<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/infiniband, branch v4.9.147</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>IB/hfi1: Remove race conditions in user_sdma send path</title>
<updated>2018-12-21T13:11:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael J. Ruhl</name>
<email>michael.j.ruhl@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-18T21:08:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d395117fac7943da6966ccbac3b95651f5581f15'/>
<id>d395117fac7943da6966ccbac3b95651f5581f15</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 28a9a9e83ceae2cee25b9af9ad20d53aaa9ab951 upstream

Packet queue state is over used to determine SDMA descriptor
availablitity and packet queue request state.

cpu 0  ret = user_sdma_send_pkts(req, pcount);
cpu 0  if (atomic_read(&amp;pq-&gt;n_reqs))
cpu 1  IRQ user_sdma_txreq_cb calls pq_update() (state to _INACTIVE)
cpu 0        xchg(&amp;pq-&gt;state, SDMA_PKT_Q_ACTIVE);

At this point pq-&gt;n_reqs == 0 and pq-&gt;state is incorrectly
SDMA_PKT_Q_ACTIVE.  The close path will hang waiting for the state
to return to _INACTIVE.

This can also change the state from _DEFERRED to _ACTIVE.  However,
this is a mostly benign race.

Remove the racy code path.

Use n_reqs to determine if a packet queue is active or not.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.9.0
Reviewed-by: Mitko Haralanov &lt;mitko.haralanov@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn &lt;mike.marciniszyn@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael J. Ruhl &lt;michael.j.ruhl@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 28a9a9e83ceae2cee25b9af9ad20d53aaa9ab951 upstream

Packet queue state is over used to determine SDMA descriptor
availablitity and packet queue request state.

cpu 0  ret = user_sdma_send_pkts(req, pcount);
cpu 0  if (atomic_read(&amp;pq-&gt;n_reqs))
cpu 1  IRQ user_sdma_txreq_cb calls pq_update() (state to _INACTIVE)
cpu 0        xchg(&amp;pq-&gt;state, SDMA_PKT_Q_ACTIVE);

At this point pq-&gt;n_reqs == 0 and pq-&gt;state is incorrectly
SDMA_PKT_Q_ACTIVE.  The close path will hang waiting for the state
to return to _INACTIVE.

This can also change the state from _DEFERRED to _ACTIVE.  However,
this is a mostly benign race.

Remove the racy code path.

Use n_reqs to determine if a packet queue is active or not.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.9.0
Reviewed-by: Mitko Haralanov &lt;mitko.haralanov@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn &lt;mike.marciniszyn@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael J. Ruhl &lt;michael.j.ruhl@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/mlx5: Fix fence type for IB_WR_LOCAL_INV WR</title>
<updated>2018-12-17T08:38:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Majd Dibbiny</name>
<email>majd@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-05T06:07:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=454892c34bb833097a21dbb693757765d1d1bb40'/>
<id>454892c34bb833097a21dbb693757765d1d1bb40</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 074fca3a18e7e1e0d4d7dcc9d7badc43b90232f4 ]

Currently, for IB_WR_LOCAL_INV WR, when the next fence is None, the
current fence will be SMALL instead of Normal Fence.

Without this patch krping doesn't work on CX-5 devices and throws
following error:

The error messages are from CX5 driver are: (from server side)
[ 710.434014] mlx5_0:dump_cqe:278:(pid 2712): dump error cqe
[ 710.434016] 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[ 710.434016] 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[ 710.434017] 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[ 710.434018] 00000000 93003204 100000b8 000524d2
[ 710.434019] krping: cq completion failed with wr_id 0 status 4 opcode 128 vender_err 32

Fixed the logic to set the correct fence type.

Fixes: 6e8484c5cf07 ("RDMA/mlx5: set UMR wqe fence according to HCA cap")
Signed-off-by: Majd Dibbiny &lt;majd@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 074fca3a18e7e1e0d4d7dcc9d7badc43b90232f4 ]

Currently, for IB_WR_LOCAL_INV WR, when the next fence is None, the
current fence will be SMALL instead of Normal Fence.

Without this patch krping doesn't work on CX-5 devices and throws
following error:

The error messages are from CX5 driver are: (from server side)
[ 710.434014] mlx5_0:dump_cqe:278:(pid 2712): dump error cqe
[ 710.434016] 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[ 710.434016] 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[ 710.434017] 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[ 710.434018] 00000000 93003204 100000b8 000524d2
[ 710.434019] krping: cq completion failed with wr_id 0 status 4 opcode 128 vender_err 32

Fixed the logic to set the correct fence type.

Fixes: 6e8484c5cf07 ("RDMA/mlx5: set UMR wqe fence according to HCA cap")
Signed-off-by: Majd Dibbiny &lt;majd@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/mlx5: Avoid load failure due to unknown link width</title>
<updated>2018-12-08T12:05:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Guralnik</name>
<email>michaelgur@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-21T13:03:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=23aa2d8f26e80d43cdc1f918c3de9bc8b60f9733'/>
<id>23aa2d8f26e80d43cdc1f918c3de9bc8b60f9733</id>
<content type='text'>
commit db7a691a1551a748cb92d9c89c6b190ea87e28d5 upstream.

If the firmware reports a connection width that is not 1x, 4x, 8x or 12x
it causes the driver to fail during initialization.

To prevent this failure every time a new width is introduced to the RDMA
stack, we will set a default 4x width for these widths which ar unknown to
the driver.

This is needed to allow to run old kernels with new firmware.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.1
Fixes: 1b5daf11b015 ("IB/mlx5: Avoid using the MAD_IFC command under ISSI &gt; 0 mode")
Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik &lt;michaelgur@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Majd Dibbiny &lt;majd@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit db7a691a1551a748cb92d9c89c6b190ea87e28d5 upstream.

If the firmware reports a connection width that is not 1x, 4x, 8x or 12x
it causes the driver to fail during initialization.

To prevent this failure every time a new width is introduced to the RDMA
stack, we will set a default 4x width for these widths which ar unknown to
the driver.

This is needed to allow to run old kernels with new firmware.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.1
Fixes: 1b5daf11b015 ("IB/mlx5: Avoid using the MAD_IFC command under ISSI &gt; 0 mode")
Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik &lt;michaelgur@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Majd Dibbiny &lt;majd@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iser: set sector for ambiguous mr status errors</title>
<updated>2018-12-08T12:05:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sagi Grimberg</name>
<email>sagi@grimberg.me</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-14T18:17:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=66739379d5c8be23fb67b77c80b7c02e9aa3a9f0'/>
<id>66739379d5c8be23fb67b77c80b7c02e9aa3a9f0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 24c3456c8d5ee6fc1933ca40f7b4406130682668 upstream.

If for some reason we failed to query the mr status, we need to make sure
to provide sufficient information for an ambiguous error (guard error on
sector 0).

Fixes: 0a7a08ad6f5f ("IB/iser: Implement check_protection")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg &lt;sagi@grimberg.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 24c3456c8d5ee6fc1933ca40f7b4406130682668 upstream.

If for some reason we failed to query the mr status, we need to make sure
to provide sufficient information for an ambiguous error (guard error on
sector 0).

Fixes: 0a7a08ad6f5f ("IB/iser: Implement check_protection")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg &lt;sagi@grimberg.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/hfi1: Eliminate races in the SDMA send error path</title>
<updated>2018-12-01T08:44:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael J. Ruhl</name>
<email>michael.j.ruhl@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-10T16:39:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=415592434d912ef06109149d6b480e5911b55eb8'/>
<id>415592434d912ef06109149d6b480e5911b55eb8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a0e0cb82804a6a21d9067022c2dfdf80d11da429 upstream.

pq_update() can only be called in two places: from the completion
function when the complete (npkts) sequence of packets has been
submitted and processed, or from setup function if a subset of the
packets were submitted (i.e. the error path).

Currently both paths can call pq_update() if an error occurrs.  This
race will cause the n_req value to go negative, hanging file_close(),
or cause a crash by freeing the txlist more than once.

Several variables are used to determine SDMA send state.  Most of
these are unnecessary, and have code inspectible races between the
setup function and the completion function, in both the send path and
the error path.

The request 'status' value can be set by the setup or by the
completion function.  This is code inspectibly racy.  Since the status
is not needed in the completion code or by the caller it has been
removed.

The request 'done' value races between usage by the setup and the
completion function.  The completion function does not need this.
When the number of processed packets matches npkts, it is done.

The 'has_error' value races between usage of the setup and the
completion function.  This can cause incorrect error handling and leave
the n_req in an incorrect value (i.e. negative).

Simplify the code by removing all of the unneeded state checks and
variables.

Clean up iovs node when it is freed.

Eliminate race conditions in the error path:

If all packets are submitted, the completion handler will set the
completion status correctly (ok or aborted).

If all packets are not submitted, the caller must wait until the
submitted packets have completed, and then set the completion status.

These two change eliminate the race condition in the error path.

Reviewed-by: Mitko Haralanov &lt;mitko.haralanov@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn &lt;mike.marciniszyn@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael J. Ruhl &lt;michael.j.ruhl@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a0e0cb82804a6a21d9067022c2dfdf80d11da429 upstream.

pq_update() can only be called in two places: from the completion
function when the complete (npkts) sequence of packets has been
submitted and processed, or from setup function if a subset of the
packets were submitted (i.e. the error path).

Currently both paths can call pq_update() if an error occurrs.  This
race will cause the n_req value to go negative, hanging file_close(),
or cause a crash by freeing the txlist more than once.

Several variables are used to determine SDMA send state.  Most of
these are unnecessary, and have code inspectible races between the
setup function and the completion function, in both the send path and
the error path.

The request 'status' value can be set by the setup or by the
completion function.  This is code inspectibly racy.  Since the status
is not needed in the completion code or by the caller it has been
removed.

The request 'done' value races between usage by the setup and the
completion function.  The completion function does not need this.
When the number of processed packets matches npkts, it is done.

The 'has_error' value races between usage of the setup and the
completion function.  This can cause incorrect error handling and leave
the n_req in an incorrect value (i.e. negative).

Simplify the code by removing all of the unneeded state checks and
variables.

Clean up iovs node when it is freed.

Eliminate race conditions in the error path:

If all packets are submitted, the completion handler will set the
completion status correctly (ok or aborted).

If all packets are not submitted, the caller must wait until the
submitted packets have completed, and then set the completion status.

These two change eliminate the race condition in the error path.

Reviewed-by: Mitko Haralanov &lt;mitko.haralanov@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn &lt;mike.marciniszyn@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael J. Ruhl &lt;michael.j.ruhl@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/core: Fix for core panic</title>
<updated>2018-12-01T08:44:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alex Estrin</name>
<email>alex.estrin@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-31T16:30:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7f6a5410f5419d8144988b6b31ffe0b300fd341e'/>
<id>7f6a5410f5419d8144988b6b31ffe0b300fd341e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e6f9bc34d3779cb7b6a337afed5de8be3f0fab77 upstream.

Build with the latest patches resulted in panic:
11384.486289] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
         (null)
[11384.486293] IP:           (null)
[11384.486295] PGD 0
[11384.486295] P4D 0
[11384.486296]
[11384.486299] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP
......... snip ......
[11384.486401] CPU: 0 PID: 968 Comm: kworker/0:1H Tainted: G        W  O
    4.13.0-a-stream-20170825 #1
[11384.486402] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WT2R/S2600WT2R,
BIOS SE5C610.86B.01.01.0014.121820151719 12/18/2015
[11384.486418] Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work [ib_core]
[11384.486419] task: ffff880850579680 task.stack: ffffc90007fec000
[11384.486420] RIP: 0010:          (null)
[11384.486420] RSP: 0018:ffffc90007fef970 EFLAGS: 00010206
[11384.486421] RAX: ffff88084cfe8000 RBX: ffff88084dce4000 RCX:
ffffc90007fef978
[11384.486422] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI:
ffff88084cfe8000
[11384.486422] RBP: ffffc90007fefab0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
ffff88084dce4080
[11384.486423] R10: ffffffffa02d7f60 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
ffff88105af65a00
[11384.486423] R13: ffff88084dce4000 R14: 000000000000c000 R15:
000000000000c000
[11384.486424] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88085f400000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[11384.486425] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[11384.486425] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000001c09000 CR4:
00000000001406f0
[11384.486426] Call Trace:
[11384.486431]  ? is_valid_mcast_lid.isra.21+0xfb/0x110 [ib_core]
[11384.486436]  ib_attach_mcast+0x6f/0xa0 [ib_core]
[11384.486441]  ipoib_mcast_attach+0x81/0x190 [ib_ipoib]
[11384.486443]  ipoib_mcast_join_complete+0x354/0xb40 [ib_ipoib]
[11384.486448]  mcast_work_handler+0x330/0x6c0 [ib_core]
[11384.486452]  join_handler+0x101/0x220 [ib_core]
[11384.486455]  ib_sa_mcmember_rec_callback+0x54/0x80 [ib_core]
[11384.486459]  recv_handler+0x3a/0x60 [ib_core]
[11384.486462]  ib_mad_recv_done+0x423/0x9b0 [ib_core]
[11384.486466]  __ib_process_cq+0x5d/0xb0 [ib_core]
[11384.486469]  ib_cq_poll_work+0x20/0x60 [ib_core]
[11384.486472]  process_one_work+0x149/0x360
[11384.486474]  worker_thread+0x4d/0x3c0
[11384.486487]  kthread+0x109/0x140
[11384.486488]  ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380
[11384.486489]  ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60
[11384.486490]  ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60
[11384.486493]  ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
[11384.486493] Code:  Bad RIP value.
[11384.486493] Code:  Bad RIP value.
[11384.486496] RIP:           (null) RSP: ffffc90007fef970
[11384.486497] CR2: 0000000000000000
[11384.486531] ---[ end trace b1acec6fb4ff6e75 ]---
[11384.532133] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[11384.536541] Kernel Offset: disabled
[11384.969491] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[11384.976875] sched: Unexpected reschedule of offline CPU#1!
[11384.983646] ------------[ cut here ]------------

Rdma device driver may not have implemented (*get_link_layer)()
so it can not be called directly. Should use appropriate helper function.

Reviewed-by: Yuval Shaia &lt;yuval.shaia@oracle.com&gt;
Fixes: 523633359224 ("IB/core: Fix the validations of a multicast LID in attach or detach operations")
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.13
Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alex Estrin &lt;alex.estrin@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Marciniszyn &lt;mike.marciniszyn@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e6f9bc34d3779cb7b6a337afed5de8be3f0fab77 upstream.

Build with the latest patches resulted in panic:
11384.486289] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
         (null)
[11384.486293] IP:           (null)
[11384.486295] PGD 0
[11384.486295] P4D 0
[11384.486296]
[11384.486299] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP
......... snip ......
[11384.486401] CPU: 0 PID: 968 Comm: kworker/0:1H Tainted: G        W  O
    4.13.0-a-stream-20170825 #1
[11384.486402] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WT2R/S2600WT2R,
BIOS SE5C610.86B.01.01.0014.121820151719 12/18/2015
[11384.486418] Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work [ib_core]
[11384.486419] task: ffff880850579680 task.stack: ffffc90007fec000
[11384.486420] RIP: 0010:          (null)
[11384.486420] RSP: 0018:ffffc90007fef970 EFLAGS: 00010206
[11384.486421] RAX: ffff88084cfe8000 RBX: ffff88084dce4000 RCX:
ffffc90007fef978
[11384.486422] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI:
ffff88084cfe8000
[11384.486422] RBP: ffffc90007fefab0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
ffff88084dce4080
[11384.486423] R10: ffffffffa02d7f60 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
ffff88105af65a00
[11384.486423] R13: ffff88084dce4000 R14: 000000000000c000 R15:
000000000000c000
[11384.486424] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88085f400000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[11384.486425] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[11384.486425] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000001c09000 CR4:
00000000001406f0
[11384.486426] Call Trace:
[11384.486431]  ? is_valid_mcast_lid.isra.21+0xfb/0x110 [ib_core]
[11384.486436]  ib_attach_mcast+0x6f/0xa0 [ib_core]
[11384.486441]  ipoib_mcast_attach+0x81/0x190 [ib_ipoib]
[11384.486443]  ipoib_mcast_join_complete+0x354/0xb40 [ib_ipoib]
[11384.486448]  mcast_work_handler+0x330/0x6c0 [ib_core]
[11384.486452]  join_handler+0x101/0x220 [ib_core]
[11384.486455]  ib_sa_mcmember_rec_callback+0x54/0x80 [ib_core]
[11384.486459]  recv_handler+0x3a/0x60 [ib_core]
[11384.486462]  ib_mad_recv_done+0x423/0x9b0 [ib_core]
[11384.486466]  __ib_process_cq+0x5d/0xb0 [ib_core]
[11384.486469]  ib_cq_poll_work+0x20/0x60 [ib_core]
[11384.486472]  process_one_work+0x149/0x360
[11384.486474]  worker_thread+0x4d/0x3c0
[11384.486487]  kthread+0x109/0x140
[11384.486488]  ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380
[11384.486489]  ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60
[11384.486490]  ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60
[11384.486493]  ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
[11384.486493] Code:  Bad RIP value.
[11384.486493] Code:  Bad RIP value.
[11384.486496] RIP:           (null) RSP: ffffc90007fef970
[11384.486497] CR2: 0000000000000000
[11384.486531] ---[ end trace b1acec6fb4ff6e75 ]---
[11384.532133] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[11384.536541] Kernel Offset: disabled
[11384.969491] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[11384.976875] sched: Unexpected reschedule of offline CPU#1!
[11384.983646] ------------[ cut here ]------------

Rdma device driver may not have implemented (*get_link_layer)()
so it can not be called directly. Should use appropriate helper function.

Reviewed-by: Yuval Shaia &lt;yuval.shaia@oracle.com&gt;
Fixes: 523633359224 ("IB/core: Fix the validations of a multicast LID in attach or detach operations")
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.13
Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alex Estrin &lt;alex.estrin@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Marciniszyn &lt;mike.marciniszyn@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/ipoib: Clear IPCB before icmp_send</title>
<updated>2018-11-13T19:16:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Denis Drozdov</name>
<email>denisd@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-11T19:33:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a48a3a51cfd66e6cec4335419b1787435a5306a3'/>
<id>a48a3a51cfd66e6cec4335419b1787435a5306a3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4d6e4d12da2c308f8f976d3955c45ee62539ac98 ]

IPCB should be cleared before icmp_send, since it may contain data from
previous layers and the data could be misinterpreted as ip header options,
which later caused the ihl to be set to an invalid value and resulted in
the following stack corruption:

[ 1083.031512] ib0: packet len 57824 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.031843] ib0: packet len 37904 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.032004] ib0: packet len 4040 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.032253] ib0: packet len 63800 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.032481] ib0: packet len 23960 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.033149] ib0: packet len 63800 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.033439] ib0: packet len 63800 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.033700] ib0: packet len 63800 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.034124] ib0: packet len 63800 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.034387] ==================================================================
[ 1083.034602] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xf08/0x1310
[ 1083.034798] Write of size 4 at addr ffff880353457c5f by task kworker/u16:0/7
[ 1083.034990]
[ 1083.035104] CPU: 7 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Tainted: G           O      4.19.0-rc5+ #1
[ 1083.035316] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu2 04/01/2014
[ 1083.035573] Workqueue: ipoib_wq ipoib_cm_skb_reap [ib_ipoib]
[ 1083.035750] Call Trace:
[ 1083.035888]  dump_stack+0x9a/0xeb
[ 1083.036031]  print_address_description+0xe3/0x2e0
[ 1083.036213]  kasan_report+0x18a/0x2e0
[ 1083.036356]  ? __ip_options_echo+0xf08/0x1310
[ 1083.036522]  __ip_options_echo+0xf08/0x1310
[ 1083.036688]  icmp_send+0x7b9/0x1cd0
[ 1083.036843]  ? icmp_route_lookup.constprop.9+0x1070/0x1070
[ 1083.037018]  ? netif_schedule_queue+0x5/0x200
[ 1083.037180]  ? debug_show_all_locks+0x310/0x310
[ 1083.037341]  ? rcu_dynticks_curr_cpu_in_eqs+0x85/0x120
[ 1083.037519]  ? debug_locks_off+0x11/0x80
[ 1083.037673]  ? debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x207/0x4c6
[ 1083.037841]  ? check_flags.part.27+0x450/0x450
[ 1083.037995]  ? debug_check_no_obj_freed+0xc3/0x4c6
[ 1083.038169]  ? debug_locks_off+0x11/0x80
[ 1083.038318]  ? skb_dequeue+0x10e/0x1a0
[ 1083.038476]  ? ipoib_cm_skb_reap+0x2b5/0x650 [ib_ipoib]
[ 1083.038642]  ? netif_schedule_queue+0xa8/0x200
[ 1083.038820]  ? ipoib_cm_skb_reap+0x544/0x650 [ib_ipoib]
[ 1083.038996]  ipoib_cm_skb_reap+0x544/0x650 [ib_ipoib]
[ 1083.039174]  process_one_work+0x912/0x1830
[ 1083.039336]  ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x310/0x310
[ 1083.039491]  ? lock_acquire+0x145/0x3a0
[ 1083.042312]  worker_thread+0x87/0xbb0
[ 1083.045099]  ? process_one_work+0x1830/0x1830
[ 1083.047865]  kthread+0x322/0x3e0
[ 1083.050624]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
[ 1083.053354]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

For instance __ip_options_echo is failing to proceed with invalid srr and
optlen passed from another layer via IPCB

[  762.139568] IPv4: __ip_options_echo rr=0 ts=0 srr=43 cipso=0
[  762.139720] IPv4: ip_options_build: IPCB 00000000f3cd969e opt 000000002ccb3533
[  762.139838] IPv4: __ip_options_echo in srr: optlen 197 soffset 84
[  762.139852] IPv4: ip_options_build srr=0 is_frag=0 rr_needaddr=0 ts_needaddr=0 ts_needtime=0 rr=0 ts=0
[  762.140269] ==================================================================
[  762.140713] IPv4: __ip_options_echo rr=0 ts=0 srr=0 cipso=0
[  762.141078] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0x12ec/0x1680
[  762.141087] Write of size 4 at addr ffff880353457c7f by task kworker/u16:0/7

Signed-off-by: Denis Drozdov &lt;denisd@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Erez Shitrit &lt;erezsh@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Feras Daoud &lt;ferasda@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4d6e4d12da2c308f8f976d3955c45ee62539ac98 ]

IPCB should be cleared before icmp_send, since it may contain data from
previous layers and the data could be misinterpreted as ip header options,
which later caused the ihl to be set to an invalid value and resulted in
the following stack corruption:

[ 1083.031512] ib0: packet len 57824 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.031843] ib0: packet len 37904 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.032004] ib0: packet len 4040 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.032253] ib0: packet len 63800 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.032481] ib0: packet len 23960 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.033149] ib0: packet len 63800 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.033439] ib0: packet len 63800 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.033700] ib0: packet len 63800 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.034124] ib0: packet len 63800 (&gt; 2048) too long to send, dropping
[ 1083.034387] ==================================================================
[ 1083.034602] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xf08/0x1310
[ 1083.034798] Write of size 4 at addr ffff880353457c5f by task kworker/u16:0/7
[ 1083.034990]
[ 1083.035104] CPU: 7 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Tainted: G           O      4.19.0-rc5+ #1
[ 1083.035316] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu2 04/01/2014
[ 1083.035573] Workqueue: ipoib_wq ipoib_cm_skb_reap [ib_ipoib]
[ 1083.035750] Call Trace:
[ 1083.035888]  dump_stack+0x9a/0xeb
[ 1083.036031]  print_address_description+0xe3/0x2e0
[ 1083.036213]  kasan_report+0x18a/0x2e0
[ 1083.036356]  ? __ip_options_echo+0xf08/0x1310
[ 1083.036522]  __ip_options_echo+0xf08/0x1310
[ 1083.036688]  icmp_send+0x7b9/0x1cd0
[ 1083.036843]  ? icmp_route_lookup.constprop.9+0x1070/0x1070
[ 1083.037018]  ? netif_schedule_queue+0x5/0x200
[ 1083.037180]  ? debug_show_all_locks+0x310/0x310
[ 1083.037341]  ? rcu_dynticks_curr_cpu_in_eqs+0x85/0x120
[ 1083.037519]  ? debug_locks_off+0x11/0x80
[ 1083.037673]  ? debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x207/0x4c6
[ 1083.037841]  ? check_flags.part.27+0x450/0x450
[ 1083.037995]  ? debug_check_no_obj_freed+0xc3/0x4c6
[ 1083.038169]  ? debug_locks_off+0x11/0x80
[ 1083.038318]  ? skb_dequeue+0x10e/0x1a0
[ 1083.038476]  ? ipoib_cm_skb_reap+0x2b5/0x650 [ib_ipoib]
[ 1083.038642]  ? netif_schedule_queue+0xa8/0x200
[ 1083.038820]  ? ipoib_cm_skb_reap+0x544/0x650 [ib_ipoib]
[ 1083.038996]  ipoib_cm_skb_reap+0x544/0x650 [ib_ipoib]
[ 1083.039174]  process_one_work+0x912/0x1830
[ 1083.039336]  ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x310/0x310
[ 1083.039491]  ? lock_acquire+0x145/0x3a0
[ 1083.042312]  worker_thread+0x87/0xbb0
[ 1083.045099]  ? process_one_work+0x1830/0x1830
[ 1083.047865]  kthread+0x322/0x3e0
[ 1083.050624]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
[ 1083.053354]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

For instance __ip_options_echo is failing to proceed with invalid srr and
optlen passed from another layer via IPCB

[  762.139568] IPv4: __ip_options_echo rr=0 ts=0 srr=43 cipso=0
[  762.139720] IPv4: ip_options_build: IPCB 00000000f3cd969e opt 000000002ccb3533
[  762.139838] IPv4: __ip_options_echo in srr: optlen 197 soffset 84
[  762.139852] IPv4: ip_options_build srr=0 is_frag=0 rr_needaddr=0 ts_needaddr=0 ts_needtime=0 rr=0 ts=0
[  762.140269] ==================================================================
[  762.140713] IPv4: __ip_options_echo rr=0 ts=0 srr=0 cipso=0
[  762.141078] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0x12ec/0x1680
[  762.141087] Write of size 4 at addr ffff880353457c7f by task kworker/u16:0/7

Signed-off-by: Denis Drozdov &lt;denisd@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Erez Shitrit &lt;erezsh@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Feras Daoud &lt;ferasda@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/core: Do not expose unsupported counters</title>
<updated>2018-11-13T19:16:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Parav Pandit</name>
<email>parav@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-07T09:12:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2537f9adf5119d895df5d4623cec84c0aa675be7'/>
<id>2537f9adf5119d895df5d4623cec84c0aa675be7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0f6ef65d1c6ec8deb5d0f11f86631ec4cfe8f22e ]

If the provider driver (such as rdma_rxe) doesn't support pma counters,
avoid exposing its directory similar to optional hw_counters directory.
If core fails to read the PMA counter, return an error so that user can
retry later if needed.

Fixes: 35c4cbb17811 ("IB/core: Create get_perf_mad function in sysfs.c")
Reported-by: Holger Hoffstätte &lt;holger@applied-asynchrony.com&gt;
Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte &lt;holger@applied-asynchrony.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit &lt;parav@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0f6ef65d1c6ec8deb5d0f11f86631ec4cfe8f22e ]

If the provider driver (such as rdma_rxe) doesn't support pma counters,
avoid exposing its directory similar to optional hw_counters directory.
If core fails to read the PMA counter, return an error so that user can
retry later if needed.

Fixes: 35c4cbb17811 ("IB/core: Create get_perf_mad function in sysfs.c")
Reported-by: Holger Hoffstätte &lt;holger@applied-asynchrony.com&gt;
Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte &lt;holger@applied-asynchrony.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit &lt;parav@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/ucm: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:43:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-16T14:32:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1fcfb1d41f8d70dfd23cb0d91a9f061f53847b0c'/>
<id>1fcfb1d41f8d70dfd23cb0d91a9f061f53847b0c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0295e39595e1146522f2722715dba7f7fba42217 upstream.

hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c:1127 ib_ucm_write() warn: potential
spectre issue 'ucm_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152449131114778&amp;w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0295e39595e1146522f2722715dba7f7fba42217 upstream.

hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c:1127 ib_ucm_write() warn: potential
spectre issue 'ucm_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152449131114778&amp;w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/ucma: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:43:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-16T14:59:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eacbd9c55f743b0940fe2d8cf27ef72ac2725f44'/>
<id>eacbd9c55f743b0940fe2d8cf27ef72ac2725f44</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a3671a4f973ee9d9621d60166cc3b037c397d604 upstream.

hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1686 ucma_write() warn: potential
spectre issue 'ucma_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152449131114778&amp;w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a3671a4f973ee9d9621d60166cc3b037c397d604 upstream.

hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1686 ucma_write() warn: potential
spectre issue 'ucma_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152449131114778&amp;w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
