<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/char, branch linux-5.0.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>hwrng: omap - Set default quality</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:45:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rouven Czerwinski</name>
<email>r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-11T10:58:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6f83951a273564564a9baf9bf7ca4fbf8e21c446'/>
<id>6f83951a273564564a9baf9bf7ca4fbf8e21c446</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 62f95ae805fa9e1e84d47d3219adddd97b2654b7 ]

Newer combinations of the glibc, kernel and openssh can result in long initial
startup times on OMAP devices:

[    6.671425] systemd-rc-once[102]: Creating ED25519 key; this may take some time ...
[  142.652491] systemd-rc-once[102]: Creating ED25519 key; done.

due to the blocking getrandom(2) system call:

[  142.610335] random: crng init done

Set the quality level for the omap hwrng driver allowing the kernel to use the
hwrng as an entropy source at boot.

Signed-off-by: Rouven Czerwinski &lt;r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 62f95ae805fa9e1e84d47d3219adddd97b2654b7 ]

Newer combinations of the glibc, kernel and openssh can result in long initial
startup times on OMAP devices:

[    6.671425] systemd-rc-once[102]: Creating ED25519 key; this may take some time ...
[  142.652491] systemd-rc-once[102]: Creating ED25519 key; done.

due to the blocking getrandom(2) system call:

[  142.610335] random: crng init done

Set the quality level for the omap hwrng driver allowing the kernel to use the
hwrng as an entropy source at boot.

Signed-off-by: Rouven Czerwinski &lt;r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>virtio_console: initialize vtermno value for ports</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:45:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pankaj Gupta</name>
<email>pagupta@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-19T06:04:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ff5e32fa5906498d0d87bc77170225914c7681c2'/>
<id>ff5e32fa5906498d0d87bc77170225914c7681c2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4b0a2c5ff7215206ea6135a405f17c5f6fca7d00 ]

For regular serial ports we do not initialize value of vtermno
variable. A garbage value is assigned for non console ports.
The value can be observed as a random integer with [1].

[1] vim /sys/kernel/debug/virtio-ports/vport*p*

This patch initialize the value of vtermno for console serial
ports to '1' and regular serial ports are initiaized to '0'.

Reported-by: siliu@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta &lt;pagupta@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4b0a2c5ff7215206ea6135a405f17c5f6fca7d00 ]

For regular serial ports we do not initialize value of vtermno
variable. A garbage value is assigned for non console ports.
The value can be observed as a random integer with [1].

[1] vim /sys/kernel/debug/virtio-ports/vport*p*

This patch initialize the value of vtermno for console serial
ports to '1' and regular serial ports are initiaized to '0'.

Reported-by: siliu@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta &lt;pagupta@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: add a spinlock_t to struct batched_entropy</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:45:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sebastian Andrzej Siewior</name>
<email>bigeasy@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-20T04:09:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d6c68321e7856a247672205a33a61f6c668ac070'/>
<id>d6c68321e7856a247672205a33a61f6c668ac070</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b7d5dc21072cda7124d13eae2aefb7343ef94197 ]

The per-CPU variable batched_entropy_uXX is protected by get_cpu_var().
This is just a preempt_disable() which ensures that the variable is only
from the local CPU. It does not protect against users on the same CPU
from another context. It is possible that a preemptible context reads
slot 0 and then an interrupt occurs and the same value is read again.

The above scenario is confirmed by lockdep if we add a spinlock:
| ================================
| WARNING: inconsistent lock state
| 5.1.0-rc3+ #42 Not tainted
| --------------------------------
| inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -&gt; {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage.
| ksoftirqd/9/56 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE0:SE0] takes:
| (____ptrval____) (batched_entropy_u32.lock){+.?.}, at: get_random_u32+0x3e/0xe0
| {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
|   _raw_spin_lock+0x2a/0x40
|   get_random_u32+0x3e/0xe0
|   new_slab+0x15c/0x7b0
|   ___slab_alloc+0x492/0x620
|   __slab_alloc.isra.73+0x53/0xa0
|   kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xaf/0x2a0
|   copy_process.part.41+0x1e1/0x2370
|   _do_fork+0xdb/0x6d0
|   kernel_thread+0x20/0x30
|   kthreadd+0x1ba/0x220
|   ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
…
| other info that might help us debug this:
|  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
|
|        CPU0
|        ----
|   lock(batched_entropy_u32.lock);
|   &lt;Interrupt&gt;
|     lock(batched_entropy_u32.lock);
|
|  *** DEADLOCK ***
|
| stack backtrace:
| Call Trace:
…
|  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x20e/0x270
|  ipmi_alloc_recv_msg+0x16/0x40
…
|  __do_softirq+0xec/0x48d
|  run_ksoftirqd+0x37/0x60
|  smpboot_thread_fn+0x191/0x290
|  kthread+0xfe/0x130
|  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

Add a spinlock_t to the batched_entropy data structure and acquire the
lock while accessing it. Acquire the lock with disabled interrupts
because this function may be used from interrupt context.

Remove the batched_entropy_reset_lock lock. Now that we have a lock for
the data scructure, we can access it from a remote CPU.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b7d5dc21072cda7124d13eae2aefb7343ef94197 ]

The per-CPU variable batched_entropy_uXX is protected by get_cpu_var().
This is just a preempt_disable() which ensures that the variable is only
from the local CPU. It does not protect against users on the same CPU
from another context. It is possible that a preemptible context reads
slot 0 and then an interrupt occurs and the same value is read again.

The above scenario is confirmed by lockdep if we add a spinlock:
| ================================
| WARNING: inconsistent lock state
| 5.1.0-rc3+ #42 Not tainted
| --------------------------------
| inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -&gt; {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage.
| ksoftirqd/9/56 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE0:SE0] takes:
| (____ptrval____) (batched_entropy_u32.lock){+.?.}, at: get_random_u32+0x3e/0xe0
| {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
|   _raw_spin_lock+0x2a/0x40
|   get_random_u32+0x3e/0xe0
|   new_slab+0x15c/0x7b0
|   ___slab_alloc+0x492/0x620
|   __slab_alloc.isra.73+0x53/0xa0
|   kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xaf/0x2a0
|   copy_process.part.41+0x1e1/0x2370
|   _do_fork+0xdb/0x6d0
|   kernel_thread+0x20/0x30
|   kthreadd+0x1ba/0x220
|   ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
…
| other info that might help us debug this:
|  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
|
|        CPU0
|        ----
|   lock(batched_entropy_u32.lock);
|   &lt;Interrupt&gt;
|     lock(batched_entropy_u32.lock);
|
|  *** DEADLOCK ***
|
| stack backtrace:
| Call Trace:
…
|  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x20e/0x270
|  ipmi_alloc_recv_msg+0x16/0x40
…
|  __do_softirq+0xec/0x48d
|  run_ksoftirqd+0x37/0x60
|  smpboot_thread_fn+0x191/0x290
|  kthread+0xfe/0x130
|  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

Add a spinlock_t to the batched_entropy data structure and acquire the
lock while accessing it. Acquire the lock with disabled interrupts
because this function may be used from interrupt context.

Remove the batched_entropy_reset_lock lock. Now that we have a lock for
the data scructure, we can access it from a remote CPU.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: fix CRNG initialization when random.trust_cpu=1</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:45:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jon DeVree</name>
<email>nuxi@vault24.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-20T03:35:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2089644fc4534bc8e425f04e4ae9a2a1fcbdcc69'/>
<id>2089644fc4534bc8e425f04e4ae9a2a1fcbdcc69</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fe6f1a6a8eedc1aa538fee0baa612b6a59639cf8 ]

When the system boots with random.trust_cpu=1 it doesn't initialize the
per-NUMA CRNGs because it skips the rest of the CRNG startup code. This
means that the code from 1e7f583af67b ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable
for silly userspace programs") is not used when random.trust_cpu=1.

crash&gt; dmesg | grep random:
[    0.000000] random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x94/0x530 with crng_init=0
[    0.314029] random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)
crash&gt; print crng_node_pool
$6 = (struct crng_state **) 0x0

After adding the missing call to numa_crng_init() the per-NUMA CRNGs are
initialized again:

crash&gt; dmesg | grep random:
[    0.000000] random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x94/0x530 with crng_init=0
[    0.314031] random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)
crash&gt; print crng_node_pool
$1 = (struct crng_state **) 0xffff9a915f4014a0

The call to invalidate_batched_entropy() was also missing. This is
important for architectures like PPC and S390 which only have the
arch_get_random_seed_* functions.

Fixes: 39a8883a2b98 ("random: add a config option to trust the CPU's hwrng")
Signed-off-by: Jon DeVree &lt;nuxi@vault24.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fe6f1a6a8eedc1aa538fee0baa612b6a59639cf8 ]

When the system boots with random.trust_cpu=1 it doesn't initialize the
per-NUMA CRNGs because it skips the rest of the CRNG startup code. This
means that the code from 1e7f583af67b ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable
for silly userspace programs") is not used when random.trust_cpu=1.

crash&gt; dmesg | grep random:
[    0.000000] random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x94/0x530 with crng_init=0
[    0.314029] random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)
crash&gt; print crng_node_pool
$6 = (struct crng_state **) 0x0

After adding the missing call to numa_crng_init() the per-NUMA CRNGs are
initialized again:

crash&gt; dmesg | grep random:
[    0.000000] random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x94/0x530 with crng_init=0
[    0.314031] random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)
crash&gt; print crng_node_pool
$1 = (struct crng_state **) 0xffff9a915f4014a0

The call to invalidate_batched_entropy() was also missing. This is
important for architectures like PPC and S390 which only have the
arch_get_random_seed_* functions.

Fixes: 39a8883a2b98 ("random: add a config option to trust the CPU's hwrng")
Signed-off-by: Jon DeVree &lt;nuxi@vault24.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipmi:ssif: compare block number correctly for multi-part return messages</title>
<updated>2019-05-22T05:38:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kamlakant Patel</name>
<email>kamlakantp@marvell.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-24T11:50:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=638fffb11c93d12a91650aeb536a4a344a163ee2'/>
<id>638fffb11c93d12a91650aeb536a4a344a163ee2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 55be8658c7e2feb11a5b5b33ee031791dbd23a69 upstream.

According to ipmi spec, block number is a number that is incremented,
starting with 0, for each new block of message data returned using the
middle transaction.

Here, the 'blocknum' is data[0] which always starts from zero(0) and
'ssif_info-&gt;multi_pos' starts from 1.
So, we need to add +1 to blocknum while comparing with multi_pos.

Fixes: 7d6380cd40f79 ("ipmi:ssif: Fix handling of multi-part return messages").
Reported-by: Kiran Kolukuluru &lt;kirank@ami.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kamlakant Patel &lt;kamlakantp@marvell.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;1556106615-18722-1-git-send-email-kamlakantp@marvell.com&gt;
[Also added a debug log if the block numbers don't match.]
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard &lt;cminyard@mvista.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 55be8658c7e2feb11a5b5b33ee031791dbd23a69 upstream.

According to ipmi spec, block number is a number that is incremented,
starting with 0, for each new block of message data returned using the
middle transaction.

Here, the 'blocknum' is data[0] which always starts from zero(0) and
'ssif_info-&gt;multi_pos' starts from 1.
So, we need to add +1 to blocknum while comparing with multi_pos.

Fixes: 7d6380cd40f79 ("ipmi:ssif: Fix handling of multi-part return messages").
Reported-by: Kiran Kolukuluru &lt;kirank@ami.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kamlakant Patel &lt;kamlakantp@marvell.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;1556106615-18722-1-git-send-email-kamlakantp@marvell.com&gt;
[Also added a debug log if the block numbers don't match.]
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard &lt;cminyard@mvista.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipmi: ipmi_si_hardcode.c: init si_type array to fix a crash</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:40:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tony Camuso</name>
<email>tcamuso@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-09T19:20:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d7200d0648e5c2cc575f1516712fedaa6468cc2e'/>
<id>d7200d0648e5c2cc575f1516712fedaa6468cc2e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a885bcfd152f97b25005298ab2d6b741aed9b49c ]

The intended behavior of function ipmi_hardcode_init_one() is to default
to kcs interface when no type argument is presented when initializing
ipmi with hard coded addresses.

However, the array of char pointers allocated on the stack by function
ipmi_hardcode_init() was not inited to zeroes, so it contained stack
debris.

Consequently, passing the cruft stored in this array to function
ipmi_hardcode_init_one() caused a crash when it was unable to detect
that the char * being passed was nonsense and tried to access the
address specified by the bogus pointer.

The fix is simply to initialize the si_type array to zeroes, so if
there were no type argument given to at the command line, function
ipmi_hardcode_init_one() could properly default to the kcs interface.

Signed-off-by: Tony Camuso &lt;tcamuso@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;1554837603-40299-1-git-send-email-tcamuso@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard &lt;cminyard@mvista.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a885bcfd152f97b25005298ab2d6b741aed9b49c ]

The intended behavior of function ipmi_hardcode_init_one() is to default
to kcs interface when no type argument is presented when initializing
ipmi with hard coded addresses.

However, the array of char pointers allocated on the stack by function
ipmi_hardcode_init() was not inited to zeroes, so it contained stack
debris.

Consequently, passing the cruft stored in this array to function
ipmi_hardcode_init_one() caused a crash when it was unable to detect
that the char * being passed was nonsense and tried to access the
address specified by the bogus pointer.

The fix is simply to initialize the si_type array to zeroes, so if
there were no type argument given to at the command line, function
ipmi_hardcode_init_one() could properly default to the kcs interface.

Signed-off-by: Tony Camuso &lt;tcamuso@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;1554837603-40299-1-git-send-email-tcamuso@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard &lt;cminyard@mvista.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tpm: fix an invalid condition in tpm_common_poll</title>
<updated>2019-04-27T07:37:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tadeusz Struk</name>
<email>tadeusz.struk@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-27T18:32:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=edc94cb2c13b06d9f72eda5dd96fecbe3973ad96'/>
<id>edc94cb2c13b06d9f72eda5dd96fecbe3973ad96</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7110629263469b4664d00b38ef80a656eddf3637 ]

The poll condition should only check response_length,
because reads should only be issued if there is data to read.
The response_read flag only prevents double writes.
The problem was that the write set the response_read to false,
enqued a tpm job, and returned. Then application called poll
which checked the response_read flag and returned EPOLLIN.
Then the application called read, but got nothing.
After all that the async_work kicked in.
Added also mutex_lock around the poll check to prevent
other possible race conditions.

Fixes: 9488585b21bef0df12 ("tpm: add support for partial reads")
Reported-by: Mantas Mikulėnas &lt;grawity@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Mantas Mikulėnas &lt;grawity@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk &lt;tadeusz.struk@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7110629263469b4664d00b38ef80a656eddf3637 ]

The poll condition should only check response_length,
because reads should only be issued if there is data to read.
The response_read flag only prevents double writes.
The problem was that the write set the response_read to false,
enqued a tpm job, and returned. Then application called poll
which checked the response_read flag and returned EPOLLIN.
Then the application called read, but got nothing.
After all that the async_work kicked in.
Added also mutex_lock around the poll check to prevent
other possible race conditions.

Fixes: 9488585b21bef0df12 ("tpm: add support for partial reads")
Reported-by: Mantas Mikulėnas &lt;grawity@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Mantas Mikulėnas &lt;grawity@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk &lt;tadeusz.struk@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tpm: Fix the type of the return value in calc_tpm2_event_size()</title>
<updated>2019-04-27T07:37:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yue Haibing</name>
<email>yuehaibing@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-23T13:05:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=18636692a1b49f0c0ebf623ad29b65514886c59c'/>
<id>18636692a1b49f0c0ebf623ad29b65514886c59c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b9d0a85d6b2e76630cfd4c475ee3af4109bfd87a upstream

calc_tpm2_event_size() has an invalid signature because
it returns a 'size_t' where as its signature says that
it returns 'int'.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 4d23cc323cdb ("tpm: add securityfs support for TPM 2.0 firmware event log")
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing &lt;yuehaibing@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
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<pre>
commit b9d0a85d6b2e76630cfd4c475ee3af4109bfd87a upstream

calc_tpm2_event_size() has an invalid signature because
it returns a 'size_t' where as its signature says that
it returns 'int'.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 4d23cc323cdb ("tpm: add securityfs support for TPM 2.0 firmware event log")
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing &lt;yuehaibing@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel: Return -E2BIG when the transfer is incomplete</title>
<updated>2019-04-27T07:37:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jarkko Sakkinen</name>
<email>jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-08T16:30:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=03c1d8f8afd8e59b67566d39416db8b0bc66668f'/>
<id>03c1d8f8afd8e59b67566d39416db8b0bc66668f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 442601e87a4769a8daba4976ec3afa5222ca211d ]

Return -E2BIG when the transfer is incomplete. The upper layer does
not retry, so not doing that is incorrect behaviour.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a2871c62e186 ("tpm: Add support for Atmel I2C TPMs")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar &lt;jsnitsel@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
[ Upstream commit 442601e87a4769a8daba4976ec3afa5222ca211d ]

Return -E2BIG when the transfer is incomplete. The upper layer does
not retry, so not doing that is incorrect behaviour.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a2871c62e186 ("tpm: Add support for Atmel I2C TPMs")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar &lt;jsnitsel@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipmi: fix sleep-in-atomic in free_user at cleanup SRCU user-&gt;release_barrier</title>
<updated>2019-04-27T07:37:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Corey Minyard</name>
<email>cminyard@mvista.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-03T20:58:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=46c4f2375638122a08b7ab8af5bc19bec74d28b4'/>
<id>46c4f2375638122a08b7ab8af5bc19bec74d28b4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3b9a907223d7f6b9d1dadea29436842ae9bcd76d upstream.

free_user() could be called in atomic context.

This patch pushed the free operation off into a workqueue.

Example:

 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/workqueue.c:2856
 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 177, name: ksoftirqd/27
 CPU: 27 PID: 177 Comm: ksoftirqd/27 Not tainted 4.19.25-3 #1
 Hardware name: AIC 1S-HV26-08/MB-DPSB04-06, BIOS IVYBV060 10/21/2015
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x5c/0x7b
  ___might_sleep+0xec/0x110
  __flush_work+0x48/0x1f0
  ? try_to_del_timer_sync+0x4d/0x80
  _cleanup_srcu_struct+0x104/0x140
  free_user+0x18/0x30 [ipmi_msghandler]
  ipmi_free_recv_msg+0x3a/0x50 [ipmi_msghandler]
  deliver_response+0xbd/0xd0 [ipmi_msghandler]
  deliver_local_response+0xe/0x30 [ipmi_msghandler]
  handle_one_recv_msg+0x163/0xc80 [ipmi_msghandler]
  ? dequeue_entity+0xa0/0x960
  handle_new_recv_msgs+0x15c/0x1f0 [ipmi_msghandler]
  tasklet_action_common.isra.22+0x103/0x120
  __do_softirq+0xf8/0x2d7
  run_ksoftirqd+0x26/0x50
  smpboot_thread_fn+0x11d/0x1e0
  kthread+0x103/0x140
  ? sort_range+0x20/0x20
  ? kthread_destroy_worker+0x40/0x40
  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40

Fixes: 77f8269606bf ("ipmi: fix use-after-free of user-&gt;release_barrier.rda")

Reported-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard &lt;cminyard@mvista.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0
Cc: Yang Yingliang &lt;yangyingliang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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<pre>
commit 3b9a907223d7f6b9d1dadea29436842ae9bcd76d upstream.

free_user() could be called in atomic context.

This patch pushed the free operation off into a workqueue.

Example:

 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/workqueue.c:2856
 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 177, name: ksoftirqd/27
 CPU: 27 PID: 177 Comm: ksoftirqd/27 Not tainted 4.19.25-3 #1
 Hardware name: AIC 1S-HV26-08/MB-DPSB04-06, BIOS IVYBV060 10/21/2015
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x5c/0x7b
  ___might_sleep+0xec/0x110
  __flush_work+0x48/0x1f0
  ? try_to_del_timer_sync+0x4d/0x80
  _cleanup_srcu_struct+0x104/0x140
  free_user+0x18/0x30 [ipmi_msghandler]
  ipmi_free_recv_msg+0x3a/0x50 [ipmi_msghandler]
  deliver_response+0xbd/0xd0 [ipmi_msghandler]
  deliver_local_response+0xe/0x30 [ipmi_msghandler]
  handle_one_recv_msg+0x163/0xc80 [ipmi_msghandler]
  ? dequeue_entity+0xa0/0x960
  handle_new_recv_msgs+0x15c/0x1f0 [ipmi_msghandler]
  tasklet_action_common.isra.22+0x103/0x120
  __do_softirq+0xf8/0x2d7
  run_ksoftirqd+0x26/0x50
  smpboot_thread_fn+0x11d/0x1e0
  kthread+0x103/0x140
  ? sort_range+0x20/0x20
  ? kthread_destroy_worker+0x40/0x40
  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40

Fixes: 77f8269606bf ("ipmi: fix use-after-free of user-&gt;release_barrier.rda")

Reported-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard &lt;cminyard@mvista.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0
Cc: Yang Yingliang &lt;yangyingliang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
