<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/md, branch v3.10.63</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>dm raid: ensure superblock's size matches device's logical block size</title>
<updated>2014-11-21T17:22:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Heinz Mauelshagen</name>
<email>heinzm@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-17T11:38:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=513f8da83b3ef6cf1475da6ef3d851286e8466fa'/>
<id>513f8da83b3ef6cf1475da6ef3d851286e8466fa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 40d43c4b4cac4c2647bf07110d7b07d35f399a84 upstream.

The dm-raid superblock (struct dm_raid_superblock) is padded to 512
bytes and that size is being used to read it in from the metadata
device into one preallocated page.

Reading or writing this on a 512-byte sector device works fine but on
a 4096-byte sector device this fails.

Set the dm-raid superblock's size to the logical block size of the
metadata device, because IO at that size is guaranteed too work.  Also
add a size check to avoid silent partial metadata loss in case the
superblock should ever grow past the logical block size or PAGE_SIZE.

[includes pointer math fix from Dan Carpenter]
Reported-by: "Liuhua Wang" &lt;lwang@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Heinz Mauelshagen &lt;heinzm@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 40d43c4b4cac4c2647bf07110d7b07d35f399a84 upstream.

The dm-raid superblock (struct dm_raid_superblock) is padded to 512
bytes and that size is being used to read it in from the metadata
device into one preallocated page.

Reading or writing this on a 512-byte sector device works fine but on
a 4096-byte sector device this fails.

Set the dm-raid superblock's size to the logical block size of the
metadata device, because IO at that size is guaranteed too work.  Also
add a size check to avoid silent partial metadata loss in case the
superblock should ever grow past the logical block size or PAGE_SIZE.

[includes pointer math fix from Dan Carpenter]
Reported-by: "Liuhua Wang" &lt;lwang@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Heinz Mauelshagen &lt;heinzm@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dm btree: fix a recursion depth bug in btree walking code</title>
<updated>2014-11-21T17:22:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Thornber</name>
<email>ejt@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-10T15:03:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fe30b804a20bbc3218193f0d528e9749332fb06a'/>
<id>fe30b804a20bbc3218193f0d528e9749332fb06a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9b460d3699324d570a4d4161c3741431887f102f upstream.

The walk code was using a 'ro_spine' to hold it's locked btree nodes.
But this data structure is designed for the rolling lock scheme, and
as such automatically unlocks blocks that are two steps up the call
chain.  This is not suitable for the simple recursive walk algorithm,
which retraces its steps.

This code is only used by the persistent array code, which in turn is
only used by dm-cache.  In order to trigger it you need to have a
mapping tree that is more than 2 levels deep; which equates to 8-16
million cache blocks.  For instance a 4T ssd with a very small block
size of 32k only just triggers this bug.

The fix just places the locked blocks on the stack, and stops using
the ro_spine altogether.

Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber &lt;ejt@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9b460d3699324d570a4d4161c3741431887f102f upstream.

The walk code was using a 'ro_spine' to hold it's locked btree nodes.
But this data structure is designed for the rolling lock scheme, and
as such automatically unlocks blocks that are two steps up the call
chain.  This is not suitable for the simple recursive walk algorithm,
which retraces its steps.

This code is only used by the persistent array code, which in turn is
only used by dm-cache.  In order to trigger it you need to have a
mapping tree that is more than 2 levels deep; which equates to 8-16
million cache blocks.  For instance a 4T ssd with a very small block
size of 32k only just triggers this bug.

The fix just places the locked blocks on the stack, and stops using
the ro_spine altogether.

Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber &lt;ejt@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dm log userspace: fix memory leak in dm_ulog_tfr_init failure path</title>
<updated>2014-11-14T16:47:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Khoroshilov</name>
<email>khoroshilov@ispras.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-01T20:58:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fdef68fb1be8fe1e02f2029b25e4a87211d884e5'/>
<id>fdef68fb1be8fe1e02f2029b25e4a87211d884e5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 56ec16cb1e1ce46354de8511eef962a417c32c92 upstream.

If cn_add_callback() fails in dm_ulog_tfr_init(), it does not
deallocate prealloced memory but calls cn_del_callback().

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov &lt;khoroshilov@ispras.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Brassow &lt;jbrassow@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 56ec16cb1e1ce46354de8511eef962a417c32c92 upstream.

If cn_add_callback() fails in dm_ulog_tfr_init(), it does not
deallocate prealloced memory but calls cn_del_callback().

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov &lt;khoroshilov@ispras.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Brassow &lt;jbrassow@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dm bufio: update last_accessed when relinking a buffer</title>
<updated>2014-11-14T16:47:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Thornber</name>
<email>ejt@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-30T08:32:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3f626317894a923edea99de4f18590c008375890'/>
<id>3f626317894a923edea99de4f18590c008375890</id>
<content type='text'>
commit eb76faf53b1ff7a77ce3f78cc98ad392ac70c2a0 upstream.

The 'last_accessed' member of the dm_buffer structure was only set when
the the buffer was created.  This led to each buffer being discarded
after dm_bufio_max_age time even if it was used recently.  In practice
this resulted in all thinp metadata being evicted soon after being read
-- this is particularly problematic for metadata intensive workloads
like multithreaded small random IO.

'last_accessed' is now updated each time the buffer is moved to the head
of the LRU list, so the buffer is now properly discarded if it was not
used in dm_bufio_max_age time.

Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber &lt;ejt@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit eb76faf53b1ff7a77ce3f78cc98ad392ac70c2a0 upstream.

The 'last_accessed' member of the dm_buffer structure was only set when
the the buffer was created.  This led to each buffer being discarded
after dm_bufio_max_age time even if it was used recently.  In practice
this resulted in all thinp metadata being evicted soon after being read
-- this is particularly problematic for metadata intensive workloads
like multithreaded small random IO.

'last_accessed' is now updated each time the buffer is moved to the head
of the LRU list, so the buffer is now properly discarded if it was not
used in dm_bufio_max_age time.

Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber &lt;ejt@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md/raid5: disable 'DISCARD' by default due to safety concerns.</title>
<updated>2014-10-09T19:18:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-02T03:45:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=06905ff8a6f07cb59b20311694f5d1454654808f'/>
<id>06905ff8a6f07cb59b20311694f5d1454654808f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8e0e99ba64c7ba46133a7c8a3e3f7de01f23bd93 upstream.

It has come to my attention (thanks Martin) that 'discard_zeroes_data'
is only a hint.  Some devices in some cases don't do what it
says on the label.

The use of DISCARD in RAID5 depends on reads from discarded regions
being predictably zero.  If a write to a previously discarded region
performs a read-modify-write cycle it assumes that the parity block
was consistent with the data blocks.  If all were zero, this would
be the case.  If some are and some aren't this would not be the case.
This could lead to data corruption after a device failure when
data needs to be reconstructed from the parity.

As we cannot trust 'discard_zeroes_data', ignore it by default
and so disallow DISCARD on all raid4/5/6 arrays.

As many devices are trustworthy, and as there are benefits to using
DISCARD, add a module parameter to over-ride this caution and cause
DISCARD to work if discard_zeroes_data is set.

If a site want to enable DISCARD on some arrays but not on others they
should select DISCARD support at the filesystem level, and set the
raid456 module parameter.
    raid456.devices_handle_discard_safely=Y

As this is a data-safety issue, I believe this patch is suitable for
-stable.
DISCARD support for RAID456 was added in 3.7

Cc: Shaohua Li &lt;shli@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Heinz Mauelshagen &lt;heinzm@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 620125f2bf8ff0c4969b79653b54d7bcc9d40637
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.10: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8e0e99ba64c7ba46133a7c8a3e3f7de01f23bd93 upstream.

It has come to my attention (thanks Martin) that 'discard_zeroes_data'
is only a hint.  Some devices in some cases don't do what it
says on the label.

The use of DISCARD in RAID5 depends on reads from discarded regions
being predictably zero.  If a write to a previously discarded region
performs a read-modify-write cycle it assumes that the parity block
was consistent with the data blocks.  If all were zero, this would
be the case.  If some are and some aren't this would not be the case.
This could lead to data corruption after a device failure when
data needs to be reconstructed from the parity.

As we cannot trust 'discard_zeroes_data', ignore it by default
and so disallow DISCARD on all raid4/5/6 arrays.

As many devices are trustworthy, and as there are benefits to using
DISCARD, add a module parameter to over-ride this caution and cause
DISCARD to work if discard_zeroes_data is set.

If a site want to enable DISCARD on some arrays but not on others they
should select DISCARD support at the filesystem level, and set the
raid456 module parameter.
    raid456.devices_handle_discard_safely=Y

As this is a data-safety issue, I believe this patch is suitable for
-stable.
DISCARD support for RAID456 was added in 3.7

Cc: Shaohua Li &lt;shli@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Heinz Mauelshagen &lt;heinzm@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 620125f2bf8ff0c4969b79653b54d7bcc9d40637
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.10: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md/raid1: fix_read_error should act on all non-faulty devices.</title>
<updated>2014-10-05T21:54:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-18T01:09:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a8f165f517656c5c84dcb059ea2d51fa73f2571c'/>
<id>a8f165f517656c5c84dcb059ea2d51fa73f2571c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b8cb6b4c121e1bf1963c16ed69e7adcb1bc301cd upstream.

If a devices is being recovered it is not InSync and is not Faulty.

If a read error is experienced on that device, fix_read_error()
will be called, but it ignores non-InSync devices.  So it will
neither fix the error nor fail the device.

It is incorrect that fix_read_error() ignores non-InSync devices.
It should only ignore Faulty devices.  So fix it.

This became a bug when we allowed reading from a device that was being
recovered.  It is suitable for any subsequent -stable kernel.

Fixes: da8840a747c0dbf49506ec906757a6b87b9741e9
Reported-by: Alexander Lyakas &lt;alex.bolshoy@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alexander Lyakas &lt;alex.bolshoy@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b8cb6b4c121e1bf1963c16ed69e7adcb1bc301cd upstream.

If a devices is being recovered it is not InSync and is not Faulty.

If a read error is experienced on that device, fix_read_error()
will be called, but it ignores non-InSync devices.  So it will
neither fix the error nor fail the device.

It is incorrect that fix_read_error() ignores non-InSync devices.
It should only ignore Faulty devices.  So fix it.

This became a bug when we allowed reading from a device that was being
recovered.  It is suitable for any subsequent -stable kernel.

Fixes: da8840a747c0dbf49506ec906757a6b87b9741e9
Reported-by: Alexander Lyakas &lt;alex.bolshoy@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alexander Lyakas &lt;alex.bolshoy@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dm crypt: fix access beyond the end of allocated space</title>
<updated>2014-10-05T21:54:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mikulas Patocka</name>
<email>mpatocka@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-28T15:09:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d283ad1a60a89680fe42534428d2baf29cc9f24a'/>
<id>d283ad1a60a89680fe42534428d2baf29cc9f24a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d49ec52ff6ddcda178fc2476a109cf1bd1fa19ed upstream.

The DM crypt target accesses memory beyond allocated space resulting in
a crash on 32 bit x86 systems.

This bug is very old (it dates back to 2.6.25 commit 3a7f6c990ad04 "dm
crypt: use async crypto").  However, this bug was masked by the fact
that kmalloc rounds the size up to the next power of two.  This bug
wasn't exposed until 3.17-rc1 commit 298a9fa08a ("dm crypt: use per-bio
data").  By switching to using per-bio data there was no longer any
padding beyond the end of a dm-crypt allocated memory block.

To minimize allocation overhead dm-crypt puts several structures into one
block allocated with kmalloc.  The block holds struct ablkcipher_request,
cipher-specific scratch pad (crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(any_tfm(cc))),
struct dm_crypt_request and an initialization vector.

The variable dmreq_start is set to offset of struct dm_crypt_request
within this memory block.  dm-crypt allocates the block with this size:
cc-&gt;dmreq_start + sizeof(struct dm_crypt_request) + cc-&gt;iv_size.

When accessing the initialization vector, dm-crypt uses the function
iv_of_dmreq, which performs this calculation: ALIGN((unsigned long)(dmreq
+ 1), crypto_ablkcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) + 1).

dm-crypt allocated "cc-&gt;iv_size" bytes beyond the end of dm_crypt_request
structure.  However, when dm-crypt accesses the initialization vector, it
takes a pointer to the end of dm_crypt_request, aligns it, and then uses
it as the initialization vector.  If the end of dm_crypt_request is not
aligned on a crypto_ablkcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) boundary the
alignment causes the initialization vector to point beyond the allocated
space.

Fix this bug by calculating the variable iv_size_padding and adding it
to the allocated size.

Also correct the alignment of dm_crypt_request.  struct dm_crypt_request
is specific to dm-crypt (it isn't used by the crypto subsystem at all),
so it is aligned on __alignof__(struct dm_crypt_request).

Also align per_bio_data_size on ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN, so that it is
aligned as if the block was allocated with kmalloc.

Reported-by: Krzysztof Kolasa &lt;kkolasa@winsoft.pl&gt;
Tested-by: Milan Broz &lt;gmazyland@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d49ec52ff6ddcda178fc2476a109cf1bd1fa19ed upstream.

The DM crypt target accesses memory beyond allocated space resulting in
a crash on 32 bit x86 systems.

This bug is very old (it dates back to 2.6.25 commit 3a7f6c990ad04 "dm
crypt: use async crypto").  However, this bug was masked by the fact
that kmalloc rounds the size up to the next power of two.  This bug
wasn't exposed until 3.17-rc1 commit 298a9fa08a ("dm crypt: use per-bio
data").  By switching to using per-bio data there was no longer any
padding beyond the end of a dm-crypt allocated memory block.

To minimize allocation overhead dm-crypt puts several structures into one
block allocated with kmalloc.  The block holds struct ablkcipher_request,
cipher-specific scratch pad (crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(any_tfm(cc))),
struct dm_crypt_request and an initialization vector.

The variable dmreq_start is set to offset of struct dm_crypt_request
within this memory block.  dm-crypt allocates the block with this size:
cc-&gt;dmreq_start + sizeof(struct dm_crypt_request) + cc-&gt;iv_size.

When accessing the initialization vector, dm-crypt uses the function
iv_of_dmreq, which performs this calculation: ALIGN((unsigned long)(dmreq
+ 1), crypto_ablkcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) + 1).

dm-crypt allocated "cc-&gt;iv_size" bytes beyond the end of dm_crypt_request
structure.  However, when dm-crypt accesses the initialization vector, it
takes a pointer to the end of dm_crypt_request, aligns it, and then uses
it as the initialization vector.  If the end of dm_crypt_request is not
aligned on a crypto_ablkcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) boundary the
alignment causes the initialization vector to point beyond the allocated
space.

Fix this bug by calculating the variable iv_size_padding and adding it
to the allocated size.

Also correct the alignment of dm_crypt_request.  struct dm_crypt_request
is specific to dm-crypt (it isn't used by the crypto subsystem at all),
so it is aligned on __alignof__(struct dm_crypt_request).

Also align per_bio_data_size on ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN, so that it is
aligned as if the block was allocated with kmalloc.

Reported-by: Krzysztof Kolasa &lt;kkolasa@winsoft.pl&gt;
Tested-by: Milan Broz &lt;gmazyland@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md/raid1,raid10: always abort recover on write error.</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:04:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-31T00:16:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b08633de6ba926a3412292b3239bf41a3f00912b'/>
<id>b08633de6ba926a3412292b3239bf41a3f00912b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2446dba03f9dabe0b477a126cbeb377854785b47 upstream.

Currently we don't abort recovery on a write error if the write error
to the recovering device was triggerd by normal IO (as opposed to
recovery IO).

This means that for one bitmap region, the recovery might write to the
recovering device for a few sectors, then not bother for subsequent
sectors (as it never writes to failed devices).  In this case
the bitmap bit will be cleared, but it really shouldn't.

The result is that if the recovering device fails and is then re-added
(after fixing whatever hardware problem triggerred the failure),
the second recovery won't redo the region it was in the middle of,
so some of the device will not be recovered properly.

If we abort the recovery, the region being processes will be cancelled
(bit not cleared) and the whole region will be retried.

As the bug can result in data corruption the patch is suitable for
-stable.  For kernels prior to 3.11 there is a conflict in raid10.c
which will require care.

Original-from: jiao hui &lt;jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: jiao hui &lt;jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2446dba03f9dabe0b477a126cbeb377854785b47 upstream.

Currently we don't abort recovery on a write error if the write error
to the recovering device was triggerd by normal IO (as opposed to
recovery IO).

This means that for one bitmap region, the recovery might write to the
recovering device for a few sectors, then not bother for subsequent
sectors (as it never writes to failed devices).  In this case
the bitmap bit will be cleared, but it really shouldn't.

The result is that if the recovering device fails and is then re-added
(after fixing whatever hardware problem triggerred the failure),
the second recovery won't redo the region it was in the middle of,
so some of the device will not be recovered properly.

If we abort the recovery, the region being processes will be cancelled
(bit not cleared) and the whole region will be retried.

As the bug can result in data corruption the patch is suitable for
-stable.  For kernels prior to 3.11 there is a conflict in raid10.c
which will require care.

Original-from: jiao hui &lt;jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: jiao hui &lt;jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md/raid10: Fix memory leak when raid10 reshape completes.</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:04:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-18T03:59:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=26584e18c463bcf54fbd97e7c76f6f00ba13b1c9'/>
<id>26584e18c463bcf54fbd97e7c76f6f00ba13b1c9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b39685526f46976bcd13aa08c82480092befa46c upstream.

When a raid10 commences a resync/recovery/reshape it allocates
some buffer space.
When a resync/recovery completes the buffer space is freed.  But not
when the reshape completes.
This can result in a small memory leak.

There is a subtle side-effect of this bug.  When a RAID10 is reshaped
to a larger array (more devices), the reshape is immediately followed
by a "resync" of the new space.  This "resync" will use the buffer
space which was allocated for "reshape".  This can cause problems
including a "BUG" in the SCSI layer.  So this is suitable for -stable.

Fixes: 3ea7daa5d7fde47cd41f4d56c2deb949114da9d6
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b39685526f46976bcd13aa08c82480092befa46c upstream.

When a raid10 commences a resync/recovery/reshape it allocates
some buffer space.
When a resync/recovery completes the buffer space is freed.  But not
when the reshape completes.
This can result in a small memory leak.

There is a subtle side-effect of this bug.  When a RAID10 is reshaped
to a larger array (more devices), the reshape is immediately followed
by a "resync" of the new space.  This "resync" will use the buffer
space which was allocated for "reshape".  This can cause problems
including a "BUG" in the SCSI layer.  So this is suitable for -stable.

Fixes: 3ea7daa5d7fde47cd41f4d56c2deb949114da9d6
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md/raid10: fix memory leak when reshaping a RAID10.</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:04:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-18T03:56:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1075d2bdf6334b8373c00978403a69a4d9fdb883'/>
<id>1075d2bdf6334b8373c00978403a69a4d9fdb883</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ce0b0a46955d1bb389684a2605dbcaa990ba0154 upstream.

raid10 reshape clears unwanted bits from a bio-&gt;bi_flags using
a method which, while clumsy, worked until 3.10 when BIO_OWNS_VEC
was added.
Since then it clears that bit but shouldn't.  This results in a
memory leak.

So change to used the approved method of clearing unwanted bits.

As this causes a memory leak which can consume all of memory
the fix is suitable for -stable.

Fixes: a38352e0ac02dbbd4fa464dc22d1352b5fbd06fd
Reported-by: mdraid.pkoch@dfgh.net (Peter Koch)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ce0b0a46955d1bb389684a2605dbcaa990ba0154 upstream.

raid10 reshape clears unwanted bits from a bio-&gt;bi_flags using
a method which, while clumsy, worked until 3.10 when BIO_OWNS_VEC
was added.
Since then it clears that bit but shouldn't.  This results in a
memory leak.

So change to used the approved method of clearing unwanted bits.

As this causes a memory leak which can consume all of memory
the fix is suitable for -stable.

Fixes: a38352e0ac02dbbd4fa464dc22d1352b5fbd06fd
Reported-by: mdraid.pkoch@dfgh.net (Peter Koch)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
