<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/firewire, branch linux-3.2.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>firewire: net: fix fragmented datagram_size off-by-one</title>
<updated>2017-02-23T03:50:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Richter</name>
<email>stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-30T16:32:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1367cf34e7be7e5dedd68e597438e9d024a1f268'/>
<id>1367cf34e7be7e5dedd68e597438e9d024a1f268</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e9300a4b7bbae83af1f7703938c94cf6dc6d308f upstream.

RFC 2734 defines the datagram_size field in fragment encapsulation
headers thus:

    datagram_size:  The encoded size of the entire IP datagram.  The
    value of datagram_size [...] SHALL be one less than the value of
    Total Length in the datagram's IP header (see STD 5, RFC 791).

Accordingly, the eth1394 driver of Linux 2.6.36 and older set and got
this field with a -/+1 offset:

    ether1394_tx() /* transmit */
        ether1394_encapsulate_prep()
            hdr-&gt;ff.dg_size = dg_size - 1;

    ether1394_data_handler() /* receive */
        if (hdr-&gt;common.lf == ETH1394_HDR_LF_FF)
            dg_size = hdr-&gt;ff.dg_size + 1;
        else
            dg_size = hdr-&gt;sf.dg_size + 1;

Likewise, I observe OS X 10.4 and Windows XP Pro SP3 to transmit 1500
byte sized datagrams in fragments with datagram_size=1499 if link
fragmentation is required.

Only firewire-net sets and gets datagram_size without this offset.  The
result is lacking interoperability of firewire-net with OS X, Windows
XP, and presumably Linux' eth1394.  (I did not test with the latter.)
For example, FTP data transfers to a Linux firewire-net box with max_rec
smaller than the 1500 bytes MTU
  - from OS X fail entirely,
  - from Win XP start out with a bunch of fragmented datagrams which
    time out, then continue with unfragmented datagrams because Win XP
    temporarily reduces the MTU to 576 bytes.

So let's fix firewire-net's datagram_size accessors.

Note that firewire-net thereby loses interoperability with unpatched
firewire-net, but only if link fragmentation is employed.  (This happens
with large broadcast datagrams, and with large datagrams on several
FireWire CardBus cards with smaller max_rec than equivalent PCI cards,
and it can be worked around by setting a small enough MTU.)

Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e9300a4b7bbae83af1f7703938c94cf6dc6d308f upstream.

RFC 2734 defines the datagram_size field in fragment encapsulation
headers thus:

    datagram_size:  The encoded size of the entire IP datagram.  The
    value of datagram_size [...] SHALL be one less than the value of
    Total Length in the datagram's IP header (see STD 5, RFC 791).

Accordingly, the eth1394 driver of Linux 2.6.36 and older set and got
this field with a -/+1 offset:

    ether1394_tx() /* transmit */
        ether1394_encapsulate_prep()
            hdr-&gt;ff.dg_size = dg_size - 1;

    ether1394_data_handler() /* receive */
        if (hdr-&gt;common.lf == ETH1394_HDR_LF_FF)
            dg_size = hdr-&gt;ff.dg_size + 1;
        else
            dg_size = hdr-&gt;sf.dg_size + 1;

Likewise, I observe OS X 10.4 and Windows XP Pro SP3 to transmit 1500
byte sized datagrams in fragments with datagram_size=1499 if link
fragmentation is required.

Only firewire-net sets and gets datagram_size without this offset.  The
result is lacking interoperability of firewire-net with OS X, Windows
XP, and presumably Linux' eth1394.  (I did not test with the latter.)
For example, FTP data transfers to a Linux firewire-net box with max_rec
smaller than the 1500 bytes MTU
  - from OS X fail entirely,
  - from Win XP start out with a bunch of fragmented datagrams which
    time out, then continue with unfragmented datagrams because Win XP
    temporarily reduces the MTU to 576 bytes.

So let's fix firewire-net's datagram_size accessors.

Note that firewire-net thereby loses interoperability with unpatched
firewire-net, but only if link fragmentation is employed.  (This happens
with large broadcast datagrams, and with large datagrams on several
FireWire CardBus cards with smaller max_rec than equivalent PCI cards,
and it can be worked around by setting a small enough MTU.)

Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows</title>
<updated>2016-11-20T01:01:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Richter</name>
<email>stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-29T19:28:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4538dfea79538a98e1468088b05627f82ac69789'/>
<id>4538dfea79538a98e1468088b05627f82ac69789</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 667121ace9dbafb368618dbabcf07901c962ddac upstream.

The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams.  A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.

So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.

In addition, ensure that
  - GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
    encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
  - the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.

Reported-by: Eyal Itkin &lt;eyal.itkin@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin &lt;eyal.itkin@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: fwnet_receive_broadcast() never matches IPv6 packets]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
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<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 667121ace9dbafb368618dbabcf07901c962ddac upstream.

The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams.  A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.

So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.

In addition, ensure that
  - GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
    encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
  - the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.

Reported-by: Eyal Itkin &lt;eyal.itkin@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin &lt;eyal.itkin@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: fwnet_receive_broadcast() never matches IPv6 packets]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>firewire: ohci: fix JMicron JMB38x IT context discovery</title>
<updated>2015-11-27T12:48:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Richter</name>
<email>stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-03T00:46:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=785381e98b73f87174d78b0ae4ba799a32eb882f'/>
<id>785381e98b73f87174d78b0ae4ba799a32eb882f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 100ceb66d5c40cc0c7018e06a9474302470be73c upstream.

Reported by Clifford and Craig for JMicron OHCI-1394 + SDHCI combo
controllers:  Often or even most of the time, the controller is
initialized with the message "added OHCI v1.10 device as card 0, 4 IR +
0 IT contexts, quirks 0x10".  With 0 isochronous transmit DMA contexts
(IT contexts), applications like audio output are impossible.

However, OHCI-1394 demands that at least 4 IT contexts are implemented
by the link layer controller, and indeed JMicron JMB38x do implement
four of them.  Only their IsoXmitIntMask register is unreliable at early
access.

With my own JMB381 single function controller I found:
  - I can reproduce the problem with a lower probability than Craig's.
  - If I put a loop around the section which clears and reads
    IsoXmitIntMask, then either the first or the second attempt will
    return the correct initial mask of 0x0000000f.  I never encountered
    a case of needing more than a second attempt.
  - Consequently, if I put a dummy reg_read(...IsoXmitIntMaskSet)
    before the first write, the subsequent read will return the correct
    result.
  - If I merely ignore a wrong read result and force the known real
    result, later isochronous transmit DMA usage works just fine.

So let's just fix this chip bug up by the latter method.  Tested with
JMB381 on kernel 3.13 and 4.3.

Since OHCI-1394 generally requires 4 IT contexts at a minium, this
workaround is simply applied whenever the initial read of IsoXmitIntMask
returns 0, regardless whether it's a JMicron chip or not.  I never heard
of this issue together with any other chip though.

I am not 100% sure that this fix works on the OHCI-1394 part of JMB380
and JMB388 combo controllers exactly the same as on the JMB381 single-
function controller, but so far I haven't had a chance to let an owner
of a combo chip run a patched kernel.

Strangely enough, IsoRecvIntMask is always reported correctly, even
though it is probed right before IsoXmitIntMask.

Reported-by: Clifford Dunn
Reported-by: Craig Moore &lt;craig.moore@qenos.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: log with fw_notify() instead of ohci_notice()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 100ceb66d5c40cc0c7018e06a9474302470be73c upstream.

Reported by Clifford and Craig for JMicron OHCI-1394 + SDHCI combo
controllers:  Often or even most of the time, the controller is
initialized with the message "added OHCI v1.10 device as card 0, 4 IR +
0 IT contexts, quirks 0x10".  With 0 isochronous transmit DMA contexts
(IT contexts), applications like audio output are impossible.

However, OHCI-1394 demands that at least 4 IT contexts are implemented
by the link layer controller, and indeed JMicron JMB38x do implement
four of them.  Only their IsoXmitIntMask register is unreliable at early
access.

With my own JMB381 single function controller I found:
  - I can reproduce the problem with a lower probability than Craig's.
  - If I put a loop around the section which clears and reads
    IsoXmitIntMask, then either the first or the second attempt will
    return the correct initial mask of 0x0000000f.  I never encountered
    a case of needing more than a second attempt.
  - Consequently, if I put a dummy reg_read(...IsoXmitIntMaskSet)
    before the first write, the subsequent read will return the correct
    result.
  - If I merely ignore a wrong read result and force the known real
    result, later isochronous transmit DMA usage works just fine.

So let's just fix this chip bug up by the latter method.  Tested with
JMB381 on kernel 3.13 and 4.3.

Since OHCI-1394 generally requires 4 IT contexts at a minium, this
workaround is simply applied whenever the initial read of IsoXmitIntMask
returns 0, regardless whether it's a JMicron chip or not.  I never heard
of this issue together with any other chip though.

I am not 100% sure that this fix works on the OHCI-1394 part of JMB380
and JMB388 combo controllers exactly the same as on the JMB381 single-
function controller, but so far I haven't had a chance to let an owner
of a combo chip run a patched kernel.

Strangely enough, IsoRecvIntMask is always reported correctly, even
though it is probed right before IsoXmitIntMask.

Reported-by: Clifford Dunn
Reported-by: Craig Moore &lt;craig.moore@qenos.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: log with fw_notify() instead of ohci_notice()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>firewire: cdev: prevent kernel stack leaking into ioctl arguments</title>
<updated>2014-12-14T16:23:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Richter</name>
<email>stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-11T16:16:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=adfa08f50fa9d50cd6d8d0ddf8a2f68462edcd52'/>
<id>adfa08f50fa9d50cd6d8d0ddf8a2f68462edcd52</id>
<content type='text'>
commit eaca2d8e75e90a70a63a6695c9f61932609db212 upstream.

Found by the UC-KLEE tool:  A user could supply less input to
firewire-cdev ioctls than write- or write/read-type ioctl handlers
expect.  The handlers used data from uninitialized kernel stack then.

This could partially leak back to the user if the kernel subsequently
generated fw_cdev_event_'s (to be read from the firewire-cdev fd)
which notably would contain the _u64 closure field which many of the
ioctl argument structures contain.

The fact that the handlers would act on random garbage input is a
lesser issue since all handlers must check their input anyway.

The fix simply always null-initializes the entire ioctl argument buffer
regardless of the actual length of expected user input.  That is, a
runtime overhead of memset(..., 40) is added to each firewirew-cdev
ioctl() call.  [Comment from Clemens Ladisch:  This part of the stack is
most likely to be already in the cache.]

Remarks:
  - There was never any leak from kernel stack to the ioctl output
    buffer itself.  IOW, it was not possible to read kernel stack by a
    read-type or write/read-type ioctl alone; the leak could at most
    happen in combination with read()ing subsequent event data.
  - The actual expected minimum user input of each ioctl from
    include/uapi/linux/firewire-cdev.h is, in bytes:
    [0x00] = 32, [0x05] =  4, [0x0a] = 16, [0x0f] = 20, [0x14] = 16,
    [0x01] = 36, [0x06] = 20, [0x0b] =  4, [0x10] = 20, [0x15] = 20,
    [0x02] = 20, [0x07] =  4, [0x0c] =  0, [0x11] =  0, [0x16] =  8,
    [0x03] =  4, [0x08] = 24, [0x0d] = 20, [0x12] = 36, [0x17] = 12,
    [0x04] = 20, [0x09] = 24, [0x0e] =  4, [0x13] = 40, [0x18] =  4.

Reported-by: David Ramos &lt;daramos@stanford.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit eaca2d8e75e90a70a63a6695c9f61932609db212 upstream.

Found by the UC-KLEE tool:  A user could supply less input to
firewire-cdev ioctls than write- or write/read-type ioctl handlers
expect.  The handlers used data from uninitialized kernel stack then.

This could partially leak back to the user if the kernel subsequently
generated fw_cdev_event_'s (to be read from the firewire-cdev fd)
which notably would contain the _u64 closure field which many of the
ioctl argument structures contain.

The fact that the handlers would act on random garbage input is a
lesser issue since all handlers must check their input anyway.

The fix simply always null-initializes the entire ioctl argument buffer
regardless of the actual length of expected user input.  That is, a
runtime overhead of memset(..., 40) is added to each firewirew-cdev
ioctl() call.  [Comment from Clemens Ladisch:  This part of the stack is
most likely to be already in the cache.]

Remarks:
  - There was never any leak from kernel stack to the ioctl output
    buffer itself.  IOW, it was not possible to read kernel stack by a
    read-type or write/read-type ioctl alone; the leak could at most
    happen in combination with read()ing subsequent event data.
  - The actual expected minimum user input of each ioctl from
    include/uapi/linux/firewire-cdev.h is, in bytes:
    [0x00] = 32, [0x05] =  4, [0x0a] = 16, [0x0f] = 20, [0x14] = 16,
    [0x01] = 36, [0x06] = 20, [0x0b] =  4, [0x10] = 20, [0x15] = 20,
    [0x02] = 20, [0x07] =  4, [0x0c] =  0, [0x11] =  0, [0x16] =  8,
    [0x03] =  4, [0x08] = 24, [0x0d] = 20, [0x12] = 36, [0x17] = 12,
    [0x04] = 20, [0x09] = 24, [0x0e] =  4, [0x13] = 40, [0x18] =  4.

Reported-by: David Ramos &lt;daramos@stanford.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>firewire: add minor number range check to fw_device_init()</title>
<updated>2013-03-06T03:24:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-02-28T01:04:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=507b2ac935cfe53dbe3a61d61254154e4829c2e4'/>
<id>507b2ac935cfe53dbe3a61d61254154e4829c2e4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3bec60d511179853138836ae6e1b61fe34d9235f upstream.

fw_device_init() didn't check whether the allocated minor number isn't
too large.  Fail if it goes overflows MINORBITS.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Acked-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
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<pre>
commit 3bec60d511179853138836ae6e1b61fe34d9235f upstream.

fw_device_init() didn't check whether the allocated minor number isn't
too large.  Fail if it goes overflows MINORBITS.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Acked-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>firewire: net: Fix handling of fragmented multicast/broadcast packets.</title>
<updated>2013-01-03T03:33:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephan Gatzka</name>
<email>stephan.gatzka@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-11-28T19:04:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c14e119fb971506913bbbb8709c85f7716f97c3f'/>
<id>c14e119fb971506913bbbb8709c85f7716f97c3f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9d2373420900a39f5212a3b289331aa3535b1000 upstream.

This patch fixes both the transmit and receive portion of sending
fragmented mutlicast and broadcast packets.

The transmit section was broken because the offset for INTFRAG and
LASTFRAG packets were just miscalculated by IEEE1394_GASP_HDR_SIZE (which
was reserved with skb_push() in fwnet_send_packet).

The receive section was broken because in fwnet_incoming_packet is a call
to fwnet_peer_find_by_node_id(). Called with generation == -1 it will
not find a peer and the partial datagrams are associated to a peer.

[Stefan R:  The fix to use context-&gt;card-&gt;generation is not perfect.
It relies on the IR tasklet which processes packets from the prior bus
generation to run before the self-ID-complete worklet which sets the
current card generation.  Alas, there is no simple way of a race-free
implementation.  Let's do it this way for now.]

Signed-off-by: Stephan Gatzka &lt;stephan.gatzka@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9d2373420900a39f5212a3b289331aa3535b1000 upstream.

This patch fixes both the transmit and receive portion of sending
fragmented mutlicast and broadcast packets.

The transmit section was broken because the offset for INTFRAG and
LASTFRAG packets were just miscalculated by IEEE1394_GASP_HDR_SIZE (which
was reserved with skb_push() in fwnet_send_packet).

The receive section was broken because in fwnet_incoming_packet is a call
to fwnet_peer_find_by_node_id(). Called with generation == -1 it will
not find a peer and the partial datagrams are associated to a peer.

[Stefan R:  The fix to use context-&gt;card-&gt;generation is not perfect.
It relies on the IR tasklet which processes packets from the prior bus
generation to run before the self-ID-complete worklet which sets the
current card generation.  Alas, there is no simple way of a race-free
implementation.  Let's do it this way for now.]

Signed-off-by: Stephan Gatzka &lt;stephan.gatzka@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>firewire: cdev: fix user memory corruption (i386 userland on amd64 kernel)</title>
<updated>2012-10-17T02:49:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Richter</name>
<email>stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-06T12:12:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e69e19924bdbfb7a44ac64c206d5cbcae57910ed'/>
<id>e69e19924bdbfb7a44ac64c206d5cbcae57910ed</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 790198f74c9d1b46b6a89504361b1a844670d050 upstream.

Fix two bugs of the /dev/fw* character device concerning the
FW_CDEV_IOC_GET_INFO ioctl with nonzero fw_cdev_get_info.bus_reset.
(Practically all /dev/fw* clients issue this ioctl right after opening
the device.)

Both bugs are caused by sizeof(struct fw_cdev_event_bus_reset) being 36
without natural alignment and 40 with natural alignment.

 1) Memory corruption, affecting i386 userland on amd64 kernel:
    Userland reserves a 36 bytes large buffer, kernel writes 40 bytes.
    This has been first found and reported against libraw1394 if
    compiled with gcc 4.7 which happens to order libraw1394's stack such
    that the bug became visible as data corruption.

 2) Information leak, affecting all kernel architectures except i386:
    4 bytes of random kernel stack data were leaked to userspace.

Hence limit the respective copy_to_user() to the 32-bit aligned size of
struct fw_cdev_event_bus_reset.

Reported-by: Simon Kirby &lt;sim@hostway.ca&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
commit 790198f74c9d1b46b6a89504361b1a844670d050 upstream.

Fix two bugs of the /dev/fw* character device concerning the
FW_CDEV_IOC_GET_INFO ioctl with nonzero fw_cdev_get_info.bus_reset.
(Practically all /dev/fw* clients issue this ioctl right after opening
the device.)

Both bugs are caused by sizeof(struct fw_cdev_event_bus_reset) being 36
without natural alignment and 40 with natural alignment.

 1) Memory corruption, affecting i386 userland on amd64 kernel:
    Userland reserves a 36 bytes large buffer, kernel writes 40 bytes.
    This has been first found and reported against libraw1394 if
    compiled with gcc 4.7 which happens to order libraw1394's stack such
    that the bug became visible as data corruption.

 2) Information leak, affecting all kernel architectures except i386:
    4 bytes of random kernel stack data were leaked to userspace.

Hence limit the respective copy_to_user() to the 32-bit aligned size of
struct fw_cdev_event_bus_reset.

Reported-by: Simon Kirby &lt;sim@hostway.ca&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>firewire: ohci: fix too-early completion of IR multichannel buffers</title>
<updated>2012-04-02T16:52:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Clemens Ladisch</name>
<email>clemens@ladisch.de</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-12T20:45:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=74b7bd47282eb4729509c1adad27e05cb77a3837'/>
<id>74b7bd47282eb4729509c1adad27e05cb77a3837</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0c0efbacab8d70700d13301e0ae7975783c0cb0a upstream.

handle_ir_buffer_fill() assumed that a completed descriptor would be
indicated by a non-zero transfer_status (as in most other descriptors).
However, this field is written by the controller as soon as (the end of)
the first packet has been written into the buffer.  As a consequence, if
we happen to run into such a descriptor when the interrupt handler is
executed after such a packet has completed, the descriptor would be
taken out of the list of active descriptors as soon as the buffer had
been partially filled, so the event for the buffer being completely
filled would never be sent.

To fix this, handle descriptors only when they have been completely
filled, i.e., when res_count == 0.  (This also matches the condition
that is reported by the controller with an interrupt.)

Signed-off-by: Clemens Ladisch &lt;clemens@ladisch.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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commit 0c0efbacab8d70700d13301e0ae7975783c0cb0a upstream.

handle_ir_buffer_fill() assumed that a completed descriptor would be
indicated by a non-zero transfer_status (as in most other descriptors).
However, this field is written by the controller as soon as (the end of)
the first packet has been written into the buffer.  As a consequence, if
we happen to run into such a descriptor when the interrupt handler is
executed after such a packet has completed, the descriptor would be
taken out of the list of active descriptors as soon as the buffer had
been partially filled, so the event for the buffer being completely
filled would never be sent.

To fix this, handle descriptors only when they have been completely
filled, i.e., when res_count == 0.  (This also matches the condition
that is reported by the controller with an interrupt.)

Signed-off-by: Clemens Ladisch &lt;clemens@ladisch.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>firewire: ohci: disable MSI on Ricoh controllers</title>
<updated>2012-02-13T19:16:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Richter</name>
<email>stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-29T11:41:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c1a1e15fd6fe7ed496d115ac9b87649e4d827d65'/>
<id>c1a1e15fd6fe7ed496d115ac9b87649e4d827d65</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 320cfa6ce0b3dc794fedfa4bae54c0f65077234d upstream.

The PCIe device

    FireWire (IEEE 1394) [0c00]: Ricoh Co Ltd FireWire Host Controller
    [1180:e832] (prog-if 10 [OHCI])

is unable to access attached FireWire devices when MSI is enabled but
works if MSI is disabled.
http://www.mail-archive.com/alsa-user@lists.sourceforge.net/msg28251.html

Hence add the "disable MSI" quirks flag for this device, or in fact for
safety and simplicity for all current (R5U230, R5U231, R5U240) and
future Ricoh PCIe 1394 controllers.

Reported-by: Stefan Thomas &lt;kontrapunktstefan@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 320cfa6ce0b3dc794fedfa4bae54c0f65077234d upstream.

The PCIe device

    FireWire (IEEE 1394) [0c00]: Ricoh Co Ltd FireWire Host Controller
    [1180:e832] (prog-if 10 [OHCI])

is unable to access attached FireWire devices when MSI is enabled but
works if MSI is disabled.
http://www.mail-archive.com/alsa-user@lists.sourceforge.net/msg28251.html

Hence add the "disable MSI" quirks flag for this device, or in fact for
safety and simplicity for all current (R5U230, R5U231, R5U240) and
future Ricoh PCIe 1394 controllers.

Reported-by: Stefan Thomas &lt;kontrapunktstefan@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>firewire: ohci: add reset packet quirk for SB Audigy</title>
<updated>2012-02-13T19:16:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Clemens Ladisch</name>
<email>clemens@ladisch.de</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-26T21:05:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=49b7e22b82d73e58a5335820b3f0441b2606515b'/>
<id>49b7e22b82d73e58a5335820b3f0441b2606515b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d1bb399ad03c11e792f6dea198d3b1e23061f094 upstream.

The Audigy's SB1394 controller is actually from Texas Instruments
and has the same bus reset packet generation bug, so it needs the
same quirk entry.

Signed-off-by: Clemens Ladisch &lt;clemens@ladisch.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d1bb399ad03c11e792f6dea198d3b1e23061f094 upstream.

The Audigy's SB1394 controller is actually from Texas Instruments
and has the same bus reset packet generation bug, so it needs the
same quirk entry.

Signed-off-by: Clemens Ladisch &lt;clemens@ladisch.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter &lt;stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
