> Reported-by: Todd Brandt <todd.e.brandt@linux.intel.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221023 Tested-by: Todd Brandt <todd.e.brandt@linux.intel.com> Fixes: 2cedb296988c ("mei: me: trigger link reset if hw ready is unexpected") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260330083830.536056-1-alexander.usyskin@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
After commit 2cedb296988c ("mei: me: trigger link reset if hw ready is unexpected")
some devices started to show long resume times (5-7 seconds).
This happens as mei falsely detects unready hardware,
starts parallel link reset flow and triggers link reset timeouts
in the resume callback.

Address it by performing detection of unready hardware only
when driver is in the MEI_DEV_ENABLED state instead of blacklisting
states as done in the original patch.
This eliminates active waitqueue check as in MEI_DEV_ENABLED state
there will be no active waitqueue.

Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki (Intel) <rafael@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Todd Brandt <todd.e.brandt@linux.intel.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221023
Tested-by: Todd Brandt <todd.e.brandt@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 2cedb296988c ("mei: me: trigger link reset if hw ready is unexpected")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260330083830.536056-1-alexander.usyskin@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>