<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/hv, branch v6.6.86</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Drivers: hv: vmbus: Don't release fb_mmio resource in vmbus_free_mmio()</title>
<updated>2025-03-22T19:50:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Kelley</name>
<email>mhklinux@outlook.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-10T03:52:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=466ae740f88cda3ba541e09eec1ae75b1a7793c9'/>
<id>466ae740f88cda3ba541e09eec1ae75b1a7793c9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 73fe9073c0cc28056cb9de0c8a516dac070f1d1f ]

The VMBus driver manages the MMIO space it owns via the hyperv_mmio
resource tree. Because the synthetic video framebuffer portion of the
MMIO space is initially setup by the Hyper-V host for each guest, the
VMBus driver does an early reserve of that portion of MMIO space in the
hyperv_mmio resource tree. It saves a pointer to that resource in
fb_mmio. When a VMBus driver requests MMIO space and passes "true"
for the "fb_overlap_ok" argument, the reserved framebuffer space is
used if possible. In that case it's not necessary to do another request
against the "shadow" hyperv_mmio resource tree because that resource
was already requested in the early reserve steps.

However, the vmbus_free_mmio() function currently does no special
handling for the fb_mmio resource. When a framebuffer device is
removed, or the driver is unbound, the current code for
vmbus_free_mmio() releases the reserved resource, leaving fb_mmio
pointing to memory that has been freed. If the same or another
driver is subsequently bound to the device, vmbus_allocate_mmio()
checks against fb_mmio, and potentially gets garbage. Furthermore
a second unbind operation produces this "nonexistent resource" error
because of the unbalanced behavior between vmbus_allocate_mmio() and
vmbus_free_mmio():

[   55.499643] resource: Trying to free nonexistent
			resource &lt;0x00000000f0000000-0x00000000f07fffff&gt;

Fix this by adding logic to vmbus_free_mmio() to recognize when
MMIO space in the fb_mmio reserved area would be released, and don't
release it. This filtering ensures the fb_mmio resource always exists,
and makes vmbus_free_mmio() more parallel with vmbus_allocate_mmio().

Fixes: be000f93e5d7 ("drivers:hv: Track allocations of children of hv_vmbus in private resource tree")
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Tested-by: Saurabh Sengar &lt;ssengar@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Saurabh Sengar &lt;ssengar@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310035208.275764-1-mhklinux@outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20250310035208.275764-1-mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 73fe9073c0cc28056cb9de0c8a516dac070f1d1f ]

The VMBus driver manages the MMIO space it owns via the hyperv_mmio
resource tree. Because the synthetic video framebuffer portion of the
MMIO space is initially setup by the Hyper-V host for each guest, the
VMBus driver does an early reserve of that portion of MMIO space in the
hyperv_mmio resource tree. It saves a pointer to that resource in
fb_mmio. When a VMBus driver requests MMIO space and passes "true"
for the "fb_overlap_ok" argument, the reserved framebuffer space is
used if possible. In that case it's not necessary to do another request
against the "shadow" hyperv_mmio resource tree because that resource
was already requested in the early reserve steps.

However, the vmbus_free_mmio() function currently does no special
handling for the fb_mmio resource. When a framebuffer device is
removed, or the driver is unbound, the current code for
vmbus_free_mmio() releases the reserved resource, leaving fb_mmio
pointing to memory that has been freed. If the same or another
driver is subsequently bound to the device, vmbus_allocate_mmio()
checks against fb_mmio, and potentially gets garbage. Furthermore
a second unbind operation produces this "nonexistent resource" error
because of the unbalanced behavior between vmbus_allocate_mmio() and
vmbus_free_mmio():

[   55.499643] resource: Trying to free nonexistent
			resource &lt;0x00000000f0000000-0x00000000f07fffff&gt;

Fix this by adding logic to vmbus_free_mmio() to recognize when
MMIO space in the fb_mmio reserved area would be released, and don't
release it. This filtering ensures the fb_mmio resource always exists,
and makes vmbus_free_mmio() more parallel with vmbus_allocate_mmio().

Fixes: be000f93e5d7 ("drivers:hv: Track allocations of children of hv_vmbus in private resource tree")
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Tested-by: Saurabh Sengar &lt;ssengar@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Saurabh Sengar &lt;ssengar@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310035208.275764-1-mhklinux@outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20250310035208.275764-1-mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Drivers: hv: util: Avoid accessing a ringbuffer not initialized yet</title>
<updated>2024-12-27T12:58:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Kelley</name>
<email>mhklinux@outlook.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-06T15:42:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=89fcec5e466b3ac9b376e0d621c71effa1a7983f'/>
<id>89fcec5e466b3ac9b376e0d621c71effa1a7983f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 07a756a49f4b4290b49ea46e089cbe6f79ff8d26 upstream.

If the KVP (or VSS) daemon starts before the VMBus channel's ringbuffer is
fully initialized, we can hit the panic below:

hv_utils: Registering HyperV Utility Driver
hv_vmbus: registering driver hv_utils
...
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
CPU: 44 UID: 0 PID: 2552 Comm: hv_kvp_daemon Tainted: G E 6.11.0-rc3+ #1
RIP: 0010:hv_pkt_iter_first+0x12/0xd0
Call Trace:
...
 vmbus_recvpacket
 hv_kvp_onchannelcallback
 vmbus_on_event
 tasklet_action_common
 tasklet_action
 handle_softirqs
 irq_exit_rcu
 sysvec_hyperv_stimer0
 &lt;/IRQ&gt;
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 asm_sysvec_hyperv_stimer0
...
 kvp_register_done
 hvt_op_read
 vfs_read
 ksys_read
 __x64_sys_read

This can happen because the KVP/VSS channel callback can be invoked
even before the channel is fully opened:
1) as soon as hv_kvp_init() -&gt; hvutil_transport_init() creates
/dev/vmbus/hv_kvp, the kvp daemon can open the device file immediately and
register itself to the driver by writing a message KVP_OP_REGISTER1 to the
file (which is handled by kvp_on_msg() -&gt;kvp_handle_handshake()) and
reading the file for the driver's response, which is handled by
hvt_op_read(), which calls hvt-&gt;on_read(), i.e. kvp_register_done().

2) the problem with kvp_register_done() is that it can cause the
channel callback to be called even before the channel is fully opened,
and when the channel callback is starting to run, util_probe()-&gt;
vmbus_open() may have not initialized the ringbuffer yet, so the
callback can hit the panic of NULL pointer dereference.

To reproduce the panic consistently, we can add a "ssleep(10)" for KVP in
__vmbus_open(), just before the first hv_ringbuffer_init(), and then we
unload and reload the driver hv_utils, and run the daemon manually within
the 10 seconds.

Fix the panic by reordering the steps in util_probe() so the char dev
entry used by the KVP or VSS daemon is not created until after
vmbus_open() has completed. This reordering prevents the race condition
from happening.

Reported-by: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Fixes: e0fa3e5e7df6 ("Drivers: hv: utils: fix a race on userspace daemons registration")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Acked-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241106154247.2271-3-mhklinux@outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20241106154247.2271-3-mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 07a756a49f4b4290b49ea46e089cbe6f79ff8d26 upstream.

If the KVP (or VSS) daemon starts before the VMBus channel's ringbuffer is
fully initialized, we can hit the panic below:

hv_utils: Registering HyperV Utility Driver
hv_vmbus: registering driver hv_utils
...
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
CPU: 44 UID: 0 PID: 2552 Comm: hv_kvp_daemon Tainted: G E 6.11.0-rc3+ #1
RIP: 0010:hv_pkt_iter_first+0x12/0xd0
Call Trace:
...
 vmbus_recvpacket
 hv_kvp_onchannelcallback
 vmbus_on_event
 tasklet_action_common
 tasklet_action
 handle_softirqs
 irq_exit_rcu
 sysvec_hyperv_stimer0
 &lt;/IRQ&gt;
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 asm_sysvec_hyperv_stimer0
...
 kvp_register_done
 hvt_op_read
 vfs_read
 ksys_read
 __x64_sys_read

This can happen because the KVP/VSS channel callback can be invoked
even before the channel is fully opened:
1) as soon as hv_kvp_init() -&gt; hvutil_transport_init() creates
/dev/vmbus/hv_kvp, the kvp daemon can open the device file immediately and
register itself to the driver by writing a message KVP_OP_REGISTER1 to the
file (which is handled by kvp_on_msg() -&gt;kvp_handle_handshake()) and
reading the file for the driver's response, which is handled by
hvt_op_read(), which calls hvt-&gt;on_read(), i.e. kvp_register_done().

2) the problem with kvp_register_done() is that it can cause the
channel callback to be called even before the channel is fully opened,
and when the channel callback is starting to run, util_probe()-&gt;
vmbus_open() may have not initialized the ringbuffer yet, so the
callback can hit the panic of NULL pointer dereference.

To reproduce the panic consistently, we can add a "ssleep(10)" for KVP in
__vmbus_open(), just before the first hv_ringbuffer_init(), and then we
unload and reload the driver hv_utils, and run the daemon manually within
the 10 seconds.

Fix the panic by reordering the steps in util_probe() so the char dev
entry used by the KVP or VSS daemon is not created until after
vmbus_open() has completed. This reordering prevents the race condition
from happening.

Reported-by: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Fixes: e0fa3e5e7df6 ("Drivers: hv: utils: fix a race on userspace daemons registration")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Acked-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241106154247.2271-3-mhklinux@outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20241106154247.2271-3-mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Drivers: hv: vmbus: Fix rescind handling in uio_hv_generic</title>
<updated>2024-09-12T09:11:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Naman Jain</name>
<email>namjain@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-29T07:13:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6ed45748c19bf960a03526d37de8b0f51cf6d72c'/>
<id>6ed45748c19bf960a03526d37de8b0f51cf6d72c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6fd28941447bf2c8ca0f26fda612a1cabc41663f upstream.

Rescind offer handling relies on rescind callbacks for some of the
resources cleanup, if they are registered. It does not unregister
vmbus device for the primary channel closure, when callback is
registered. Without it, next onoffer does not come, rescind flag
remains set and device goes to unusable state.

Add logic to unregister vmbus for the primary channel in rescind callback
to ensure channel removal and relid release, and to ensure that next
onoffer can be received and handled properly.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ca3cda6fcf1e ("uio_hv_generic: add rescind support")
Signed-off-by: Naman Jain &lt;namjain@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Saurabh Sengar &lt;ssengar@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240829071312.1595-3-namjain@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6fd28941447bf2c8ca0f26fda612a1cabc41663f upstream.

Rescind offer handling relies on rescind callbacks for some of the
resources cleanup, if they are registered. It does not unregister
vmbus device for the primary channel closure, when callback is
registered. Without it, next onoffer does not come, rescind flag
remains set and device goes to unusable state.

Add logic to unregister vmbus for the primary channel in rescind callback
to ensure channel removal and relid release, and to ensure that next
onoffer can be received and handled properly.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ca3cda6fcf1e ("uio_hv_generic: add rescind support")
Signed-off-by: Naman Jain &lt;namjain@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Saurabh Sengar &lt;ssengar@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240829071312.1595-3-namjain@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Drivers: hv: vmbus: Don't free ring buffers that couldn't be re-encrypted</title>
<updated>2024-05-17T10:02:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Kelley</name>
<email>mhklinux@outlook.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-11T16:15:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=82f9e213b124a7d2bb5b16ea35d570260ef467e0'/>
<id>82f9e213b124a7d2bb5b16ea35d570260ef467e0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 30d18df6567be09c1433e81993e35e3da573ac48 ]

In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an
error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to
take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared)
memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security
issues.

The VMBus ring buffer code could free decrypted/shared pages if
set_memory_decrypted() fails. Check the decrypted field in the struct
vmbus_gpadl for the ring buffers to decide whether to free the memory.

Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311161558.1310-6-mhklinux@outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20240311161558.1310-6-mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 30d18df6567be09c1433e81993e35e3da573ac48 ]

In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an
error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to
take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared)
memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security
issues.

The VMBus ring buffer code could free decrypted/shared pages if
set_memory_decrypted() fails. Check the decrypted field in the struct
vmbus_gpadl for the ring buffers to decide whether to free the memory.

Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311161558.1310-6-mhklinux@outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20240311161558.1310-6-mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Drivers: hv: vmbus: Track decrypted status in vmbus_gpadl</title>
<updated>2024-05-17T10:02:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rick Edgecombe</name>
<email>rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-11T16:15:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8e62341f5c45b27519b7d193bcc32ada416ad9d8'/>
<id>8e62341f5c45b27519b7d193bcc32ada416ad9d8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 211f514ebf1ef5de37b1cf6df9d28a56cfd242ca ]

In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an
error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to
take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared)
memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security
issues.

In order to make sure callers of vmbus_establish_gpadl() and
vmbus_teardown_gpadl() don't return decrypted/shared pages to
allocators, add a field in struct vmbus_gpadl to keep track of the
decryption status of the buffers. This will allow the callers to
know if they should free or leak the pages.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe &lt;rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311161558.1310-3-mhklinux@outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20240311161558.1310-3-mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 211f514ebf1ef5de37b1cf6df9d28a56cfd242ca ]

In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an
error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to
take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared)
memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security
issues.

In order to make sure callers of vmbus_establish_gpadl() and
vmbus_teardown_gpadl() don't return decrypted/shared pages to
allocators, add a field in struct vmbus_gpadl to keep track of the
decryption status of the buffers. This will allow the callers to
know if they should free or leak the pages.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe &lt;rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311161558.1310-3-mhklinux@outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20240311161558.1310-3-mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Drivers: hv: vmbus: Leak pages if set_memory_encrypted() fails</title>
<updated>2024-05-17T10:02:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rick Edgecombe</name>
<email>rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-11T16:15:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6123a4e8e25bd40cf44db14694abac00e6b664e6'/>
<id>6123a4e8e25bd40cf44db14694abac00e6b664e6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 03f5a999adba062456c8c818a683beb1b498983a ]

In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an
error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to
take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared)
memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security
issues.

VMBus code could free decrypted pages if set_memory_encrypted()/decrypted()
fails. Leak the pages if this happens.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe &lt;rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311161558.1310-2-mhklinux@outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20240311161558.1310-2-mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 03f5a999adba062456c8c818a683beb1b498983a ]

In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an
error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to
take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared)
memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security
issues.

VMBus code could free decrypted pages if set_memory_encrypted()/decrypted()
fails. Leak the pages if this happens.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe &lt;rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan &lt;sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311161558.1310-2-mhklinux@outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20240311161558.1310-2-mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/hyperv: Use per cpu initial stack for vtl context</title>
<updated>2024-03-26T22:20:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Saurabh Sengar</name>
<email>ssengar@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-03T08:01:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3d6af30f177f8c3417437ca963992075f6c18bec'/>
<id>3d6af30f177f8c3417437ca963992075f6c18bec</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2b4b90e053a29057fb05ba81acce26bddce8d404 ]

Currently, the secondary CPUs in Hyper-V VTL context lack support for
parallel startup. Therefore, relying on the single initial_stack fetched
from the current task structure suffices for all vCPUs.

However, common initial_stack risks stack corruption when parallel startup
is enabled. In order to facilitate parallel startup, use the initial_stack
from the per CPU idle thread instead of the current task.

Fixes: 3be1bc2fe9d2 ("x86/hyperv: VTL support for Hyper-V")
Signed-off-by: Saurabh Sengar &lt;ssengar@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1709452896-13342-1-git-send-email-ssengar@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;1709452896-13342-1-git-send-email-ssengar@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2b4b90e053a29057fb05ba81acce26bddce8d404 ]

Currently, the secondary CPUs in Hyper-V VTL context lack support for
parallel startup. Therefore, relying on the single initial_stack fetched
from the current task structure suffices for all vCPUs.

However, common initial_stack risks stack corruption when parallel startup
is enabled. In order to facilitate parallel startup, use the initial_stack
from the per CPU idle thread instead of the current task.

Fixes: 3be1bc2fe9d2 ("x86/hyperv: VTL support for Hyper-V")
Signed-off-by: Saurabh Sengar &lt;ssengar@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1709452896-13342-1-git-send-email-ssengar@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;1709452896-13342-1-git-send-email-ssengar@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'hyperv-next-signed-20230902' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux</title>
<updated>2023-09-04T18:26:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-04T18:26:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0b90c5637dfea8a08f87db5dd16000eb679013a3'/>
<id>0b90c5637dfea8a08f87db5dd16000eb679013a3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull hyperv updates from Wei Liu:

 - Support for SEV-SNP guests on Hyper-V (Tianyu Lan)

 - Support for TDX guests on Hyper-V (Dexuan Cui)

 - Use SBRM API in Hyper-V balloon driver (Mitchell Levy)

 - Avoid dereferencing ACPI root object handle in VMBus driver (Maciej
   Szmigiero)

 - A few misecllaneous fixes (Jiapeng Chong, Nathan Chancellor, Saurabh
   Sengar)

* tag 'hyperv-next-signed-20230902' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux: (24 commits)
  x86/hyperv: Remove duplicate include
  x86/hyperv: Move the code in ivm.c around to avoid unnecessary ifdef's
  x86/hyperv: Remove hv_isolation_type_en_snp
  x86/hyperv: Use TDX GHCI to access some MSRs in a TDX VM with the paravisor
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bring the post_msg_page back for TDX VMs with the paravisor
  x86/hyperv: Introduce a global variable hyperv_paravisor_present
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Support &gt;64 VPs for a fully enlightened TDX/SNP VM
  x86/hyperv: Fix serial console interrupts for fully enlightened TDX guests
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Support fully enlightened TDX guests
  x86/hyperv: Support hypercalls for fully enlightened TDX guests
  x86/hyperv: Add hv_isolation_type_tdx() to detect TDX guests
  x86/hyperv: Fix undefined reference to isolation_type_en_snp without CONFIG_HYPERV
  x86/hyperv: Add missing 'inline' to hv_snp_boot_ap() stub
  hv: hyperv.h: Replace one-element array with flexible-array member
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Don't dereference ACPI root object handle
  x86/hyperv: Add hyperv-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
  x86/hyperv: Add smp support for SEV-SNP guest
  clocksource: hyper-v: Mark hyperv tsc page unencrypted in sev-snp enlightened guest
  x86/hyperv: Use vmmcall to implement Hyper-V hypercall in sev-snp enlightened guest
  drivers: hv: Mark percpu hvcall input arg page unencrypted in SEV-SNP enlightened guest
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull hyperv updates from Wei Liu:

 - Support for SEV-SNP guests on Hyper-V (Tianyu Lan)

 - Support for TDX guests on Hyper-V (Dexuan Cui)

 - Use SBRM API in Hyper-V balloon driver (Mitchell Levy)

 - Avoid dereferencing ACPI root object handle in VMBus driver (Maciej
   Szmigiero)

 - A few misecllaneous fixes (Jiapeng Chong, Nathan Chancellor, Saurabh
   Sengar)

* tag 'hyperv-next-signed-20230902' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux: (24 commits)
  x86/hyperv: Remove duplicate include
  x86/hyperv: Move the code in ivm.c around to avoid unnecessary ifdef's
  x86/hyperv: Remove hv_isolation_type_en_snp
  x86/hyperv: Use TDX GHCI to access some MSRs in a TDX VM with the paravisor
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bring the post_msg_page back for TDX VMs with the paravisor
  x86/hyperv: Introduce a global variable hyperv_paravisor_present
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Support &gt;64 VPs for a fully enlightened TDX/SNP VM
  x86/hyperv: Fix serial console interrupts for fully enlightened TDX guests
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Support fully enlightened TDX guests
  x86/hyperv: Support hypercalls for fully enlightened TDX guests
  x86/hyperv: Add hv_isolation_type_tdx() to detect TDX guests
  x86/hyperv: Fix undefined reference to isolation_type_en_snp without CONFIG_HYPERV
  x86/hyperv: Add missing 'inline' to hv_snp_boot_ap() stub
  hv: hyperv.h: Replace one-element array with flexible-array member
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Don't dereference ACPI root object handle
  x86/hyperv: Add hyperv-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
  x86/hyperv: Add smp support for SEV-SNP guest
  clocksource: hyper-v: Mark hyperv tsc page unencrypted in sev-snp enlightened guest
  x86/hyperv: Use vmmcall to implement Hyper-V hypercall in sev-snp enlightened guest
  drivers: hv: Mark percpu hvcall input arg page unencrypted in SEV-SNP enlightened guest
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/hyperv: Remove hv_isolation_type_en_snp</title>
<updated>2023-08-25T00:04:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dexuan Cui</name>
<email>decui@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-24T08:07:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e3131f1c81448a87e08dffd21867312a5ce563d9'/>
<id>e3131f1c81448a87e08dffd21867312a5ce563d9</id>
<content type='text'>
In ms_hyperv_init_platform(), do not distinguish between a SNP VM with
the paravisor and a SNP VM without the paravisor.

Replace hv_isolation_type_en_snp() with
!ms_hyperv.paravisor_present &amp;&amp; hv_isolation_type_snp().

The hv_isolation_type_en_snp() in drivers/hv/hv.c and
drivers/hv/hv_common.c can be changed to hv_isolation_type_snp() since
we know !ms_hyperv.paravisor_present is true there.

Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mikelley@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan &lt;tiala@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230824080712.30327-10-decui@microsoft.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In ms_hyperv_init_platform(), do not distinguish between a SNP VM with
the paravisor and a SNP VM without the paravisor.

Replace hv_isolation_type_en_snp() with
!ms_hyperv.paravisor_present &amp;&amp; hv_isolation_type_snp().

The hv_isolation_type_en_snp() in drivers/hv/hv.c and
drivers/hv/hv_common.c can be changed to hv_isolation_type_snp() since
we know !ms_hyperv.paravisor_present is true there.

Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mikelley@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan &lt;tiala@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230824080712.30327-10-decui@microsoft.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bring the post_msg_page back for TDX VMs with the paravisor</title>
<updated>2023-08-25T00:04:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dexuan Cui</name>
<email>decui@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-24T08:07:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=23378295042a4bcaeec350733a4771678e7a1f3a'/>
<id>23378295042a4bcaeec350733a4771678e7a1f3a</id>
<content type='text'>
The post_msg_page was removed in
commit 9a6b1a170ca8 ("Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove the per-CPU post_msg_page")

However, it turns out that we need to bring it back, but only for a TDX VM
with the paravisor: in such a VM, the hyperv_pcpu_input_arg is not decrypted,
but the HVCALL_POST_MESSAGE in such a VM needs a decrypted page as the
hypercall input page: see the comments in hyperv_init() for a detailed
explanation.

Except for HVCALL_POST_MESSAGE and HVCALL_SIGNAL_EVENT, the other hypercalls
in a TDX VM with the paravisor still use hv_hypercall_pg and must use the
hyperv_pcpu_input_arg (which is encrypted in such a VM), when a hypercall
input page is used.

Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan &lt;tiala@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mikelley@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230824080712.30327-8-decui@microsoft.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The post_msg_page was removed in
commit 9a6b1a170ca8 ("Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove the per-CPU post_msg_page")

However, it turns out that we need to bring it back, but only for a TDX VM
with the paravisor: in such a VM, the hyperv_pcpu_input_arg is not decrypted,
but the HVCALL_POST_MESSAGE in such a VM needs a decrypted page as the
hypercall input page: see the comments in hyperv_init() for a detailed
explanation.

Except for HVCALL_POST_MESSAGE and HVCALL_SIGNAL_EVENT, the other hypercalls
in a TDX VM with the paravisor still use hv_hypercall_pg and must use the
hyperv_pcpu_input_arg (which is encrypted in such a VM), when a hypercall
input page is used.

Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan &lt;tiala@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mikelley@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230824080712.30327-8-decui@microsoft.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
