<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/infiniband/core, branch linux-3.14.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface</title>
<updated>2016-08-16T07:29:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Gunthorpe</name>
<email>jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-11T01:13:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c96c87e19293995d5adde47bb20ae827e8b73607'/>
<id>c96c87e19293995d5adde47bb20ae827e8b73607</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3 upstream.

The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl().  This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.

For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.

For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).

The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.

Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
[ Expanded to include removed ipath driver, and dropped non-existent
  hfi1 driver ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3 upstream.

The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl().  This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.

For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.

For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).

The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.

Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
[ Expanded to include removed ipath driver, and dropped non-existent
  hfi1 driver ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/cm: Fix rb-tree duplicate free and use-after-free</title>
<updated>2015-11-09T20:50:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Doron Tsur</name>
<email>doront@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-11T12:58:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0a494af786ed92017825ad11a0351e869d1ff977'/>
<id>0a494af786ed92017825ad11a0351e869d1ff977</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0ca81a2840f77855bbad1b9f172c545c4dc9e6a4 upstream.

ib_send_cm_sidr_rep could sometimes erase the node from the sidr
(depending on errors in the process). Since ib_send_cm_sidr_rep is
called both from cm_sidr_req_handler and cm_destroy_id, cm_id_priv
could be either erased from the rb_tree twice or not erased at all.
Fixing that by making sure it's erased only once before freeing
cm_id_priv.

Fixes: a977049dacde ('[PATCH] IB: Add the kernel CM implementation')
Signed-off-by: Doron Tsur &lt;doront@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matan Barak &lt;matanb@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0ca81a2840f77855bbad1b9f172c545c4dc9e6a4 upstream.

ib_send_cm_sidr_rep could sometimes erase the node from the sidr
(depending on errors in the process). Since ib_send_cm_sidr_rep is
called both from cm_sidr_req_handler and cm_destroy_id, cm_id_priv
could be either erased from the rb_tree twice or not erased at all.
Fixing that by making sure it's erased only once before freeing
cm_id_priv.

Fixes: a977049dacde ('[PATCH] IB: Add the kernel CM implementation')
Signed-off-by: Doron Tsur &lt;doront@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matan Barak &lt;matanb@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/uverbs: Fix race between ib_uverbs_open and remove_one</title>
<updated>2015-10-01T09:36:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yishai Hadas</name>
<email>yishaih@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-13T15:32:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=20dbae92ee5ee3d0b6d4b6fb6ba6428d9475467e'/>
<id>20dbae92ee5ee3d0b6d4b6fb6ba6428d9475467e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 35d4a0b63dc0c6d1177d4f532a9deae958f0662c upstream.

Fixes: 2a72f212263701b927559f6850446421d5906c41 ("IB/uverbs: Remove dev_table")

Before this commit there was a device look-up table that was protected
by a spin_lock used by ib_uverbs_open and by ib_uverbs_remove_one. When
it was dropped and container_of was used instead, it enabled the race
with remove_one as dev might be freed just after:
dev = container_of(inode-&gt;i_cdev, struct ib_uverbs_device, cdev) but
before the kref_get.

In addition, this buggy patch added some dead code as
container_of(x,y,z) can never be NULL and so dev can never be NULL.
As a result the comment above ib_uverbs_open saying "the open method
will either immediately run -ENXIO" is wrong as it can never happen.

The solution follows Jason Gunthorpe suggestion from below URL:
https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org/msg25692.html

cdev will hold a kref on the parent (the containing structure,
ib_uverbs_device) and only when that kref is released it is
guaranteed that open will never be called again.

In addition, fixes the active count scheme to use an atomic
not a kref to prevent WARN_ON as pointed by above comment
from Jason.

Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas &lt;yishaih@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shachar Raindel &lt;raindel@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 35d4a0b63dc0c6d1177d4f532a9deae958f0662c upstream.

Fixes: 2a72f212263701b927559f6850446421d5906c41 ("IB/uverbs: Remove dev_table")

Before this commit there was a device look-up table that was protected
by a spin_lock used by ib_uverbs_open and by ib_uverbs_remove_one. When
it was dropped and container_of was used instead, it enabled the race
with remove_one as dev might be freed just after:
dev = container_of(inode-&gt;i_cdev, struct ib_uverbs_device, cdev) but
before the kref_get.

In addition, this buggy patch added some dead code as
container_of(x,y,z) can never be NULL and so dev can never be NULL.
As a result the comment above ib_uverbs_open saying "the open method
will either immediately run -ENXIO" is wrong as it can never happen.

The solution follows Jason Gunthorpe suggestion from below URL:
https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org/msg25692.html

cdev will hold a kref on the parent (the containing structure,
ib_uverbs_device) and only when that kref is released it is
guaranteed that open will never be called again.

In addition, fixes the active count scheme to use an atomic
not a kref to prevent WARN_ON as pointed by above comment
from Jason.

Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas &lt;yishaih@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shachar Raindel &lt;raindel@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/uverbs: reject invalid or unknown opcodes</title>
<updated>2015-10-01T09:36:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-26T09:00:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=58922dda37a03d4ae7a51f5fe1fc042cbc749b51'/>
<id>58922dda37a03d4ae7a51f5fe1fc042cbc749b51</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b632ffa7cee439ba5dce3b3bc4a5cbe2b3e20133 upstream.

We have many WR opcodes that are only supported in kernel space
and/or require optional information to be copied into the WR
structure.  Reject all those not explicitly handled so that we
can't pass invalid information to drivers.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg &lt;sagig@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b632ffa7cee439ba5dce3b3bc4a5cbe2b3e20133 upstream.

We have many WR opcodes that are only supported in kernel space
and/or require optional information to be copied into the WR
structure.  Reject all those not explicitly handled so that we
can't pass invalid information to drivers.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg &lt;sagig@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/CMA: Canonize IPv4 on IPV6 sockets properly</title>
<updated>2015-05-17T16:53:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Gunthorpe</name>
<email>jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-20T20:01:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=23313ab5b924d46668ee17be8b273b8787beb5bb'/>
<id>23313ab5b924d46668ee17be8b273b8787beb5bb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 285214409a9e5fceba2215461b4682b6069d8e77 upstream.

When accepting a new IPv4 connect to an IPv6 socket, the CMA tries to
canonize the address family to IPv4, but does not properly process
the listening sockaddr to get the listening port, and does not properly
set the address family of the canonized sockaddr.

Fixes: e51060f08a61 ("IB: IP address based RDMA connection manager")

Reported-By: Yotam Kenneth &lt;yotamke@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
Tested-by: Haggai Eran &lt;haggaie@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 285214409a9e5fceba2215461b4682b6069d8e77 upstream.

When accepting a new IPv4 connect to an IPv6 socket, the CMA tries to
canonize the address family to IPv4, but does not properly process
the listening sockaddr to get the listening port, and does not properly
set the address family of the canonized sockaddr.

Fixes: e51060f08a61 ("IB: IP address based RDMA connection manager")

Reported-By: Yotam Kenneth &lt;yotamke@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com&gt;
Tested-by: Haggai Eran &lt;haggaie@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/core: don't disallow registering region starting at 0x0</title>
<updated>2015-05-06T19:59:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yann Droneaud</name>
<email>ydroneaud@opteya.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-13T12:56:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a849e648dfdc4089e7848eafeb17c86ad22fabcb'/>
<id>a849e648dfdc4089e7848eafeb17c86ad22fabcb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 66578b0b2f69659f00b6169e6fe7377c4b100d18 upstream.

In a call to ib_umem_get(), if address is 0x0 and size is
already page aligned, check added in commit 8494057ab5e4
("IB/uverbs: Prevent integer overflow in ib_umem_get address
arithmetic") will refuse to register a memory region that
could otherwise be valid (provided vm.mmap_min_addr sysctl
and mmap_low_allowed SELinux knobs allow userspace to map
something at address 0x0).

This patch allows back such registration: ib_umem_get()
should probably don't care of the base address provided it
can be pinned with get_user_pages().

There's two possible overflows, in (addr + size) and in
PAGE_ALIGN(addr + size), this patch keep ensuring none
of them happen while allowing to pin memory at address
0x0. Anyway, the case of size equal 0 is no more (partially)
handled as 0-length memory region are disallowed by an
earlier check.

Link: http://mid.gmane.org/cover.1428929103.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com
Cc: Shachar Raindel &lt;raindel@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: Jack Morgenstein &lt;jackm@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: Or Gerlitz &lt;ogerlitz@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud &lt;ydroneaud@opteya.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg &lt;sagig@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Haggai Eran &lt;haggaie@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 66578b0b2f69659f00b6169e6fe7377c4b100d18 upstream.

In a call to ib_umem_get(), if address is 0x0 and size is
already page aligned, check added in commit 8494057ab5e4
("IB/uverbs: Prevent integer overflow in ib_umem_get address
arithmetic") will refuse to register a memory region that
could otherwise be valid (provided vm.mmap_min_addr sysctl
and mmap_low_allowed SELinux knobs allow userspace to map
something at address 0x0).

This patch allows back such registration: ib_umem_get()
should probably don't care of the base address provided it
can be pinned with get_user_pages().

There's two possible overflows, in (addr + size) and in
PAGE_ALIGN(addr + size), this patch keep ensuring none
of them happen while allowing to pin memory at address
0x0. Anyway, the case of size equal 0 is no more (partially)
handled as 0-length memory region are disallowed by an
earlier check.

Link: http://mid.gmane.org/cover.1428929103.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com
Cc: Shachar Raindel &lt;raindel@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: Jack Morgenstein &lt;jackm@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: Or Gerlitz &lt;ogerlitz@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud &lt;ydroneaud@opteya.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg &lt;sagig@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Haggai Eran &lt;haggaie@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/core: disallow registering 0-sized memory region</title>
<updated>2015-05-06T19:59:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yann Droneaud</name>
<email>ydroneaud@opteya.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-13T12:56:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6386953ba58c0a49001d7c88bf433b031cdaa3ec'/>
<id>6386953ba58c0a49001d7c88bf433b031cdaa3ec</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8abaae62f3fdead8f4ce0ab46b4ab93dee39bab2 upstream.

If ib_umem_get() is called with a size equal to 0 and an
non-page aligned address, one page will be pinned and a
0-sized umem will be returned to the caller.

This should not be allowed: it's not expected for a memory
region to have a size equal to 0.

This patch adds a check to explicitly refuse to register
a 0-sized region.

Link: http://mid.gmane.org/cover.1428929103.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com
Cc: Shachar Raindel &lt;raindel@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: Jack Morgenstein &lt;jackm@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: Or Gerlitz &lt;ogerlitz@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud &lt;ydroneaud@opteya.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8abaae62f3fdead8f4ce0ab46b4ab93dee39bab2 upstream.

If ib_umem_get() is called with a size equal to 0 and an
non-page aligned address, one page will be pinned and a
0-sized umem will be returned to the caller.

This should not be allowed: it's not expected for a memory
region to have a size equal to 0.

This patch adds a check to explicitly refuse to register
a 0-sized region.

Link: http://mid.gmane.org/cover.1428929103.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com
Cc: Shachar Raindel &lt;raindel@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: Jack Morgenstein &lt;jackm@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: Or Gerlitz &lt;ogerlitz@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud &lt;ydroneaud@opteya.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/uverbs: Prevent integer overflow in ib_umem_get address arithmetic</title>
<updated>2015-04-19T08:11:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shachar Raindel</name>
<email>raindel@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-18T17:39:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f40fc98d0b046ba153442b3bfd7887437f2ebd30'/>
<id>f40fc98d0b046ba153442b3bfd7887437f2ebd30</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8494057ab5e40df590ef6ef7d66324d3ae33356b upstream.

Properly verify that the resulting page aligned end address is larger
than both the start address and the length of the memory area requested.

Both the start and length arguments for ib_umem_get are controlled by
the user. A misbehaving user can provide values which will cause an
integer overflow when calculating the page aligned end address.

This overflow can cause also miscalculation of the number of pages
mapped, and additional logic issues.

Addresses: CVE-2014-8159
Signed-off-by: Shachar Raindel &lt;raindel@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein &lt;jackm@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz &lt;ogerlitz@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier &lt;roland@purestorage.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8494057ab5e40df590ef6ef7d66324d3ae33356b upstream.

Properly verify that the resulting page aligned end address is larger
than both the start address and the length of the memory area requested.

Both the start and length arguments for ib_umem_get are controlled by
the user. A misbehaving user can provide values which will cause an
integer overflow when calculating the page aligned end address.

This overflow can cause also miscalculation of the number of pages
mapped, and additional logic issues.

Addresses: CVE-2014-8159
Signed-off-by: Shachar Raindel &lt;raindel@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein &lt;jackm@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz &lt;ogerlitz@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier &lt;roland@purestorage.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/core: Avoid leakage from kernel to user space</title>
<updated>2015-04-19T08:11:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eli Cohen</name>
<email>eli@dev.mellanox.co.il</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-14T13:47:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=485d37770f43e476566ec83c8059c81989a86301'/>
<id>485d37770f43e476566ec83c8059c81989a86301</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 377b513485fd885dea1083a9a5430df65b35e048 upstream.

Clear the reserved field of struct ib_uverbs_async_event_desc which is
copied to user space.

Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen &lt;eli@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud &lt;ydroneaud@opteya.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier &lt;roland@purestorage.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 377b513485fd885dea1083a9a5430df65b35e048 upstream.

Clear the reserved field of struct ib_uverbs_async_event_desc which is
copied to user space.

Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen &lt;eli@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud &lt;ydroneaud@opteya.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier &lt;roland@purestorage.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IB/core: When marshaling ucma path from user-space, clear unused fields</title>
<updated>2015-03-18T12:31:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ilya Nelkenbaum</name>
<email>ilyan@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-05T11:53:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f96bc2a82461e732157402aaa26b9c31bfdbdea9'/>
<id>f96bc2a82461e732157402aaa26b9c31bfdbdea9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c2be9dc0e0fa59cc43c2c7084fc42b430809a0fe upstream.

When marshaling a user path to the kernel struct ib_sa_path, we need
to zero smac and dmac and set the vlan id to the "no vlan" value.

This is to ensure that Ethernet attributes are not used with
InfiniBand QPs.

Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Nelkenbaum &lt;ilyan@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz &lt;ogerlitz@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier &lt;roland@purestorage.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c2be9dc0e0fa59cc43c2c7084fc42b430809a0fe upstream.

When marshaling a user path to the kernel struct ib_sa_path, we need
to zero smac and dmac and set the vlan id to the "no vlan" value.

This is to ensure that Ethernet attributes are not used with
InfiniBand QPs.

Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Nelkenbaum &lt;ilyan@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz &lt;ogerlitz@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier &lt;roland@purestorage.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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