<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/md/raid1.c, branch v3.10.78</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>md/raid1: fix read balance when a drive is write-mostly.</title>
<updated>2015-03-06T22:40:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tomáš Hodek</name>
<email>tomas.hodek@volny.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-23T00:00:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b581e762b1a452ac94d452117a6c953f4d011767'/>
<id>b581e762b1a452ac94d452117a6c953f4d011767</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d1901ef099c38afd11add4cfb3312c02ef21ec4a upstream.

When a drive is marked write-mostly it should only be the
target of reads if there is no other option.

This behaviour was broken by

commit 9dedf60313fa4dddfd5b9b226a0ef12a512bf9dc
    md/raid1: read balance chooses idlest disk for SSD

which causes a write-mostly device to be *preferred* is some cases.

Restore correct behaviour by checking and setting
best_dist_disk and best_pending_disk rather than best_disk.

We only need to test one of these as they are both changed
from -1 or &gt;=0 at the same time.

As we leave min_pending and best_dist unchanged, any non-write-mostly
device will appear better than the write-mostly device.

Reported-by: Tomáš Hodek &lt;tomas.hodek@volny.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Dark Penguin &lt;darkpenguin@yandex.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-raid&amp;m=135982797322422
Fixes: 9dedf60313fa4dddfd5b9b226a0ef12a512bf9dc
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d1901ef099c38afd11add4cfb3312c02ef21ec4a upstream.

When a drive is marked write-mostly it should only be the
target of reads if there is no other option.

This behaviour was broken by

commit 9dedf60313fa4dddfd5b9b226a0ef12a512bf9dc
    md/raid1: read balance chooses idlest disk for SSD

which causes a write-mostly device to be *preferred* is some cases.

Restore correct behaviour by checking and setting
best_dist_disk and best_pending_disk rather than best_disk.

We only need to test one of these as they are both changed
from -1 or &gt;=0 at the same time.

As we leave min_pending and best_dist unchanged, any non-write-mostly
device will appear better than the write-mostly device.

Reported-by: Tomáš Hodek &lt;tomas.hodek@volny.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Dark Penguin &lt;darkpenguin@yandex.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-raid&amp;m=135982797322422
Fixes: 9dedf60313fa4dddfd5b9b226a0ef12a512bf9dc
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md/raid1: fix_read_error should act on all non-faulty devices.</title>
<updated>2014-10-05T21:54:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-18T01:09:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a8f165f517656c5c84dcb059ea2d51fa73f2571c'/>
<id>a8f165f517656c5c84dcb059ea2d51fa73f2571c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b8cb6b4c121e1bf1963c16ed69e7adcb1bc301cd upstream.

If a devices is being recovered it is not InSync and is not Faulty.

If a read error is experienced on that device, fix_read_error()
will be called, but it ignores non-InSync devices.  So it will
neither fix the error nor fail the device.

It is incorrect that fix_read_error() ignores non-InSync devices.
It should only ignore Faulty devices.  So fix it.

This became a bug when we allowed reading from a device that was being
recovered.  It is suitable for any subsequent -stable kernel.

Fixes: da8840a747c0dbf49506ec906757a6b87b9741e9
Reported-by: Alexander Lyakas &lt;alex.bolshoy@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alexander Lyakas &lt;alex.bolshoy@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b8cb6b4c121e1bf1963c16ed69e7adcb1bc301cd upstream.

If a devices is being recovered it is not InSync and is not Faulty.

If a read error is experienced on that device, fix_read_error()
will be called, but it ignores non-InSync devices.  So it will
neither fix the error nor fail the device.

It is incorrect that fix_read_error() ignores non-InSync devices.
It should only ignore Faulty devices.  So fix it.

This became a bug when we allowed reading from a device that was being
recovered.  It is suitable for any subsequent -stable kernel.

Fixes: da8840a747c0dbf49506ec906757a6b87b9741e9
Reported-by: Alexander Lyakas &lt;alex.bolshoy@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alexander Lyakas &lt;alex.bolshoy@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md/raid1,raid10: always abort recover on write error.</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:04:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-31T00:16:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b08633de6ba926a3412292b3239bf41a3f00912b'/>
<id>b08633de6ba926a3412292b3239bf41a3f00912b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2446dba03f9dabe0b477a126cbeb377854785b47 upstream.

Currently we don't abort recovery on a write error if the write error
to the recovering device was triggerd by normal IO (as opposed to
recovery IO).

This means that for one bitmap region, the recovery might write to the
recovering device for a few sectors, then not bother for subsequent
sectors (as it never writes to failed devices).  In this case
the bitmap bit will be cleared, but it really shouldn't.

The result is that if the recovering device fails and is then re-added
(after fixing whatever hardware problem triggerred the failure),
the second recovery won't redo the region it was in the middle of,
so some of the device will not be recovered properly.

If we abort the recovery, the region being processes will be cancelled
(bit not cleared) and the whole region will be retried.

As the bug can result in data corruption the patch is suitable for
-stable.  For kernels prior to 3.11 there is a conflict in raid10.c
which will require care.

Original-from: jiao hui &lt;jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: jiao hui &lt;jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2446dba03f9dabe0b477a126cbeb377854785b47 upstream.

Currently we don't abort recovery on a write error if the write error
to the recovering device was triggerd by normal IO (as opposed to
recovery IO).

This means that for one bitmap region, the recovery might write to the
recovering device for a few sectors, then not bother for subsequent
sectors (as it never writes to failed devices).  In this case
the bitmap bit will be cleared, but it really shouldn't.

The result is that if the recovering device fails and is then re-added
(after fixing whatever hardware problem triggerred the failure),
the second recovery won't redo the region it was in the middle of,
so some of the device will not be recovered properly.

If we abort the recovery, the region being processes will be cancelled
(bit not cleared) and the whole region will be retried.

As the bug can result in data corruption the patch is suitable for
-stable.  For kernels prior to 3.11 there is a conflict in raid10.c
which will require care.

Original-from: jiao hui &lt;jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn&gt;
Reported-and-tested-by: jiao hui &lt;jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md/raid1: r1buf_pool_alloc: free allocate pages when subsequent allocation fails.</title>
<updated>2014-05-31T04:52:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-09T02:25:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fdc9aa48b7ca57c9e2154ad68bf0fcd731dabeb7'/>
<id>fdc9aa48b7ca57c9e2154ad68bf0fcd731dabeb7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit da1aab3dca9aa88ae34ca392470b8943159e25fe upstream.

When performing a user-request check/repair (MD_RECOVERY_REQUEST is set)
on a raid1, we allocate multiple bios each with their own set of pages.

If the page allocations for one bio fails, we currently do *not* free
the pages allocated for the previous bios, nor do we free the bio itself.

This patch frees all the already-allocate pages, and makes sure that
all the bios are freed as well.

This bug can cause a memory leak which can ultimately OOM a machine.
It was introduced in 3.10-rc1.

Fixes: a07876064a0b73ab5ef1ebcf14b1cf0231c07858
Cc: Kent Overstreet &lt;koverstreet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Russell King - ARM Linux &lt;linux@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit da1aab3dca9aa88ae34ca392470b8943159e25fe upstream.

When performing a user-request check/repair (MD_RECOVERY_REQUEST is set)
on a raid1, we allocate multiple bios each with their own set of pages.

If the page allocations for one bio fails, we currently do *not* free
the pages allocated for the previous bios, nor do we free the bio itself.

This patch frees all the already-allocate pages, and makes sure that
all the bios are freed as well.

This bug can cause a memory leak which can ultimately OOM a machine.
It was introduced in 3.10-rc1.

Fixes: a07876064a0b73ab5ef1ebcf14b1cf0231c07858
Cc: Kent Overstreet &lt;koverstreet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Russell King - ARM Linux &lt;linux@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md/raid1: restore ability for check and repair to fix read errors.</title>
<updated>2014-02-22T20:41:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-05T01:17:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9f2d289933e60ec726a7a9522e2dcdfdc82c58de'/>
<id>9f2d289933e60ec726a7a9522e2dcdfdc82c58de</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1877db75589a895bbdc4c4c3f23558e57b521141 upstream.

commit 30bc9b53878a9921b02e3b5bc4283ac1c6de102a
    md/raid1: fix bio handling problems in process_checks()

Move the bio_reset() to a point before where BIO_UPTODATE is checked,
so that check now always report that the bio is uptodate, even if it is not.

This causes process_check() to sometimes treat read-errors as
successful matches so the good data isn't written out.

This patch preserves the flag until it is needed.

Bug was introduced in 3.11, but backported to 3.10-stable (as it fixed
an even worse bug).  So suitable for any -stable since 3.10.

Reported-and-tested-by: Michael Tokarev &lt;mjt@tls.msk.ru&gt;
Fixed: 30bc9b53878a9921b02e3b5bc4283ac1c6de102a
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1877db75589a895bbdc4c4c3f23558e57b521141 upstream.

commit 30bc9b53878a9921b02e3b5bc4283ac1c6de102a
    md/raid1: fix bio handling problems in process_checks()

Move the bio_reset() to a point before where BIO_UPTODATE is checked,
so that check now always report that the bio is uptodate, even if it is not.

This causes process_check() to sometimes treat read-errors as
successful matches so the good data isn't written out.

This patch preserves the flag until it is needed.

Bug was introduced in 3.11, but backported to 3.10-stable (as it fixed
an even worse bug).  So suitable for any -stable since 3.10.

Reported-and-tested-by: Michael Tokarev &lt;mjt@tls.msk.ru&gt;
Fixed: 30bc9b53878a9921b02e3b5bc4283ac1c6de102a
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md: Fix skipping recovery for read-only arrays.</title>
<updated>2013-11-13T03:05:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lukasz Dorau</name>
<email>lukasz.dorau@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-24T01:55:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ed840bec21c6f2f99ca34e974a5905e4f2116c1b'/>
<id>ed840bec21c6f2f99ca34e974a5905e4f2116c1b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 61e4947c99c4494336254ec540c50186d186150b upstream.

Since:
        commit 7ceb17e87bde79d285a8b988cfed9eaeebe60b86
        md: Allow devices to be re-added to a read-only array.

spares are activated on a read-only array. In case of raid1 and raid10
personalities it causes that not-in-sync devices are marked in-sync
without checking if recovery has been finished.

If a read-only array is degraded and one of its devices is not in-sync
(because the array has been only partially recovered) recovery will be skipped.

This patch adds checking if recovery has been finished before marking a device
in-sync for raid1 and raid10 personalities. In case of raid5 personality
such condition is already present (at raid5.c:6029).

Bug was introduced in 3.10 and causes data corruption.

Signed-off-by: Pawel Baldysiak &lt;pawel.baldysiak@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Dorau &lt;lukasz.dorau@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 61e4947c99c4494336254ec540c50186d186150b upstream.

Since:
        commit 7ceb17e87bde79d285a8b988cfed9eaeebe60b86
        md: Allow devices to be re-added to a read-only array.

spares are activated on a read-only array. In case of raid1 and raid10
personalities it causes that not-in-sync devices are marked in-sync
without checking if recovery has been finished.

If a read-only array is degraded and one of its devices is not in-sync
(because the array has been only partially recovered) recovery will be skipped.

This patch adds checking if recovery has been finished before marking a device
in-sync for raid1 and raid10 personalities. In case of raid5 personality
such condition is already present (at raid5.c:6029).

Bug was introduced in 3.10 and causes data corruption.

Signed-off-by: Pawel Baldysiak &lt;pawel.baldysiak@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Dorau &lt;lukasz.dorau@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md/raid1: fix bio handling problems in process_checks()</title>
<updated>2013-08-04T08:50:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-17T05:19:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8afb90da9f16abc5e577318544419bfcf3565391'/>
<id>8afb90da9f16abc5e577318544419bfcf3565391</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 30bc9b53878a9921b02e3b5bc4283ac1c6de102a upstream.

Recent change to use bio_copy_data() in raid1 when repairing
an array is faulty.

The underlying may have changed the bio in various ways using
bio_advance and these need to be undone not just for the 'sbio' which
is being copied to, but also the 'pbio' (primary) which is being
copied from.

So perform the reset on all bios that were read from and do it early.

This also ensure that the sbio-&gt;bi_io_vec[j].bv_len passed to
memcmp is correct.

This fixes a crash during a 'check' of a RAID1 array.  The crash was
introduced in 3.10 so this is suitable for 3.10-stable.

Reported-by: Joe Lawrence &lt;joe.lawrence@stratus.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 30bc9b53878a9921b02e3b5bc4283ac1c6de102a upstream.

Recent change to use bio_copy_data() in raid1 when repairing
an array is faulty.

The underlying may have changed the bio in various ways using
bio_advance and these need to be undone not just for the 'sbio' which
is being copied to, but also the 'pbio' (primary) which is being
copied from.

So perform the reset on all bios that were read from and do it early.

This also ensure that the sbio-&gt;bi_io_vec[j].bv_len passed to
memcmp is correct.

This fixes a crash during a 'check' of a RAID1 array.  The crash was
introduced in 3.10 so this is suitable for 3.10-stable.

Reported-by: Joe Lawrence &lt;joe.lawrence@stratus.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'md-3.10-fixes' of git://neil.brown.name/md</title>
<updated>2013-06-13T17:13:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-13T17:13:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=82ea4be61f45d1a7ba1f5151d90124d1ece0c07a'/>
<id>82ea4be61f45d1a7ba1f5151d90124d1ece0c07a</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull md bugfixes from Neil Brown:
 "A few bugfixes for md

  Some tagged for -stable"

* tag 'md-3.10-fixes' of git://neil.brown.name/md:
  md/raid1,5,10: Disable WRITE SAME until a recovery strategy is in place
  md/raid1,raid10: use freeze_array in place of raise_barrier in various places.
  md/raid1: consider WRITE as successful only if at least one non-Faulty and non-rebuilding drive completed it.
  md: md_stop_writes() should always freeze recovery.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull md bugfixes from Neil Brown:
 "A few bugfixes for md

  Some tagged for -stable"

* tag 'md-3.10-fixes' of git://neil.brown.name/md:
  md/raid1,5,10: Disable WRITE SAME until a recovery strategy is in place
  md/raid1,raid10: use freeze_array in place of raise_barrier in various places.
  md/raid1: consider WRITE as successful only if at least one non-Faulty and non-rebuilding drive completed it.
  md: md_stop_writes() should always freeze recovery.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md/raid1,5,10: Disable WRITE SAME until a recovery strategy is in place</title>
<updated>2013-06-13T04:49:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>H. Peter Anvin</name>
<email>hpa@zytor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-12T14:37:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5026d7a9b2f3eb1f9bda66c18ac6bc3036ec9020'/>
<id>5026d7a9b2f3eb1f9bda66c18ac6bc3036ec9020</id>
<content type='text'>
There are cases where the kernel will believe that the WRITE SAME
command is supported by a block device which does not, in fact,
support WRITE SAME.  This currently happens for SATA drivers behind a
SAS controller, but there are probably a hundred other ways that can
happen, including drive firmware bugs.

After receiving an error for WRITE SAME the block layer will retry the
request as a plain write of zeroes, but mdraid will consider the
failure as fatal and consider the drive failed.  This has the effect
that all the mirrors containing a specific set of data are each
offlined in very rapid succession resulting in data loss.

However, just bouncing the request back up to the block layer isn't
ideal either, because the whole initial request-retry sequence should
be inside the write bitmap fence, which probably means that md needs
to do its own conversion of WRITE SAME to write zero.

Until the failure scenario has been sorted out, disable WRITE SAME for
raid1, raid5, and raid10.

[neilb: added raid5]

This patch is appropriate for any -stable since 3.7 when write_same
support was added.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There are cases where the kernel will believe that the WRITE SAME
command is supported by a block device which does not, in fact,
support WRITE SAME.  This currently happens for SATA drivers behind a
SAS controller, but there are probably a hundred other ways that can
happen, including drive firmware bugs.

After receiving an error for WRITE SAME the block layer will retry the
request as a plain write of zeroes, but mdraid will consider the
failure as fatal and consider the drive failed.  This has the effect
that all the mirrors containing a specific set of data are each
offlined in very rapid succession resulting in data loss.

However, just bouncing the request back up to the block layer isn't
ideal either, because the whole initial request-retry sequence should
be inside the write bitmap fence, which probably means that md needs
to do its own conversion of WRITE SAME to write zero.

Until the failure scenario has been sorted out, disable WRITE SAME for
raid1, raid5, and raid10.

[neilb: added raid5]

This patch is appropriate for any -stable since 3.7 when write_same
support was added.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>md/raid1,raid10: use freeze_array in place of raise_barrier in various places.</title>
<updated>2013-06-13T03:40:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2013-06-12T01:01:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e2d59925221cd562e07fee38ec8839f7209ae603'/>
<id>e2d59925221cd562e07fee38ec8839f7209ae603</id>
<content type='text'>
Various places in raid1 and raid10 are calling raise_barrier when they
really should call freeze_array.
The former is only intended to be called from "make_request".
The later has extra checks for 'nr_queued' and makes a call to
flush_pending_writes(), so it is safe to call it from within the
management thread.

Using raise_barrier will sometimes deadlock.  Using freeze_array
should not.

As 'freeze_array' currently expects one request to be pending (in
handle_read_error - the only previous caller), we need to pass
it the number of pending requests (extra) to ignore.

The deadlock was made particularly noticeable by commits
050b66152f87c7 (raid10) and 6b740b8d79252f13 (raid1) which
appeared in 3.4, so the fix is appropriate for any -stable
kernel since then.

This patch probably won't apply directly to some early kernels and
will need to be applied by hand.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Alexander Lyakas &lt;alex.bolshoy@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Various places in raid1 and raid10 are calling raise_barrier when they
really should call freeze_array.
The former is only intended to be called from "make_request".
The later has extra checks for 'nr_queued' and makes a call to
flush_pending_writes(), so it is safe to call it from within the
management thread.

Using raise_barrier will sometimes deadlock.  Using freeze_array
should not.

As 'freeze_array' currently expects one request to be pending (in
handle_read_error - the only previous caller), we need to pass
it the number of pending requests (extra) to ignore.

The deadlock was made particularly noticeable by commits
050b66152f87c7 (raid10) and 6b740b8d79252f13 (raid1) which
appeared in 3.4, so the fix is appropriate for any -stable
kernel since then.

This patch probably won't apply directly to some early kernels and
will need to be applied by hand.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Alexander Lyakas &lt;alex.bolshoy@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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