<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/crypto/bcm, branch v5.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>crypto: bcm - Use the defined variable to clean code</title>
<updated>2020-05-08T05:30:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tang Bin</name>
<email>tangbin@cmss.chinamobile.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-27T08:22:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3f7819bd42153b6df04af40dfa3439ce71ce4ad1'/>
<id>3f7819bd42153b6df04af40dfa3439ce71ce4ad1</id>
<content type='text'>
Use the defined variable "dev" to make the code cleaner.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Shengju &lt;zhangshengju@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tang Bin &lt;tangbin@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Use the defined variable "dev" to make the code cleaner.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Shengju &lt;zhangshengju@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tang Bin &lt;tangbin@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: bcm - Fix unused assignment</title>
<updated>2020-04-30T05:19:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tang Bin</name>
<email>tangbin@cmss.chinamobile.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-25T14:24:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=12b3cf9093542d9f752a4968815ece836159013f'/>
<id>12b3cf9093542d9f752a4968815ece836159013f</id>
<content type='text'>
Delete unused initialized value in cipher.c file.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Shengju &lt;zhangshengju@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tang Bin &lt;tangbin@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Delete unused initialized value in cipher.c file.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Shengju &lt;zhangshengju@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tang Bin &lt;tangbin@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: bcm - Remove the unnecessary cast for PTR_ERR().</title>
<updated>2020-04-30T05:19:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tang Bin</name>
<email>tangbin@cmss.chinamobile.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-25T14:22:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=42a13ddbab00455504d50ef159360f7451d597e4'/>
<id>42a13ddbab00455504d50ef159360f7451d597e4</id>
<content type='text'>
It's not necessary to specify 'int' casting for PTR_ERR().

Signed-off-by: Zhang Shengju &lt;zhangshengju@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tang Bin &lt;tangbin@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It's not necessary to specify 'int' casting for PTR_ERR().

Signed-off-by: Zhang Shengju &lt;zhangshengju@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tang Bin &lt;tangbin@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: bcm - Delete redundant variable definition</title>
<updated>2020-04-24T07:42:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tang Bin</name>
<email>tangbin@cmss.chinamobile.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-19T07:12:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9c3d6497fbfa0911d4cd6f261762a0a7af29566a'/>
<id>9c3d6497fbfa0911d4cd6f261762a0a7af29566a</id>
<content type='text'>
The variable "i" is redundant to be assigned a value
of zero,because it's assigned in the for loop, so remove
redundant one here.

Signed-off-by: Shengju Zhang &lt;zhangshengju@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tang Bin &lt;tangbin@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The variable "i" is redundant to be assigned a value
of zero,because it's assigned in the for loop, so remove
redundant one here.

Signed-off-by: Shengju Zhang &lt;zhangshengju@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tang Bin &lt;tangbin@cmss.chinamobile.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: bcm - Use scnprintf() for avoiding potential buffer overflow</title>
<updated>2020-03-20T03:36:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-11T07:15:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7fe8e483ec6f62ad43e9c2ba7e07b047f4d35d69'/>
<id>7fe8e483ec6f62ad43e9c2ba7e07b047f4d35d69</id>
<content type='text'>
Since snprintf() returns the would-be-output size instead of the
actual output size, the succeeding calls may go beyond the given
buffer limit.  Fix it by replacing with scnprintf().

Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Since snprintf() returns the would-be-output size instead of the
actual output size, the succeeding calls may go beyond the given
buffer limit.  Fix it by replacing with scnprintf().

Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: remove propagation of CRYPTO_TFM_RES_* flags</title>
<updated>2020-01-09T03:30:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-31T03:19:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=af5034e8e4a5838fc77e476c1a91822e449d5869'/>
<id>af5034e8e4a5838fc77e476c1a91822e449d5869</id>
<content type='text'>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_* flags were apparently meant as a way to make the
-&gt;setkey() functions provide more information about errors.  But these
flags weren't actually being used or tested, and in many cases they
weren't being set correctly anyway.  So they've now been removed.

Also, if someone ever actually needs to start better distinguishing
-&gt;setkey() errors (which is somewhat unlikely, as this has been unneeded
for a long time), we'd be much better off just defining different return
values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.

So just remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK and all the unneeded logic that
propagates these flags around.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_* flags were apparently meant as a way to make the
-&gt;setkey() functions provide more information about errors.  But these
flags weren't actually being used or tested, and in many cases they
weren't being set correctly anyway.  So they've now been removed.

Also, if someone ever actually needs to start better distinguishing
-&gt;setkey() errors (which is somewhat unlikely, as this has been unneeded
for a long time), we'd be much better off just defining different return
values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.

So just remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK and all the unneeded logic that
propagates these flags around.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN</title>
<updated>2020-01-09T03:30:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-31T03:19:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=674f368a952c48ede71784935a799a5205b92b6c'/>
<id>674f368a952c48ede71784935a799a5205b92b6c</id>
<content type='text'>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the -&gt;setkey() functions provide more information about errors.

However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.

Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc.  But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.

Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length.  For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.

So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly.  But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.

So just remove this flag.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the -&gt;setkey() functions provide more information about errors.

However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.

Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc.  But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.

Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length.  For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.

So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly.  But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.

So just remove this flag.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă &lt;horia.geanta@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: bcm-spu - switch to skcipher API</title>
<updated>2019-11-17T01:02:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ardb@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-09T17:09:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a9c01cd608c43912320c830275395f2c78c94719'/>
<id>a9c01cd608c43912320c830275395f2c78c94719</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 7a7ffe65c8c5 ("crypto: skcipher - Add top-level skcipher interface")
dated 20 august 2015 introduced the new skcipher API which is supposed to
replace both blkcipher and ablkcipher. While all consumers of the API have
been converted long ago, some producers of the ablkcipher remain, forcing
us to keep the ablkcipher support routines alive, along with the matching
code to expose [a]blkciphers via the skcipher API.

So switch this driver to the skcipher API, allowing us to finally drop the
ablkcipher code in the near future.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 7a7ffe65c8c5 ("crypto: skcipher - Add top-level skcipher interface")
dated 20 august 2015 introduced the new skcipher API which is supposed to
replace both blkcipher and ablkcipher. While all consumers of the API have
been converted long ago, some producers of the ablkcipher remain, forcing
us to keep the ablkcipher support routines alive, along with the matching
code to expose [a]blkciphers via the skcipher API.

So switch this driver to the skcipher API, allowing us to finally drop the
ablkcipher code in the near future.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: bcm/des - switch to new verification routines</title>
<updated>2019-08-22T04:39:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-15T09:00:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=05a7238d085f6cfaff9ad41e56f74d9923afa091'/>
<id>05a7238d085f6cfaff9ad41e56f74d9923afa091</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: bcm - check assoclen for rfc4543/rfc4106</title>
<updated>2019-07-27T11:08:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Iuliana Prodan</name>
<email>iuliana.prodan@nxp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-19T07:09:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b3553effafa027feca33e0aa357fce08b3c80b02'/>
<id>b3553effafa027feca33e0aa357fce08b3c80b02</id>
<content type='text'>
Validated assoclen for RFC4543 which expects an assoclen
of 16 or 20, the same as RFC4106.
Based on seqiv, IPsec ESP and RFC4543/RFC4106 the assoclen is sizeof
IP Header (spi, seq_no, extended seq_no) and IV len. This can be 16 or
20 bytes.

Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan &lt;iuliana.prodan@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Validated assoclen for RFC4543 which expects an assoclen
of 16 or 20, the same as RFC4106.
Based on seqiv, IPsec ESP and RFC4543/RFC4106 the assoclen is sizeof
IP Header (spi, seq_no, extended seq_no) and IV len. This can be 16 or
20 bytes.

Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan &lt;iuliana.prodan@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
