<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/char, branch v4.14.232</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>parisc: parisc-agp requires SBA IOMMU driver</title>
<updated>2021-04-16T09:57:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Helge Deller</name>
<email>deller@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-06T09:32:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9264bb1315cfb31a19f3693b8366f11c5b4e0082'/>
<id>9264bb1315cfb31a19f3693b8366f11c5b4e0082</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9054284e8846b0105aad43a4e7174ca29fffbc44 upstream.

Add a dependency to the SBA IOMMU driver to avoid:
ERROR: modpost: "sba_list" [drivers/char/agp/parisc-agp.ko] undefined!

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9054284e8846b0105aad43a4e7174ca29fffbc44 upstream.

Add a dependency to the SBA IOMMU driver to avoid:
ERROR: modpost: "sba_list" [drivers/char/agp/parisc-agp.ko] undefined!

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tpm_tis: Fix check_locality for correct locality acquisition</title>
<updated>2021-03-03T17:22:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Bottomley</name>
<email>James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-01T18:09:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7ba5ff552d4b4c81c6fff81f41954e27a6468aa1'/>
<id>7ba5ff552d4b4c81c6fff81f41954e27a6468aa1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3d9ae54af1d02a7c0edc55c77d7df2b921e58a87 upstream.

The TPM TIS specification says the TPM signals the acquisition of locality
when the TMP_ACCESS_REQUEST_USE bit goes to one *and* the
TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_USE bit goes to zero.  Currently we only check the
former not the latter, so check both.  Adding the check on
TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_USE should fix the case where the locality is
re-requested before the TPM has released it.  In this case the locality may
get released briefly before it is reacquired, which causes all sorts of
problems. However, with the added check, TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_USE should
remain 1 until the second request for the locality is granted.

Cc: stable@ger.kernel.org
Fixes: 27084efee0c3 ("[PATCH] tpm: driver for next generation TPM chips")
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar &lt;jsnitsel@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3d9ae54af1d02a7c0edc55c77d7df2b921e58a87 upstream.

The TPM TIS specification says the TPM signals the acquisition of locality
when the TMP_ACCESS_REQUEST_USE bit goes to one *and* the
TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_USE bit goes to zero.  Currently we only check the
former not the latter, so check both.  Adding the check on
TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_USE should fix the case where the locality is
re-requested before the TPM has released it.  In this case the locality may
get released briefly before it is reacquired, which causes all sorts of
problems. However, with the added check, TPM_ACCESS_REQUEST_USE should
remain 1 until the second request for the locality is granted.

Cc: stable@ger.kernel.org
Fixes: 27084efee0c3 ("[PATCH] tpm: driver for next generation TPM chips")
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar &lt;jsnitsel@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hwrng: timeriomem - Fix cooldown period calculation</title>
<updated>2021-03-03T17:22:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Henrik Weinstock</name>
<email>jan.weinstock@rwth-aachen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-01T15:14:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ca30f70de83a89862340948dca9bcbe31b6a8632'/>
<id>ca30f70de83a89862340948dca9bcbe31b6a8632</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e145f5565dc48ccaf4cb50b7cfc48777bed8c100 ]

Ensure cooldown period tolerance of 1% is actually accounted for.

Fixes: ca3bff70ab32 ("hwrng: timeriomem - Improve performance...")
Signed-off-by: Jan Henrik Weinstock &lt;jan.weinstock@rwth-aachen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e145f5565dc48ccaf4cb50b7cfc48777bed8c100 ]

Ensure cooldown period tolerance of 1% is actually accounted for.

Fixes: ca3bff70ab32 ("hwrng: timeriomem - Improve performance...")
Signed-off-by: Jan Henrik Weinstock &lt;jan.weinstock@rwth-aachen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: fix the RNDRESEEDCRNG ioctl</title>
<updated>2021-03-03T17:22:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-12T19:28:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f8700bb4b89593070040a11c0f9a91e7b94018ae'/>
<id>f8700bb4b89593070040a11c0f9a91e7b94018ae</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 11a0b5e0ec8c13bef06f7414f9e914506140d5cb upstream.

The RNDRESEEDCRNG ioctl reseeds the primary_crng from itself, which
doesn't make sense.  Reseed it from the input_pool instead.

Fixes: d848e5f8e1eb ("random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210112192818.69921-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 11a0b5e0ec8c13bef06f7414f9e914506140d5cb upstream.

The RNDRESEEDCRNG ioctl reseeds the primary_crng from itself, which
doesn't make sense.  Reseed it from the input_pool instead.

Fixes: d848e5f8e1eb ("random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210112192818.69921-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:28:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>George Spelvin</name>
<email>lkml@sdf.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-09T06:57:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a16f026330fee92e434267dc35c21bceaa7fd573'/>
<id>a16f026330fee92e434267dc35c21bceaa7fd573</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.

Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output.  An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.

It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack.  Oops.

This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key.  (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.)  Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.

Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.

Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution.  This patch replaces
it.

Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: tytso@mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Marc Plumb &lt;lkml.mplumb@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin &lt;lkml@sdf.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
  to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
  inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
  members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
  happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
[wt: backported to 4.14 -- various context adjustments; timer API change]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.

Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output.  An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.

It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack.  Oops.

This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key.  (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.)  Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.

Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.

Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution.  This patch replaces
it.

Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: tytso@mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Marc Plumb &lt;lkml.mplumb@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin &lt;lkml@sdf.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
  to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
  inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
  members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
  happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
[wt: backported to 4.14 -- various context adjustments; timer API change]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers: char: tlclk.c: Avoid data race between init and interrupt handler</title>
<updated>2020-10-01T11:12:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Madhuparna Bhowmik</name>
<email>madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-17T15:34:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=418b8afbecf6707599cadadddf12c1b7b6a4e0a3'/>
<id>418b8afbecf6707599cadadddf12c1b7b6a4e0a3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 44b8fb6eaa7c3fb770bf1e37619cdb3902cca1fc ]

After registering character device the file operation callbacks can be
called. The open callback registers interrupt handler.
Therefore interrupt handler can execute in parallel with rest of the init
function. To avoid such data race initialize telclk_interrupt variable
and struct alarm_events before registering character device.

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik &lt;madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200417153451.1551-1-madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 44b8fb6eaa7c3fb770bf1e37619cdb3902cca1fc ]

After registering character device the file operation callbacks can be
called. The open callback registers interrupt handler.
Therefore interrupt handler can execute in parallel with rest of the init
function. To avoid such data race initialize telclk_interrupt variable
and struct alarm_events before registering character device.

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik &lt;madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200417153451.1551-1-madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tpm: ibmvtpm: Wait for buffer to be set before proceeding</title>
<updated>2020-10-01T11:12:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-12T15:53:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=80090ac63e908e9932a0d8f8a8fe0812daf97a8a'/>
<id>80090ac63e908e9932a0d8f8a8fe0812daf97a8a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d8d74ea3c00214aee1e1826ca18e77944812b9b4 ]

Synchronize with the results from the CRQs before continuing with
the initialization. This avoids trying to send TPM commands while
the rtce buffer has not been allocated, yet.

This patch fixes an existing race condition that may occurr if the
hypervisor does not quickly respond to the VTPM_GET_RTCE_BUFFER_SIZE
request sent during initialization and therefore the ibmvtpm-&gt;rtce_buf
has not been allocated at the time the first TPM command is sent.

Fixes: 132f76294744 ("drivers/char/tpm: Add new device driver to support IBM vTPM")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d8d74ea3c00214aee1e1826ca18e77944812b9b4 ]

Synchronize with the results from the CRQs before continuing with
the initialization. This avoids trying to send TPM commands while
the rtce buffer has not been allocated, yet.

This patch fixes an existing race condition that may occurr if the
hypervisor does not quickly respond to the VTPM_GET_RTCE_BUFFER_SIZE
request sent during initialization and therefore the ibmvtpm-&gt;rtce_buf
has not been allocated at the time the first TPM command is sent.

Fixes: 132f76294744 ("drivers/char/tpm: Add new device driver to support IBM vTPM")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tpm: Unify the mismatching TPM space buffer sizes</title>
<updated>2020-09-03T09:22:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jarkko Sakkinen</name>
<email>jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-31T18:58:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0a221a7442cc3a0da05cf97603ada6dcd6f33beb'/>
<id>0a221a7442cc3a0da05cf97603ada6dcd6f33beb</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6c4e79d99e6f42b79040f1a33cd4018f5425030b ]

The size of the buffers for storing context's and sessions can vary from
arch to arch as PAGE_SIZE can be anything between 4 kB and 256 kB (the
maximum for PPC64). Define a fixed buffer size set to 16 kB. This should be
enough for most use with three handles (that is how many we allow at the
moment). Parametrize the buffer size while doing this, so that it is easier
to revisit this later on if required.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Fixes: 745b361e989a ("tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces")
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar &lt;jsnitsel@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6c4e79d99e6f42b79040f1a33cd4018f5425030b ]

The size of the buffers for storing context's and sessions can vary from
arch to arch as PAGE_SIZE can be anything between 4 kB and 256 kB (the
maximum for PPC64). Define a fixed buffer size set to 16 kB. This should be
enough for most use with three handles (that is how many we allow at the
moment). Parametrize the buffer size while doing this, so that it is easier
to revisit this later on if required.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Fixes: 745b361e989a ("tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces")
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar &lt;jsnitsel@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>agp/intel: Fix a memory leak on module initialisation failure</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T07:48:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Qiushi Wu</name>
<email>wu000273@umn.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-22T08:34:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b3ad6a3db008e4565d97da15c00ef25ee4b5b59a'/>
<id>b3ad6a3db008e4565d97da15c00ef25ee4b5b59a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b975abbd382fe442713a4c233549abb90e57c22b ]

In intel_gtt_setup_scratch_page(), pointer "page" is not released if
pci_dma_mapping_error() return an error, leading to a memory leak on
module initialisation failure.  Simply fix this issue by freeing "page"
before return.

Fixes: 0e87d2b06cb46 ("intel-gtt: initialize our own scratch page")
Signed-off-by: Qiushi Wu &lt;wu000273@umn.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson &lt;chris@chris-wilson.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson &lt;chris@chris-wilson.co.uk&gt;
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200522083451.7448-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b975abbd382fe442713a4c233549abb90e57c22b ]

In intel_gtt_setup_scratch_page(), pointer "page" is not released if
pci_dma_mapping_error() return an error, leading to a memory leak on
module initialisation failure.  Simply fix this issue by freeing "page"
before return.

Fixes: 0e87d2b06cb46 ("intel-gtt: initialize our own scratch page")
Signed-off-by: Qiushi Wu &lt;wu000273@umn.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson &lt;chris@chris-wilson.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson &lt;chris@chris-wilson.co.uk&gt;
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200522083451.7448-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity</title>
<updated>2020-08-07T07:38:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Willy Tarreau</name>
<email>w@1wt.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-10T13:23:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=583bcbc024f6bf8daa266f4f71b99e9d6e78c40b'/>
<id>583bcbc024f6bf8daa266f4f71b99e9d6e78c40b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f227e3ec3b5cad859ad15666874405e8c1bbc1d4 upstream.

This modifies the first 32 bits out of the 128 bits of a random CPU's
net_rand_state on interrupt or CPU activity to complicate remote
observations that could lead to guessing the network RNG's internal
state.

Note that depending on some network devices' interrupt rate moderation
or binding, this re-seeding might happen on every packet or even almost
never.

In addition, with NOHZ some CPUs might not even get timer interrupts,
leaving their local state rarely updated, while they are running
networked processes making use of the random state.  For this reason, we
also perform this update in update_process_times() in order to at least
update the state when there is user or system activity, since it's the
only case we care about.

Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f227e3ec3b5cad859ad15666874405e8c1bbc1d4 upstream.

This modifies the first 32 bits out of the 128 bits of a random CPU's
net_rand_state on interrupt or CPU activity to complicate remote
observations that could lead to guessing the network RNG's internal
state.

Note that depending on some network devices' interrupt rate moderation
or binding, this re-seeding might happen on every packet or even almost
never.

In addition, with NOHZ some CPUs might not even get timer interrupts,
leaving their local state rarely updated, while they are running
networked processes making use of the random state.  For this reason, we
also perform this update in update_process_times() in order to at least
update the state when there is user or system activity, since it's the
only case we care about.

Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
