linux-stable.git/drivers/base/cpu.c, branch v4.19.321

Revert "drivers core: Use sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for show(device *...) functions"

2023-10-10T19:45:00+00:00

This reverts commit 3ce2cd63e8ee037644db0cbea65e6c40ab6cc178 which is
commit aa838896d87af561a33ecefea1caa4c15a68bc47 upstream.

Ben writes:
	When I looked into the referenced security issue, it seemed to only be
	exploitable through wakelock names, and in the upstream kernel only
	after commit c8377adfa781 "PM / wakeup: Show wakeup sources stats in
	sysfs" (first included in 5.4).  So I would be interested to know if
	and why a fix was needed for 4.19.

	More importantly, this backported version uniformly converts to
	sysfs_emit(), but there are 3 places sysfs_emit_at() must be used
	instead:

Reported-by: Ben Hutchings 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/95831df76c41a53bc3e1ac8ece64915dd63763a1.camel@decadent.org.uk
Cc: Joe Perches 
Cc: Brennan Lamoreaux 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

drivers core: Use sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for show(device *...) functions

2023-08-11T09:45:40+00:00

commit aa838896d87af561a33ecefea1caa4c15a68bc47 upstream.

Convert the various sprintf fmaily calls in sysfs device show functions
to sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for PAGE_SIZE buffer safety.

Done with:

$ spatch -sp-file sysfs_emit_dev.cocci --in-place --max-width=80 .

And cocci script:

$ cat sysfs_emit_dev.cocci
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
	return
-	sprintf(buf,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...>
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
	return
-	snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...>
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
	return
-	scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...>
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
	return
-	strcpy(buf, chr);
+	sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
	...>
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
	len =
-	sprintf(buf,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...>
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
	len =
-	snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...>
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
	len =
-	scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...>
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	<...
-	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+	len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len,
	...);
	...>
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	...
-	strcpy(buf, chr);
-	return strlen(buf);
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
}

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3d033c33056d88bbe34d4ddb62afd05ee166ab9a.1600285923.git.joe@perches.com
[ Brennan : Regenerated for 4.19 to fix CVE-2022-20166 ]
Signed-off-by: Brennan Lamoreaux 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation

2023-08-08T17:49:18+00:00

commit 8974eb588283b7d44a7c91fa09fcbaf380339f3a upstream

Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector registers.

Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions
that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable
hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and
encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector
registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector
register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical
side channel techniques like cache timing attacks.

This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons.
First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it.
This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can
be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control
bit alone.

Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the
mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX.
It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be
mitigated against GDS.

The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by
setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with
mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading:

    /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon 
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen 
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tick/nohz: Fix cpu_is_hotpluggable() by checking with nohz subsystem

2023-05-17T09:13:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit 58d7668242647e661a20efe065519abd6454287e ]

For CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL systems, the tick_do_timer_cpu cannot be offlined.
However, cpu_is_hotpluggable() still returns true for those CPUs. This causes
torture tests that do offlining to end up trying to offline this CPU causing
test failures. Such failure happens on all architectures.

Fix the repeated error messages thrown by this (even if the hotplug errors are
harmless) by asking the opinion of the nohz subsystem on whether the CPU can be
hotplugged.

[ Apply Frederic Weisbecker feedback on refactoring tick_nohz_cpu_down(). ]

For drivers/base/ portion:
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker 
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker 
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" 
Cc: Zhouyi Zhou 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Marc Zyngier 
Cc: rcu 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2987557f52b9 ("driver-core/cpu: Expose hotpluggability to the rest of the kernel")
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney 
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability

2022-11-23T06:53:44+00:00

commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

  [peterz: add hygon]
  [kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips 
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips 
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
[cascardo: adjusted BUG numbers to match upstream]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo 
[suleiman: Remove hygon]
Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data

2022-06-16T11:18:52+00:00

commit 8d50cdf8b8341770bc6367bce40c0c1bb0e1d5b3 upstream

Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar
to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation

2020-06-10T19:35:01+00:00

commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream

SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
  either mitigations=off or srbds=off.

* Export vulnerability status via sysfs

* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

 [ bp: Massage,
   - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
   - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
   - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
   - reflow comments.
   jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
   tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
 ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck 
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure

2019-11-12T18:21:36+00:00

commit db4d30fbb71b47e4ecb11c4efa5d8aad4b03dfae upstream.

Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:

   https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195

There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.

This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.

It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.

Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.

Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli 
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/taa: Add sysfs reporting for TSX Async Abort

2019-11-12T18:21:32+00:00

commit 6608b45ac5ecb56f9e171252229c39580cc85f0f upstream.

Add the sysfs reporting file for TSX Async Abort. It exposes the
vulnerability and the mitigation state similar to the existing files for
the other hardware vulnerabilities.

Sysfs file path is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan 
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross 
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck 
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS

2019-05-14T17:17:56+00:00

commit 8a4b06d391b0a42a373808979b5028f5c84d9c6a upstream

Add the sysfs reporting file for MDS. It exposes the vulnerability and
mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov 
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters 
Tested-by: Jon Masters 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman