linux-stable.git/drivers/infiniband, branch v7.2.4 Linux kernel stable tree RDMA/uverbs: Guard legacy bundles without method_elm 2026-09-07T15:37:06+00:00 Yuhang Pan 242270054@hdu.edu.cn 2026-08-14T09:27:23+00:00 edae84e5461749ed9adf9fcf5c6e075381040ac3 commit 60a42d510113f46de47e86a84bf5758597644487 upstream. The legacy write() path dispatches through a uverbs_api_write_method, but the uverbs_attr_bundle passed to provider code does not have an ioctl method element. If malformed provider input causes the common uverbs validation code to emit an error message, uverbs_get_handler_fn() dereferences the uninitialized method_elm pointer. Initialize method_elm explicitly for legacy bundles and make uverbs_get_handler_fn() return NULL when no ioctl method is present. The legacy dispatcher continues to use its local write method, while the ioctl path continues to use the registered ioctl handler. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7122ff96068a ("RDMA/core: Do not read wild stack memory in uverbs_get_handler_fn()") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/AOYAQgCQK3IXqJLr1TB5Qao9.1.1787036796115.Hmail.242270054@hdu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Yuhang Pan <242270054@hdu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 60a42d510113f46de47e86a84bf5758597644487 upstream.

The legacy write() path dispatches through a uverbs_api_write_method, but
the uverbs_attr_bundle passed to provider code does not have an ioctl
method element. If malformed provider input causes the common uverbs
validation code to emit an error message, uverbs_get_handler_fn()
dereferences the uninitialized method_elm pointer.

Initialize method_elm explicitly for legacy bundles and make
uverbs_get_handler_fn() return NULL when no ioctl method is present. The
legacy dispatcher continues to use its local write method, while the ioctl
path continues to use the registered ioctl handler.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7122ff96068a ("RDMA/core: Do not read wild stack memory in uverbs_get_handler_fn()")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/AOYAQgCQK3IXqJLr1TB5Qao9.1.1787036796115.Hmail.242270054@hdu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Yuhang Pan <242270054@hdu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
RDMA/uverbs: Add UVERBS_ATTR_UHW to UVERBS_METHOD_REG_MR 2026-09-07T15:37:06+00:00 Jason Gunthorpe jgg@nvidia.com 2026-07-02T16:47:10+00:00 9e71d0f4944ba5641e01db29b3256c963656d671 commit 011199f46f44a9fd93a9e5ab5d7fd1328d80e9bf upstream. The original commit missed that three drivers (mthca, irdma, siw) have UHW data associated with reg_mr that cannot be passed through the ioctl. They also assume that the udata cannot be NULL, so failing to pass a valid udata can trigger a NULL udata crash in those drivers. This never happens in real systems since in rdma-core ibv_cmd_reg_mr_ex() does not accept a udata and those three drivers don't use it, however a malicious userspace could trigger it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5b2e45049dc0 ("IB/core: Add UVERBS_METHOD_REG_MR on the MR object") Reported-by: Jacob Moroni <jmoroni@google.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHYDg1TOGxRGZrS69d4Y--Shj_DZv0nJuM73iHUBwBM70g_t3Q@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 011199f46f44a9fd93a9e5ab5d7fd1328d80e9bf upstream.

The original commit missed that three drivers (mthca, irdma, siw) have UHW
data associated with reg_mr that cannot be passed through the ioctl. They
also assume that the udata cannot be NULL, so failing to pass a valid
udata can trigger a NULL udata crash in those drivers.

This never happens in real systems since in rdma-core ibv_cmd_reg_mr_ex()
does not accept a udata and those three drivers don't use it, however a
malicious userspace could trigger it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5b2e45049dc0 ("IB/core: Add UVERBS_METHOD_REG_MR on the MR object")
Reported-by: Jacob Moroni <jmoroni@google.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHYDg1TOGxRGZrS69d4Y--Shj_DZv0nJuM73iHUBwBM70g_t3Q@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
RDMA/ucma: Lock the handler in ucma_write_cm_event() 2026-09-07T15:37:06+00:00 Norbert Szetei norbert@doyensec.com 2026-07-27T08:06:12+00:00 0be1955040a2eceed0ecfc387fdc92305411d273 commit f4cc21c6a8e9d392871477f9fd98d68e5ad80272 upstream. ctx->file may only be changed under the handler lock and the xa_lock, which is what stops uevents being queued for a ctx while ucma_migrate_id() moves it to another file. The CM core takes that lock before invoking ucma_event_handler(), but the write() paths that queue uevents themselves do not. ucma_write_cm_event() re-reads ctx->file for each of its four dereferences, so ucma_migrate_id() can swap it mid-sequence: mutex_lock(&ctx->file->mut); /* file A */ list_add_tail(&uevent->list, &ctx->file->event_list); /* file B */ mutex_unlock(&ctx->file->mut); /* file B */ wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->file->poll_wait); /* file B */ The window is the mutex_lock() itself: the writer sleeps in it while the migration reassigns ctx->file. The list_add_tail() then runs on file B's event_list holding only file A's mutex: list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffff888101320f30), but was ffff88814a08c418. (prev=ffff88814a075c18). kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:32! Call Trace: ucma_write_cm_event+0x36e/0x5e0 and file A's mut is left held forever, wedging its next writer in D state. The uevent is also stranded on a list ucma_cleanup_ctx_events() will not walk, so it outlives its context. /dev/infiniband/rdma_cm is 0666 and no RDMA device is involved, so an unprivileged user reaches all of this. Take the handler lock, as ucma_cleanup_mc_events() does; ctx->cm_id is pinned by the ucma_get_ctx() reference. Fixes: a3c9d0fcd371 ("RDMA/ucma: Support write an event into a CM") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/60544A67-EFD6-4D5D-974C-D983445F1070@doyensec.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit f4cc21c6a8e9d392871477f9fd98d68e5ad80272 upstream.

ctx->file may only be changed under the handler lock and the xa_lock, which
is what stops uevents being queued for a ctx while ucma_migrate_id() moves
it to another file.  The CM core takes that lock before invoking
ucma_event_handler(), but the write() paths that queue uevents themselves
do not.

ucma_write_cm_event() re-reads ctx->file for each of its four dereferences,
so ucma_migrate_id() can swap it mid-sequence:

	mutex_lock(&ctx->file->mut);			/* file A */
	list_add_tail(&uevent->list, &ctx->file->event_list);	/* file B */
	mutex_unlock(&ctx->file->mut);			/* file B */
	wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->file->poll_wait);	/* file B */

The window is the mutex_lock() itself: the writer sleeps in it while the
migration reassigns ctx->file.  The list_add_tail() then runs on file B's
event_list holding only file A's mutex:

  list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffff888101320f30),
    but was ffff88814a08c418. (prev=ffff88814a075c18).
  kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:32!
  Call Trace:
   ucma_write_cm_event+0x36e/0x5e0

and file A's mut is left held forever, wedging its next writer in D state.
The uevent is also stranded on a list ucma_cleanup_ctx_events() will not
walk, so it outlives its context.  /dev/infiniband/rdma_cm is 0666 and no
RDMA device is involved, so an unprivileged user reaches all of this.

Take the handler lock, as ucma_cleanup_mc_events() does; ctx->cm_id is
pinned by the ucma_get_ctx() reference.

Fixes: a3c9d0fcd371 ("RDMA/ucma: Support write an event into a CM")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/60544A67-EFD6-4D5D-974C-D983445F1070@doyensec.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
RDMA/ucma: Lock the handler in ucma_set_ib_path() 2026-09-07T15:37:06+00:00 Norbert Szetei norbert@doyensec.com 2026-07-27T08:08:36+00:00 43a7d8ae9f645dc00235cfa4bf57673c20b769f8 commit ecbe7d36dc2de07e5dfbb4a8ff5b315ab43de820 upstream. ucma_set_ib_path() calls ucma_event_handler() straight from the write() path, without the handler lock that keeps ctx->file stable while a uevent is queued. The handler re-reads ctx->file for every dereference: mutex_lock(&ctx->file->mut); /* file A */ list_add_tail(&uevent->list, &ctx->file->event_list); /* file B */ mutex_unlock(&ctx->file->mut); /* file B */ wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->file->poll_wait); /* file B */ A concurrent ucma_migrate_id() reassigns ctx->file while the SET_OPTION caller sleeps in mutex_lock(), so the list_add_tail() lands on file B's event_list while only file A's mutex is held, racing every other user of that list: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __list_add_valid_or_report+0x1aa/0x1c0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888153c6a418 by task poc_corr/486 Call Trace: __list_add_valid_or_report+0x1aa/0x1c0 ucma_event_handler+0x1be/0xc00 ucma_set_ib_path+0x45e/0x710 ucma_set_option+0x32e/0x590 ucma_write+0x1f9/0x330 Allocated by task 505: ucma_write_cm_event+0x1a1/0x660 Freed by task 505: kfree+0x1da/0x4c0 ucma_get_event+0x5d5/0x7e0 The freed object is a ucma_event that another thread dequeued from file B's list under file B's mutex. File A's mut is left held on top of that, wedging its next writer in uninterruptible sleep. This path needs a bound and address-resolved cm_id, so it requires an RDMA device to be present. Take the handler lock around the call. Fixes: 09e328e47a69 ("RDMA/ucma: Fix the locking of ctx->file") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/2823D190-92D5-4714-8769-4FB643C64FF3@doyensec.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit ecbe7d36dc2de07e5dfbb4a8ff5b315ab43de820 upstream.

ucma_set_ib_path() calls ucma_event_handler() straight from the write()
path, without the handler lock that keeps ctx->file stable while a uevent
is queued.  The handler re-reads ctx->file for every dereference:

	mutex_lock(&ctx->file->mut);			/* file A */
	list_add_tail(&uevent->list, &ctx->file->event_list);	/* file B */
	mutex_unlock(&ctx->file->mut);			/* file B */
	wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->file->poll_wait);	/* file B */

A concurrent ucma_migrate_id() reassigns ctx->file while the SET_OPTION
caller sleeps in mutex_lock(), so the list_add_tail() lands on file B's
event_list while only file A's mutex is held, racing every other user of
that list:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __list_add_valid_or_report+0x1aa/0x1c0
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff888153c6a418 by task poc_corr/486
  Call Trace:
   __list_add_valid_or_report+0x1aa/0x1c0
   ucma_event_handler+0x1be/0xc00
   ucma_set_ib_path+0x45e/0x710
   ucma_set_option+0x32e/0x590
   ucma_write+0x1f9/0x330
  Allocated by task 505:
   ucma_write_cm_event+0x1a1/0x660
  Freed by task 505:
   kfree+0x1da/0x4c0
   ucma_get_event+0x5d5/0x7e0

The freed object is a ucma_event that another thread dequeued from file B's
list under file B's mutex.  File A's mut is left held on top of that,
wedging its next writer in uninterruptible sleep.

This path needs a bound and address-resolved cm_id, so it requires an RDMA
device to be present.

Take the handler lock around the call.

Fixes: 09e328e47a69 ("RDMA/ucma: Fix the locking of ctx->file")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/2823D190-92D5-4714-8769-4FB643C64FF3@doyensec.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
RDMA/ionic: Embed counter driver data in rdma_counter allocation 2026-09-07T15:37:06+00:00 Abhijit Gangurde abhijit.gangurde@amd.com 2026-08-05T05:32:54+00:00 08b8630b557828aedb1d9ef0a6e2ec421f334ee2 commit cf3ebd89e754015625fee90aa938f6bc79a2c974 upstream. Commit 7e53b31acc7f ("RDMA/core: Create and destroy rdma_counter using rdma_zalloc_drv_obj()") requires drivers implementing counter ops to embed struct rdma_counter in a driver-specific struct, register its size via INIT_RDMA_OBJ_SIZE, and provide a counter_init callback. The ionic driver was merged without this adaptation, causing a NULL pointer dereference in alloc_and_bind() since rdma_zalloc_drv_obj() allocates zero bytes when size_rdma_counter is unset. Consolidate struct ionic_counter into a new struct ionic_rdma_counter that embeds struct rdma_counter, replace the xarray with a lightweight ida for ID allocation, and add the required counter_init and INIT_RDMA_OBJ_SIZE declarations. Fixes: ea4c399642b8 ("RDMA/ionic: Implement device stats ops") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.18 Signed-off-by: Abhijit Gangurde <abhijit.gangurde@amd.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260805053254.4023262-2-abhijit.gangurde@amd.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit cf3ebd89e754015625fee90aa938f6bc79a2c974 upstream.

Commit 7e53b31acc7f ("RDMA/core: Create and destroy rdma_counter using
rdma_zalloc_drv_obj()") requires drivers implementing counter ops to
embed struct rdma_counter in a driver-specific struct, register its size
via INIT_RDMA_OBJ_SIZE, and provide a counter_init callback.

The ionic driver was merged without this adaptation, causing a NULL
pointer dereference in alloc_and_bind() since rdma_zalloc_drv_obj()
allocates zero bytes when size_rdma_counter is unset.

Consolidate struct ionic_counter into a new struct ionic_rdma_counter
that embeds struct rdma_counter, replace the xarray with a lightweight
ida for ID allocation, and add the required counter_init and
INIT_RDMA_OBJ_SIZE declarations.

Fixes: ea4c399642b8 ("RDMA/ionic: Implement device stats ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.18
Signed-off-by: Abhijit Gangurde <abhijit.gangurde@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260805053254.4023262-2-abhijit.gangurde@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
RDMA/ionic: Cap eq_count to the eth driver's interrupt vector budget 2026-09-07T15:37:06+00:00 Brett Creeley brett.creeley@amd.com 2026-08-05T05:32:53+00:00 94d393f8dd94cbe6af747ecc1b7951663c447598 commit 1d0f877d593438a494ca5b05cc8699150409005a upstream. ionic_fill_lif_cfg() reads eq_count from firmware uncapped, but the eth driver only reserves ionic->neqs_per_lif MSI-X vectors for RDMA event queues. Since ionic_rdma probes via the auxiliary bus before the netdev is brought up, it can exhaust the shared interrupt bitmap, causing ionic_open() to fail with -ENOSPC when allocating rx/tx interrupts. Cap RDMA eq_count to neqs_per_lif, which is populated by ionic_lif_size() at PCI probe before the RDMA aux device registers. Fixes: 8d765af51a09 ("RDMA/ionic: Register auxiliary module for ionic ethernet adapter") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brett Creeley <brett.creeley@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Abhijit Gangurde <abhijit.gangurde@amd.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260805053254.4023262-1-abhijit.gangurde@amd.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 1d0f877d593438a494ca5b05cc8699150409005a upstream.

ionic_fill_lif_cfg() reads eq_count from firmware uncapped, but the
eth driver only reserves ionic->neqs_per_lif MSI-X vectors for RDMA
event queues. Since ionic_rdma probes via the auxiliary bus before
the netdev is brought up, it can exhaust the shared interrupt bitmap,
causing ionic_open() to fail with -ENOSPC when allocating rx/tx
interrupts.

Cap RDMA eq_count to neqs_per_lif, which is populated by
ionic_lif_size() at PCI probe before the RDMA aux device registers.

Fixes: 8d765af51a09 ("RDMA/ionic: Register auxiliary module for ionic ethernet adapter")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brett Creeley <brett.creeley@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Abhijit Gangurde <abhijit.gangurde@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260805053254.4023262-1-abhijit.gangurde@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
RDMA/cxgb4: Cancel reg_work before freeing device on remove 2026-09-07T15:37:06+00:00 Fan Wu fanwu01@zju.edu.cn 2026-08-06T13:01:27+00:00 320e5258a53af0abc5abd9eb01519a48bab2dee8 commit a7100601aa1a39f799a566acce10db20eaf4b7f2 upstream. c4iw_uld_state_change() queues reg_work to register the RDMA device. c4iw_remove() can free ctx->dev while this work is pending or running, leaving c4iw_register_device() accessing the freed device. Cancel reg_work before removing the device. The registration work can tear down ctx->dev when registration fails, so do not unregister or deallocate it again in that case. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. Fixes: 1c8f1da5d851 ("iw_cxgb4: Fix possible circular dependency locking warning") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260806130128.465460-1-fanwu01@zju.edu.cn Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6 Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <fanwu01@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit a7100601aa1a39f799a566acce10db20eaf4b7f2 upstream.

c4iw_uld_state_change() queues reg_work to register the RDMA device.
c4iw_remove() can free ctx->dev while this work is pending or running,
leaving c4iw_register_device() accessing the freed device.

Cancel reg_work before removing the device.  The registration work can
tear down ctx->dev when registration fails, so do not unregister or
deallocate it again in that case.

This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

Fixes: 1c8f1da5d851 ("iw_cxgb4: Fix possible circular dependency locking warning")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260806130128.465460-1-fanwu01@zju.edu.cn
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <fanwu01@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
RDMA/rxe: Fix OOB in free_rd_atomic_resources() 2026-09-02T12:33:17+00:00 Peiyang He peiyang_he@smail.nju.edu.cn 2026-07-30T02:28:27+00:00 d219e7a8eed3802970c3e4d243d79c70ef0a31bf [ Upstream commit de329533792a373186d79dca1ca120f8fa0afd05 ] free_rd_atomic_resources() iterates using qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic. Updating max_dest_rd_atomic before freeing the old array can make the free path walk past the old allocation and trigger a slab out-of-bounds write catched by KASAN: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resource drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:180 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:171 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:163 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rxe_qp_from_attr+0x1e88/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:712 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88802b8dddb8 by task syz.3.451/11063 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11063 Comm: syz.3.451 Not tainted 7.1.0 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xf7/0x600 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 mm/kasan/report.c:595 free_rd_atomic_resource drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:180 [inline] free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:171 [inline] free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:163 [inline] rxe_qp_from_attr+0x1e88/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:712 rxe_modify_qp+0x1e2/0x530 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:623 ib_security_modify_qp+0x223/0xfa0 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:625 _ib_modify_qp+0x333/0xec0 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1915 modify_qp+0x13ca/0x1940 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1932 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xcb/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1958 ib_uverbs_write+0xb86/0x1030 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:680 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:740 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fefc75a70cd Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fefc8495018 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fefc7835fa0 RCX: 00007fefc75a70cd RDX: 0000000000000078 RSI: 0000200000000240 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 00007fefc764f10f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007fefc7836038 R14: 00007fefc7835fa0 R15: 00007ffcf0586aa0 </TASK> Allocated by task 11063: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5296 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x32a/0x850 mm/slub.c:5308 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline] alloc_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:155 [inline] rxe_qp_from_attr+0x3f8/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:714 rxe_modify_qp+0x1e2/0x530 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:623 ib_security_modify_qp+0x223/0xfa0 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:625 _ib_modify_qp+0x333/0xec0 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1915 modify_qp+0x13ca/0x1940 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1932 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xcb/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1958 ib_uverbs_write+0xb86/0x1030 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:680 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:740 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802b8ddd80 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 56-byte region [ffff88802b8ddd80, ffff88802b8dddb8) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x2b8dd flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 00fff00000000000 ffff888015c418c0 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000800200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2c40(GFP_NOFS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 4651, tgid 4651 ((udev-worker)), ts 123427165316, free_ts 123425874255 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0xfc/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:1853 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1861 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x75b/0x3220 mm/page_alloc.c:3941 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x27e/0x2b00 mm/page_alloc.c:5221 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:3278 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:3467 [inline] new_slab+0xa6/0x670 mm/slub.c:3525 refill_objects+0x278/0x420 mm/slub.c:7272 refill_sheaf mm/slub.c:2816 [inline] __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2ed/0x640 mm/slub.c:4652 alloc_from_pcs mm/slub.c:4750 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4884 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5295 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x68d/0x850 mm/slub.c:5308 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline] tomoyo_encode2+0x100/0x3e0 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:45 tomoyo_encode+0x29/0x50 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:80 tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0x18c/0x690 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:283 tomoyo_get_realpath security/tomoyo/file.c:151 [inline] tomoyo_check_open_permission+0x2ab/0x3c0 security/tomoyo/file.c:776 tomoyo_file_open+0x6b/0x90 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:334 security_file_open+0x7a/0x1b0 security/security.c:2739 do_dentry_open+0x57e/0x1690 fs/open.c:924 vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1079 do_open fs/namei.c:4699 [inline] path_openat+0x218a/0x3190 fs/namei.c:4858 page last free pid 1 tgid 1 stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline] __free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1397 [inline] __free_frozen_pages+0x763/0xfc0 mm/page_alloc.c:2938 selinux_genfs_get_sid security/selinux/hooks.c:1364 [inline] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x903/0x1320 security/selinux/hooks.c:1563 selinux_d_instantiate+0x26/0x30 security/selinux/hooks.c:6658 security_d_instantiate+0x123/0x190 security/security.c:3704 d_splice_alias_ops+0x92/0x850 fs/dcache.c:3141 kernfs_iop_lookup+0x23f/0x2d0 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1289 lookup_open.isra.0+0x659/0x1080 fs/namei.c:4484 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:4611 [inline] path_openat+0x17dd/0x3190 fs/namei.c:4855 do_file_open+0x20c/0x430 fs/namei.c:4887 do_sys_openat2+0x101/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1364 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1370 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1386 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1381 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x141/0x200 fs/open.c:1381 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88802b8ddc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88802b8ddd00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88802b8ddd80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88802b8dde00: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88802b8dde80: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fix the OOB by moving the assignment after free_rd_atomic_resources() so the old array is freed using the old bound. This matches the original ordering in commit 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver"). Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/365C68B4923F8214+30195a67-0b90-4b92-ab96-2ce41517793c@smail.nju.edu.cn/ Fixes: b6bbee0d2438 ("IB/rxe: Properly honor max IRD value for rd/atomic.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peiyang He <peiyang_he@smail.nju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit de329533792a373186d79dca1ca120f8fa0afd05 ]

free_rd_atomic_resources() iterates using qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic.
Updating max_dest_rd_atomic before freeing the old array can make the
free path walk past the old allocation and trigger a slab out-of-bounds
write catched by KASAN:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resource drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:180 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:171 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:163 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rxe_qp_from_attr+0x1e88/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:712
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88802b8dddb8 by task syz.3.451/11063

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11063 Comm: syz.3.451 Not tainted 7.1.0 #2 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xf7/0x600 mm/kasan/report.c:482
 kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 mm/kasan/report.c:595
 free_rd_atomic_resource drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:180 [inline]
 free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:171 [inline]
 free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:163 [inline]
 rxe_qp_from_attr+0x1e88/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:712
 rxe_modify_qp+0x1e2/0x530 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:623
 ib_security_modify_qp+0x223/0xfa0 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:625
 _ib_modify_qp+0x333/0xec0 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1915
 modify_qp+0x13ca/0x1940 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1932
 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xcb/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1958
 ib_uverbs_write+0xb86/0x1030 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:680
 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:686
 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:740
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fefc75a70cd
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fefc8495018 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fefc7835fa0 RCX: 00007fefc75a70cd
RDX: 0000000000000078 RSI: 0000200000000240 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007fefc764f10f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fefc7836038 R14: 00007fefc7835fa0 R15: 00007ffcf0586aa0
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 11063:
 kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:57
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78
 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5296 [inline]
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x32a/0x850 mm/slub.c:5308
 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline]
 kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline]
 alloc_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:155 [inline]
 rxe_qp_from_attr+0x3f8/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:714
 rxe_modify_qp+0x1e2/0x530 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:623
 ib_security_modify_qp+0x223/0xfa0 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:625
 _ib_modify_qp+0x333/0xec0 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1915
 modify_qp+0x13ca/0x1940 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1932
 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xcb/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1958
 ib_uverbs_write+0xb86/0x1030 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:680
 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:686
 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:740
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802b8ddd80
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
 allocated 56-byte region [ffff88802b8ddd80, ffff88802b8dddb8)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x2b8dd
flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000000 ffff888015c418c0 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000800200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2c40(GFP_NOFS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 4651, tgid 4651 ((udev-worker)), ts 123427165316, free_ts 123425874255
 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
 post_alloc_hook+0xfc/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:1853
 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1861 [inline]
 get_page_from_freelist+0x75b/0x3220 mm/page_alloc.c:3941
 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x27e/0x2b00 mm/page_alloc.c:5221
 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:3278 [inline]
 allocate_slab mm/slub.c:3467 [inline]
 new_slab+0xa6/0x670 mm/slub.c:3525
 refill_objects+0x278/0x420 mm/slub.c:7272
 refill_sheaf mm/slub.c:2816 [inline]
 __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2ed/0x640 mm/slub.c:4652
 alloc_from_pcs mm/slub.c:4750 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4884 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5295 [inline]
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x68d/0x850 mm/slub.c:5308
 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline]
 kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline]
 tomoyo_encode2+0x100/0x3e0 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:45
 tomoyo_encode+0x29/0x50 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:80
 tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0x18c/0x690 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:283
 tomoyo_get_realpath security/tomoyo/file.c:151 [inline]
 tomoyo_check_open_permission+0x2ab/0x3c0 security/tomoyo/file.c:776
 tomoyo_file_open+0x6b/0x90 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:334
 security_file_open+0x7a/0x1b0 security/security.c:2739
 do_dentry_open+0x57e/0x1690 fs/open.c:924
 vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1079
 do_open fs/namei.c:4699 [inline]
 path_openat+0x218a/0x3190 fs/namei.c:4858
page last free pid 1 tgid 1 stack trace:
 reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
 __free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1397 [inline]
 __free_frozen_pages+0x763/0xfc0 mm/page_alloc.c:2938
 selinux_genfs_get_sid security/selinux/hooks.c:1364 [inline]
 inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x903/0x1320 security/selinux/hooks.c:1563
 selinux_d_instantiate+0x26/0x30 security/selinux/hooks.c:6658
 security_d_instantiate+0x123/0x190 security/security.c:3704
 d_splice_alias_ops+0x92/0x850 fs/dcache.c:3141
 kernfs_iop_lookup+0x23f/0x2d0 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1289
 lookup_open.isra.0+0x659/0x1080 fs/namei.c:4484
 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:4611 [inline]
 path_openat+0x17dd/0x3190 fs/namei.c:4855
 do_file_open+0x20c/0x430 fs/namei.c:4887
 do_sys_openat2+0x101/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1364
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1370 [inline]
 __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1386 [inline]
 __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1381 [inline]
 __x64_sys_openat+0x141/0x200 fs/open.c:1381
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88802b8ddc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88802b8ddd00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88802b8ddd80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                        ^
 ffff88802b8dde00: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88802b8dde80: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

Fix the OOB by moving the assignment after free_rd_atomic_resources()
so the old array is freed using the old bound. This matches the original
ordering in commit 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver").

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/365C68B4923F8214+30195a67-0b90-4b92-ab96-2ce41517793c@smail.nju.edu.cn/
Fixes: b6bbee0d2438 ("IB/rxe: Properly honor max IRD value for rd/atomic.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Peiyang He <peiyang_he@smail.nju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
RDMA/rxe: Fix responder UAF on IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC modify_qp 2026-09-02T12:33:17+00:00 Ibrahim Hashimov security@auditcode.ai 2026-07-12T12:17:20+00:00 60dfd47929cd1e7070daa810d40ce538d888410d [ Upstream commit 6f7014237405e7f032b5c53a82d9eccf6161c291 ] rxe_qp_from_attr() handles IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC outside the IB_QP_STATE path, so it holds no state_lock and runs while the responder task rxe_receiver() (recv_task on rxe_wq) is live. A modify_qp() setting only that attribute calls free_rd_atomic_resources() then alloc_rd_atomic_resources(), swapping qp->resp.resources[] while rxe_prepare_res()/find_resource() walk it; free_rd_atomic_resources() also leaves the cached pointer qp->resp.res dangling. A local unprivileged user can race the free/realloc into a use-after-free in rxe_receiver() (local DoS). Drain recv_task around the swap with rxe_disable_task()/rxe_enable_task(), as rxe_qp_reset() already does when tearing this array down, re-enabling only after alloc_rd_atomic_resources() succeeds so the responder never resumes against a NULL qp->resp.resources on the ENOMEM path. Also clear qp->resp.res in free_rd_atomic_resources(), like the rxe_resp.c completion paths. Reproduced under KASAN; the slab-use-after-free in rxe_receiver() is gone. Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver") Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260712121720.78001-1-security@auditcode.ai Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07 Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 6f7014237405e7f032b5c53a82d9eccf6161c291 ]

rxe_qp_from_attr() handles IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC outside the
IB_QP_STATE path, so it holds no state_lock and runs while the responder
task rxe_receiver() (recv_task on rxe_wq) is live. A modify_qp() setting
only that attribute calls free_rd_atomic_resources() then
alloc_rd_atomic_resources(), swapping qp->resp.resources[] while
rxe_prepare_res()/find_resource() walk it; free_rd_atomic_resources()
also leaves the cached pointer qp->resp.res dangling. A local
unprivileged user can race the free/realloc into a use-after-free in
rxe_receiver() (local DoS).

Drain recv_task around the swap with rxe_disable_task()/rxe_enable_task(),
as rxe_qp_reset() already does when tearing this array down, re-enabling
only after alloc_rd_atomic_resources() succeeds so the responder never
resumes against a NULL qp->resp.resources on the ENOMEM path. Also clear
qp->resp.res in free_rd_atomic_resources(), like the rxe_resp.c
completion paths.

Reproduced under KASAN; the slab-use-after-free in rxe_receiver() is gone.

Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260712121720.78001-1-security@auditcode.ai
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bnge/bng_re: fix ring ID widths 2026-07-23T17:24:12+00:00 Vikas Gupta vikas.gupta@broadcom.com 2026-07-21T06:37:31+00:00 b9e558976bb968162c35ddccdb076a77fc906993 Firmware requires more than 16 bits to address TX ring IDs for its internal QP management. Widen the associated HSI ring ID fields to 32 bits. The values firmware assigns remain within 24 bits, bounded by the hardware doorbell XID field. The fw_ring_id field belongs to bnge_ring_struct, a common struct shared by all ring types, so widening it to u32 applies uniformly across TX, RX, CP, and NQ rings but firmware assigns values within 16-bit range for all ring types except TX, which requires the wider field. Note that, Thor Ultra hardware has not yet been deployed and no firmware has been released to field, so backward compatibility is not a concern. Fixes: 42d1c54d6248 ("bnge/bng_re: Add a new HSI") Signed-off-by: Vikas Gupta <vikas.gupta@broadcom.com> Reviewed-by: Siva Reddy Kallam <siva.kallam@broadcom.com> Reviewed-by: Dharmender Garg <dharmender.garg@broadcom.com> Reviewed-by: Yendapally Reddy Dhananjaya Reddy <yendapally.reddy@broadcom.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260721063731.2622500-1-vikas.gupta@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> 
Firmware requires more than 16 bits to address TX ring IDs for its
internal QP management. Widen the associated HSI ring ID fields to
32 bits. The values firmware assigns remain within 24 bits, bounded
by the hardware doorbell XID field.

The fw_ring_id field belongs to bnge_ring_struct, a common struct
shared by all ring types, so widening it to u32 applies uniformly
across TX, RX, CP, and NQ rings but firmware assigns values within
16-bit range for all ring types except TX, which requires the wider
field.

Note that, Thor Ultra hardware has not yet been deployed and no
firmware has been released to field, so backward compatibility
is not a concern.

Fixes: 42d1c54d6248 ("bnge/bng_re: Add a new HSI")
Signed-off-by: Vikas Gupta <vikas.gupta@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Siva Reddy Kallam <siva.kallam@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Dharmender Garg <dharmender.garg@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Yendapally Reddy Dhananjaya Reddy <yendapally.reddy@broadcom.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260721063731.2622500-1-vikas.gupta@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>