linux-stable.git/drivers/input, branch v6.12.96

Input: maplecontrol - set driver data before registering input device

2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00

commit fe938ee497d58c644f6910cfe6ae155f6fb3e523 upstream.

Set maple driver data before calling input_register_device() to
ensure that it is available if the device is opened immediately and
the callback is triggered.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash
Tested-by: Florian Fuchs 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/akNYib9hQFNN1fA9@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Input: maplemouse - set driver data before registering input device

2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00

commit 738f24bbbc95dd50cb4229d1ed62a05f29db2bda upstream.

Set maple driver data before calling input_register_device() to
ensure that it is available if the device is opened immediately and
the callback is triggered.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash
Tested-by: Florian Fuchs 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/akNXw45L_8bxD6QV@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Input: maple_keyb - set driver data before registering input device

2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00

commit 536394ec81419b67d9f4f0028812c4372397be1b upstream.

Set maple driver data before calling input_register_device() to
ensure that it is available if the device is opened immediately and
the callback is triggered.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Input: mms114 - fix multi-touch slot corruption

2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00

commit adea84ee6cdea611146c4251d3c1616f5a09feca upstream.

If the touchscreen controller reports a touch ID of 0, the driver
calculates the slot ID as touch->id - 1, which underflows to UINT_MAX.
This is passed to input_mt_slot() as -1.

Since the input core ignores negative slot values, the active slot remains
unchanged. The driver then reports the touch coordinates for the previously
active slot, corrupting its state.

Fix this by rejecting touch reports with ID 0.

Fixes: 07b8481d4aff ("Input: add MELFAS mms114 touchscreen driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704060115.353049-1-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Input: maplemouse - fix NULL pointer dereference in open()

2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00

commit ee89db004238bd0b034f2a6176e175561658750b upstream.

Commit 555c765b0cc2 ("Input: mouse - drop unnecessary calls to
input_set_drvdata") dropped the input_set_drvdata() call in probe
because the data appeared to be unused. However, dc_mouse_open() and
dc_mouse_close() were using maple_get_drvdata(to_maple_dev(&dev->dev)).
This appears to be accessing the data attached to an instance of
maple_device structure, while in reality this actually retrieves driver
data from the input device's embedded struct device (doing invalid
conversion of input device structure to maple device). After
input_set_drvdata() was removed, that lookup started returning NULL and
opening the input device dereferences mse->mdev.

Restore input_set_drvdata() and convert open() and close() to use
input_get_drvdata() so the dependency is no longer hidden.

Fixes: 6b3480855aad ("maple: input: fix up maple mouse driver")
Fixes: 555c765b0cc2 ("Input: mouse - drop unnecessary calls to input_set_drvdata")
Signed-off-by: Florian Fuchs 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260628230715.2982552-1-fuchsfl@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size

2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00

commit 66725039f7090afe14c31bd259e2059a68f04023 upstream.

mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a
fixed-size on-stack buffer

	struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH];

which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes,
i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from
the device:

	packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE);
	if (packet_size <= 0)
		goto out;
	...
	error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,
			(u8 *)touch);

packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check
is the lower bound packet_size <= 0; it is never bounded against the
size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller
(or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of
up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of
touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can
overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address.

A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject
an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler's
other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer.

Fixes: 07b8481d4aff ("Input: add MELFAS mms114 touchscreen driver")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-dc4b8dc4-v1-1-d7cb0a828d92@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet

2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00

commit 478cdd736f2ce3114f90e775d7358136d3977b94 upstream.

tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed
three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full
packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree:

	tw->data[tw->idx++] = data;
	if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) {
		...
		tw->idx = 0;
	}

The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device
controls.  A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow
peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the
index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and
keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte
array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen
byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write.

Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when
the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do.

Fixes: 11ea3173d5f2 ("Input: add driver for Touchwin serial touchscreens")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260613-b4-disp-69921bfd-v1-1-82c036899959@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Input: mms114 - fix touch indexing for MMS134S and MMS136

2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00

commit a6ac4e24c1a8a533bb61035184fdcc7eede4cc8d upstream.

The MMS134S and MMS136 touch controllers have an event size of 6 bytes
rather than 8 bytes. When __mms114_read_reg() reads the touch data
packet from the device into the touch buffer, the events are packed
tightly at 6-byte intervals. However, the driver iterates through the
events using standard C array indexing (touch[index]), where each
element is sizeof(struct mms114_touch) (8 bytes) apart. As a result, any
touch events beyond the first one are read from incorrect offsets and
parsed improperly.

Fix this by explicitly calculating the byte offset for each touch event
based on the device's specific event size.

Fixes: 53fefdd1d3a3 ("Input: mms114 - support MMS136")
Fixes: ab108678195f ("Input: mms114 - support MMS134S")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash
Reviewed-by: Bryam Vargas 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616050912.1531241-1-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index

2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00

commit 0e9943d2e4c63496b6ca84bc66fd3c71d40558e2 upstream.

iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by
taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and
using it to address the per-effect state array:

	i = data[1] & 0x7f;
	if (data[1] & 0x80) {
		if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
				      iforce->core_effects[i].flags))
			...
	} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
				      iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) {
		...
	}

The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but
core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries.  For an index
of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an
out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array.  core_effects[]
is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the
trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio /
iforce_usb object.

data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB
interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force
feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or
clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object.

Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it.  Bound against
the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so
the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the
device registered.  A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always
carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are
unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded
and is left untouched.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260613-b4-disp-4828d263-v1-1-02320e1a89dd@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count

2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00

commit 5ed62a96e06be4e94b8296b7932afee550a70e04 upstream.

goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported
by the device into an on-stack buffer

	u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS];

which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only
runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num,
but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device
configuration block and is never clamped:

	ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f;

The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit
controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up
to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num
of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes
ts->contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into
point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the
92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write.

Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts
point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration.

Fixes: a7ac7c95d468 ("Input: goodix - use max touch number from device config")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas 
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-6844625d-v1-1-df0aed080c9d@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman