linux-stable.git/drivers/md, branch v4.14.45

bcache: quit dc->writeback_thread when BCACHE_DEV_DETACHING is set

2018-05-30T05:52:30+00:00

[ Upstream commit fadd94e05c02afec7b70b0b14915624f1782f578 ]

In patch "bcache: fix cached_dev->count usage for bch_cache_set_error()",
cached_dev_get() is called when creating dc->writeback_thread, and
cached_dev_put() is called when exiting dc->writeback_thread. This
modification works well unless people detach the bcache device manually by
    'echo 1 > /sys/block/bcache/bcache/detach'
Because this sysfs interface only calls bch_cached_dev_detach() which wakes
up dc->writeback_thread but does not stop it. The reason is, before patch
"bcache: fix cached_dev->count usage for bch_cache_set_error()", inside
bch_writeback_thread(), if cache is not dirty after writeback,
cached_dev_put() will be called here. And in cached_dev_make_request() when
a new write request makes cache from clean to dirty, cached_dev_get() will
be called there. Since we don't operate dc->count in these locations,
refcount d->count cannot be dropped after cache becomes clean, and
cached_dev_detach_finish() won't be called to detach bcache device.

This patch fixes the issue by checking whether BCACHE_DEV_DETACHING is
set inside bch_writeback_thread(). If this bit is set and cache is clean
(no existing writeback_keys), break the while-loop, call cached_dev_put()
and quit the writeback thread.

Please note if cache is still dirty, even BCACHE_DEV_DETACHING is set the
writeback thread should continue to perform writeback, this is the original
design of manually detach.

It is safe to do the following check without locking, let me explain why,
+	if (!test_bit(BCACHE_DEV_DETACHING, &dc->disk.flags) &&
+	    (!atomic_read(&dc->has_dirty) || !dc->writeback_running)) {

If the kenrel thread does not sleep and continue to run due to conditions
are not updated in time on the running CPU core, it just consumes more CPU
cycles and has no hurt. This should-sleep-but-run is safe here. We just
focus on the should-run-but-sleep condition, which means the writeback
thread goes to sleep in mistake while it should continue to run.
1, First of all, no matter the writeback thread is hung or not,
   kthread_stop() from cached_dev_detach_finish() will wake up it and
   terminate by making kthread_should_stop() return true. And in normal
   run time, bit on index BCACHE_DEV_DETACHING is always cleared, the
   condition
	!test_bit(BCACHE_DEV_DETACHING, &dc->disk.flags)
   is always true and can be ignored as constant value.
2, If one of the following conditions is true, the writeback thread should
   go to sleep,
   "!atomic_read(&dc->has_dirty)" or "!dc->writeback_running)"
   each of them independently controls the writeback thread should sleep or
   not, let's analyse them one by one.
2.1 condition "!atomic_read(&dc->has_dirty)"
   If dc->has_dirty is set from 0 to 1 on another CPU core, bcache will
   call bch_writeback_queue() immediately or call bch_writeback_add() which
   indirectly calls bch_writeback_queue() too. In bch_writeback_queue(),
   wake_up_process(dc->writeback_thread) is called. It sets writeback
   thread's task state to TASK_RUNNING and following an implicit memory
   barrier, then tries to wake up the writeback thread.
   In writeback thread, its task state is set to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE before
   doing the condition check. If other CPU core sets the TASK_RUNNING state
   after writeback thread setting TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, the writeback thread
   will be scheduled to run very soon because its state is not
   TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE. If other CPU core sets the TASK_RUNNING state before
   writeback thread setting TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, the implict memory barrier
   of wake_up_process() will make sure modification of dc->has_dirty on
   other CPU core is updated and observed on the CPU core of writeback
   thread. Therefore the condition check will correctly be false, and
   continue writeback code without sleeping.
2.2 condition "!dc->writeback_running)"
   dc->writeback_running can be changed via sysfs file, every time it is
   modified, a following bch_writeback_queue() is alwasy called. So the
   change is always observed on the CPU core of writeback thread. If
   dc->writeback_running is changed from 0 to 1 on other CPU core, this
   condition check will observe the modification and allow writeback
   thread to continue to run without sleeping.
Now we can see, even without a locking protection, multiple conditions
check is safe here, no deadlock or process hang up will happen.

I compose a separte patch because that patch "bcache: fix cached_dev->count
usage for bch_cache_set_error()" already gets a "Reviewed-by:" from Hannes
Reinecke. Also this fix is not trivial and good for a separate patch.

Signed-off-by: Coly Li 
Reviewed-by: Michael Lyle 
Cc: Hannes Reinecke 
Cc: Huijun Tang 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bcache: fix kcrashes with fio in RAID5 backend dev

2018-05-30T05:52:05+00:00

[ Upstream commit 60eb34ec5526e264c2bbaea4f7512d714d791caf ]

Kernel crashed when run fio in a RAID5 backend bcache device, the call
trace is bellow:
[  440.012034] kernel BUG at block/blk-ioc.c:146!
[  440.012696] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[  440.026537] CPU: 2 PID: 2205 Comm: md127_raid5 Not tainted 4.15.0 #8
[  440.027441] Hardware name: HP ProLiant MicroServer Gen8, BIOS J06 07/16
/2015
[  440.028615] RIP: 0010:put_io_context+0x8b/0x90
[  440.029246] RSP: 0018:ffffa8c882b43af8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  440.029990] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa8c88294fca0 RCX: 0000000000
0f4240
[  440.031006] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: ffffa8c882
94fca0
[  440.032030] RBP: ffffa8c882b43b10 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: ffff949cb8
0c1700
[  440.033206] R10: 0000000000000104 R11: 000000000000b71c R12: 00000000000
01000
[  440.034222] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff949cad84db70 R15: ffff949cb11
bd1e0
[  440.035239] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff949cba280000(0000) knlGS:
0000000000000000
[  440.060190] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  440.084967] CR2: 00007ff0493ef000 CR3: 00000002f1e0a002 CR4: 00000000001
606e0
[  440.110498] Call Trace:
[  440.135443]  bio_disassociate_task+0x1b/0x60
[  440.160355]  bio_free+0x1b/0x60
[  440.184666]  bio_put+0x23/0x30
[  440.208272]  search_free+0x23/0x40 [bcache]
[  440.231448]  cached_dev_write_complete+0x31/0x70 [bcache]
[  440.254468]  closure_put+0xb6/0xd0 [bcache]
[  440.277087]  request_endio+0x30/0x40 [bcache]
[  440.298703]  bio_endio+0xa1/0x120
[  440.319644]  handle_stripe+0x418/0x2270 [raid456]
[  440.340614]  ? load_balance+0x17b/0x9c0
[  440.360506]  handle_active_stripes.isra.58+0x387/0x5a0 [raid456]
[  440.380675]  ? __release_stripe+0x15/0x20 [raid456]
[  440.400132]  raid5d+0x3ed/0x5d0 [raid456]
[  440.419193]  ? schedule+0x36/0x80
[  440.437932]  ? schedule_timeout+0x1d2/0x2f0
[  440.456136]  md_thread+0x122/0x150
[  440.473687]  ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80
[  440.491411]  kthread+0x102/0x140
[  440.508636]  ? find_pers+0x70/0x70
[  440.524927]  ? kthread_associate_blkcg+0xa0/0xa0
[  440.541791]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[  440.558020] Code: c2 48 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 48 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 bb c2
48 00 48 8b 3d bc 36 4b 01 48 89 de e8 7c f7 e0 ff 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 <0f> 0b
0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 8d 47 b8 48 89 e5 41 57 41
[  440.610020] RIP: put_io_context+0x8b/0x90 RSP: ffffa8c882b43af8
[  440.628575] ---[ end trace a1fd79d85643a73e ]--

All the crash issue happened when a bypass IO coming, in such scenario
s->iop.bio is pointed to the s->orig_bio. In search_free(), it finishes the
s->orig_bio by calling bio_complete(), and after that, s->iop.bio became
invalid, then kernel would crash when calling bio_put(). Maybe its upper
layer's faulty, since bio should not be freed before we calling bio_put(),
but we'd better calling bio_put() first before calling bio_complete() to
notify upper layer ending this bio.

This patch moves bio_complete() under bio_put() to avoid kernel crash.

[mlyle: fixed commit subject for character limits]

Reported-by: Matthias Ferdinand 
Tested-by: Matthias Ferdinand 
Signed-off-by: Tang Junhui 
Reviewed-by: Michael Lyle 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

md/raid1: fix NULL pointer dereference

2018-05-30T05:52:03+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3de59bb9d551428cbdc76a9ea57883f82e350b4d ]

In handle_write_finished(), if r1_bio->bios[m] != NULL, it thinks
the corresponding conf->mirrors[m].rdev is also not NULL. But, it
is not always true.

Even if some io hold replacement rdev(i.e. rdev->nr_pending.count > 0),
raid1_remove_disk() can also set the rdev as NULL. That means,
bios[m] != NULL, but mirrors[m].rdev is NULL, resulting in NULL
pointer dereference in handle_write_finished and sync_request_write.

This patch can fix BUGs as follows:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000140
 IP: [] raid1d+0x2bd/0xfc0
 PGD 12ab52067 PUD 12f587067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
 CPU: 1 PID: 2008 Comm: md3_raid1 Not tainted 4.1.44+ #130
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1.fc26 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  ? schedule+0x37/0x90
  ? prepare_to_wait_event+0x83/0xf0
  md_thread+0x144/0x150
  ? wake_atomic_t_function+0x70/0x70
  ? md_start_sync+0xf0/0xf0
  kthread+0xd8/0xf0
  ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
  ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70
  ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000b8
 IP: sync_request_write+0x9e/0x980
 PGD 800000007c518067 P4D 800000007c518067 PUD 8002b067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
 CPU: 24 PID: 2549 Comm: md3_raid1 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #118
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1.fc26 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
  ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0
  ? flush_pending_writes+0x3a/0xd0
  ? pick_next_task_fair+0x4d5/0x5f0
  ? __switch_to+0xa2/0x430
  raid1d+0x65a/0x870
  ? find_pers+0x70/0x70
  ? find_pers+0x70/0x70
  ? md_thread+0x11c/0x160
  md_thread+0x11c/0x160
  ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
  kthread+0x111/0x130
  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
  ? do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x190
  ? SyS_exit_group+0x10/0x10
  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

Reviewed-by: NeilBrown 
Signed-off-by: Yufen Yu 
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

md: fix a potential deadlock of raid5/raid10 reshape

2018-05-30T05:52:03+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8876391e440ba615b10eef729576e111f0315f87 ]

There is a potential deadlock if mount/umount happens when
raid5_finish_reshape() tries to grow the size of emulated disk.

How the deadlock happens?
1) The raid5 resync thread finished reshape (expanding array).
2) The mount or umount thread holds VFS sb->s_umount lock and tries to
   write through critical data into raid5 emulated block device. So it
   waits for raid5 kernel thread handling stripes in order to finish it
   I/Os.
3) In the routine of raid5 kernel thread, md_check_recovery() will be
   called first in order to reap the raid5 resync thread. That is,
   raid5_finish_reshape() will be called. In this function, it will try
   to update conf and call VFS revalidate_disk() to grow the raid5
   emulated block device. It will try to acquire VFS sb->s_umount lock.
The raid5 kernel thread cannot continue, so no one can handle mount/
umount I/Os (stripes). Once the write-through I/Os cannot be finished,
mount/umount will not release sb->s_umount lock. The deadlock happens.

The raid5 kernel thread is an emulated block device. It is responible to
handle I/Os (stripes) from upper layers. The emulated block device
should not request any I/Os on itself. That is, it should not call VFS
layer functions. (If it did, it will try to acquire VFS locks to
guarantee the I/Os sequence.) So we have the resync thread to send
resync I/O requests and to wait for the results.

For solving this potential deadlock, we can put the size growth of the
emulated block device as the final step of reshape thread.

2017/12/29:
Thanks to Guoqing Jiang ,
we confirmed that there is the same deadlock issue in raid10. It's
reproducible and can be fixed by this patch. For raid10.c, we can remove
the similar code to prevent deadlock as well since they has been called
before.

Reported-by: Alex Wu 
Reviewed-by: Alex Wu 
Reviewed-by: Chung-Chiang Cheng 
Signed-off-by: BingJing Chang 
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

md: raid5: avoid string overflow warning

2018-05-30T05:52:00+00:00

[ Upstream commit 53b8d89ddbdbb0e4625a46d2cdbb6f106c52f801 ]

gcc warns about a possible overflow of the kmem_cache string, when adding
four characters to a string of the same length:

drivers/md/raid5.c: In function 'setup_conf':
drivers/md/raid5.c:2207:34: error: '-alt' directive writing 4 bytes into a region of size between 1 and 32 [-Werror=format-overflow=]
  sprintf(conf->cache_name[1], "%s-alt", conf->cache_name[0]);
                                  ^~~~
drivers/md/raid5.c:2207:2: note: 'sprintf' output between 5 and 36 bytes into a destination of size 32
  sprintf(conf->cache_name[1], "%s-alt", conf->cache_name[0]);
  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

If I'm counting correctly, we need 11 characters for the fixed part
of the string and 18 characters for a 64-bit pointer (when no gendisk
is used), so that leaves three characters for conf->level, which should
always be sufficient.

This makes the code use snprintf() with the correct length, to
make the code more robust against changes, and to get the compiler
to shut up.

In commit f4be6b43f1ac ("md/raid5: ensure we create a unique name for
kmem_cache when mddev has no gendisk") from 2010, Neil said that
the pointer could be removed "shortly" once devices without gendisk
are disallowed. I have no idea if that happened, but if it did, that
should probably be changed as well.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

md raid10: fix NULL deference in handle_write_completed()

2018-05-30T05:51:59+00:00

[ Upstream commit 01a69cab01c184d3786af09e9339311123d63d22 ]

In the case of 'recover', an r10bio with R10BIO_WriteError &
R10BIO_IsRecover will be progressed by handle_write_completed().
This function traverses all r10bio->devs[copies].
If devs[m].repl_bio != NULL, it thinks conf->mirrors[dev].replacement
is also not NULL. However, this is not always true.

When there is an rdev of raid10 has replacement, then each r10bio
->devs[m].repl_bio != NULL in conf->r10buf_pool. However, in 'recover',
even if corresponded replacement is NULL, it doesn't clear r10bio
->devs[m].repl_bio, resulting in replacement NULL deference.

This bug was introduced when replacement support for raid10 was
added in Linux 3.3.

As NeilBrown suggested:
	Elsewhere the determination of "is this device part of the
	resync/recovery" is made by resting bio->bi_end_io.
	If this is end_sync_write, then we tried to write here.
	If it is NULL, then we didn't try to write.

Fixes: 9ad1aefc8ae8 ("md/raid10:  Handle replacement devices during resync.")
Cc: stable (V3.3+)
Suggested-by: NeilBrown 
Signed-off-by: Yufen Yu 
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

md: fix md_write_start() deadlock w/o metadata devices

2018-05-30T05:51:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4b6c1060eaa6495aa5b0032e8f2d51dd936b1257 ]

If no metadata devices are configured on raid1/4/5/6/10
(e.g. via dm-raid), md_write_start() unconditionally waits
for superblocks to be written thus deadlocking.

Fix introduces mddev->has_superblocks bool, defines it in md_run()
and checks for it in md_write_start() to conditionally avoid waiting.

Once on it, check for non-existing superblocks in md_super_write().

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198647
Fixes: cc27b0c78c796 ("md: fix deadlock between mddev_suspend() and md_write_start()")

Signed-off-by: Heinz Mauelshagen 
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

MD: Free bioset when md_run fails

2018-05-30T05:51:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit b126194cbb799f9980b92a77e58db6ad794c8082 ]

Signed-off-by: Xiao Ni 
Acked-by: Guoqing Jiang 
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

dm integrity: use kvfree for kvmalloc'd memory

2018-05-16T08:10:27+00:00

commit fc8cec113904a47396bf0a1afc62920d66319d36 upstream.

Use kvfree instead of kfree because the array is allocated with kvmalloc.

Fixes: 7eada909bfd7a ("dm: add integrity target")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka 
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bcache: return attach error when no cache set exist

2018-04-26T09:02:18+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7f4fc93d4713394ee8f1cd44c238e046e11b4f15 ]

I attach a back-end device to a cache set, and the cache set is not
registered yet, this back-end device did not attach successfully, and no
error returned:
[root]# echo 87859280-fec6-4bcc-20df7ca8f86b > /sys/block/sde/bcache/attach
[root]#

In sysfs_attach(), the return value "v" is initialized to "size" in
the beginning, and if no cache set exist in bch_cache_sets, the "v" value
would not change any more, and return to sysfs, sysfs regard it as success
since the "size" is a positive number.

This patch fixes this issue by assigning "v" with "-ENOENT" in the
initialization.

Signed-off-by: Tang Junhui 
Reviewed-by: Michael Lyle 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman