<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/base/cpu.c, branch linux-6.2.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>tick/nohz: Fix cpu_is_hotpluggable() by checking with nohz subsystem</title>
<updated>2023-05-11T14:10:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joel Fernandes (Google)</name>
<email>joel@joelfernandes.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-24T17:31:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4b7845ad71693caee331043e6f7b8152adb50729'/>
<id>4b7845ad71693caee331043e6f7b8152adb50729</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 58d7668242647e661a20efe065519abd6454287e upstream.

For CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL systems, the tick_do_timer_cpu cannot be offlined.
However, cpu_is_hotpluggable() still returns true for those CPUs. This causes
torture tests that do offlining to end up trying to offline this CPU causing
test failures. Such failure happens on all architectures.

Fix the repeated error messages thrown by this (even if the hotplug errors are
harmless) by asking the opinion of the nohz subsystem on whether the CPU can be
hotplugged.

[ Apply Frederic Weisbecker feedback on refactoring tick_nohz_cpu_down(). ]

For drivers/base/ portion:
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Zhouyi Zhou &lt;zhouzhouyi@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: rcu &lt;rcu@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2987557f52b9 ("driver-core/cpu: Expose hotpluggability to the rest of the kernel")
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) &lt;joel@joelfernandes.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 58d7668242647e661a20efe065519abd6454287e upstream.

For CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL systems, the tick_do_timer_cpu cannot be offlined.
However, cpu_is_hotpluggable() still returns true for those CPUs. This causes
torture tests that do offlining to end up trying to offline this CPU causing
test failures. Such failure happens on all architectures.

Fix the repeated error messages thrown by this (even if the hotplug errors are
harmless) by asking the opinion of the nohz subsystem on whether the CPU can be
hotplugged.

[ Apply Frederic Weisbecker feedback on refactoring tick_nohz_cpu_down(). ]

For drivers/base/ portion:
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Zhouyi Zhou &lt;zhouzhouyi@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: rcu &lt;rcu@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2987557f52b9 ("driver-core/cpu: Expose hotpluggability to the rest of the kernel")
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) &lt;joel@joelfernandes.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability</title>
<updated>2022-06-27T08:33:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexandre Chartre</name>
<email>alexandre.chartre@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-14T21:15:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8'/>
<id>6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8</id>
<content type='text'>
Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

  [peterz: add hygon]
  [kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre &lt;alexandre.chartre@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

  [peterz: add hygon]
  [kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips &lt;kim.phillips@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre &lt;alexandre.chartre@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data</title>
<updated>2022-05-21T10:16:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-20T03:32:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8d50cdf8b8341770bc6367bce40c0c1bb0e1d5b3'/>
<id>8d50cdf8b8341770bc6367bce40c0c1bb0e1d5b3</id>
<content type='text'>
Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar
to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar
to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/isolation: Use single feature type while referring to housekeeping cpumask</title>
<updated>2022-02-16T14:57:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Frederic Weisbecker</name>
<email>frederic@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-07T15:59:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=04d4e665a60902cf36e7ad39af1179cb5df542ad'/>
<id>04d4e665a60902cf36e7ad39af1179cb5df542ad</id>
<content type='text'>
Refer to housekeeping APIs using single feature types instead of flags.
This prevents from passing multiple isolation features at once to
housekeeping interfaces, which soon won't be possible anymore as each
isolation features will have their own cpumask.

Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Phil Auld &lt;pauld@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220207155910.527133-5-frederic@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Refer to housekeeping APIs using single feature types instead of flags.
This prevents from passing multiple isolation features at once to
housekeeping interfaces, which soon won't be possible anymore as each
isolation features will have their own cpumask.

Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Phil Auld &lt;pauld@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220207155910.527133-5-frederic@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>driver: base: Prefer unsigned int to bare use of unsigned</title>
<updated>2021-07-21T15:30:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jinchao Wang</name>
<email>wjc@cdjrlc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-28T17:19:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e7deeb9d79d8691f1e6c4c6707471ec3d7b9886b'/>
<id>e7deeb9d79d8691f1e6c4c6707471ec3d7b9886b</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix checkpatch warnings:
    WARNING: Prefer 'unsigned int' to bare use of 'unsigned'

Signed-off-by: Jinchao Wang &lt;wjc@cdjrlc.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210628171907.63646-2-wjc@cdjrlc.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix checkpatch warnings:
    WARNING: Prefer 'unsigned int' to bare use of 'unsigned'

Signed-off-by: Jinchao Wang &lt;wjc@cdjrlc.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210628171907.63646-2-wjc@cdjrlc.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers/base: Constify static attribute_group structs</title>
<updated>2021-06-04T13:06:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rikard Falkeborn</name>
<email>rikard.falkeborn@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-28T21:34:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5a576764e4190f7b48cf3cf40f4294f001918605'/>
<id>5a576764e4190f7b48cf3cf40f4294f001918605</id>
<content type='text'>
These are only used by putting their address in an array of pointers to
const struct attribute_group (either directly or via the
__ATTRIBUTE_GROUP macro). Make them const to allow the compiler to place
them in read-only memory.

Signed-off-by: Rikard Falkeborn &lt;rikard.falkeborn@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210528213408.20067-1-rikard.falkeborn@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
These are only used by putting their address in an array of pointers to
const struct attribute_group (either directly or via the
__ATTRIBUTE_GROUP macro). Make them const to allow the compiler to place
them in read-only memory.

Signed-off-by: Rikard Falkeborn &lt;rikard.falkeborn@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210528213408.20067-1-rikard.falkeborn@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers/base/cpu: remove redundant assignment of variable retval</title>
<updated>2021-03-23T13:56:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin Ian King</name>
<email>colin.king@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-18T20:28:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6b72cf128282a4c2191fc2278ba5010c85b51fb6'/>
<id>6b72cf128282a4c2191fc2278ba5010c85b51fb6</id>
<content type='text'>
The variable retval is being initialized with a value that is never read
and it is being updated later with a new value.  Clean this up by
initializing retval to -ENOMEM and remove the assignment to retval
on the !dev failure path.

Kudos to Rafael for the improved fix suggestion.

Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210218202837.516231-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The variable retval is being initialized with a value that is never read
and it is being updated later with a new value.  Clean this up by
initializing retval to -ENOMEM and remove the assignment to retval
on the !dev failure path.

Kudos to Rafael for the improved fix suggestion.

Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210218202837.516231-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers core: Miscellaneous changes for sysfs_emit</title>
<updated>2020-10-02T11:12:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Perches</name>
<email>joe@perches.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-16T20:40:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=948b3edba8988306b635578a72b0dab6091a5eb0'/>
<id>948b3edba8988306b635578a72b0dab6091a5eb0</id>
<content type='text'>
Change additional instances that could use sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at
that the coccinelle script could not convert.

o macros creating show functions with ## concatenation
o unbound sprintf uses with buf+len for start of output to sysfs_emit_at
o returns with ?: tests and sprintf to sysfs_emit
o sysfs output with struct class * not struct device * arguments

Miscellanea:

o remove unnecessary initializations around these changes
o consistently use int len for return length of show functions
o use octal permissions and not S_&lt;FOO&gt;
o rename a few show function names so DEVICE_ATTR_&lt;FOO&gt; can be used
o use DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO where appropriate
o consistently use const char *output for strings
o checkpatch/style neatening

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8bc24444fe2049a9b2de6127389b57edfdfe324d.1600285923.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Change additional instances that could use sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at
that the coccinelle script could not convert.

o macros creating show functions with ## concatenation
o unbound sprintf uses with buf+len for start of output to sysfs_emit_at
o returns with ?: tests and sprintf to sysfs_emit
o sysfs output with struct class * not struct device * arguments

Miscellanea:

o remove unnecessary initializations around these changes
o consistently use int len for return length of show functions
o use octal permissions and not S_&lt;FOO&gt;
o rename a few show function names so DEVICE_ATTR_&lt;FOO&gt; can be used
o use DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO where appropriate
o consistently use const char *output for strings
o checkpatch/style neatening

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8bc24444fe2049a9b2de6127389b57edfdfe324d.1600285923.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers core: Use sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for show(device *...) functions</title>
<updated>2020-10-02T11:09:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Perches</name>
<email>joe@perches.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-16T20:40:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=aa838896d87af561a33ecefea1caa4c15a68bc47'/>
<id>aa838896d87af561a33ecefea1caa4c15a68bc47</id>
<content type='text'>
Convert the various sprintf fmaily calls in sysfs device show functions
to sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for PAGE_SIZE buffer safety.

Done with:

$ spatch -sp-file sysfs_emit_dev.cocci --in-place --max-width=80 .

And cocci script:

$ cat sysfs_emit_dev.cocci
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
	return
-	sprintf(buf,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...&gt;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
	return
-	snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...&gt;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
	return
-	scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...&gt;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
	return
-	strcpy(buf, chr);
+	sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
	...&gt;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
	len =
-	sprintf(buf,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...&gt;
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
	len =
-	snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...&gt;
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
	len =
-	scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...&gt;
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
-	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+	len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len,
	...);
	...&gt;
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	...
-	strcpy(buf, chr);
-	return strlen(buf);
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
}

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3d033c33056d88bbe34d4ddb62afd05ee166ab9a.1600285923.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Convert the various sprintf fmaily calls in sysfs device show functions
to sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for PAGE_SIZE buffer safety.

Done with:

$ spatch -sp-file sysfs_emit_dev.cocci --in-place --max-width=80 .

And cocci script:

$ cat sysfs_emit_dev.cocci
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
	return
-	sprintf(buf,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...&gt;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
	return
-	snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...&gt;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
	return
-	scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...&gt;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
	return
-	strcpy(buf, chr);
+	sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
	...&gt;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
	len =
-	sprintf(buf,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...&gt;
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
	len =
-	snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...&gt;
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
	len =
-	scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	sysfs_emit(buf,
	...);
	...&gt;
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	&lt;...
-	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+	len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len,
	...);
	...&gt;
	return len;
}

@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@

ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
	...
-	strcpy(buf, chr);
-	return strlen(buf);
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
}

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3d033c33056d88bbe34d4ddb62afd05ee166ab9a.1600285923.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation</title>
<updated>2020-04-20T10:19:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Gross</name>
<email>mgross@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-16T15:54:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb'/>
<id>7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb</id>
<content type='text'>
SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
  either mitigations=off or srbds=off.

* Export vulnerability status via sysfs

* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

 [ bp: Massage,
   - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
   - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
   - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
   - reflow comments.
   jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
   tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
 ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan &lt;neelima.krishnan@intel.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
  either mitigations=off or srbds=off.

* Export vulnerability status via sysfs

* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

 [ bp: Massage,
   - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
   - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
   - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
   - reflow comments.
   jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
   tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
 ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross &lt;mgross@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan &lt;neelima.krishnan@intel.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
