<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/atm, branch v4.4.201</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Kconfig: Fix the reference to the IDT77105 Phy driver in the description of ATM_NICSTAR_USE_IDT77105</title>
<updated>2019-09-21T05:12:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe JAILLET</name>
<email>christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-19T05:04:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=77019b6089105abbb788d41a98f19492fcd89147'/>
<id>77019b6089105abbb788d41a98f19492fcd89147</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cd9d4ff9b78fcd0fc4708900ba3e52e71e1a7690 ]

This should be IDT77105, not IDT77015.

Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET &lt;christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit cd9d4ff9b78fcd0fc4708900ba3e52e71e1a7690 ]

This should be IDT77105, not IDT77015.

Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET &lt;christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>atm: iphase: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability</title>
<updated>2019-08-11T10:20:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-31T03:21:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eee434d29e93f65711bdb1887674e7325f793806'/>
<id>eee434d29e93f65711bdb1887674e7325f793806</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ea443e5e98b5b74e317ef3d26bcaea54931ccdee ]

board is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/atm/iphase.c:2765 ia_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'ia_dev' [r] (local cap)
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2774 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half.  'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2782 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half.  'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2816 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half.  'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2823 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half.  'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2830 ia_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue '_ia_dev' [r] (local cap)
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2845 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half.  'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2856 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half.  'iadev'

Fix this by sanitizing board before using it to index ia_dev and _ia_dev

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ea443e5e98b5b74e317ef3d26bcaea54931ccdee ]

board is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/atm/iphase.c:2765 ia_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'ia_dev' [r] (local cap)
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2774 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half.  'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2782 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half.  'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2816 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half.  'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2823 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half.  'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2830 ia_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue '_ia_dev' [r] (local cap)
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2845 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half.  'iadev'
drivers/atm/iphase.c:2856 ia_ioctl() warn: possible spectre second half.  'iadev'

Fix this by sanitizing board before using it to index ia_dev and _ia_dev

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>atm: he: fix sign-extension overflow on large shift</title>
<updated>2019-03-23T07:44:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin Ian King</name>
<email>colin.king@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-15T18:03:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4949b728976c1142c8a6b484e789af5d554886b1'/>
<id>4949b728976c1142c8a6b484e789af5d554886b1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cb12d72b27a6f41325ae23a11033cf5fedfa1b97 ]

Shifting the 1 by exp by an int can lead to sign-extension overlow when
exp is 31 since 1 is an signed int and sign-extending this result to an
unsigned long long will set the upper 32 bits.  Fix this by shifting an
unsigned long.

Detected by cppcheck:
(warning) Shifting signed 32-bit value by 31 bits is undefined behaviour

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit cb12d72b27a6f41325ae23a11033cf5fedfa1b97 ]

Shifting the 1 by exp by an int can lead to sign-extension overlow when
exp is 31 since 1 is an signed int and sign-extending this result to an
unsigned long long will set the upper 32 bits.  Fix this by shifting an
unsigned long.

Detected by cppcheck:
(warning) Shifting signed 32-bit value by 31 bits is undefined behaviour

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>atm: zatm: Fix potential Spectre v1</title>
<updated>2018-07-22T12:25:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-29T18:28:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=af4bae09386c787fbc2fa9b69a50d65eba4b6e30'/>
<id>af4bae09386c787fbc2fa9b69a50d65eba4b6e30</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ced9e191501e52b95e1b57b8e0db00943869eed0 ]

pool can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/atm/zatm.c:1491 zatm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
'zatm_dev-&gt;pool_info' (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing pool before using it to index
zatm_dev-&gt;pool_info

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152449131114778&amp;w=2

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ced9e191501e52b95e1b57b8e0db00943869eed0 ]

pool can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/atm/zatm.c:1491 zatm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
'zatm_dev-&gt;pool_info' (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing pool before using it to index
zatm_dev-&gt;pool_info

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152449131114778&amp;w=2

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>atm: zatm: fix memcmp casting</title>
<updated>2018-07-03T09:21:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ivan Bornyakov</name>
<email>brnkv.i1@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-25T17:49:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=acf477d528bfd2793ac8d13ff4368fa8e2e90c70'/>
<id>acf477d528bfd2793ac8d13ff4368fa8e2e90c70</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f9c6442a8f0b1dde9e755eb4ff6fa22bcce4eabc ]

memcmp() returns int, but eprom_try_esi() cast it to unsigned char. One
can lose significant bits and get 0 from non-0 value returned by the
memcmp().

Signed-off-by: Ivan Bornyakov &lt;brnkv.i1@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f9c6442a8f0b1dde9e755eb4ff6fa22bcce4eabc ]

memcmp() returns int, but eprom_try_esi() cast it to unsigned char. One
can lose significant bits and get 0 from non-0 value returned by the
memcmp().

Signed-off-by: Ivan Bornyakov &lt;brnkv.i1@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>atm: zatm: Fix potential Spectre v1</title>
<updated>2018-05-16T08:06:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-03T18:17:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=46864b108b00bda066f5774785efbe82a4439a84'/>
<id>46864b108b00bda066f5774785efbe82a4439a84</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2be147f7459db5bbf292e0a6f135037b55e20b39 upstream.

pool can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/atm/zatm.c:1462 zatm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
'zatm_dev-&gt;pool_info' (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing pool before using it to index
zatm_dev-&gt;pool_info

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152449131114778&amp;w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2be147f7459db5bbf292e0a6f135037b55e20b39 upstream.

pool can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/atm/zatm.c:1462 zatm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
'zatm_dev-&gt;pool_info' (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing pool before using it to index
zatm_dev-&gt;pool_info

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=152449131114778&amp;w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>atm: horizon: Fix irq release error</title>
<updated>2017-12-16T09:33:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arvind Yadav</name>
<email>arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-14T08:12:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1b85cd5d926273b22273770f610a025f907b6ba6'/>
<id>1b85cd5d926273b22273770f610a025f907b6ba6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bde533f2ea607cbbbe76ef8738b36243939a7bc2 ]

atm_dev_register() can fail here and passed parameters to free irq
which is not initialised. Initialization of 'dev-&gt;irq' happened after
the 'goto out_free_irq'. So using 'irq' insted of 'dev-&gt;irq' in
free_irq().

Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav &lt;arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit bde533f2ea607cbbbe76ef8738b36243939a7bc2 ]

atm_dev_register() can fail here and passed parameters to free irq
which is not initialised. Initialization of 'dev-&gt;irq' happened after
the 'goto out_free_irq'. So using 'irq' insted of 'dev-&gt;irq' in
free_irq().

Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav &lt;arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>atm: iphase: fix misleading indention</title>
<updated>2015-10-13T02:56:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tillmann Heidsieck</name>
<email>theidsieck@leenox.de</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-10T19:47:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cbb41b91e68a302087762823136c9067138cff7c'/>
<id>cbb41b91e68a302087762823136c9067138cff7c</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix a smatch warning:
drivers/atm/iphase.c:1178 rx_pkt() warn: curly braces intended?

The code is correct, the indention is misleading. In case the allocation
of skb fails, we want to skip to the end.

Signed-off-by: Tillmann Heidsieck &lt;theidsieck@leenox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix a smatch warning:
drivers/atm/iphase.c:1178 rx_pkt() warn: curly braces intended?

The code is correct, the indention is misleading. In case the allocation
of skb fails, we want to skip to the end.

Signed-off-by: Tillmann Heidsieck &lt;theidsieck@leenox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>atm: iphase: return -ENOMEM instead of -1 in case of failed kmalloc()</title>
<updated>2015-10-13T02:56:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tillmann Heidsieck</name>
<email>theidsieck@leenox.de</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-10T19:47:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=21e26ff993dea9dceaf0f19cfec4bef58387b0f2'/>
<id>21e26ff993dea9dceaf0f19cfec4bef58387b0f2</id>
<content type='text'>
Smatch complains about returning hard coded error codes, silence this
warning.

drivers/atm/iphase.c:115 ia_enque_rtn_q() warn: returning -1 instead of -ENOMEM is sloppy

Signed-off-by: Tillmann Heidsieck &lt;theidsieck@leenox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Smatch complains about returning hard coded error codes, silence this
warning.

drivers/atm/iphase.c:115 ia_enque_rtn_q() warn: returning -1 instead of -ENOMEM is sloppy

Signed-off-by: Tillmann Heidsieck &lt;theidsieck@leenox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>solos-pci: Increase headroom on received packets</title>
<updated>2015-09-18T04:29:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Woodhouse</name>
<email>dwmw2@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-16T11:35:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ce816eb064c82ab96276969971a561db78e66164'/>
<id>ce816eb064c82ab96276969971a561db78e66164</id>
<content type='text'>
A comment in include/linux/skbuff.h says that:

 * Various parts of the networking layer expect at least 32 bytes of
 * headroom, you should not reduce this.

This was demonstrated by a panic when handling fragmented IPv6 packets:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&amp;m=144236093519172&amp;w=2

It's not entirely clear if that comment is still valid — and if it is,
perhaps netif_rx() ought to be enforcing it with a warning.

But either way, it is rather stupid from a performance point of view
for us to be receiving packets into a buffer which doesn't have enough
room to prepend an Ethernet header — it means that *every* incoming
packet is going to be need to be reallocated. So let's fix that.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;David.Woodhouse@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
A comment in include/linux/skbuff.h says that:

 * Various parts of the networking layer expect at least 32 bytes of
 * headroom, you should not reduce this.

This was demonstrated by a panic when handling fragmented IPv6 packets:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&amp;m=144236093519172&amp;w=2

It's not entirely clear if that comment is still valid — and if it is,
perhaps netif_rx() ought to be enforcing it with a warning.

But either way, it is rather stupid from a performance point of view
for us to be receiving packets into a buffer which doesn't have enough
room to prepend an Ethernet header — it means that *every* incoming
packet is going to be need to be reallocated. So let's fix that.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;David.Woodhouse@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
