<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/char/random.c, branch v5.18.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>random: check for signals after page of pool writes</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:24:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-22T20:25:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=068108f53811d99b5a470eafe5b0ddd523ed2c79'/>
<id>068108f53811d99b5a470eafe5b0ddd523ed2c79</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1ce6c8d68f8ac587f54d0a271ac594d3d51f3efb upstream.

get_random_bytes_user() checks for signals after producing a PAGE_SIZE
worth of output, just like /dev/zero does. write_pool() is doing
basically the same work (actually, slightly more expensive), and so
should stop to check for signals in the same way. Let's also name it
write_pool_user() to match get_random_bytes_user(), so this won't be
misused in the future.

Before this patch, massive writes to /dev/urandom would tie up the
process for an extremely long time and make it unterminatable. After, it
can be successfully interrupted. The following test program can be used
to see this works as intended:

  #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
  #include &lt;fcntl.h&gt;
  #include &lt;signal.h&gt;
  #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;

  static unsigned char x[~0U];

  static void handle(int) { }

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
    pid_t pid = getpid(), child;
    int fd;
    signal(SIGUSR1, handle);
    if (!(child = fork())) {
      for (;;)
        kill(pid, SIGUSR1);
    }
    fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_WRONLY);
    pause();
    printf("interrupted after writing %zd bytes\n", write(fd, x, sizeof(x)));
    close(fd);
    kill(child, SIGTERM);
    return 0;
  }

Result before: "interrupted after writing 2147479552 bytes"
Result after: "interrupted after writing 4096 bytes"

Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1ce6c8d68f8ac587f54d0a271ac594d3d51f3efb upstream.

get_random_bytes_user() checks for signals after producing a PAGE_SIZE
worth of output, just like /dev/zero does. write_pool() is doing
basically the same work (actually, slightly more expensive), and so
should stop to check for signals in the same way. Let's also name it
write_pool_user() to match get_random_bytes_user(), so this won't be
misused in the future.

Before this patch, massive writes to /dev/urandom would tie up the
process for an extremely long time and make it unterminatable. After, it
can be successfully interrupted. The following test program can be used
to see this works as intended:

  #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
  #include &lt;fcntl.h&gt;
  #include &lt;signal.h&gt;
  #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;

  static unsigned char x[~0U];

  static void handle(int) { }

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
    pid_t pid = getpid(), child;
    int fd;
    signal(SIGUSR1, handle);
    if (!(child = fork())) {
      for (;;)
        kill(pid, SIGUSR1);
    }
    fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_WRONLY);
    pause();
    printf("interrupted after writing %zd bytes\n", write(fd, x, sizeof(x)));
    close(fd);
    kill(child, SIGTERM);
    return 0;
  }

Result before: "interrupted after writing 2147479552 bytes"
Result after: "interrupted after writing 4096 bytes"

Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: wire up fops-&gt;splice_{read,write}_iter()</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:24:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-19T23:31:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=08467db994c0cf6c16e347a99e374a432e6c3509'/>
<id>08467db994c0cf6c16e347a99e374a432e6c3509</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 79025e727a846be6fd215ae9cdb654368ac3f9a6 upstream.

Now that random/urandom is using {read,write}_iter, we can wire it up to
using the generic splice handlers.

Fixes: 36e2c7421f02 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
[Jason: added the splice_write path. Note that sendfile() and such still
 does not work for read, though it does for write, because of a file
 type restriction in splice_direct_to_actor(), which I'll address
 separately.]
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 79025e727a846be6fd215ae9cdb654368ac3f9a6 upstream.

Now that random/urandom is using {read,write}_iter, we can wire it up to
using the generic splice handlers.

Fixes: 36e2c7421f02 ("fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
[Jason: added the splice_write path. Note that sendfile() and such still
 does not work for read, though it does for write, because of a file
 type restriction in splice_direct_to_actor(), which I'll address
 separately.]
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: convert to using fops-&gt;write_iter()</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:24:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-19T23:43:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fdb1b354e301dd2aa56df862b9d4894b79039c40'/>
<id>fdb1b354e301dd2aa56df862b9d4894b79039c40</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 22b0a222af4df8ee9bb8e07013ab44da9511b047 upstream.

Now that the read side has been converted to fix a regression with
splice, convert the write side as well to have some symmetry in the
interface used (and help deprecate -&gt;write()).

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
[Jason: cleaned up random_ioctl a bit, require full writes in
 RNDADDENTROPY since it's crediting entropy, simplify control flow of
 write_pool(), and incorporate suggestions from Al.]
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 22b0a222af4df8ee9bb8e07013ab44da9511b047 upstream.

Now that the read side has been converted to fix a regression with
splice, convert the write side as well to have some symmetry in the
interface used (and help deprecate -&gt;write()).

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
[Jason: cleaned up random_ioctl a bit, require full writes in
 RNDADDENTROPY since it's crediting entropy, simplify control flow of
 write_pool(), and incorporate suggestions from Al.]
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: convert to using fops-&gt;read_iter()</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:24:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-19T23:31:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=09ea8bc7276aead310e5faa21ae29ceeecea87c9'/>
<id>09ea8bc7276aead310e5faa21ae29ceeecea87c9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1b388e7765f2eaa137cf5d92b47ef5925ad83ced upstream.

This is a pre-requisite to wiring up splice() again for the random
and urandom drivers. It also allows us to remove the INT_MAX check in
getrandom(), because import_single_range() applies capping internally.

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
[Jason: rewrote get_random_bytes_user() to simplify and also incorporate
 additional suggestions from Al.]
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1b388e7765f2eaa137cf5d92b47ef5925ad83ced upstream.

This is a pre-requisite to wiring up splice() again for the random
and urandom drivers. It also allows us to remove the INT_MAX check in
getrandom(), because import_single_range() applies capping internally.

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
[Jason: rewrote get_random_bytes_user() to simplify and also incorporate
 additional suggestions from Al.]
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: unify batched entropy implementations</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:24:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-14T22:22:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=806afdc6d97fe17a9b96a8d6964f7d2da610ee58'/>
<id>806afdc6d97fe17a9b96a8d6964f7d2da610ee58</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3092adcef3ffd2ef59634998297ca8358461ebce upstream.

There are currently two separate batched entropy implementations, for
u32 and u64, with nearly identical code, with the goal of avoiding
unaligned memory accesses and letting the buffers be used more
efficiently. Having to maintain these two functions independently is a
bit of a hassle though, considering that they always need to be kept in
sync.

This commit factors them out into a type-generic macro, so that the
expansion produces the same code as before, such that diffing the
assembly shows no differences. This will also make it easier in the
future to add u16 and u8 batches.

This was initially tested using an always_inline function and letting
gcc constant fold the type size in, but the code gen was less efficient,
and in general it was more verbose and harder to follow. So this patch
goes with the boring macro solution, similar to what's already done for
the _wait functions in random.h.

Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3092adcef3ffd2ef59634998297ca8358461ebce upstream.

There are currently two separate batched entropy implementations, for
u32 and u64, with nearly identical code, with the goal of avoiding
unaligned memory accesses and letting the buffers be used more
efficiently. Having to maintain these two functions independently is a
bit of a hassle though, considering that they always need to be kept in
sync.

This commit factors them out into a type-generic macro, so that the
expansion produces the same code as before, such that diffing the
assembly shows no differences. This will also make it easier in the
future to add u16 and u8 batches.

This was initially tested using an always_inline function and letting
gcc constant fold the type size in, but the code gen was less efficient,
and in general it was more verbose and harder to follow. So this patch
goes with the boring macro solution, similar to what's already done for
the _wait functions in random.h.

Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:24:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-14T11:59:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=463ebd6f8707e57847680541a05c910947a2518a'/>
<id>463ebd6f8707e57847680541a05c910947a2518a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5ad7dd882e45d7fe432c32e896e2aaa0b21746ea upstream.

randomize_page is an mm function. It is documented like one. It contains
the history of one. It has the naming convention of one. It looks
just like another very similar function in mm, randomize_stack_top().
And it has always been maintained and updated by mm people. There is no
need for it to be in random.c. In the "which shape does not look like
the other ones" test, pointing to randomize_page() is correct.

So move randomize_page() into mm/util.c, right next to the similar
randomize_stack_top() function.

This commit contains no actual code changes.

Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5ad7dd882e45d7fe432c32e896e2aaa0b21746ea upstream.

randomize_page is an mm function. It is documented like one. It contains
the history of one. It has the naming convention of one. It looks
just like another very similar function in mm, randomize_stack_top().
And it has always been maintained and updated by mm people. There is no
need for it to be in random.c. In the "which shape does not look like
the other ones" test, pointing to randomize_page() is correct.

So move randomize_page() into mm/util.c, right next to the similar
randomize_stack_top() function.

This commit contains no actual code changes.

Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: move initialization functions out of hot pages</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:24:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-13T14:17:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4f276d40e6032bcc19b341185e335dee65a431aa'/>
<id>4f276d40e6032bcc19b341185e335dee65a431aa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 560181c27b582557d633ecb608110075433383af upstream.

Much of random.c is devoted to initializing the rng and accounting for
when a sufficient amount of entropy has been added. In a perfect world,
this would all happen during init, and so we could mark these functions
as __init. But in reality, this isn't the case: sometimes the rng only
finishes initializing some seconds after system init is finished.

For this reason, at the moment, a whole host of functions that are only
used relatively close to system init and then never again are intermixed
with functions that are used in hot code all the time. This creates more
cache misses than necessary.

In order to pack the hot code closer together, this commit moves the
initialization functions that can't be marked as __init into
.text.unlikely by way of the __cold attribute.

Of particular note is moving credit_init_bits() into a macro wrapper
that inlines the crng_ready() static branch check. This avoids a
function call to a nop+ret, and most notably prevents extra entropy
arithmetic from being computed in mix_interrupt_randomness().

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 560181c27b582557d633ecb608110075433383af upstream.

Much of random.c is devoted to initializing the rng and accounting for
when a sufficient amount of entropy has been added. In a perfect world,
this would all happen during init, and so we could mark these functions
as __init. But in reality, this isn't the case: sometimes the rng only
finishes initializing some seconds after system init is finished.

For this reason, at the moment, a whole host of functions that are only
used relatively close to system init and then never again are intermixed
with functions that are used in hot code all the time. This creates more
cache misses than necessary.

In order to pack the hot code closer together, this commit moves the
initialization functions that can't be marked as __init into
.text.unlikely by way of the __cold attribute.

Of particular note is moving credit_init_bits() into a macro wrapper
that inlines the crng_ready() static branch check. This avoids a
function call to a nop+ret, and most notably prevents extra entropy
arithmetic from being computed in mix_interrupt_randomness().

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: make consistent use of buf and len</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:24:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-13T11:18:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6fd3ff02dadcf6eacf6efd2e0840e75506d15905'/>
<id>6fd3ff02dadcf6eacf6efd2e0840e75506d15905</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a19402634c435a4eae226df53c141cdbb9922e7b upstream.

The current code was a mix of "nbytes", "count", "size", "buffer", "in",
and so forth. Instead, let's clean this up by naming input parameters
"buf" (or "ubuf") and "len", so that you always understand that you're
reading this variety of function argument.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a19402634c435a4eae226df53c141cdbb9922e7b upstream.

The current code was a mix of "nbytes", "count", "size", "buffer", "in",
and so forth. Instead, let's clean this up by naming input parameters
"buf" (or "ubuf") and "len", so that you always understand that you're
reading this variety of function argument.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: use static branch for crng_ready()</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:24:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-03T13:30:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=05daffcd83dae217daedfa17577bbf8dc91f48fd'/>
<id>05daffcd83dae217daedfa17577bbf8dc91f48fd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f5bda35fba615ace70a656d4700423fa6c9bebee upstream.

Since crng_ready() is only false briefly during initialization and then
forever after becomes true, we don't need to evaluate it after, making
it a prime candidate for a static branch.

One complication, however, is that it changes state in a particular call
to credit_init_bits(), which might be made from atomic context, which
means we must kick off a workqueue to change the static key. Further
complicating things, credit_init_bits() may be called sufficiently early
on in system initialization such that system_wq is NULL.

Fortunately, there exists the nice function execute_in_process_context(),
which will immediately execute the function if !in_interrupt(), and
otherwise defer it to a workqueue. During early init, before workqueues
are available, in_interrupt() is always false, because interrupts
haven't even been enabled yet, which means the function in that case
executes immediately. Later on, after workqueues are available,
in_interrupt() might be true, but in that case, the work is queued in
system_wq and all goes well.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Sultan Alsawaf &lt;sultan@kerneltoast.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f5bda35fba615ace70a656d4700423fa6c9bebee upstream.

Since crng_ready() is only false briefly during initialization and then
forever after becomes true, we don't need to evaluate it after, making
it a prime candidate for a static branch.

One complication, however, is that it changes state in a particular call
to credit_init_bits(), which might be made from atomic context, which
means we must kick off a workqueue to change the static key. Further
complicating things, credit_init_bits() may be called sufficiently early
on in system initialization such that system_wq is NULL.

Fortunately, there exists the nice function execute_in_process_context(),
which will immediately execute the function if !in_interrupt(), and
otherwise defer it to a workqueue. During early init, before workqueues
are available, in_interrupt() is always false, because interrupts
haven't even been enabled yet, which means the function in that case
executes immediately. Later on, after workqueues are available,
in_interrupt() might be true, but in that case, the work is queued in
system_wq and all goes well.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Sultan Alsawaf &lt;sultan@kerneltoast.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: credit architectural init the exact amount</title>
<updated>2022-05-30T07:24:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-12T13:32:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=91657c81fc3d0401189060acf54cddc201464645'/>
<id>91657c81fc3d0401189060acf54cddc201464645</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 12e45a2a6308105469968951e6d563e8f4fea187 upstream.

RDRAND and RDSEED can fail sometimes, which is fine. We currently
initialize the RNG with 512 bits of RDRAND/RDSEED. We only need 256 bits
of those to succeed in order to initialize the RNG. Instead of the
current "all or nothing" approach, actually credit these contributions
the amount that is actually contributed.

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 12e45a2a6308105469968951e6d563e8f4fea187 upstream.

RDRAND and RDSEED can fail sometimes, which is fine. We currently
initialize the RNG with 512 bits of RDRAND/RDSEED. We only need 256 bits
of those to succeed in order to initialize the RNG. Instead of the
current "all or nothing" approach, actually credit these contributions
the amount that is actually contributed.

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
