<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/infiniband, branch v4.9.136</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>IB/ucm: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:43:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-16T14:32:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1fcfb1d41f8d70dfd23cb0d91a9f061f53847b0c'/>
<id>1fcfb1d41f8d70dfd23cb0d91a9f061f53847b0c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0295e39595e1146522f2722715dba7f7fba42217 upstream.

hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c:1127 ib_ucm_write() warn: potential
spectre issue 'ucm_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152449131114778&amp;w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0295e39595e1146522f2722715dba7f7fba42217 upstream.

hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c:1127 ib_ucm_write() warn: potential
spectre issue 'ucm_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152449131114778&amp;w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/ucma: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:43:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-16T14:59:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eacbd9c55f743b0940fe2d8cf27ef72ac2725f44'/>
<id>eacbd9c55f743b0940fe2d8cf27ef72ac2725f44</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a3671a4f973ee9d9621d60166cc3b037c397d604 upstream.

hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1686 ucma_write() warn: potential
spectre issue 'ucma_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152449131114778&amp;w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a3671a4f973ee9d9621d60166cc3b037c397d604 upstream.

hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1686 ucma_write() warn: potential
spectre issue 'ucma_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152449131114778&amp;w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/mlx4: Fix an error handling path in 'mlx4_ib_rereg_user_mr()'</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:42:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Jaillet</name>
<email>christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-11T18:15:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=43832bec7647dd6f16ea2af92d44d12a474494c6'/>
<id>43832bec7647dd6f16ea2af92d44d12a474494c6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3dc7c7badb7502ec3e3aa817a8bdd9e53aa54c52 ]

Before returning -EPERM we should release some resources, as already done
in the other error handling path of the function.

Fixes: d8f9cc328c88 ("IB/mlx4: Mark user MR as writable if actual virtual memory is writable")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET &lt;christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3dc7c7badb7502ec3e3aa817a8bdd9e53aa54c52 ]

Before returning -EPERM we should release some resources, as already done
in the other error handling path of the function.

Fixes: d8f9cc328c88 ("IB/mlx4: Mark user MR as writable if actual virtual memory is writable")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET &lt;christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "IB/ipoib: Update broadcast object if PKey value was changed in index 0"</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:42:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alex Estrin</name>
<email>alex.estrin@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-26T13:06:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9629cf8ef9ad67f685d5367ede20a3573c4a15de'/>
<id>9629cf8ef9ad67f685d5367ede20a3573c4a15de</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 612601d0013f03de9dc134809f242ba6da9ca252 ]

commit 9a9b8112699d will cause core to fail UD QP from being destroyed
on ipoib unload, therefore cause resources leakage.
On pkey change event above patch modifies mgid before calling underlying
driver to detach it from QP. Drivers' detach_mcast() will fail to find
modified mgid it was never given to attach in a first place.
Core qp-&gt;usecnt will never go down, so ib_destroy_qp() will fail.

IPoIB driver actually does take care of new broadcast mgid based on new
pkey by destroying an old mcast object in ipoib_mcast_dev_flush())
....
	if (priv-&gt;broadcast) {
		rb_erase(&amp;priv-&gt;broadcast-&gt;rb_node, &amp;priv-&gt;multicast_tree);
		list_add_tail(&amp;priv-&gt;broadcast-&gt;list, &amp;remove_list);
		priv-&gt;broadcast = NULL;
	}
...

then in restarted ipoib_macst_join_task() creating a new broadcast mcast
object, sending join request and on completion tells the driver to attach
to reinitialized QP:
...
if (!priv-&gt;broadcast) {
...
	broadcast = ipoib_mcast_alloc(dev, 0);
...
	memcpy(broadcast-&gt;mcmember.mgid.raw, priv-&gt;dev-&gt;broadcast + 4,
	       sizeof (union ib_gid));
	priv-&gt;broadcast = broadcast;
...

Fixes: 9a9b8112699d ("IB/ipoib: Update broadcast object if PKey value was changed in index 0")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn &lt;mike.marciniszyn@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alex Estrin &lt;alex.estrin@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Feras Daoud &lt;ferasda@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 612601d0013f03de9dc134809f242ba6da9ca252 ]

commit 9a9b8112699d will cause core to fail UD QP from being destroyed
on ipoib unload, therefore cause resources leakage.
On pkey change event above patch modifies mgid before calling underlying
driver to detach it from QP. Drivers' detach_mcast() will fail to find
modified mgid it was never given to attach in a first place.
Core qp-&gt;usecnt will never go down, so ib_destroy_qp() will fail.

IPoIB driver actually does take care of new broadcast mgid based on new
pkey by destroying an old mcast object in ipoib_mcast_dev_flush())
....
	if (priv-&gt;broadcast) {
		rb_erase(&amp;priv-&gt;broadcast-&gt;rb_node, &amp;priv-&gt;multicast_tree);
		list_add_tail(&amp;priv-&gt;broadcast-&gt;list, &amp;remove_list);
		priv-&gt;broadcast = NULL;
	}
...

then in restarted ipoib_macst_join_task() creating a new broadcast mcast
object, sending join request and on completion tells the driver to attach
to reinitialized QP:
...
if (!priv-&gt;broadcast) {
...
	broadcast = ipoib_mcast_alloc(dev, 0);
...
	memcpy(broadcast-&gt;mcmember.mgid.raw, priv-&gt;dev-&gt;broadcast + 4,
	       sizeof (union ib_gid));
	priv-&gt;broadcast = broadcast;
...

Fixes: 9a9b8112699d ("IB/ipoib: Update broadcast object if PKey value was changed in index 0")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mike Marciniszyn &lt;mike.marciniszyn@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alex Estrin &lt;alex.estrin@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Feras Daoud &lt;ferasda@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/mlx5: Avoid passing an invalid QP type to firmware</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:42:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Noa Osherovich</name>
<email>noaos@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-25T11:39:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d287f1dab98c20bb9fd3c044b7f913ed17b4ad22'/>
<id>d287f1dab98c20bb9fd3c044b7f913ed17b4ad22</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e7b169f34403becd3c9fd3b6e46614ab788f2187 ]

During QP creation, the mlx5 driver translates the QP type to an
internal value which is passed on to FW. There was no check to make
sure that the translated value is valid, and -EINVAL was coerced into
the mailbox command.

Current firmware refuses this as an invalid QP type, but future/past
firmware may do something else.

Fixes: 09a7d9eca1a6c ('{net,IB}/mlx5: QP/XRCD commands via mlx5 ifc')
Reviewed-by: Ilya Lesokhin &lt;ilyal@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Noa Osherovich &lt;noaos@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e7b169f34403becd3c9fd3b6e46614ab788f2187 ]

During QP creation, the mlx5 driver translates the QP type to an
internal value which is passed on to FW. There was no check to make
sure that the translated value is valid, and -EINVAL was coerced into
the mailbox command.

Current firmware refuses this as an invalid QP type, but future/past
firmware may do something else.

Fixes: 09a7d9eca1a6c ('{net,IB}/mlx5: QP/XRCD commands via mlx5 ifc')
Reviewed-by: Ilya Lesokhin &lt;ilyal@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Noa Osherovich &lt;noaos@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/rxe: put the pool on allocation failure</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:42:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Doug Ledford</name>
<email>dledford@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-09T13:11:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=150b28b45a35d9f056abaf047760cb906b35fca3'/>
<id>150b28b45a35d9f056abaf047760cb906b35fca3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6b9f8970cd30929cb6b372fa44fa66da9e59c650 ]

If the allocation of elem fails, it is not sufficient to simply check
for NULL and return.  We need to also put our reference on the pool or
else we will leave the pool with a permanent ref count and we will never
be able to free it.

Fixes: 4831ca9e4a8e ("IB/rxe: check for allocation failure on elem")
Suggested-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6b9f8970cd30929cb6b372fa44fa66da9e59c650 ]

If the allocation of elem fails, it is not sufficient to simply check
for NULL and return.  We need to also put our reference on the pool or
else we will leave the pool with a permanent ref count and we will never
be able to free it.

Fixes: 4831ca9e4a8e ("IB/rxe: check for allocation failure on elem")
Suggested-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/ipoib: Fix lockdep issue found on ipoib_ib_dev_heavy_flush</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:42:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alex Vesker</name>
<email>valex@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-21T15:38:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2e6474b253556343e9b0f685a5824c86aebae763'/>
<id>2e6474b253556343e9b0f685a5824c86aebae763</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1f80bd6a6cc8358b81194e1f5fc16449947396ec ]

The locking order of vlan_rwsem (LOCK A) and then rtnl (LOCK B),
contradicts other flows such as ipoib_open possibly causing a deadlock.
To prevent this deadlock heavy flush is called with RTNL locked and
only then tries to acquire vlan_rwsem.
This deadlock is possible only when there are child interfaces.

[  140.941758] ======================================================
[  140.946276] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  140.950950] 4.15.0-rc1+ #9 Tainted: G           O
[  140.954797] ------------------------------------------------------
[  140.959424] kworker/u32:1/146 is trying to acquire lock:
[  140.963450]  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;ffffffffc083516a&gt;] __ipoib_ib_dev_flush+0x2da/0x4e0 [ib_ipoib]
[  140.970006]
but task is already holding lock:
[  140.975141]  (&amp;priv-&gt;vlan_rwsem){++++}, at: [&lt;ffffffffc0834ee1&gt;] __ipoib_ib_dev_flush+0x51/0x4e0 [ib_ipoib]
[  140.982105]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[  140.990023]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  140.998650]
-&gt; #1 (&amp;priv-&gt;vlan_rwsem){++++}:
[  141.005276]        down_read+0x4d/0xb0
[  141.009560]        ipoib_open+0xad/0x120 [ib_ipoib]
[  141.014400]        __dev_open+0xcb/0x140
[  141.017919]        __dev_change_flags+0x1a4/0x1e0
[  141.022133]        dev_change_flags+0x23/0x60
[  141.025695]        devinet_ioctl+0x704/0x7d0
[  141.029156]        sock_do_ioctl+0x20/0x50
[  141.032526]        sock_ioctl+0x221/0x300
[  141.036079]        do_vfs_ioctl+0xa6/0x6d0
[  141.039656]        SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
[  141.042811]        entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
[  141.046891]
-&gt; #0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}:
[  141.051701]        lock_acquire+0xd4/0x220
[  141.055212]        __mutex_lock+0x88/0x970
[  141.058631]        __ipoib_ib_dev_flush+0x2da/0x4e0 [ib_ipoib]
[  141.063160]        __ipoib_ib_dev_flush+0x71/0x4e0 [ib_ipoib]
[  141.067648]        process_one_work+0x1f5/0x610
[  141.071429]        worker_thread+0x4a/0x3f0
[  141.074890]        kthread+0x141/0x180
[  141.078085]        ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[  141.081559]

other info that might help us debug this:
[  141.088967]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  141.094280]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  141.097953]        ----                    ----
[  141.101640]   lock(&amp;priv-&gt;vlan_rwsem);
[  141.104771]                                lock(rtnl_mutex);
[  141.109207]                                lock(&amp;priv-&gt;vlan_rwsem);
[  141.114032]   lock(rtnl_mutex);
[  141.116800]
 *** DEADLOCK ***

Fixes: b4b678b06f6e ("IB/ipoib: Grab rtnl lock on heavy flush when calling ndo_open/stop")
Signed-off-by: Alex Vesker &lt;valex@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1f80bd6a6cc8358b81194e1f5fc16449947396ec ]

The locking order of vlan_rwsem (LOCK A) and then rtnl (LOCK B),
contradicts other flows such as ipoib_open possibly causing a deadlock.
To prevent this deadlock heavy flush is called with RTNL locked and
only then tries to acquire vlan_rwsem.
This deadlock is possible only when there are child interfaces.

[  140.941758] ======================================================
[  140.946276] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  140.950950] 4.15.0-rc1+ #9 Tainted: G           O
[  140.954797] ------------------------------------------------------
[  140.959424] kworker/u32:1/146 is trying to acquire lock:
[  140.963450]  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [&lt;ffffffffc083516a&gt;] __ipoib_ib_dev_flush+0x2da/0x4e0 [ib_ipoib]
[  140.970006]
but task is already holding lock:
[  140.975141]  (&amp;priv-&gt;vlan_rwsem){++++}, at: [&lt;ffffffffc0834ee1&gt;] __ipoib_ib_dev_flush+0x51/0x4e0 [ib_ipoib]
[  140.982105]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[  140.990023]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  140.998650]
-&gt; #1 (&amp;priv-&gt;vlan_rwsem){++++}:
[  141.005276]        down_read+0x4d/0xb0
[  141.009560]        ipoib_open+0xad/0x120 [ib_ipoib]
[  141.014400]        __dev_open+0xcb/0x140
[  141.017919]        __dev_change_flags+0x1a4/0x1e0
[  141.022133]        dev_change_flags+0x23/0x60
[  141.025695]        devinet_ioctl+0x704/0x7d0
[  141.029156]        sock_do_ioctl+0x20/0x50
[  141.032526]        sock_ioctl+0x221/0x300
[  141.036079]        do_vfs_ioctl+0xa6/0x6d0
[  141.039656]        SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
[  141.042811]        entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
[  141.046891]
-&gt; #0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}:
[  141.051701]        lock_acquire+0xd4/0x220
[  141.055212]        __mutex_lock+0x88/0x970
[  141.058631]        __ipoib_ib_dev_flush+0x2da/0x4e0 [ib_ipoib]
[  141.063160]        __ipoib_ib_dev_flush+0x71/0x4e0 [ib_ipoib]
[  141.067648]        process_one_work+0x1f5/0x610
[  141.071429]        worker_thread+0x4a/0x3f0
[  141.074890]        kthread+0x141/0x180
[  141.078085]        ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[  141.081559]

other info that might help us debug this:
[  141.088967]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  141.094280]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  141.097953]        ----                    ----
[  141.101640]   lock(&amp;priv-&gt;vlan_rwsem);
[  141.104771]                                lock(rtnl_mutex);
[  141.109207]                                lock(&amp;priv-&gt;vlan_rwsem);
[  141.114032]   lock(rtnl_mutex);
[  141.116800]
 *** DEADLOCK ***

Fixes: b4b678b06f6e ("IB/ipoib: Grab rtnl lock on heavy flush when calling ndo_open/stop")
Signed-off-by: Alex Vesker &lt;valex@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxe: Fix a sleep-in-atomic bug in post_one_send</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:42:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jia-Ju Bai</name>
<email>baijiaju1990@163.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-05T12:23:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e7d5fa96ef7bee036b751af01f62ade7d482b13d'/>
<id>e7d5fa96ef7bee036b751af01f62ade7d482b13d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 07d432bb97f19dd5e784175152f9fce3b2646133 ]

The driver may sleep under a spin lock, and the function call path is:
post_one_send (acquire the lock by spin_lock_irqsave)
  init_send_wqe
    copy_from_user --&gt; may sleep

There is no flow that makes "qp-&gt;is_user" true, and copy_from_user may
cause bug when a non-user pointer is used. So the lines of copy_from_user
and check of "qp-&gt;is_user" are removed.

Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai &lt;baijiaju1990@163.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Acked-by: Moni Shoua &lt;monis@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 07d432bb97f19dd5e784175152f9fce3b2646133 ]

The driver may sleep under a spin lock, and the function call path is:
post_one_send (acquire the lock by spin_lock_irqsave)
  init_send_wqe
    copy_from_user --&gt; may sleep

There is no flow that makes "qp-&gt;is_user" true, and copy_from_user may
cause bug when a non-user pointer is used. So the lines of copy_from_user
and check of "qp-&gt;is_user" are removed.

Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai &lt;baijiaju1990@163.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Acked-by: Moni Shoua &lt;monis@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/core: Fix the validations of a multicast LID in attach or detach operations</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:42:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Noa Osherovich</name>
<email>noaos@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-12T08:14:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=01acd933d6184a7626f5e0dac1ad0cb794aa74a5'/>
<id>01acd933d6184a7626f5e0dac1ad0cb794aa74a5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5236333592244557a19694a51337df6ac018f0a7 ]

RoCE Annex (A16.9.10/11) declares that during attach (detach) QP to a
multicast group, if the QP is associated with a RoCE port, the
multicast group MLID is unused and is ignored.

During attach or detach multicast, when the QP is associated with a
port, it is enough to check the port's link layer and validate the
LID only if it is Infiniband. Otherwise, avoid validating the
multicast LID.

Fixes: 8561eae60ff9 ("IB/core: For multicast functions, verify that LIDs are multicast LIDs")
Signed-off-by: Noa Osherovich &lt;noaos@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Moni Shoua &lt;monis@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5236333592244557a19694a51337df6ac018f0a7 ]

RoCE Annex (A16.9.10/11) declares that during attach (detach) QP to a
multicast group, if the QP is associated with a RoCE port, the
multicast group MLID is unused and is ignored.

During attach or detach multicast, when the QP is associated with a
port, it is enough to check the port's link layer and validate the
LID only if it is Infiniband. Otherwise, avoid validating the
multicast LID.

Fixes: 8561eae60ff9 ("IB/core: For multicast functions, verify that LIDs are multicast LIDs")
Signed-off-by: Noa Osherovich &lt;noaos@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Moni Shoua &lt;monis@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/ipoib: Do not warn if IPoIB debugfs doesn't exist</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:42:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alaa Hleihel</name>
<email>alaa@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-13T10:18:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9fd3be2cbb16f871a1e66faab3ac6d408bf7f644'/>
<id>9fd3be2cbb16f871a1e66faab3ac6d408bf7f644</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 14fa91e0fef8e4d6feb8b1fa2a807828e0abe815 ]

netdev_wait_allrefs() could rebroadcast NETDEV_UNREGISTER event
multiple times until all refs are gone, which will result in calling
ipoib_delete_debug_files multiple times and printing a warning.

Remove the WARN_ONCE since checks of NULL pointers before calling
debugfs_remove are not needed.

Fixes: 771a52584096 ("IB/IPoIB: ibX: failed to create mcg debug file")
Signed-off-by: Alaa Hleihel &lt;alaa@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 14fa91e0fef8e4d6feb8b1fa2a807828e0abe815 ]

netdev_wait_allrefs() could rebroadcast NETDEV_UNREGISTER event
multiple times until all refs are gone, which will result in calling
ipoib_delete_debug_files multiple times and printing a warning.

Remove the WARN_ONCE since checks of NULL pointers before calling
debugfs_remove are not needed.

Fixes: 771a52584096 ("IB/IPoIB: ibX: failed to create mcg debug file")
Signed-off-by: Alaa Hleihel &lt;alaa@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
