linux-stable.git/drivers/base/cpu.c, branch linux-4.9.y

x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data

2022-06-16T11:00:52+00:00

commit 8d50cdf8b8341770bc6367bce40c0c1bb0e1d5b3 upstream

Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar
to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation

2020-06-11T07:22:23+00:00

commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream

SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
  either mitigations=off or srbds=off.

* Export vulnerability status via sysfs

* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

 [ bp: Massage,
   - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
   - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
   - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
   - reflow comments.
   jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
   tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
 ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck 
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure

2019-11-16T09:29:54+00:00

commit db4d30fbb71b47e4ecb11c4efa5d8aad4b03dfae upstream.

Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:

   https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195

There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.

This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.

It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.

Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.

Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli 
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
 - No support for X86_VENDOR_HYGON, ATOM_AIRMONT_NP
 - Adjust context, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/taa: Add sysfs reporting for TSX Async Abort

2019-11-16T09:29:43+00:00

commit 6608b45ac5ecb56f9e171252229c39580cc85f0f upstream.

Add the sysfs reporting file for TSX Async Abort. It exposes the
vulnerability and the mitigation state similar to the existing files for
the other hardware vulnerabilities.

Sysfs file path is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan 
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross 
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck 
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS

2019-05-14T17:19:40+00:00

commit 8a4b06d391b0a42a373808979b5028f5c84d9c6a upstream.

Add the sysfs reporting file for MDS. It exposes the vulnerability and
mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov 
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters 
Tested-by: Jon Masters 
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: test x86_hyper instead of using hypervisor_is_type()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf

2018-08-15T16:14:45+00:00

commit 17dbca119312b4e8173d4e25ff64262119fcef38 upstream

L1TF core kernel workarounds are cheap and normally always enabled, However
they still should be reported in sysfs if the system is vulnerable or
mitigated. Add the necessary CPU feature/bug bits.

- Extend the existing checks for Meltdowns to determine if the system is
  vulnerable. All CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown are also not
  vulnerable to L1TF

- Check for 32bit non PAE and emit a warning as there is no practical way
  for mitigation due to the limited physical address bits

- If the system has more than MAX_PA/2 physical memory the invert page
  workarounds don't protect the system against the L1TF attack anymore,
  because an inverted physical address will also point to valid
  memory. Print a warning in this case and report that the system is
  vulnerable.

Add a function which returns the PFN limit for the L1TF mitigation, which
will be used in follow up patches for sanity and range checks.

[ tglx: Renamed the CPU feature bit to L1TF_PTEINV ]
[ dwmw2: Backport to 4.9 (cpufeatures.h, E820) ]

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Acked-by: Dave Hansen 
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass

2018-05-22T14:57:59+00:00

commit c456442cd3a59eeb1d60293c26cbe2ff2c4e42cf upstream

Add the sysfs file for the new vulerability. It does not do much except
show the words 'Vulnerable' for recent x86 cores.

Intel cores prior to family 6 are known not to be vulnerable, and so are
some Atoms and some Xeon Phi.

It assumes that older Cyrix, Centaur, etc. cores are immune.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov 
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder

2018-01-17T08:38:57+00:00

commit 87590ce6e373d1a5401f6539f0c59ef92dd924a9 upstream.

As the meltdown/spectre problem affects several CPU architectures, it makes
sense to have common way to express whether a system is affected by a
particular vulnerability or not. If affected the way to express the
mitigation should be common as well.

Create /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities folder and files for
meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2.

Allow architectures to override the show function.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: David Woodhouse 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.096657732@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cpu: clean up register_cpu func

2016-08-31T13:19:55+00:00

This patch could reduce one branch in this function. Also
make the code more readble.

Signed-off-by: Alex Shi 
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano 
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ulf Hansson 
Cc: Daniel Lezcano 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

drivers/base/cpu.c: use __cpu_*_mask directly

2016-01-21T01:09:18+00:00

The only user of the lvalue-ness of the cpu_*_mask variables is in
drivers/base/cpu.c, and that is mostly a work-around for the fact that not
even const variables can be used in static initialization.  Now that the
underlying struct cpumasks are exposed we can take their address.

Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes 
Acked-by: Rusty Russell 
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds