linux-stable.git/drivers/md, branch v3.17.3

dm log userspace: fix memory leak in dm_ulog_tfr_init failure path

2014-11-14T18:10:26+00:00

commit 56ec16cb1e1ce46354de8511eef962a417c32c92 upstream.

If cn_add_callback() fails in dm_ulog_tfr_init(), it does not
deallocate prealloced memory but calls cn_del_callback().

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov 
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Brassow 
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

dm bufio: when done scanning return from __scan immediately

2014-11-14T18:10:26+00:00

commit 0e825862f3c04cee40e25f55680333728a4ffa9b upstream.

When __scan frees the required number of buffer entries that the
shrinker requested (nr_to_scan becomes zero) it must return.  Before
this fix the __scan code exited only the inner loop and continued in the
outer loop -- which could result in reduced performance due to extra
buffers being freed (e.g. unnecessarily evicted thinp metadata needing
to be synchronously re-read into bufio's cache).

Also, move dm_bufio_cond_resched to __scan's inner loop, so that
iterating the bufio client's lru lists doesn't result in scheduling
latency.

Reported-by: Joe Thornber 
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka 
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

dm bufio: update last_accessed when relinking a buffer

2014-11-14T18:10:26+00:00

commit eb76faf53b1ff7a77ce3f78cc98ad392ac70c2a0 upstream.

The 'last_accessed' member of the dm_buffer structure was only set when
the the buffer was created.  This led to each buffer being discarded
after dm_bufio_max_age time even if it was used recently.  In practice
this resulted in all thinp metadata being evicted soon after being read
-- this is particularly problematic for metadata intensive workloads
like multithreaded small random IO.

'last_accessed' is now updated each time the buffer is moved to the head
of the LRU list, so the buffer is now properly discarded if it was not
used in dm_bufio_max_age time.

Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber 
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka 
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

md/raid5: disable 'DISCARD' by default due to safety concerns.

2014-10-02T03:45:00+00:00

It has come to my attention (thanks Martin) that 'discard_zeroes_data'
is only a hint.  Some devices in some cases don't do what it
says on the label.

The use of DISCARD in RAID5 depends on reads from discarded regions
being predictably zero.  If a write to a previously discarded region
performs a read-modify-write cycle it assumes that the parity block
was consistent with the data blocks.  If all were zero, this would
be the case.  If some are and some aren't this would not be the case.
This could lead to data corruption after a device failure when
data needs to be reconstructed from the parity.

As we cannot trust 'discard_zeroes_data', ignore it by default
and so disallow DISCARD on all raid4/5/6 arrays.

As many devices are trustworthy, and as there are benefits to using
DISCARD, add a module parameter to over-ride this caution and cause
DISCARD to work if discard_zeroes_data is set.

If a site want to enable DISCARD on some arrays but not on others they
should select DISCARD support at the filesystem level, and set the
raid456 module parameter.
    raid456.devices_handle_discard_safely=Y

As this is a data-safety issue, I believe this patch is suitable for
-stable.
DISCARD support for RAID456 was added in 3.7

Cc: Shaohua Li 
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" 
Cc: Mike Snitzer 
Cc: Heinz Mauelshagen 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (3.7+)
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen 
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer 
Fixes: 620125f2bf8ff0c4969b79653b54d7bcc9d40637
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown

Merge tag 'md/3.17-more-fixes' of git://git.neil.brown.name/md

2014-09-24T15:53:33+00:00

Pull bugfixes for md/raid1 from Neil Brown:
 "It is amazing how much easier it is to find bugs when you know one is
  there.  Two bug reports resulted in finding 7 bugs!

  All are tagged for -stable.  Those that can't cause (rare) data
  corruption, cause lockups.

  Particularly, but not only, fixing new "resync" code"

* tag 'md/3.17-more-fixes' of git://git.neil.brown.name/md:
  md/raid1: fix_read_error should act on all non-faulty devices.
  md/raid1: count resync requests in nr_pending.
  md/raid1: update next_resync under resync_lock.
  md/raid1: Don't use next_resync to determine how far resync has progressed
  md/raid1: make sure resync waits for conflicting writes to complete.
  md/raid1: clean up request counts properly in close_sync()
  md/raid1:  be more cautious where we read-balance during resync.
  md/raid1: intialise start_next_window for READ case to avoid hang

md/raid1: fix_read_error should act on all non-faulty devices.

2014-09-22T01:26:01+00:00

If a devices is being recovered it is not InSync and is not Faulty.

If a read error is experienced on that device, fix_read_error()
will be called, but it ignores non-InSync devices.  So it will
neither fix the error nor fail the device.

It is incorrect that fix_read_error() ignores non-InSync devices.
It should only ignore Faulty devices.  So fix it.

This became a bug when we allowed reading from a device that was being
recovered.  It is suitable for any subsequent -stable kernel.

Fixes: da8840a747c0dbf49506ec906757a6b87b9741e9
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.5+)
Reported-by: Alexander Lyakas 
Tested-by: Alexander Lyakas 
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown

md/raid1: count resync requests in nr_pending.

2014-09-22T01:26:01+00:00

Both normal IO and resync IO can be retried with reschedule_retry()
and so be counted into ->nr_queued, but only normal IO gets counted in
->nr_pending.

Before the recent improvement to RAID1 resync there could only
possibly have been one or the other on the queue.  When handling a
read failure it could only be normal IO.  So when handle_read_error()
called freeze_array() the fact that freeze_array only compares
->nr_queued against ->nr_pending was safe.

But now that these two types can interleave, we can have both normal
and resync IO requests queued, so we need to count them both in
nr_pending.

This error can lead to freeze_array() hanging if there is a read
error, so it is suitable for -stable.

Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1cb1523cc231c9a90a278333c21f761
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Reported-by: Brassow Jonathan 
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown

md/raid1: update next_resync under resync_lock.

2014-09-22T01:26:01+00:00

raise_barrier() uses next_resync as part of its calculations, so it
really should be updated first, instead of afterwards.

next_resync is always used under resync_lock so update it under
resync lock to, just before it is used.  That is safest.

This could cause normal IO and resync IO to interact badly so
it suitable for -stable.

Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1cb1523cc231c9a90a278333c21f761
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown

md/raid1: Don't use next_resync to determine how far resync has progressed

2014-09-22T01:26:01+00:00

next_resync is (approximately) the location for the next resync request.
However it does *not* reliably determine the earliest location
at which resync might be happening.
This is because resync requests can complete out of order, and
we only limit the number of current requests, not the distance
from the earliest pending request to the latest.

mddev->curr_resync_completed is a reliable indicator of the earliest
position at which resync could be happening.   It is updated less
frequently, but is actually reliable which is more important.

So use it to determine if a write request is before the region
being resynced and so safe from conflict.

This error can allow resync IO to interfere with normal IO which
could lead to data corruption. Hence: stable.

Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1cb1523cc231c9a90a278333c21f761
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown

md/raid1: make sure resync waits for conflicting writes to complete.

2014-09-22T01:26:01+00:00

The resync/recovery process for raid1 was recently changed
so that writes could happen in parallel with resync providing
they were in different regions of the device.

There is a problem though:  While a write request will always
wait for conflicting resync to complete, a resync request
will *not* always wait for conflicting writes to complete.

Two changes are needed to fix this:

1/ raise_barrier (which waits until it is safe to do resync)
   must wait until current_window_requests is zero
2/ wait_battier (which waits at the start of a new write request)
   must update current_window_requests if the request could
   possible conflict with a concurrent resync.

As concurrent writes and resync can lead to data loss,
this patch is suitable for -stable.

Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1cb1523cc231c9a90a278333c21f761
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.13+)
Cc: majianpeng 
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown