<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/firmware/efi, branch linux-4.6.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>efi: Fix out-of-bounds read in variable_matches()</title>
<updated>2016-04-22T18:41:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Laszlo Ersek</name>
<email>lersek@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-21T16:21:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=630ba0cc7a6dbafbdee43795617c872b35cde1b4'/>
<id>630ba0cc7a6dbafbdee43795617c872b35cde1b4</id>
<content type='text'>
The variable_matches() function can currently read "var_name[len]", for
example when:

 - var_name[0] == 'a',
 - len == 1
 - match_name points to the NUL-terminated string "ab".

This function is supposed to accept "var_name" inputs that are not
NUL-terminated (hence the "len" parameter"). Document the function, and
access "var_name[*match]" only if "*match" is smaller than "len".

Reported-by: Chris Wilson &lt;chris@chris-wilson.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek &lt;lersek@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@coreos.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Andryuk &lt;jandryuk@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jani Nikula &lt;jani.nikula@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.10+
Link: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.freedesktop.xorg.drivers.intel/86906
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The variable_matches() function can currently read "var_name[len]", for
example when:

 - var_name[0] == 'a',
 - len == 1
 - match_name points to the NUL-terminated string "ab".

This function is supposed to accept "var_name" inputs that are not
NUL-terminated (hence the "len" parameter"). Document the function, and
access "var_name[*match]" only if "*match" is smaller than "len".

Reported-by: Chris Wilson &lt;chris@chris-wilson.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek &lt;lersek@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@coreos.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Andryuk &lt;jandryuk@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jani Nikula &lt;jani.nikula@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.10+
Link: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.freedesktop.xorg.drivers.intel/86906
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efi/arm64: Don't apply MEMBLOCK_NOMAP to UEFI memory map mapping</title>
<updated>2016-03-31T20:33:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-30T07:46:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7cc8cbcf82d165dd658d89a7a287140948e76413'/>
<id>7cc8cbcf82d165dd658d89a7a287140948e76413</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 4dffbfc48d65 ("arm64/efi: mark UEFI reserved regions as
MEMBLOCK_NOMAP") updated the mapping logic of both the RuntimeServices
regions as well as the kernel's copy of the UEFI memory map to set the
MEMBLOCK_NOMAP flag, which causes these regions to be omitted from the
kernel direct mapping, and from being covered by a struct page.
For the RuntimeServices regions, this is an obvious win, since the contents
of these regions have significance to the firmware executable code itself,
and are mapped in the EFI page tables using attributes that are described in
the UEFI memory map, and which may differ from the attributes we use for
mapping system RAM. It also prevents the contents from being modified
inadvertently, since the EFI page tables are only live during runtime
service invocations.

None of these concerns apply to the allocation that covers the UEFI memory
map, since it is entirely owned by the kernel. Setting the MEMBLOCK_NOMAP on
the region did allow us to use ioremap_cache() to map it both on arm64 and
on ARM, since the latter does not allow ioremap_cache() to be used on
regions that are covered by a struct page.

The ioremap_cache() on ARM restriction will be lifted in the v4.7 timeframe,
but in the mean time, it has been reported that commit 4dffbfc48d65 causes
a regression on 64k granule kernels. This is due to the fact that, given
the 64 KB page size, the region that we end up removing from the kernel
direct mapping is rounded up to 64 KB, and this 64 KB page frame may be
shared with the initrd when booting via GRUB (which does not align its
EFI_LOADER_DATA allocations to 64 KB like the stub does). This will crash
the kernel as soon as it tries to access the initrd.

Since the issue is specific to arm64, revert back to memblock_reserve()'ing
the UEFI memory map when running on arm64. This is a temporary fix for v4.5
and v4.6, and will be superseded in the v4.7 timeframe when we will be able
to move back to memblock_reserve() unconditionally.

Fixes: 4dffbfc48d65 ("arm64/efi: mark UEFI reserved regions as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP")
Reported-by: Mark Salter &lt;msalter@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Leif Lindholm &lt;leif.lindholm@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Jeremy Linton &lt;jeremy.linton@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Langsdorf &lt;mlangsdo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.5
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 4dffbfc48d65 ("arm64/efi: mark UEFI reserved regions as
MEMBLOCK_NOMAP") updated the mapping logic of both the RuntimeServices
regions as well as the kernel's copy of the UEFI memory map to set the
MEMBLOCK_NOMAP flag, which causes these regions to be omitted from the
kernel direct mapping, and from being covered by a struct page.
For the RuntimeServices regions, this is an obvious win, since the contents
of these regions have significance to the firmware executable code itself,
and are mapped in the EFI page tables using attributes that are described in
the UEFI memory map, and which may differ from the attributes we use for
mapping system RAM. It also prevents the contents from being modified
inadvertently, since the EFI page tables are only live during runtime
service invocations.

None of these concerns apply to the allocation that covers the UEFI memory
map, since it is entirely owned by the kernel. Setting the MEMBLOCK_NOMAP on
the region did allow us to use ioremap_cache() to map it both on arm64 and
on ARM, since the latter does not allow ioremap_cache() to be used on
regions that are covered by a struct page.

The ioremap_cache() on ARM restriction will be lifted in the v4.7 timeframe,
but in the mean time, it has been reported that commit 4dffbfc48d65 causes
a regression on 64k granule kernels. This is due to the fact that, given
the 64 KB page size, the region that we end up removing from the kernel
direct mapping is rounded up to 64 KB, and this 64 KB page frame may be
shared with the initrd when booting via GRUB (which does not align its
EFI_LOADER_DATA allocations to 64 KB like the stub does). This will crash
the kernel as soon as it tries to access the initrd.

Since the issue is specific to arm64, revert back to memblock_reserve()'ing
the UEFI memory map when running on arm64. This is a temporary fix for v4.5
and v4.6, and will be superseded in the v4.7 timeframe when we will be able
to move back to memblock_reserve() unconditionally.

Fixes: 4dffbfc48d65 ("arm64/efi: mark UEFI reserved regions as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP")
Reported-by: Mark Salter &lt;msalter@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Leif Lindholm &lt;leif.lindholm@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Jeremy Linton &lt;jeremy.linton@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Langsdorf &lt;mlangsdo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.5
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel: add kcov code coverage</title>
<updated>2016-03-22T22:36:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Vyukov</name>
<email>dvyukov@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-22T21:27:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5c9a8750a6409c63a0f01d51a9024861022f6593'/>
<id>5c9a8750a6409c63a0f01d51a9024861022f6593</id>
<content type='text'>
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing).  Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system.  A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/).  However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.

kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible.  It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g.  scheduler, locking).

Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes.  Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch).  I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.

This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side.  The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.

We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:

  https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs

We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation".  For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.

Why not gcov.  Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat.  A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g.  an invalid
input).  In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M).  Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges.  On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.

kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure.  But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.

Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Tavis Ormandy &lt;taviso@google.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas &lt;quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Kostya Serebryany &lt;kcc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@google.com&gt;
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: David Drysdale &lt;drysdale@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill@shutemov.name&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing).  Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system.  A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/).  However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.

kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible.  It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g.  scheduler, locking).

Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes.  Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch).  I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.

This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side.  The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.

We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:

  https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs

We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation".  For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.

Why not gcov.  Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat.  A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g.  an invalid
input).  In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M).  Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges.  On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.

kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure.  But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.

Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Tavis Ormandy &lt;taviso@google.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas &lt;quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Kostya Serebryany &lt;kcc@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@google.com&gt;
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: David Drysdale &lt;drysdale@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill@shutemov.name&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c: use in_compat_syscall() to check for compat callers</title>
<updated>2016-03-22T22:36:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-22T21:25:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4f01ed221e2ef5e7efdb0ac89179b4faf4cc3c86'/>
<id>4f01ed221e2ef5e7efdb0ac89179b4faf4cc3c86</id>
<content type='text'>
This should make no difference on any architecture, as x86's historical
is_compat_task behavior really did check whether the calling syscall was
a compat syscall.  x86's is_compat_task is going away, though.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This should make no difference on any architecture, as x86's historical
is_compat_task behavior really did check whether the calling syscall was
a compat syscall.  x86's is_compat_task is going away, though.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2016-03-21T01:58:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-21T01:58:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=24b5e20f11a75866bbffc46c30a22fa50612a769'/>
<id>24b5e20f11a75866bbffc46c30a22fa50612a769</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull EFI updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes are:

   - Use separate EFI page tables when executing EFI firmware code.
     This isolates the EFI context from the rest of the kernel, which
     has security and general robustness advantages.  (Matt Fleming)

   - Run regular UEFI firmware with interrupts enabled.  This is already
     the status quo under other OSs.  (Ard Biesheuvel)

   - Various x86 EFI enhancements, such as the use of non-executable
     attributes for EFI memory mappings.  (Sai Praneeth Prakhya)

   - Various arm64 UEFI enhancements.  (Ard Biesheuvel)

   - ... various fixes and cleanups.

  The separate EFI page tables feature got delayed twice already,
  because it's an intrusive change and we didn't feel confident about
  it - third time's the charm we hope!"

* 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (37 commits)
  x86/mm/pat: Fix boot crash when 1GB pages are not supported by the CPU
  x86/efi: Only map kernel text for EFI mixed mode
  x86/efi: Map EFI_MEMORY_{XP,RO} memory region bits to EFI page tables
  x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd()
  efi/arm*: Perform hardware compatibility check
  efi/arm64: Check for h/w support before booting a &gt;4 KB granular kernel
  efi/arm: Check for LPAE support before booting a LPAE kernel
  efi/arm-init: Use read-only early mappings
  efi/efistub: Prevent __init annotations from being used
  arm64/vmlinux.lds.S: Handle .init.rodata.xxx and .init.bss sections
  efi/arm64: Drop __init annotation from handle_kernel_image()
  x86/mm/pat: Use _PAGE_GLOBAL bit for EFI page table mappings
  efi/runtime-wrappers: Run UEFI Runtime Services with interrupts enabled
  efi: Reformat GUID tables to follow the format in UEFI spec
  efi: Add Persistent Memory type name
  efi: Add NV memory attribute
  x86/efi: Show actual ending addresses in efi_print_memmap
  x86/efi/bgrt: Don't ignore the BGRT if the 'valid' bit is 0
  efivars: Use to_efivar_entry
  efi: Runtime-wrapper: Get rid of the rtc_lock spinlock
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull EFI updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes are:

   - Use separate EFI page tables when executing EFI firmware code.
     This isolates the EFI context from the rest of the kernel, which
     has security and general robustness advantages.  (Matt Fleming)

   - Run regular UEFI firmware with interrupts enabled.  This is already
     the status quo under other OSs.  (Ard Biesheuvel)

   - Various x86 EFI enhancements, such as the use of non-executable
     attributes for EFI memory mappings.  (Sai Praneeth Prakhya)

   - Various arm64 UEFI enhancements.  (Ard Biesheuvel)

   - ... various fixes and cleanups.

  The separate EFI page tables feature got delayed twice already,
  because it's an intrusive change and we didn't feel confident about
  it - third time's the charm we hope!"

* 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (37 commits)
  x86/mm/pat: Fix boot crash when 1GB pages are not supported by the CPU
  x86/efi: Only map kernel text for EFI mixed mode
  x86/efi: Map EFI_MEMORY_{XP,RO} memory region bits to EFI page tables
  x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd()
  efi/arm*: Perform hardware compatibility check
  efi/arm64: Check for h/w support before booting a &gt;4 KB granular kernel
  efi/arm: Check for LPAE support before booting a LPAE kernel
  efi/arm-init: Use read-only early mappings
  efi/efistub: Prevent __init annotations from being used
  arm64/vmlinux.lds.S: Handle .init.rodata.xxx and .init.bss sections
  efi/arm64: Drop __init annotation from handle_kernel_image()
  x86/mm/pat: Use _PAGE_GLOBAL bit for EFI page table mappings
  efi/runtime-wrappers: Run UEFI Runtime Services with interrupts enabled
  efi: Reformat GUID tables to follow the format in UEFI spec
  efi: Add Persistent Memory type name
  efi: Add NV memory attribute
  x86/efi: Show actual ending addresses in efi_print_memmap
  x86/efi/bgrt: Don't ignore the BGRT if the 'valid' bit is 0
  efivars: Use to_efivar_entry
  efi: Runtime-wrapper: Get rid of the rtc_lock spinlock
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'core-objtool-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2016-03-21T01:23:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-21T01:23:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=26660a4046b171a752e72a1dd32153230234fe3a'/>
<id>26660a4046b171a752e72a1dd32153230234fe3a</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull 'objtool' stack frame validation from Ingo Molnar:
 "This tree adds a new kernel build-time object file validation feature
  (ONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION=y): kernel stack frame correctness validation.
  It was written by and is maintained by Josh Poimboeuf.

  The motivation: there's a category of hard to find kernel bugs, most
  of them in assembly code (but also occasionally in C code), that
  degrades the quality of kernel stack dumps/backtraces.  These bugs are
  hard to detect at the source code level.  Such bugs result in
  incorrect/incomplete backtraces most of time - but can also in some
  rare cases result in crashes or other undefined behavior.

  The build time correctness checking is done via the new 'objtool'
  user-space utility that was written for this purpose and which is
  hosted in the kernel repository in tools/objtool/.  The tool's (very
  simple) UI and source code design is shaped after Git and perf and
  shares quite a bit of infrastructure with tools/perf (which tooling
  infrastructure sharing effort got merged via perf and is already
  upstream).  Objtool follows the well-known kernel coding style.

  Objtool does not try to check .c or .S files, it instead analyzes the
  resulting .o generated machine code from first principles: it decodes
  the instruction stream and interprets it.  (Right now objtool supports
  the x86-64 architecture.)

  From tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt:

   "The kernel CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION option enables a host tool named
    objtool which runs at compile time.  It has a "check" subcommand
    which analyzes every .o file and ensures the validity of its stack
    metadata.  It enforces a set of rules on asm code and C inline
    assembly code so that stack traces can be reliable.

    Currently it only checks frame pointer usage, but there are plans to
    add CFI validation for C files and CFI generation for asm files.

    For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths
    and validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.

    It also follows code paths involving special sections, like
    .altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
    alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
    instructions).  Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements,
    for which gcc sometimes uses jump tables."

  When this new kernel option is enabled (it's disabled by default), the
  tool, if it finds any suspicious assembly code pattern, outputs
  warnings in compiler warning format:

    warning: objtool: rtlwifi_rate_mapping()+0x2e7: frame pointer state mismatch
    warning: objtool: cik_tiling_mode_table_init()+0x6ce: call without frame pointer save/setup
    warning: objtool:__schedule()+0x3c0: duplicate frame pointer save
    warning: objtool:__schedule()+0x3fd: sibling call from callable instruction with changed frame pointer

  ... so that scripts that pick up compiler warnings will notice them.
  All known warnings triggered by the tool are fixed by the tree, most
  of the commits in fact prepare the kernel to be warning-free.  Most of
  them are bugfixes or cleanups that stand on their own, but there are
  also some annotations of 'special' stack frames for justified cases
  such entries to JIT-ed code (BPF) or really special boot time code.

  There are two other long-term motivations behind this tool as well:

   - To improve the quality and reliability of kernel stack frames, so
     that they can be used for optimized live patching.

   - To create independent infrastructure to check the correctness of
     CFI stack frames at build time.  CFI debuginfo is notoriously
     unreliable and we cannot use it in the kernel as-is without extra
     checking done both on the kernel side and on the build side.

  The quality of kernel stack frames matters to debuggability as well,
  so IMO we can merge this without having to consider the live patching
  or CFI debuginfo angle"

* 'core-objtool-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (52 commits)
  objtool: Only print one warning per function
  objtool: Add several performance improvements
  tools: Copy hashtable.h into tools directory
  objtool: Fix false positive warnings for functions with multiple switch statements
  objtool: Rename some variables and functions
  objtool: Remove superflous INIT_LIST_HEAD
  objtool: Add helper macros for traversing instructions
  objtool: Fix false positive warnings related to sibling calls
  objtool: Compile with debugging symbols
  objtool: Detect infinite recursion
  objtool: Prevent infinite recursion in noreturn detection
  objtool: Detect and warn if libelf is missing and don't break the build
  tools: Support relative directory path for 'O='
  objtool: Support CROSS_COMPILE
  x86/asm/decoder: Use explicitly signed chars
  objtool: Enable stack metadata validation on 64-bit x86
  objtool: Add CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION option
  objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
  x86/kprobes: Mark kretprobe_trampoline() stack frame as non-standard
  sched: Always inline context_switch()
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull 'objtool' stack frame validation from Ingo Molnar:
 "This tree adds a new kernel build-time object file validation feature
  (ONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION=y): kernel stack frame correctness validation.
  It was written by and is maintained by Josh Poimboeuf.

  The motivation: there's a category of hard to find kernel bugs, most
  of them in assembly code (but also occasionally in C code), that
  degrades the quality of kernel stack dumps/backtraces.  These bugs are
  hard to detect at the source code level.  Such bugs result in
  incorrect/incomplete backtraces most of time - but can also in some
  rare cases result in crashes or other undefined behavior.

  The build time correctness checking is done via the new 'objtool'
  user-space utility that was written for this purpose and which is
  hosted in the kernel repository in tools/objtool/.  The tool's (very
  simple) UI and source code design is shaped after Git and perf and
  shares quite a bit of infrastructure with tools/perf (which tooling
  infrastructure sharing effort got merged via perf and is already
  upstream).  Objtool follows the well-known kernel coding style.

  Objtool does not try to check .c or .S files, it instead analyzes the
  resulting .o generated machine code from first principles: it decodes
  the instruction stream and interprets it.  (Right now objtool supports
  the x86-64 architecture.)

  From tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt:

   "The kernel CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION option enables a host tool named
    objtool which runs at compile time.  It has a "check" subcommand
    which analyzes every .o file and ensures the validity of its stack
    metadata.  It enforces a set of rules on asm code and C inline
    assembly code so that stack traces can be reliable.

    Currently it only checks frame pointer usage, but there are plans to
    add CFI validation for C files and CFI generation for asm files.

    For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths
    and validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.

    It also follows code paths involving special sections, like
    .altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
    alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
    instructions).  Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements,
    for which gcc sometimes uses jump tables."

  When this new kernel option is enabled (it's disabled by default), the
  tool, if it finds any suspicious assembly code pattern, outputs
  warnings in compiler warning format:

    warning: objtool: rtlwifi_rate_mapping()+0x2e7: frame pointer state mismatch
    warning: objtool: cik_tiling_mode_table_init()+0x6ce: call without frame pointer save/setup
    warning: objtool:__schedule()+0x3c0: duplicate frame pointer save
    warning: objtool:__schedule()+0x3fd: sibling call from callable instruction with changed frame pointer

  ... so that scripts that pick up compiler warnings will notice them.
  All known warnings triggered by the tool are fixed by the tree, most
  of the commits in fact prepare the kernel to be warning-free.  Most of
  them are bugfixes or cleanups that stand on their own, but there are
  also some annotations of 'special' stack frames for justified cases
  such entries to JIT-ed code (BPF) or really special boot time code.

  There are two other long-term motivations behind this tool as well:

   - To improve the quality and reliability of kernel stack frames, so
     that they can be used for optimized live patching.

   - To create independent infrastructure to check the correctness of
     CFI stack frames at build time.  CFI debuginfo is notoriously
     unreliable and we cannot use it in the kernel as-is without extra
     checking done both on the kernel side and on the build side.

  The quality of kernel stack frames matters to debuggability as well,
  so IMO we can merge this without having to consider the live patching
  or CFI debuginfo angle"

* 'core-objtool-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (52 commits)
  objtool: Only print one warning per function
  objtool: Add several performance improvements
  tools: Copy hashtable.h into tools directory
  objtool: Fix false positive warnings for functions with multiple switch statements
  objtool: Rename some variables and functions
  objtool: Remove superflous INIT_LIST_HEAD
  objtool: Add helper macros for traversing instructions
  objtool: Fix false positive warnings related to sibling calls
  objtool: Compile with debugging symbols
  objtool: Detect infinite recursion
  objtool: Prevent infinite recursion in noreturn detection
  objtool: Detect and warn if libelf is missing and don't break the build
  tools: Support relative directory path for 'O='
  objtool: Support CROSS_COMPILE
  x86/asm/decoder: Use explicitly signed chars
  objtool: Enable stack metadata validation on 64-bit x86
  objtool: Add CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION option
  objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
  x86/kprobes: Mark kretprobe_trampoline() stack frame as non-standard
  sched: Always inline context_switch()
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux</title>
<updated>2016-03-18T03:03:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-18T03:03:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=588ab3f9afdfa1a6b1e5761c858b2c4ab6098285'/>
<id>588ab3f9afdfa1a6b1e5761c858b2c4ab6098285</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:
 "Here are the main arm64 updates for 4.6.  There are some relatively
  intrusive changes to support KASLR, the reworking of the kernel
  virtual memory layout and initial page table creation.

  Summary:

   - Initial page table creation reworked to avoid breaking large block
     mappings (huge pages) into smaller ones.  The ARM architecture
     requires break-before-make in such cases to avoid TLB conflicts but
     that's not always possible on live page tables

   - Kernel virtual memory layout: the kernel image is no longer linked
     to the bottom of the linear mapping (PAGE_OFFSET) but at the bottom
     of the vmalloc space, allowing the kernel to be loaded (nearly)
     anywhere in physical RAM

   - Kernel ASLR: position independent kernel Image and modules being
     randomly mapped in the vmalloc space with the randomness is
     provided by UEFI (efi_get_random_bytes() patches merged via the
     arm64 tree, acked by Matt Fleming)

   - Implement relative exception tables for arm64, required by KASLR
     (initial code for ARCH_HAS_RELATIVE_EXTABLE added to lib/extable.c
     but actual x86 conversion to deferred to 4.7 because of the merge
     dependencies)

   - Support for the User Access Override feature of ARMv8.2: this
     allows uaccess functions (get_user etc.) to be implemented using
     LDTR/STTR instructions.  Such instructions, when run by the kernel,
     perform unprivileged accesses adding an extra level of protection.
     The set_fs() macro is used to "upgrade" such instruction to
     privileged accesses via the UAO bit

   - Half-precision floating point support (part of ARMv8.2)

   - Optimisations for CPUs with or without a hardware prefetcher (using
     run-time code patching)

   - copy_page performance improvement to deal with 128 bytes at a time

   - Sanity checks on the CPU capabilities (via CPUID) to prevent
     incompatible secondary CPUs from being brought up (e.g.  weird
     big.LITTLE configurations)

   - valid_user_regs() reworked for better sanity check of the
     sigcontext information (restored pstate information)

   - ACPI parking protocol implementation

   - CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA enabled by default

   - VDSO code marked as read-only

   - DEBUG_PAGEALLOC support

   - ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL enabled

   - Erratum workaround Cavium ThunderX SoC

   - set_pte_at() fix for PROT_NONE mappings

   - Code clean-ups"

* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (99 commits)
  arm64: kasan: Fix zero shadow mapping overriding kernel image shadow
  arm64: kasan: Use actual memory node when populating the kernel image shadow
  arm64: Update PTE_RDONLY in set_pte_at() for PROT_NONE permission
  arm64: Fix misspellings in comments.
  arm64: efi: add missing frame pointer assignment
  arm64: make mrs_s prefixing implicit in read_cpuid
  arm64: enable CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA by default
  arm64: Rework valid_user_regs
  arm64: mm: check at build time that PAGE_OFFSET divides the VA space evenly
  arm64: KVM: Move kvm_call_hyp back to its original localtion
  arm64: mm: treat memstart_addr as a signed quantity
  arm64: mm: list kernel sections in order
  arm64: lse: deal with clobbered IP registers after branch via PLT
  arm64: mm: dump: Use VA_START directly instead of private LOWEST_ADDR
  arm64: kconfig: add submenu for 8.2 architectural features
  arm64: kernel: acpi: fix ioremap in ACPI parking protocol cpu_postboot
  arm64: Add support for Half precision floating point
  arm64: Remove fixmap include fragility
  arm64: Add workaround for Cavium erratum 27456
  arm64: mm: Mark .rodata as RO
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:
 "Here are the main arm64 updates for 4.6.  There are some relatively
  intrusive changes to support KASLR, the reworking of the kernel
  virtual memory layout and initial page table creation.

  Summary:

   - Initial page table creation reworked to avoid breaking large block
     mappings (huge pages) into smaller ones.  The ARM architecture
     requires break-before-make in such cases to avoid TLB conflicts but
     that's not always possible on live page tables

   - Kernel virtual memory layout: the kernel image is no longer linked
     to the bottom of the linear mapping (PAGE_OFFSET) but at the bottom
     of the vmalloc space, allowing the kernel to be loaded (nearly)
     anywhere in physical RAM

   - Kernel ASLR: position independent kernel Image and modules being
     randomly mapped in the vmalloc space with the randomness is
     provided by UEFI (efi_get_random_bytes() patches merged via the
     arm64 tree, acked by Matt Fleming)

   - Implement relative exception tables for arm64, required by KASLR
     (initial code for ARCH_HAS_RELATIVE_EXTABLE added to lib/extable.c
     but actual x86 conversion to deferred to 4.7 because of the merge
     dependencies)

   - Support for the User Access Override feature of ARMv8.2: this
     allows uaccess functions (get_user etc.) to be implemented using
     LDTR/STTR instructions.  Such instructions, when run by the kernel,
     perform unprivileged accesses adding an extra level of protection.
     The set_fs() macro is used to "upgrade" such instruction to
     privileged accesses via the UAO bit

   - Half-precision floating point support (part of ARMv8.2)

   - Optimisations for CPUs with or without a hardware prefetcher (using
     run-time code patching)

   - copy_page performance improvement to deal with 128 bytes at a time

   - Sanity checks on the CPU capabilities (via CPUID) to prevent
     incompatible secondary CPUs from being brought up (e.g.  weird
     big.LITTLE configurations)

   - valid_user_regs() reworked for better sanity check of the
     sigcontext information (restored pstate information)

   - ACPI parking protocol implementation

   - CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA enabled by default

   - VDSO code marked as read-only

   - DEBUG_PAGEALLOC support

   - ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL enabled

   - Erratum workaround Cavium ThunderX SoC

   - set_pte_at() fix for PROT_NONE mappings

   - Code clean-ups"

* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (99 commits)
  arm64: kasan: Fix zero shadow mapping overriding kernel image shadow
  arm64: kasan: Use actual memory node when populating the kernel image shadow
  arm64: Update PTE_RDONLY in set_pte_at() for PROT_NONE permission
  arm64: Fix misspellings in comments.
  arm64: efi: add missing frame pointer assignment
  arm64: make mrs_s prefixing implicit in read_cpuid
  arm64: enable CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA by default
  arm64: Rework valid_user_regs
  arm64: mm: check at build time that PAGE_OFFSET divides the VA space evenly
  arm64: KVM: Move kvm_call_hyp back to its original localtion
  arm64: mm: treat memstart_addr as a signed quantity
  arm64: mm: list kernel sections in order
  arm64: lse: deal with clobbered IP registers after branch via PLT
  arm64: mm: dump: Use VA_START directly instead of private LOWEST_ADDR
  arm64: kconfig: add submenu for 8.2 architectural features
  arm64: kernel: acpi: fix ioremap in ACPI parking protocol cpu_postboot
  arm64: Add support for Half precision floating point
  arm64: Remove fixmap include fragility
  arm64: Add workaround for Cavium erratum 27456
  arm64: mm: Mark .rodata as RO
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>objtool: Mark non-standard object files and directories</title>
<updated>2016-02-29T07:35:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Poimboeuf</name>
<email>jpoimboe@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-29T04:22:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c0dd671686b2229e888ede77682ab0633b2a0dd7'/>
<id>c0dd671686b2229e888ede77682ab0633b2a0dd7</id>
<content type='text'>
Code which runs outside the kernel's normal mode of operation often does
unusual things which can cause a static analysis tool like objtool to
emit false positive warnings:

 - boot image
 - vdso image
 - relocation
 - realmode
 - efi
 - head
 - purgatory
 - modpost

Set OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD for their related files and directories,
which will tell objtool to skip checking them.  It's ok to skip them
because they don't affect runtime stack traces.

Also skip the following code which does the right thing with respect to
frame pointers, but is too "special" to be validated by a tool:

 - entry
 - mcount

Also skip the test_nx module because it modifies its exception handling
table at runtime, which objtool can't understand.  Fortunately it's
just a test module so it doesn't matter much.

Currently objtool is the only user of OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD, but it
might eventually be useful for other tools.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch &lt;bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Chris J Arges &lt;chris.j.arges@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Marek &lt;mmarek@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Pedro Alves &lt;palves@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/366c080e3844e8a5b6a0327dc7e8c2b90ca3baeb.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Code which runs outside the kernel's normal mode of operation often does
unusual things which can cause a static analysis tool like objtool to
emit false positive warnings:

 - boot image
 - vdso image
 - relocation
 - realmode
 - efi
 - head
 - purgatory
 - modpost

Set OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD for their related files and directories,
which will tell objtool to skip checking them.  It's ok to skip them
because they don't affect runtime stack traces.

Also skip the following code which does the right thing with respect to
frame pointers, but is too "special" to be validated by a tool:

 - entry
 - mcount

Also skip the test_nx module because it modifies its exception handling
table at runtime, which objtool can't understand.  Fortunately it's
just a test module so it doesn't matter much.

Currently objtool is the only user of OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD, but it
might eventually be useful for other tools.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch &lt;bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Chris J Arges &lt;chris.j.arges@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Marek &lt;mmarek@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Pedro Alves &lt;palves@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/366c080e3844e8a5b6a0327dc7e8c2b90ca3baeb.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: efi: invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to supply KASLR randomness</title>
<updated>2016-02-24T14:57:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-26T13:48:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2b5fe07a78a09a32002642b8a823428ade611f16'/>
<id>2b5fe07a78a09a32002642b8a823428ade611f16</id>
<content type='text'>
Since arm64 does not use a decompressor that supplies an execution
environment where it is feasible to some extent to provide a source of
randomness, the arm64 KASLR kernel depends on the bootloader to supply
some random bits in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property upon kernel entry.

On UEFI systems, we can use the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL, if supplied, to obtain
some random bits. At the same time, use it to randomize the offset of the
kernel Image in physical memory.

Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Since arm64 does not use a decompressor that supplies an execution
environment where it is feasible to some extent to provide a source of
randomness, the arm64 KASLR kernel depends on the bootloader to supply
some random bits in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property upon kernel entry.

On UEFI systems, we can use the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL, if supplied, to obtain
some random bits. At the same time, use it to randomize the offset of the
kernel Image in physical memory.

Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efi: stub: use high allocation for converted command line</title>
<updated>2016-02-24T14:57:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-11T10:47:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=48fcb2d0216103d15306caa4814e2381104df6d8'/>
<id>48fcb2d0216103d15306caa4814e2381104df6d8</id>
<content type='text'>
Before we can move the command line processing before the allocation
of the kernel, which is required for detecting the 'nokaslr' option
which controls that allocation, move the converted command line higher
up in memory, to prevent it from interfering with the kernel itself.

Since x86 needs the address to fit in 32 bits, use UINT_MAX as the upper
bound there. Otherwise, use ULONG_MAX (i.e., no limit)

Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
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Before we can move the command line processing before the allocation
of the kernel, which is required for detecting the 'nokaslr' option
which controls that allocation, move the converted command line higher
up in memory, to prevent it from interfering with the kernel itself.

Since x86 needs the address to fit in 32 bits, use UINT_MAX as the upper
bound there. Otherwise, use ULONG_MAX (i.e., no limit)

Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
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