linux-stable.git/drivers/crypto/caam, branch linux-5.6.y

crypto: caam - fix the address of the last entry of S/G

2020-05-06T06:16:31+00:00

commit 55b3209acbb01cb02b1ee6b1afe80d83b1aab36d upstream.

For skcipher algorithms, the input, output HW S/G tables
look like this: [IV, src][dst, IV]
Now, we can have 2 conditions here:
- there is no IV;
- src and dst are equal (in-place encryption) and scattered
and the error is an "off-by-one" in the HW S/G table.

This issue was seen with KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in skcipher_edesc_alloc+0x95c/0x1018

Read of size 4 at addr ffff000022a02958 by task cryptomgr_test/321

CPU: 2 PID: 321 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted
5.6.0-rc1-00165-ge4ef8383-dirty #4
Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x260
 show_stack+0x14/0x20
 dump_stack+0xe8/0x144
 print_address_description.isra.11+0x64/0x348
 __kasan_report+0x11c/0x230
 kasan_report+0xc/0x18
 __asan_load4+0x90/0xb0
 skcipher_edesc_alloc+0x95c/0x1018
 skcipher_encrypt+0x84/0x150
 crypto_skcipher_encrypt+0x50/0x68
 test_skcipher_vec_cfg+0x4d4/0xc10
 test_skcipher_vec+0x178/0x1d8
 alg_test_skcipher+0xec/0x230
 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0
 alg_test+0x1c/0x60
 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58
 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Allocated by task 321:
 save_stack+0x24/0xb0
 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.10+0xc4/0xe0
 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18
 __kmalloc+0x178/0x2b8
 skcipher_edesc_alloc+0x21c/0x1018
 skcipher_encrypt+0x84/0x150
 crypto_skcipher_encrypt+0x50/0x68
 test_skcipher_vec_cfg+0x4d4/0xc10
 test_skcipher_vec+0x178/0x1d8
 alg_test_skcipher+0xec/0x230
 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0
 alg_test+0x1c/0x60
 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58
 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Freed by task 0:
(stack is not available)

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff000022a02800
 which belongs to the cache dma-kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 344 bytes inside of
 512-byte region [ffff000022a02800, ffff000022a02a00)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:fffffe00006a8000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff00093200c400
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0xffff00000010200(slab|head)
raw: 0ffff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff00093200c400
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff000022a02800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff000022a02880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff000022a02900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                                    ^
 ffff000022a02980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff000022a02a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

Fixes: 334d37c9e263 ("crypto: caam - update IV using HW support")
Cc:  # v5.3+
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan 
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: caam - update xts sector size for large input length

2020-04-17T14:13:39+00:00

commit 3f142b6a7b573bde6cff926f246da05652c61eb4 upstream.

Since in the software implementation of XTS-AES there is
no notion of sector every input length is processed the same way.
CAAM implementation has the notion of sector which causes different
results between the software implementation and the one in CAAM
for input lengths bigger than 512 bytes.
Increase sector size to maximum value on 16 bits.

Fixes: c6415a6016bf ("crypto: caam - add support for acipher xts(aes)")
Cc:  # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila 
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: caam/qi2 - fix chacha20 data size error

2020-04-17T14:13:39+00:00

commit 3a5a9e1ef37b030b836d92df8264f840988f4a38 upstream.

HW generates a Data Size error for chacha20 requests that are not
a multiple of 64B, since algorithm state (AS) does not have
the FINAL bit set.

Since updating req->iv (for chaining) is not required,
modify skcipher descriptors to set the FINAL bit for chacha20.

[Note that for skcipher decryption we know that ctx1_iv_off is 0,
which allows for an optimization by not checking algorithm type,
since append_dec_op1() sets FINAL bit for all algorithms except AES.]

Also drop the descriptor operations that save the IV.
However, in order to keep code logic simple, things like
S/G tables generation etc. are not touched.

Cc:  # v5.3+
Fixes: 334d37c9e263 ("crypto: caam - update IV using HW support")
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă 
Tested-by: Valentin Ciocoi Radulescu 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: caam - add support for i.MX8M Plus

2020-01-22T08:21:11+00:00

Add support for the crypto engine used in i.mx8mp (i.MX 8M "Plus"),
which is very similar to the one used in i.mx8mq, i.mx8mm, i.mx8mn.

Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu

crypto: caam/qi2 - fix typo in algorithm's driver name

2020-01-22T08:21:07+00:00

Fixes: 8d818c105501 ("crypto: caam/qi2 - add DPAA2-CAAM driver")
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu

crypto: caam - add support for i.MX8M Nano

2020-01-16T07:18:13+00:00

Add support for the crypto engine used in i.mx8mn (i.MX 8M "Nano"),
which is very similar to the one used in i.mx8mq, i.mx8mm.

Since the clocks are identical for all members of i.MX 8M family,
simplify the SoC <--> clock array mapping table.

Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă 
Tested-by: Iuliana Prodan 
Reviewed-by: Iuliana Prodan 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu

crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN

2020-01-09T03:30:53+00:00

The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.

However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.

Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc.  But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.

Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length.  For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.

So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly.  But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.

So just remove this flag.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers 
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu

crypto: caam - Add support for i.MX8M Mini

2019-12-27T10:18:03+00:00

The i.MX8M Mini uses the same crypto engine as the i.MX8MQ, but
the driver is restricting the check to just the i.MX8MQ.

This patch expands the check for either i.MX8MQ or i.MX8MM.

Signed-off-by: Adam Ford 
Tested-by: Iuliana Prodan 
Reviewed-by: Iuliana Prodan 
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu

crypto: caam/qi2 - remove double buffering for ahash

2019-12-20T06:58:33+00:00

Previously double buffering was used for storing previous and next
"less-than-block-size" bytes. Double buffering can be removed by moving
the copy of next "less-than-block-size" bytes after current request is
executed by HW.

Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila 
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu

crypto: caam - remove double buffering for ahash

2019-12-20T06:58:33+00:00

Previously double buffering was used for storing previous and next
"less-than-block-size" bytes. Double buffering can be removed by moving
the copy of next "less-than-block-size" bytes after current request is
executed by HW.

Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila 
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu