<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/hid, branch v6.18.49</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:31:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Raman Varabets</name>
<email>kernel-linux-20260610-80b7ab08@raman.v1.sg</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-26T15:11:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a8e1f970f9040294cfd9100c681c32af6c2aeec0'/>
<id>a8e1f970f9040294cfd9100c681c32af6c2aeec0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bf3e39df3a397fd82967a31d17c4e02c7feab221 ]

ft260_i2c_read() points dev-&gt;read_buf at a caller-supplied buffer
(often an on-stack variable), arms a completion and waits up to five
seconds for the device to return the data. The HID input callback
ft260_raw_event() runs in the input/IRQ path, independent of the
dev-&gt;lock mutex held by the read path, and copies the device-supplied
payload into dev-&gt;read_buf after a plain NULL check.

These two paths share read_buf, read_idx and read_len with no
serialization. If the device delays its response until the read
times out, ft260_i2c_read() resets the controller, clears read_buf
and returns, unwinding the stack frame the buffer lived in. A
response that arrives at that moment lets ft260_raw_event() pass the
NULL check and then memcpy() the device-controlled payload into the
now-freed stack location, a bounded but attacker-influenced
stack-use-after-return write triggerable by malicious or
malfunctioning hardware.

Add a dedicated spinlock that serializes every access to read_buf,
read_idx and read_len. ft260_raw_event() now holds it across the
NULL check, the memcpy and the index update, while the read path
takes it when arming and when clearing the buffer, so the teardown
can no longer slip between the check and the copy.

Fixes: 6a82582d9fa4 ("HID: ft260: add usb hid to i2c host bridge driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Raman Varabets &lt;kernel-linux-20260610-80b7ab08@raman.v1.sg&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael Zaidman &lt;michael.zaidman@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit bf3e39df3a397fd82967a31d17c4e02c7feab221 ]

ft260_i2c_read() points dev-&gt;read_buf at a caller-supplied buffer
(often an on-stack variable), arms a completion and waits up to five
seconds for the device to return the data. The HID input callback
ft260_raw_event() runs in the input/IRQ path, independent of the
dev-&gt;lock mutex held by the read path, and copies the device-supplied
payload into dev-&gt;read_buf after a plain NULL check.

These two paths share read_buf, read_idx and read_len with no
serialization. If the device delays its response until the read
times out, ft260_i2c_read() resets the controller, clears read_buf
and returns, unwinding the stack frame the buffer lived in. A
response that arrives at that moment lets ft260_raw_event() pass the
NULL check and then memcpy() the device-controlled payload into the
now-freed stack location, a bounded but attacker-influenced
stack-use-after-return write triggerable by malicious or
malfunctioning hardware.

Add a dedicated spinlock that serializes every access to read_buf,
read_idx and read_len. ft260_raw_event() now holds it across the
NULL check, the memcpy and the index update, while the read path
takes it when arming and when clearing the buffer, so the teardown
can no longer slip between the check and the copy.

Fixes: 6a82582d9fa4 ("HID: ft260: add usb hid to i2c host bridge driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Raman Varabets &lt;kernel-linux-20260610-80b7ab08@raman.v1.sg&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael Zaidman &lt;michael.zaidman@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: ft260: validate i2c input report length</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:31:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Zaidman</name>
<email>michael.zaidman@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-26T15:11:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=30c37ac21a458262e014a3c649234dd46ef0ce75'/>
<id>30c37ac21a458262e014a3c649234dd46ef0ce75</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 80c4bbb2b38513e9c3d84805fa61a0ee16d79c45 ]

Add two checks to ft260_raw_event() to prevent out-of-bounds reads
from malicious or malfunctioning devices:

First, reject reports shorter than the 2-byte header (report ID +
length fields). Without this, even accessing xfer-&gt;length on a
1-byte report is an OOB read.

Second, validate xfer-&gt;length against the actual data capacity of
the received HID report. Each I2C data report ID (0xD0 through
0xDE) defines a different report size in the HID descriptor, so the
available payload varies per report. A corrupted length field could
cause memcpy to read beyond the report buffer.

Reported-by: Sebastián Josué Alba Vives &lt;sebasjosue84@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman &lt;michael.zaidman@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 80c4bbb2b38513e9c3d84805fa61a0ee16d79c45 ]

Add two checks to ft260_raw_event() to prevent out-of-bounds reads
from malicious or malfunctioning devices:

First, reject reports shorter than the 2-byte header (report ID +
length fields). Without this, even accessing xfer-&gt;length on a
1-byte report is an OOB read.

Second, validate xfer-&gt;length against the actual data capacity of
the received HID report. Each I2C data report ID (0xD0 through
0xDE) defines a different report size in the HID descriptor, so the
available payload varies per report. A corrupted length field could
cause memcpy to read beyond the report buffer.

Reported-by: Sebastián Josué Alba Vives &lt;sebasjosue84@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Zaidman &lt;michael.zaidman@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: bf3e39df3a39 ("HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: asus: fix missing hid_is_usb() check</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:31:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-26T13:46:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8b5debb6252cd1e2b6c7adf8f95761a0e743d2cf'/>
<id>8b5debb6252cd1e2b6c7adf8f95761a0e743d2cf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 02bf61dfb44f17ec187d1da1a82495951bbd12df ]

to_usb_interface() can only be used on a hid_device whose parent is really
USB; uhid can create devices that identify as being on BUS_USB, but don't
actually have a USB parent.
Fix the use of to_usb_interface() without a hid_is_usb() check.

I have verified that it is currently possible to trigger a kernel splat due
to this bug in an ASAN build, and that this commit fixes the issue.

Fixes: 00e005c952f7 ("hid-asus: check ROG Ally MCU version and warn")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 02bf61dfb44f17ec187d1da1a82495951bbd12df ]

to_usb_interface() can only be used on a hid_device whose parent is really
USB; uhid can create devices that identify as being on BUS_USB, but don't
actually have a USB parent.
Fix the use of to_usb_interface() without a hid_is_usb() check.

I have verified that it is currently possible to trigger a kernel splat due
to this bug in an ASAN build, and that this commit fixes the issue.

Fixes: 00e005c952f7 ("hid-asus: check ROG Ally MCU version and warn")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: asus: simplify RGB init sequence</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:31:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Antheas Kapenekakis</name>
<email>lkml@antheas.dev</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-26T13:46:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d0754db7883c81d340c8a0185ce8b0a2ba0e3cf4'/>
<id>d0754db7883c81d340c8a0185ce8b0a2ba0e3cf4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 56d1b33e644cca1bedffbc73d28778ed4ae30f64 ]

Currently, RGB initialization forks depending on whether a device is
NKEY. However, in reality both initialization forks are the same, other
than the NKEY initialization initializing the LED_REPORT_ID1,
LED_REPORT_ID2 endpoints, and the non-NKEY initialization having a
functionality check which is skipped for the NKEY path.

Therefore, merge the if blocks, gate the ID1/ID2 initializations
behind the NKEY quirk instead, and introduce the functionality check
for NKEY devices (it is supported by them).

There should be no functional change with this patch.

Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires &lt;bentiss@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Antheas Kapenekakis &lt;lkml@antheas.dev&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260122075044.5070-2-lkml@antheas.dev
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen &lt;ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen &lt;ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 02bf61dfb44f ("HID: asus: fix missing hid_is_usb() check")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 56d1b33e644cca1bedffbc73d28778ed4ae30f64 ]

Currently, RGB initialization forks depending on whether a device is
NKEY. However, in reality both initialization forks are the same, other
than the NKEY initialization initializing the LED_REPORT_ID1,
LED_REPORT_ID2 endpoints, and the non-NKEY initialization having a
functionality check which is skipped for the NKEY path.

Therefore, merge the if blocks, gate the ID1/ID2 initializations
behind the NKEY quirk instead, and introduce the functionality check
for NKEY devices (it is supported by them).

There should be no functional change with this patch.

Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires &lt;bentiss@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Antheas Kapenekakis &lt;lkml@antheas.dev&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260122075044.5070-2-lkml@antheas.dev
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen &lt;ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen &lt;ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 02bf61dfb44f ("HID: asus: fix missing hid_is_usb() check")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: magicmouse: prevent unbounded recursion in magicmouse_raw_event()</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:31:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jose Villaseñor Montfort</name>
<email>pepemontfort@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-26T11:21:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=70589b0c005db003f6d8ae4db3c4d54fed7b83e4'/>
<id>70589b0c005db003f6d8ae4db3c4d54fed7b83e4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit db8d634128d2ba88d79c0b601e983ebe14bb0519 ]

magicmouse_raw_event() handles DOUBLE_REPORT_ID (0xf7) packets, which pack
two touch reports into one, by splitting the packet and calling itself on
each half. The only guard against runaway recursion is a "size &lt; 1" check,
which stops zero-sized calls but does not bound the recursion depth.

A malicious HID device that matches this driver can send a report starting
with DOUBLE_REPORT_ID and filled with the sequence [0xf7, 0x00]. Each level
consumes two bytes and recurses on the remainder, so an incoming report of
up to HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16 KiB) drives roughly 8000 nested calls. That
easily exhausts the 16 KiB kernel stack, leading to a stack overflow: a
panic with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK, or memory corruption without it.

A double report only ever wraps two normal reports; it is never
legitimately nested. Refuse to re-enter the DOUBLE_REPORT_ID case from a
recursive call so the recursion depth is bounded to two, while all valid
packets keep being parsed exactly as before.

Fixes: a462230e16ac ("HID: magicmouse: enable Magic Trackpad support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-input/20260706181347.700DB1F00A3F@smtp.kernel.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jose Villaseñor Montfort &lt;pepemontfort@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alec Hall &lt;signshop.alec@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alec Hall &lt;signshop.alec@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit db8d634128d2ba88d79c0b601e983ebe14bb0519 ]

magicmouse_raw_event() handles DOUBLE_REPORT_ID (0xf7) packets, which pack
two touch reports into one, by splitting the packet and calling itself on
each half. The only guard against runaway recursion is a "size &lt; 1" check,
which stops zero-sized calls but does not bound the recursion depth.

A malicious HID device that matches this driver can send a report starting
with DOUBLE_REPORT_ID and filled with the sequence [0xf7, 0x00]. Each level
consumes two bytes and recurses on the remainder, so an incoming report of
up to HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16 KiB) drives roughly 8000 nested calls. That
easily exhausts the 16 KiB kernel stack, leading to a stack overflow: a
panic with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK, or memory corruption without it.

A double report only ever wraps two normal reports; it is never
legitimately nested. Refuse to re-enter the DOUBLE_REPORT_ID case from a
recursive call so the recursion depth is bounded to two, while all valid
packets keep being parsed exactly as before.

Fixes: a462230e16ac ("HID: magicmouse: enable Magic Trackpad support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-input/20260706181347.700DB1F00A3F@smtp.kernel.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jose Villaseñor Montfort &lt;pepemontfort@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alec Hall &lt;signshop.alec@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alec Hall &lt;signshop.alec@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: hyperv: validate initial device info bounds</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:32:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-10T02:28:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=608f8fd8c0f7b6268da43509447802955f210aac'/>
<id>608f8fd8c0f7b6268da43509447802955f210aac</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 934b7778aa7b7c8f6bb073d2a73ba3674885bae0 upstream.

The Hyper-V synthetic HID host supplies SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO
messages that contain a HID descriptor followed by the report descriptor
bytes. mousevsc_on_receive_device_info() trusts bLength and
wDescriptorLength without checking that the received packet contains both
byte ranges.

A malformed host or backend message can therefore make the guest read
past the received VMBus packet while copying the report descriptor. Pass
the received initial-device-info size into the parser and reject
descriptor lengths that exceed the packet.

Impact: A malicious Hyper-V host or backend can crash a guest by sending
a short initial device-info message with an oversized HID report
descriptor length.

Fixes: b95f5bcb811e ("HID: Move the hid-hyperv driver out of staging")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 934b7778aa7b7c8f6bb073d2a73ba3674885bae0 upstream.

The Hyper-V synthetic HID host supplies SYNTH_HID_INITIAL_DEVICE_INFO
messages that contain a HID descriptor followed by the report descriptor
bytes. mousevsc_on_receive_device_info() trusts bLength and
wDescriptorLength without checking that the received packet contains both
byte ranges.

A malformed host or backend message can therefore make the guest read
past the received VMBus packet while copying the report descriptor. Pass
the received initial-device-info size into the parser and reject
descriptor lengths that exceed the packet.

Impact: A malicious Hyper-V host or backend can crash a guest by sending
a short initial device-info message with an oversized HID report
descriptor length.

Fixes: b95f5bcb811e ("HID: Move the hid-hyperv driver out of staging")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: uclogic: fix use-after-free of inrange_timer on remove</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:32:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ibrahim Hashimov</name>
<email>security@auditcode.ai</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-14T17:39:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=849e537160bbb77fe419ecc3944bfe125dcd441b'/>
<id>849e537160bbb77fe419ecc3944bfe125dcd441b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 506fd50a9027340f0e9dcc587d10ccb03312dba6 upstream.

uclogic_remove() cancels the pen in-range timer and then stops the
device:

	timer_delete_sync(&amp;drvdata-&gt;inrange_timer);
	hid_hw_stop(hdev);

timer_delete_sync() only guarantees the timer is idle at that instant.
uclogic_raw_event_pen() keeps delivering pen reports until hid_hw_stop()
stops the transport several lines later, and every report with
pen-&gt;inrange == UCLOGIC_PARAMS_PEN_INRANGE_NONE re-arms the timer:

	mod_timer(&amp;drvdata-&gt;inrange_timer, jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(100));

A report landing between the timer_delete_sync() call and the transport
teardown in hid_hw_stop() re-arms inrange_timer after it was cancelled.
uclogic_remove() then returns and the devm drvdata is freed, while
hid_hw_stop() has already freed the input device drvdata-&gt;pen_input
points at, so when the timer fires ~100 ms later
uclogic_inrange_timeout() dereferences freed memory -- a use-after-free
in timer-softirq context.

Swapping the two calls is not a fix: stopping the device first frees
drvdata-&gt;pen_input via hidinput_disconnect() while the timer may still
be pending, so a timer already armed before removal fires on the freed
input device in the window before timer_delete_sync() runs.

Use timer_shutdown_sync() before hid_hw_stop() instead. It cancels the
timer, waits for a running callback while pen_input is still valid, and
prevents any further re-arming -- a later mod_timer() from an in-flight
report is silently ignored -- so the timer is provably dead before
hid_hw_stop() frees the inputs. This is the ordering the timer core
documents for this "timer re-armed from another path" teardown case.

Fixes: 01309e29eb95 ("HID: uclogic: Support in-range reporting emulation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov &lt;security@auditcode.ai&gt;
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 506fd50a9027340f0e9dcc587d10ccb03312dba6 upstream.

uclogic_remove() cancels the pen in-range timer and then stops the
device:

	timer_delete_sync(&amp;drvdata-&gt;inrange_timer);
	hid_hw_stop(hdev);

timer_delete_sync() only guarantees the timer is idle at that instant.
uclogic_raw_event_pen() keeps delivering pen reports until hid_hw_stop()
stops the transport several lines later, and every report with
pen-&gt;inrange == UCLOGIC_PARAMS_PEN_INRANGE_NONE re-arms the timer:

	mod_timer(&amp;drvdata-&gt;inrange_timer, jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(100));

A report landing between the timer_delete_sync() call and the transport
teardown in hid_hw_stop() re-arms inrange_timer after it was cancelled.
uclogic_remove() then returns and the devm drvdata is freed, while
hid_hw_stop() has already freed the input device drvdata-&gt;pen_input
points at, so when the timer fires ~100 ms later
uclogic_inrange_timeout() dereferences freed memory -- a use-after-free
in timer-softirq context.

Swapping the two calls is not a fix: stopping the device first frees
drvdata-&gt;pen_input via hidinput_disconnect() while the timer may still
be pending, so a timer already armed before removal fires on the freed
input device in the window before timer_delete_sync() runs.

Use timer_shutdown_sync() before hid_hw_stop() instead. It cancels the
timer, waits for a running callback while pen_input is still valid, and
prevents any further re-arming -- a later mod_timer() from an in-flight
report is silently ignored -- so the timer is provably dead before
hid_hw_stop() frees the inputs. This is the ordering the timer core
documents for this "timer re-armed from another path" teardown case.

Fixes: 01309e29eb95 ("HID: uclogic: Support in-range reporting emulation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov &lt;security@auditcode.ai&gt;
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: sensor: custom: Fix use-after-free in enable_sensor</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:32:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Haoxiang Li</name>
<email>haoxiang_li2024@163.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-07T07:15:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8406d4b69d48bc72fb6f8812a65a17a1f903440b'/>
<id>8406d4b69d48bc72fb6f8812a65a17a1f903440b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ad8fb82b04422f49530d2aa2753cc81d1c60102c upstream.

enable_sensor_store() can call set_power_report_state(), which
dereferences sensor_inst-&gt;power_state and sensor_inst-&gt;report_state.
These pointers refer to entries in sensor_inst-&gt;fields.

Create the field attributes before exposing the enable_sensor sysfs
attribute, so enable_sensor cannot be accessed before the state it
depends on has been initialized.

On remove, delete enable_sensor before freeing the field attributes,
so a concurrent sysfs write cannot dereference freed memory through
power_state or report_state.

Reported-by: Sashiko AI Review &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260623021950.1736413-1-haoxiang_li2024@163.com?part=1
Fixes: 4a7de0519df5 ("HID: sensor: Custom and Generic sensor support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li &lt;haoxiang_li2024@163.com&gt;
Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada &lt;srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ad8fb82b04422f49530d2aa2753cc81d1c60102c upstream.

enable_sensor_store() can call set_power_report_state(), which
dereferences sensor_inst-&gt;power_state and sensor_inst-&gt;report_state.
These pointers refer to entries in sensor_inst-&gt;fields.

Create the field attributes before exposing the enable_sensor sysfs
attribute, so enable_sensor cannot be accessed before the state it
depends on has been initialized.

On remove, delete enable_sensor before freeing the field attributes,
so a concurrent sysfs write cannot dereference freed memory through
power_state or report_state.

Reported-by: Sashiko AI Review &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260623021950.1736413-1-haoxiang_li2024@163.com?part=1
Fixes: 4a7de0519df5 ("HID: sensor: Custom and Generic sensor support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li &lt;haoxiang_li2024@163.com&gt;
Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada &lt;srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: core: fix number/pointer type confusion on long items</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:32:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-03T18:30:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1fa1591efd417e39e5e164bebea8ca7a3837c469'/>
<id>1fa1591efd417e39e5e164bebea8ca7a3837c469</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 28abce951343fcec26e397610868efa4e1395c3f upstream.

When fetch_item() is called by hid_scan_report() on an item with
HID_ITEM_TAG_LONG, it stores a pointer to the item data in
item-&gt;data.longdata instead of storing a value directly in
item-&gt;data.{u8/u16/u32}.

When item_udata() or item_sdata() encounters such an item, it incorrectly
assumes that the item is in short format, and therefore returns the lower
part of a kernel pointer reinterpreted as a number.

When a HID device is connected whose descriptor contains a
HID_GLOBAL_ITEM_TAG_REPORT_SIZE encoded in long format with size=4, this
causes the lower half of a kernel pointer to be printed into dmesg as a
number, like this:

    hid (null): invalid report_size 107953555

To fix it, let item_udata() and item_sdata() verify that the item is in
short format.

Note that this bug only affects hid_scan_report(), while the main parsing
pass hid_parse_collections() will always bail out when encountering a long
item.

Sidenote: There are currently no users of data.longdata; maybe we should
just remove any parsing of long-format descriptors as a follow-up.

Fixes: 3dc8fc083dbf ("HID: Use hid_parser for pre-scanning the report descriptors")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 28abce951343fcec26e397610868efa4e1395c3f upstream.

When fetch_item() is called by hid_scan_report() on an item with
HID_ITEM_TAG_LONG, it stores a pointer to the item data in
item-&gt;data.longdata instead of storing a value directly in
item-&gt;data.{u8/u16/u32}.

When item_udata() or item_sdata() encounters such an item, it incorrectly
assumes that the item is in short format, and therefore returns the lower
part of a kernel pointer reinterpreted as a number.

When a HID device is connected whose descriptor contains a
HID_GLOBAL_ITEM_TAG_REPORT_SIZE encoded in long format with size=4, this
causes the lower half of a kernel pointer to be printed into dmesg as a
number, like this:

    hid (null): invalid report_size 107953555

To fix it, let item_udata() and item_sdata() verify that the item is in
short format.

Note that this bug only affects hid_scan_report(), while the main parsing
pass hid_parse_collections() will always bail out when encountering a long
item.

Sidenote: There are currently no users of data.longdata; maybe we should
just remove any parsing of long-format descriptors as a follow-up.

Fixes: 3dc8fc083dbf ("HID: Use hid_parser for pre-scanning the report descriptors")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: nintendo: stop device IO before hid_hw_stop on probe failure</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:32:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiangshan Yi</name>
<email>yijiangshan@kylinos.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-30T03:19:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5efcd7bbfaaec67d137c99aa0940fa34375db27f'/>
<id>5efcd7bbfaaec67d137c99aa0940fa34375db27f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1f74d3bff6fe04a64e02ab3661d2e0d554565aa6 upstream.

nintendo_hid_probe() calls hid_device_io_start() before joycon_init()
and joycon_leds_create().  If either fails, the error path jumps to
err_close which calls hid_hw_close()/hid_hw_stop() without first calling
hid_device_io_stop().

hid_hw_stop() does not stop device IO, so hid_input_report() may still
run and access driver data that is being torn down, resulting in a
use-after-free.

Add an err_io_stop label that calls hid_device_io_stop() before
hid_hw_close(), and point the two post-io_start error paths at it.

Fixes: 2af16c1f846b ("HID: nintendo: add nintendo switch controller driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiangshan Yi &lt;yijiangshan@kylinos.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1f74d3bff6fe04a64e02ab3661d2e0d554565aa6 upstream.

nintendo_hid_probe() calls hid_device_io_start() before joycon_init()
and joycon_leds_create().  If either fails, the error path jumps to
err_close which calls hid_hw_close()/hid_hw_stop() without first calling
hid_device_io_stop().

hid_hw_stop() does not stop device IO, so hid_input_report() may still
run and access driver data that is being torn down, resulting in a
use-after-free.

Add an err_io_stop label that calls hid_device_io_stop() before
hid_hw_close(), and point the two post-io_start error paths at it.

Fixes: 2af16c1f846b ("HID: nintendo: add nintendo switch controller driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiangshan Yi &lt;yijiangshan@kylinos.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
