<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/infiniband/core, branch linux-3.18.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/ucma: check fd type in ucma_migrate_id()</title>
<updated>2018-10-13T07:09:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-03T16:54:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d90c014001768c1398580a677718a171fec81ed4'/>
<id>d90c014001768c1398580a677718a171fec81ed4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0d23ba6034b9cf48b8918404367506da3e4b3ee5 ]

The current code grabs the private_data of whatever file descriptor
userspace has supplied and implicitly casts it to a `struct ucma_file *`,
potentially causing a type confusion.

This is probably fine in practice because the pointer is only used for
comparisons, it is never actually dereferenced; and even in the
comparisons, it is unlikely that a file from another filesystem would have
a -&gt;private_data pointer that happens to also be valid in this context.
But -&gt;private_data is not always guaranteed to be a valid pointer to an
object owned by the file's filesystem; for example, some filesystems just
cram numbers in there.

Check the type of the supplied file descriptor to be safe, analogous to how
other places in the kernel do it.

Fixes: 88314e4dda1e ("RDMA/cma: add support for rdma_migrate_id()")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0d23ba6034b9cf48b8918404367506da3e4b3ee5 ]

The current code grabs the private_data of whatever file descriptor
userspace has supplied and implicitly casts it to a `struct ucma_file *`,
potentially causing a type confusion.

This is probably fine in practice because the pointer is only used for
comparisons, it is never actually dereferenced; and even in the
comparisons, it is unlikely that a file from another filesystem would have
a -&gt;private_data pointer that happens to also be valid in this context.
But -&gt;private_data is not always guaranteed to be a valid pointer to an
object owned by the file's filesystem; for example, some filesystems just
cram numbers in there.

Check the type of the supplied file descriptor to be safe, analogous to how
other places in the kernel do it.

Fixes: 88314e4dda1e ("RDMA/cma: add support for rdma_migrate_id()")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/cma: Protect cma dev list with lock</title>
<updated>2018-09-26T06:33:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Parav Pandit</name>
<email>parav@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-30T05:35:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e6858a99540555179f7ed1027e9307563bada64b'/>
<id>e6858a99540555179f7ed1027e9307563bada64b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 954a8e3aea87e896e320cf648c1a5bbe47de443e upstream.

When AF_IB addresses are used during rdma_resolve_addr() a lock is not
held. A cma device can get removed while list traversal is in progress
which may lead to crash. ie

        CPU0                                     CPU1
        ====                                     ====
rdma_resolve_addr()
 cma_resolve_ib_dev()
  list_for_each()                         cma_remove_one()
    cur_dev-&gt;device                        mutex_lock(&amp;lock)
                                            list_del();
                                           mutex_unlock(&amp;lock);
                                           cma_process_remove();


Therefore, hold a lock while traversing the list which avoids such
situation.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 3.10
Fixes: f17df3b0dede ("RDMA/cma: Add support for AF_IB to rdma_resolve_addr()")
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit &lt;parav@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens &lt;danielj@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 954a8e3aea87e896e320cf648c1a5bbe47de443e upstream.

When AF_IB addresses are used during rdma_resolve_addr() a lock is not
held. A cma device can get removed while list traversal is in progress
which may lead to crash. ie

        CPU0                                     CPU1
        ====                                     ====
rdma_resolve_addr()
 cma_resolve_ib_dev()
  list_for_each()                         cma_remove_one()
    cur_dev-&gt;device                        mutex_lock(&amp;lock)
                                            list_del();
                                           mutex_unlock(&amp;lock);
                                           cma_process_remove();


Therefore, hold a lock while traversing the list which avoids such
situation.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 3.10
Fixes: f17df3b0dede ("RDMA/cma: Add support for AF_IB to rdma_resolve_addr()")
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit &lt;parav@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens &lt;danielj@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro &lt;dennis.dalessandro@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/mad: Convert BUG_ONs to error flows</title>
<updated>2018-08-09T10:20:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-29T11:56:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b3ab448458ed69f6cb3c408c30d38e29acc06001'/>
<id>b3ab448458ed69f6cb3c408c30d38e29acc06001</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2468b82d69e3a53d024f28d79ba0fdb8bf43dfbf ]

Let's perform checks in-place instead of BUG_ONs.

Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2468b82d69e3a53d024f28d79ba0fdb8bf43dfbf ]

Let's perform checks in-place instead of BUG_ONs.

Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug</title>
<updated>2018-08-09T10:20:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cong Wang</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-01T18:31:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=77e6abf43c95a39fd97a5fb644c26e303bd60459'/>
<id>77e6abf43c95a39fd97a5fb644c26e303bd60459</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cb2595c1393b4a5211534e6f0a0fbad369e21ad8 ]

ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().

But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.

So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.

Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().

Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus &lt;noamr@beyondsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit cb2595c1393b4a5211534e6f0a0fbad369e21ad8 ]

ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().

But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.

So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.

Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().

Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus &lt;noamr@beyondsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/ucm: Mark UCM interface as BROKEN</title>
<updated>2018-07-22T11:43:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-23T05:22:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=09b7c3365419f8ab8aa0507298e80fe07250ca1b'/>
<id>09b7c3365419f8ab8aa0507298e80fe07250ca1b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7a8690ed6f5346f6738971892205e91d39b6b901 upstream.

In commit 357d23c811a7 ("Remove the obsolete libibcm library")
in rdma-core [1], we removed obsolete library which used the
/dev/infiniband/ucmX interface.

Following multiple syzkaller reports about non-sanitized
user input in the UCMA module, the short audit reveals the same
issues in UCM module too.

It is better to disable this interface in the kernel,
before syzkaller team invests time and energy to harden
this unused interface.

[1] https://github.com/linux-rdma/rdma-core/pull/279

Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7a8690ed6f5346f6738971892205e91d39b6b901 upstream.

In commit 357d23c811a7 ("Remove the obsolete libibcm library")
in rdma-core [1], we removed obsolete library which used the
/dev/infiniband/ucmX interface.

Following multiple syzkaller reports about non-sanitized
user input in the UCMA module, the short audit reveals the same
issues in UCM module too.

It is better to disable this interface in the kernel,
before syzkaller team invests time and energy to harden
this unused interface.

[1] https://github.com/linux-rdma/rdma-core/pull/279

Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/ucma: Fix access to non-initialized CM_ID object</title>
<updated>2018-03-24T09:57:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-13T09:43:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eb5394496c07b4ed8a63f9217c89acf349ffe90c'/>
<id>eb5394496c07b4ed8a63f9217c89acf349ffe90c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7688f2c3bbf55e52388e37ac5d63ca471a7712e1 upstream.

The attempt to join multicast group without ensuring that CMA device
exists will lead to the following crash reported by syzkaller.

[   64.076794] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in rdma_join_multicast+0x26e/0x12c0
[   64.076797] Read of size 8 at addr 00000000000000b0 by task join/691
[   64.076797]
[   64.076800] CPU: 1 PID: 691 Comm: join Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1-00219-gb97853b65b93 #23
[   64.076802] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-proj4
[   64.076803] Call Trace:
[   64.076809]  dump_stack+0x5c/0x77
[   64.076817]  kasan_report+0x163/0x380
[   64.085859]  ? rdma_join_multicast+0x26e/0x12c0
[   64.086634]  rdma_join_multicast+0x26e/0x12c0
[   64.087370]  ? rdma_disconnect+0xf0/0xf0
[   64.088579]  ? __radix_tree_replace+0xc3/0x110
[   64.089132]  ? node_tag_clear+0x81/0xb0
[   64.089606]  ? idr_alloc_u32+0x12e/0x1a0
[   64.090517]  ? __fprop_inc_percpu_max+0x150/0x150
[   64.091768]  ? tracing_record_taskinfo+0x10/0xc0
[   64.092340]  ? idr_alloc+0x76/0xc0
[   64.092951]  ? idr_alloc_u32+0x1a0/0x1a0
[   64.093632]  ? ucma_process_join+0x23d/0x460
[   64.094510]  ucma_process_join+0x23d/0x460
[   64.095199]  ? ucma_migrate_id+0x440/0x440
[   64.095696]  ? futex_wake+0x10b/0x2a0
[   64.096159]  ucma_join_multicast+0x88/0xe0
[   64.096660]  ? ucma_process_join+0x460/0x460
[   64.097540]  ? _copy_from_user+0x5e/0x90
[   64.098017]  ucma_write+0x174/0x1f0
[   64.098640]  ? ucma_resolve_route+0xf0/0xf0
[   64.099343]  ? rb_erase_cached+0x6c7/0x7f0
[   64.099839]  __vfs_write+0xc4/0x350
[   64.100622]  ? perf_syscall_enter+0xe4/0x5f0
[   64.101335]  ? kernel_read+0xa0/0xa0
[   64.103525]  ? perf_sched_cb_inc+0xc0/0xc0
[   64.105510]  ? syscall_exit_register+0x2a0/0x2a0
[   64.107359]  ? __switch_to+0x351/0x640
[   64.109285]  ? fsnotify+0x899/0x8f0
[   64.111610]  ? fsnotify_unmount_inodes+0x170/0x170
[   64.113876]  ? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags+0x30/0x30
[   64.115813]  ? ring_buffer_record_is_on+0xd/0x20
[   64.117824]  ? __fget+0xa8/0xf0
[   64.119869]  vfs_write+0xf7/0x280
[   64.122001]  SyS_write+0xa1/0x120
[   64.124213]  ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120
[   64.126644]  ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120
[   64.128563]  do_syscall_64+0xeb/0x250
[   64.130732]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86
[   64.132984] RIP: 0033:0x7f5c994ade99
[   64.135699] RSP: 002b:00007f5c99b97d98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[   64.138740] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000200001e4 RCX: 00007f5c994ade99
[   64.141056] RDX: 00000000000000a0 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000015
[   64.143536] RBP: 00007f5c99b97ec0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   64.146017] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f5c99b97fc0
[   64.148608] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff660e1c40 R15: 00007f5c99b989c0
[   64.151060]
[   64.153703] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[   64.156032] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000b0
[   64.159066] IP: rdma_join_multicast+0x26e/0x12c0
[   64.161451] PGD 80000001d0298067 P4D 80000001d0298067 PUD 1dea39067 PMD 0
[   64.164442] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[   64.166817] CPU: 1 PID: 691 Comm: join Tainted: G    B 4.16.0-rc1-00219-gb97853b65b93 #23
[   64.170004] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-proj4
[   64.174985] RIP: 0010:rdma_join_multicast+0x26e/0x12c0
[   64.177246] RSP: 0018:ffff8801c8207860 EFLAGS: 00010282
[   64.179901] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff94789522
[   64.183344] RDX: 1ffffffff2d50fa5 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297
[   64.186237] RBP: ffff8801c8207a50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed0039040ea7
[   64.189328] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0039040ea6 R12: 0000000000000000
[   64.192634] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8801e2022800 R15: ffff8801d4ac2400
[   64.196105] FS:  00007f5c99b98700(0000) GS:ffff8801e5d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   64.199211] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   64.202046] CR2: 00000000000000b0 CR3: 00000001d1c48004 CR4: 00000000003606a0
[   64.205032] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   64.208221] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   64.211554] Call Trace:
[   64.213464]  ? rdma_disconnect+0xf0/0xf0
[   64.216124]  ? __radix_tree_replace+0xc3/0x110
[   64.219337]  ? node_tag_clear+0x81/0xb0
[   64.222140]  ? idr_alloc_u32+0x12e/0x1a0
[   64.224422]  ? __fprop_inc_percpu_max+0x150/0x150
[   64.226588]  ? tracing_record_taskinfo+0x10/0xc0
[   64.229763]  ? idr_alloc+0x76/0xc0
[   64.232186]  ? idr_alloc_u32+0x1a0/0x1a0
[   64.234505]  ? ucma_process_join+0x23d/0x460
[   64.237024]  ucma_process_join+0x23d/0x460
[   64.240076]  ? ucma_migrate_id+0x440/0x440
[   64.243284]  ? futex_wake+0x10b/0x2a0
[   64.245302]  ucma_join_multicast+0x88/0xe0
[   64.247783]  ? ucma_process_join+0x460/0x460
[   64.250841]  ? _copy_from_user+0x5e/0x90
[   64.253878]  ucma_write+0x174/0x1f0
[   64.257008]  ? ucma_resolve_route+0xf0/0xf0
[   64.259877]  ? rb_erase_cached+0x6c7/0x7f0
[   64.262746]  __vfs_write+0xc4/0x350
[   64.265537]  ? perf_syscall_enter+0xe4/0x5f0
[   64.267792]  ? kernel_read+0xa0/0xa0
[   64.270358]  ? perf_sched_cb_inc+0xc0/0xc0
[   64.272575]  ? syscall_exit_register+0x2a0/0x2a0
[   64.275367]  ? __switch_to+0x351/0x640
[   64.277700]  ? fsnotify+0x899/0x8f0
[   64.280530]  ? fsnotify_unmount_inodes+0x170/0x170
[   64.283156]  ? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags+0x30/0x30
[   64.286182]  ? ring_buffer_record_is_on+0xd/0x20
[   64.288749]  ? __fget+0xa8/0xf0
[   64.291136]  vfs_write+0xf7/0x280
[   64.292972]  SyS_write+0xa1/0x120
[   64.294965]  ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120
[   64.297474]  ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120
[   64.299751]  do_syscall_64+0xeb/0x250
[   64.301826]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86
[   64.304352] RIP: 0033:0x7f5c994ade99
[   64.306711] RSP: 002b:00007f5c99b97d98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[   64.309577] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000200001e4 RCX: 00007f5c994ade99
[   64.312334] RDX: 00000000000000a0 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000015
[   64.315783] RBP: 00007f5c99b97ec0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   64.318365] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f5c99b97fc0
[   64.320980] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff660e1c40 R15: 00007f5c99b989c0
[   64.323515] Code: e8 e8 79 08 ff 4c 89 ff 45 0f b6 a7 b8 01 00 00 e8 68 7c 08 ff 49 8b 1f 4d 89 e5 49 c1 e4 04 48 8
[   64.330753] RIP: rdma_join_multicast+0x26e/0x12c0 RSP: ffff8801c8207860
[   64.332979] CR2: 00000000000000b0
[   64.335550] ---[ end trace 0c00c17a408849c1 ]---

Reported-by: &lt;syzbot+e6aba77967bd72cbc9d6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sean Hefty &lt;sean.hefty@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7688f2c3bbf55e52388e37ac5d63ca471a7712e1 upstream.

The attempt to join multicast group without ensuring that CMA device
exists will lead to the following crash reported by syzkaller.

[   64.076794] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in rdma_join_multicast+0x26e/0x12c0
[   64.076797] Read of size 8 at addr 00000000000000b0 by task join/691
[   64.076797]
[   64.076800] CPU: 1 PID: 691 Comm: join Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1-00219-gb97853b65b93 #23
[   64.076802] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-proj4
[   64.076803] Call Trace:
[   64.076809]  dump_stack+0x5c/0x77
[   64.076817]  kasan_report+0x163/0x380
[   64.085859]  ? rdma_join_multicast+0x26e/0x12c0
[   64.086634]  rdma_join_multicast+0x26e/0x12c0
[   64.087370]  ? rdma_disconnect+0xf0/0xf0
[   64.088579]  ? __radix_tree_replace+0xc3/0x110
[   64.089132]  ? node_tag_clear+0x81/0xb0
[   64.089606]  ? idr_alloc_u32+0x12e/0x1a0
[   64.090517]  ? __fprop_inc_percpu_max+0x150/0x150
[   64.091768]  ? tracing_record_taskinfo+0x10/0xc0
[   64.092340]  ? idr_alloc+0x76/0xc0
[   64.092951]  ? idr_alloc_u32+0x1a0/0x1a0
[   64.093632]  ? ucma_process_join+0x23d/0x460
[   64.094510]  ucma_process_join+0x23d/0x460
[   64.095199]  ? ucma_migrate_id+0x440/0x440
[   64.095696]  ? futex_wake+0x10b/0x2a0
[   64.096159]  ucma_join_multicast+0x88/0xe0
[   64.096660]  ? ucma_process_join+0x460/0x460
[   64.097540]  ? _copy_from_user+0x5e/0x90
[   64.098017]  ucma_write+0x174/0x1f0
[   64.098640]  ? ucma_resolve_route+0xf0/0xf0
[   64.099343]  ? rb_erase_cached+0x6c7/0x7f0
[   64.099839]  __vfs_write+0xc4/0x350
[   64.100622]  ? perf_syscall_enter+0xe4/0x5f0
[   64.101335]  ? kernel_read+0xa0/0xa0
[   64.103525]  ? perf_sched_cb_inc+0xc0/0xc0
[   64.105510]  ? syscall_exit_register+0x2a0/0x2a0
[   64.107359]  ? __switch_to+0x351/0x640
[   64.109285]  ? fsnotify+0x899/0x8f0
[   64.111610]  ? fsnotify_unmount_inodes+0x170/0x170
[   64.113876]  ? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags+0x30/0x30
[   64.115813]  ? ring_buffer_record_is_on+0xd/0x20
[   64.117824]  ? __fget+0xa8/0xf0
[   64.119869]  vfs_write+0xf7/0x280
[   64.122001]  SyS_write+0xa1/0x120
[   64.124213]  ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120
[   64.126644]  ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120
[   64.128563]  do_syscall_64+0xeb/0x250
[   64.130732]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86
[   64.132984] RIP: 0033:0x7f5c994ade99
[   64.135699] RSP: 002b:00007f5c99b97d98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[   64.138740] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000200001e4 RCX: 00007f5c994ade99
[   64.141056] RDX: 00000000000000a0 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000015
[   64.143536] RBP: 00007f5c99b97ec0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   64.146017] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f5c99b97fc0
[   64.148608] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff660e1c40 R15: 00007f5c99b989c0
[   64.151060]
[   64.153703] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[   64.156032] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000b0
[   64.159066] IP: rdma_join_multicast+0x26e/0x12c0
[   64.161451] PGD 80000001d0298067 P4D 80000001d0298067 PUD 1dea39067 PMD 0
[   64.164442] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[   64.166817] CPU: 1 PID: 691 Comm: join Tainted: G    B 4.16.0-rc1-00219-gb97853b65b93 #23
[   64.170004] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-proj4
[   64.174985] RIP: 0010:rdma_join_multicast+0x26e/0x12c0
[   64.177246] RSP: 0018:ffff8801c8207860 EFLAGS: 00010282
[   64.179901] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff94789522
[   64.183344] RDX: 1ffffffff2d50fa5 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297
[   64.186237] RBP: ffff8801c8207a50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed0039040ea7
[   64.189328] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0039040ea6 R12: 0000000000000000
[   64.192634] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8801e2022800 R15: ffff8801d4ac2400
[   64.196105] FS:  00007f5c99b98700(0000) GS:ffff8801e5d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   64.199211] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   64.202046] CR2: 00000000000000b0 CR3: 00000001d1c48004 CR4: 00000000003606a0
[   64.205032] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   64.208221] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   64.211554] Call Trace:
[   64.213464]  ? rdma_disconnect+0xf0/0xf0
[   64.216124]  ? __radix_tree_replace+0xc3/0x110
[   64.219337]  ? node_tag_clear+0x81/0xb0
[   64.222140]  ? idr_alloc_u32+0x12e/0x1a0
[   64.224422]  ? __fprop_inc_percpu_max+0x150/0x150
[   64.226588]  ? tracing_record_taskinfo+0x10/0xc0
[   64.229763]  ? idr_alloc+0x76/0xc0
[   64.232186]  ? idr_alloc_u32+0x1a0/0x1a0
[   64.234505]  ? ucma_process_join+0x23d/0x460
[   64.237024]  ucma_process_join+0x23d/0x460
[   64.240076]  ? ucma_migrate_id+0x440/0x440
[   64.243284]  ? futex_wake+0x10b/0x2a0
[   64.245302]  ucma_join_multicast+0x88/0xe0
[   64.247783]  ? ucma_process_join+0x460/0x460
[   64.250841]  ? _copy_from_user+0x5e/0x90
[   64.253878]  ucma_write+0x174/0x1f0
[   64.257008]  ? ucma_resolve_route+0xf0/0xf0
[   64.259877]  ? rb_erase_cached+0x6c7/0x7f0
[   64.262746]  __vfs_write+0xc4/0x350
[   64.265537]  ? perf_syscall_enter+0xe4/0x5f0
[   64.267792]  ? kernel_read+0xa0/0xa0
[   64.270358]  ? perf_sched_cb_inc+0xc0/0xc0
[   64.272575]  ? syscall_exit_register+0x2a0/0x2a0
[   64.275367]  ? __switch_to+0x351/0x640
[   64.277700]  ? fsnotify+0x899/0x8f0
[   64.280530]  ? fsnotify_unmount_inodes+0x170/0x170
[   64.283156]  ? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags+0x30/0x30
[   64.286182]  ? ring_buffer_record_is_on+0xd/0x20
[   64.288749]  ? __fget+0xa8/0xf0
[   64.291136]  vfs_write+0xf7/0x280
[   64.292972]  SyS_write+0xa1/0x120
[   64.294965]  ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120
[   64.297474]  ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120
[   64.299751]  do_syscall_64+0xeb/0x250
[   64.301826]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86
[   64.304352] RIP: 0033:0x7f5c994ade99
[   64.306711] RSP: 002b:00007f5c99b97d98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[   64.309577] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000200001e4 RCX: 00007f5c994ade99
[   64.312334] RDX: 00000000000000a0 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000015
[   64.315783] RBP: 00007f5c99b97ec0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   64.318365] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f5c99b97fc0
[   64.320980] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff660e1c40 R15: 00007f5c99b989c0
[   64.323515] Code: e8 e8 79 08 ff 4c 89 ff 45 0f b6 a7 b8 01 00 00 e8 68 7c 08 ff 49 8b 1f 4d 89 e5 49 c1 e4 04 48 8
[   64.330753] RIP: rdma_join_multicast+0x26e/0x12c0 RSP: ffff8801c8207860
[   64.332979] CR2: 00000000000000b0
[   64.335550] ---[ end trace 0c00c17a408849c1 ]---

Reported-by: &lt;syzbot+e6aba77967bd72cbc9d6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sean Hefty &lt;sean.hefty@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/cma: Use correct size when writing netlink stats</title>
<updated>2018-03-24T09:57:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Parav Pandit</name>
<email>parav@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-14T12:51:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0353b3376f655b140175245db6643f06a78bd241'/>
<id>0353b3376f655b140175245db6643f06a78bd241</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7baaa49af3716fb31877c61f59b74d029ce15b75 ]

The code was using the src size when formatting the dst. They are almost
certainly the same value but it reads wrong.

Fixes: ce117ffac2e9 ("RDMA/cma: Export AF_IB statistics")
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit &lt;parav@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens &lt;danielj@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7baaa49af3716fb31877c61f59b74d029ce15b75 ]

The code was using the src size when formatting the dst. They are almost
certainly the same value but it reads wrong.

Fixes: ce117ffac2e9 ("RDMA/cma: Export AF_IB statistics")
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit &lt;parav@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens &lt;danielj@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface</title>
<updated>2016-05-17T18:51:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Gunthorpe</name>
<email>jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-11T01:13:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a34c1651ea7a55f3c0e77c80c3b27605d5a7dfea'/>
<id>a34c1651ea7a55f3c0e77c80c3b27605d5a7dfea</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3 ]

The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl().  This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.

For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.

For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).

The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.

Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3 ]

The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl().  This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.

For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.

For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).

The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.

Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/cm: Fix rb-tree duplicate free and use-after-free</title>
<updated>2015-11-15T17:51:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Doron Tsur</name>
<email>doront@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-11T12:58:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=69a7ca06041ad6f3a7672db472ac26cdd2a3df83'/>
<id>69a7ca06041ad6f3a7672db472ac26cdd2a3df83</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0ca81a2840f77855bbad1b9f172c545c4dc9e6a4 ]

ib_send_cm_sidr_rep could sometimes erase the node from the sidr
(depending on errors in the process). Since ib_send_cm_sidr_rep is
called both from cm_sidr_req_handler and cm_destroy_id, cm_id_priv
could be either erased from the rb_tree twice or not erased at all.
Fixing that by making sure it's erased only once before freeing
cm_id_priv.

Fixes: a977049dacde ('[PATCH] IB: Add the kernel CM implementation')
Signed-off-by: Doron Tsur &lt;doront@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matan Barak &lt;matanb@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0ca81a2840f77855bbad1b9f172c545c4dc9e6a4 ]

ib_send_cm_sidr_rep could sometimes erase the node from the sidr
(depending on errors in the process). Since ib_send_cm_sidr_rep is
called both from cm_sidr_req_handler and cm_destroy_id, cm_id_priv
could be either erased from the rb_tree twice or not erased at all.
Fixing that by making sure it's erased only once before freeing
cm_id_priv.

Fixes: a977049dacde ('[PATCH] IB: Add the kernel CM implementation')
Signed-off-by: Doron Tsur &lt;doront@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matan Barak &lt;matanb@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/uverbs: Fix race between ib_uverbs_open and remove_one</title>
<updated>2015-10-07T14:22:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yishai Hadas</name>
<email>yishaih@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-13T15:32:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=edf5a729fde3db5342937462999f6414de2a662e'/>
<id>edf5a729fde3db5342937462999f6414de2a662e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 35d4a0b63dc0c6d1177d4f532a9deae958f0662c ]

Fixes: 2a72f212263701b927559f6850446421d5906c41 ("IB/uverbs: Remove dev_table")

Before this commit there was a device look-up table that was protected
by a spin_lock used by ib_uverbs_open and by ib_uverbs_remove_one. When
it was dropped and container_of was used instead, it enabled the race
with remove_one as dev might be freed just after:
dev = container_of(inode-&gt;i_cdev, struct ib_uverbs_device, cdev) but
before the kref_get.

In addition, this buggy patch added some dead code as
container_of(x,y,z) can never be NULL and so dev can never be NULL.
As a result the comment above ib_uverbs_open saying "the open method
will either immediately run -ENXIO" is wrong as it can never happen.

The solution follows Jason Gunthorpe suggestion from below URL:
https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org/msg25692.html

cdev will hold a kref on the parent (the containing structure,
ib_uverbs_device) and only when that kref is released it is
guaranteed that open will never be called again.

In addition, fixes the active count scheme to use an atomic
not a kref to prevent WARN_ON as pointed by above comment
from Jason.

Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas &lt;yishaih@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shachar Raindel &lt;raindel@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 35d4a0b63dc0c6d1177d4f532a9deae958f0662c ]

Fixes: 2a72f212263701b927559f6850446421d5906c41 ("IB/uverbs: Remove dev_table")

Before this commit there was a device look-up table that was protected
by a spin_lock used by ib_uverbs_open and by ib_uverbs_remove_one. When
it was dropped and container_of was used instead, it enabled the race
with remove_one as dev might be freed just after:
dev = container_of(inode-&gt;i_cdev, struct ib_uverbs_device, cdev) but
before the kref_get.

In addition, this buggy patch added some dead code as
container_of(x,y,z) can never be NULL and so dev can never be NULL.
As a result the comment above ib_uverbs_open saying "the open method
will either immediately run -ENXIO" is wrong as it can never happen.

The solution follows Jason Gunthorpe suggestion from below URL:
https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org/msg25692.html

cdev will hold a kref on the parent (the containing structure,
ib_uverbs_device) and only when that kref is released it is
guaranteed that open will never be called again.

In addition, fixes the active count scheme to use an atomic
not a kref to prevent WARN_ON as pointed by above comment
from Jason.

Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas &lt;yishaih@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shachar Raindel &lt;raindel@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
