linux-stable.git/drivers/input/touchscreen, branch v6.12.96 Linux kernel stable tree Input: mms114 - fix multi-touch slot corruption 2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00 Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com 2026-07-04T06:01:12+00:00 f8ef4504057a7bed830d3f490a51cb6dc9430570 commit adea84ee6cdea611146c4251d3c1616f5a09feca upstream. If the touchscreen controller reports a touch ID of 0, the driver calculates the slot ID as touch->id - 1, which underflows to UINT_MAX. This is passed to input_mt_slot() as -1. Since the input core ignores negative slot values, the active slot remains unchanged. The driver then reports the touch coordinates for the previously active slot, corrupting its state. Fix this by rejecting touch reports with ID 0. Fixes: 07b8481d4aff ("Input: add MELFAS mms114 touchscreen driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704060115.353049-1-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit adea84ee6cdea611146c4251d3c1616f5a09feca upstream.

If the touchscreen controller reports a touch ID of 0, the driver
calculates the slot ID as touch->id - 1, which underflows to UINT_MAX.
This is passed to input_mt_slot() as -1.

Since the input core ignores negative slot values, the active slot remains
unchanged. The driver then reports the touch coordinates for the previously
active slot, corrupting its state.

Fix this by rejecting touch reports with ID 0.

Fixes: 07b8481d4aff ("Input: add MELFAS mms114 touchscreen driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704060115.353049-1-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size 2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00 Bryam Vargas hexlabsecurity@proton.me 2026-06-14T21:19:43+00:00 b78150729762d47c14fe29a2582bdca5568e62b8 commit 66725039f7090afe14c31bd259e2059a68f04023 upstream. mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a fixed-size on-stack buffer struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH]; which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes, i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from the device: packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE); if (packet_size <= 0) goto out; ... error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size, (u8 *)touch); packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check is the lower bound packet_size <= 0; it is never bounded against the size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address. A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler's other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer. Fixes: 07b8481d4aff ("Input: add MELFAS mms114 touchscreen driver") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-dc4b8dc4-v1-1-d7cb0a828d92@proton.me Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 66725039f7090afe14c31bd259e2059a68f04023 upstream.

mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a
fixed-size on-stack buffer

	struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH];

which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes,
i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from
the device:

	packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE);
	if (packet_size <= 0)
		goto out;
	...
	error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,
			(u8 *)touch);

packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check
is the lower bound packet_size <= 0; it is never bounded against the
size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller
(or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of
up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of
touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can
overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address.

A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject
an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler's
other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer.

Fixes: 07b8481d4aff ("Input: add MELFAS mms114 touchscreen driver")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-dc4b8dc4-v1-1-d7cb0a828d92@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet 2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00 Bryam Vargas hexlabsecurity@proton.me 2026-06-14T01:07:20+00:00 70e4248793762df9832fd4fc2fc6ac7924572c36 commit 478cdd736f2ce3114f90e775d7358136d3977b94 upstream. tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree: tw->data[tw->idx++] = data; if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) { ... tw->idx = 0; } The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write. Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do. Fixes: 11ea3173d5f2 ("Input: add driver for Touchwin serial touchscreens") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260613-b4-disp-69921bfd-v1-1-82c036899959@proton.me Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 478cdd736f2ce3114f90e775d7358136d3977b94 upstream.

tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed
three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full
packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree:

	tw->data[tw->idx++] = data;
	if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) {
		...
		tw->idx = 0;
	}

The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device
controls.  A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow
peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the
index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and
keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte
array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen
byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write.

Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when
the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do.

Fixes: 11ea3173d5f2 ("Input: add driver for Touchwin serial touchscreens")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260613-b4-disp-69921bfd-v1-1-82c036899959@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Input: mms114 - fix touch indexing for MMS134S and MMS136 2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00 Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com 2026-06-23T05:35:18+00:00 7c00a0787af7164438bdbc97fcae9733cfc58d21 commit a6ac4e24c1a8a533bb61035184fdcc7eede4cc8d upstream. The MMS134S and MMS136 touch controllers have an event size of 6 bytes rather than 8 bytes. When __mms114_read_reg() reads the touch data packet from the device into the touch buffer, the events are packed tightly at 6-byte intervals. However, the driver iterates through the events using standard C array indexing (touch[index]), where each element is sizeof(struct mms114_touch) (8 bytes) apart. As a result, any touch events beyond the first one are read from incorrect offsets and parsed improperly. Fix this by explicitly calculating the byte offset for each touch event based on the device's specific event size. Fixes: 53fefdd1d3a3 ("Input: mms114 - support MMS136") Fixes: ab108678195f ("Input: mms114 - support MMS134S") Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash Reviewed-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616050912.1531241-1-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit a6ac4e24c1a8a533bb61035184fdcc7eede4cc8d upstream.

The MMS134S and MMS136 touch controllers have an event size of 6 bytes
rather than 8 bytes. When __mms114_read_reg() reads the touch data
packet from the device into the touch buffer, the events are packed
tightly at 6-byte intervals. However, the driver iterates through the
events using standard C array indexing (touch[index]), where each
element is sizeof(struct mms114_touch) (8 bytes) apart. As a result, any
touch events beyond the first one are read from incorrect offsets and
parsed improperly.

Fix this by explicitly calculating the byte offset for each touch event
based on the device's specific event size.

Fixes: 53fefdd1d3a3 ("Input: mms114 - support MMS136")
Fixes: ab108678195f ("Input: mms114 - support MMS134S")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash
Reviewed-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616050912.1531241-1-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count 2026-07-18T14:52:16+00:00 Bryam Vargas hexlabsecurity@proton.me 2026-06-13T02:10:33+00:00 46addbd13dbf4aacb71cfbca964a5e552d0f45ae commit 5ed62a96e06be4e94b8296b7932afee550a70e04 upstream. goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported by the device into an on-stack buffer u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS]; which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num, but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device configuration block and is never clamped: ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f; The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes ts->contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the 92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write. Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration. Fixes: a7ac7c95d468 ("Input: goodix - use max touch number from device config") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <johannes.goede@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-6844625d-v1-1-df0aed080c9d@proton.me Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 5ed62a96e06be4e94b8296b7932afee550a70e04 upstream.

goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported
by the device into an on-stack buffer

	u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS];

which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only
runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num,
but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device
configuration block and is never clamped:

	ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f;

The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit
controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up
to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num
of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes
ts->contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into
point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the
92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write.

Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts
point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration.

Fixes: a7ac7c95d468 ("Input: goodix - use max touch number from device config")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <johannes.goede@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-6844625d-v1-1-df0aed080c9d@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Input: atmel_mxt_ts - fix boundary check in mxt_prepare_cfg_mem 2026-06-09T10:25:56+00:00 Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com 2026-05-04T18:54:45+00:00 ae92e334544263a02d9f99e18385e718c44392c9 commit baa0210fb6a9dc3882509a9411b6d284d88fe30e upstream. When a configuration file provides an object size that is larger than the driver's known mxt_obj_size(object), the driver intends to discard the extra bytes. The loop iterates using for (i = 0; i < size; i++). Inside the loop, the condition to skip processing extra bytes is: if (i > mxt_obj_size(object)) continue; Since i is a 0-based index, the valid indices for the object are 0 through mxt_obj_size(object) - 1. When i == mxt_obj_size(object), the condition evaluates to false, and the code processes the byte instead of discarding it. This causes the code to calculate byte_offset = reg + i - cfg->start_ofs and writes the byte there, overwriting exactly one byte of the adjacent instance or object. Update the boundary check to skip extra bytes correctly by using >=. Fixes: 50a77c658b80 ("Input: atmel_mxt_ts - download device config using firmware loader") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro Reviewed-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260504185448.4055973-1-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit baa0210fb6a9dc3882509a9411b6d284d88fe30e upstream.

When a configuration file provides an object size that is larger than the
driver's known mxt_obj_size(object), the driver intends to discard the
extra bytes.

The loop iterates using for (i = 0; i < size; i++). Inside the loop, the
condition to skip processing extra bytes is:

    if (i > mxt_obj_size(object))
        continue;

Since i is a 0-based index, the valid indices for the object are 0 through
mxt_obj_size(object) - 1.

When i == mxt_obj_size(object), the condition evaluates to false, and the
code processes the byte instead of discarding it.

This causes the code to calculate byte_offset = reg + i - cfg->start_ofs
and writes the byte there, overwriting exactly one byte of the adjacent
instance or object.

Update the boundary check to skip extra bytes correctly by using >=.

Fixes: 50a77c658b80 ("Input: atmel_mxt_ts - download device config using firmware loader")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro
Reviewed-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260504185448.4055973-1-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Input: usbtouchscreen - clamp NEXIO data_len/x_len to URB buffer size 2026-06-09T10:25:35+00:00 Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org 2026-04-20T16:00:27+00:00 103d2de9f505f56da173e43f12dba62f92620278 commit 2905281cbda52ec9df540113b35b835feb5fafd3 upstream. nexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header in the device's interrupt packet and then walks packet->data[0..x_len) and packet->data[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a threshold. Both fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535). The existing adjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still reach roughly 0xfeff. The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size (1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the packed header — so packet->data[] has 1017 valid bytes. read_data() callbacks are not given urb->actual_length, and nothing else bounds the walk. A device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read past the coherent DMA allocation. The first index whose byte exceeds NEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the reported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to userspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events. Far enough out, the read can also hit an unmapped page and fault. Fix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer's data[] capacity and x_len to data_len. Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Fixes: 5197424cdccc ("Input: usbtouchscreen - add NEXIO (or iNexio) support") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_t1000 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026042026-chlorine-epidermis-fd6d@gregkh Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 2905281cbda52ec9df540113b35b835feb5fafd3 upstream.

nexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header
in the device's interrupt packet and then walks packet->data[0..x_len)
and packet->data[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a
threshold.

Both fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535).  The existing
adjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still
reach roughly 0xfeff.  The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size
(1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the
packed header — so packet->data[] has 1017 valid bytes.  read_data()
callbacks are not given urb->actual_length, and nothing else bounds the
walk.

A device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read
past the coherent DMA allocation.  The first index whose byte exceeds
NEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the
reported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to
userspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events.  Far enough out, the read can also
hit an unmapped page and fault.

Fix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer's data[] capacity and
x_len to data_len.

Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Fixes: 5197424cdccc ("Input: usbtouchscreen - add NEXIO (or iNexio) support")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026042026-chlorine-epidermis-fd6d@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Input: ti_am335x_tsc - fix off-by-one error in wire_order validation 2026-01-08T09:14:06+00:00 Junjie Cao junjie.cao@intel.com 2025-12-19T05:56:59+00:00 84e4d3543168912549271b34261f5e0f94952d6e commit 248d3a73a0167dce15ba100477c3e778c4787178 upstream. The current validation 'wire_order[i] > ARRAY_SIZE(config_pins)' allows wire_order[i] to equal ARRAY_SIZE(config_pins), which causes out-of-bounds access when used as index in 'config_pins[wire_order[i]]'. Since config_pins has 4 elements (indices 0-3), the valid range for wire_order should be 0-3. Fix the off-by-one error by using >= instead of > in the validation check. Signed-off-by: Junjie Cao <junjie.cao@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251114062817.852698-1-junjie.cao@intel.com Fixes: bb76dc09ddfc ("input: ti_am33x_tsc: Order of TSC wires, made configurable") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 248d3a73a0167dce15ba100477c3e778c4787178 upstream.

The current validation 'wire_order[i] > ARRAY_SIZE(config_pins)' allows
wire_order[i] to equal ARRAY_SIZE(config_pins), which causes out-of-bounds
access when used as index in 'config_pins[wire_order[i]]'.

Since config_pins has 4 elements (indices 0-3), the valid range for
wire_order should be 0-3. Fix the off-by-one error by using >= instead
of > in the validation check.

Signed-off-by: Junjie Cao <junjie.cao@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251114062817.852698-1-junjie.cao@intel.com
Fixes: bb76dc09ddfc ("input: ti_am33x_tsc: Order of TSC wires, made configurable")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Input: goodix - add support for ACPI ID GDIX1003 2025-12-01T10:43:23+00:00 Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com 2025-10-13T16:15:25+00:00 47420474a1d9c4db19bbc654fc5b0a3723c26cb2 commit c6d99e488117201c63efd747ce17b80687c3f5a9 upstream. Some newer devices use an ACPI hardware ID of GDIX1003 for their Goodix touchscreen controller, instead of GDIX1001 / GDIX1002. Add GDIX1003 to the goodix_acpi_match[] table. Reported-by: Weikang Guo <guoweikang.kernel@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-input/20250225024409.1467040-1-guoweikang.kernel@gmail.com/ Tested-by: Weikang Guo <guoweikang.kernel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251013121022.44333-1-hansg@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit c6d99e488117201c63efd747ce17b80687c3f5a9 upstream.

Some newer devices use an ACPI hardware ID of GDIX1003 for their Goodix
touchscreen controller, instead of GDIX1001 / GDIX1002. Add GDIX1003
to the goodix_acpi_match[] table.

Reported-by: Weikang Guo <guoweikang.kernel@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-input/20250225024409.1467040-1-guoweikang.kernel@gmail.com/
Tested-by: Weikang Guo <guoweikang.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251013121022.44333-1-hansg@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Input: atmel_mxt_ts - allow reset GPIO to sleep 2025-10-15T10:00:23+00:00 Marek Vasut marek.vasut@mailbox.org 2025-10-05T02:33:10+00:00 2c988e1f9df01ab0ff7caa28ad5c08b2313cc40a commit c7866ee0a9ddd9789faadf58cdac6abd7aabf045 upstream. The reset GPIO is not toggled in any critical section where it couldn't sleep, allow the reset GPIO to sleep. This allows the driver to operate reset GPIOs connected to I2C GPIO expanders. Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut@mailbox.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251005023335.166483-1-marek.vasut@mailbox.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit c7866ee0a9ddd9789faadf58cdac6abd7aabf045 upstream.

The reset GPIO is not toggled in any critical section where it couldn't
sleep, allow the reset GPIO to sleep. This allows the driver to operate
reset GPIOs connected to I2C GPIO expanders.

Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut@mailbox.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251005023335.166483-1-marek.vasut@mailbox.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>