<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/drivers/android, branch v6.1.178</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>binder: fix UAF in binder_free_transaction()</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T13:54:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Carlos Llamas</name>
<email>cmllamas@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-19T18:52:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=48aeda9f8039e4a6971d1804578efde7f2c01eda'/>
<id>48aeda9f8039e4a6971d1804578efde7f2c01eda</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f223d27a546c1e1f48d38fd67760e78f068fe8c4 upstream.

In binder_free_transaction(), the t-&gt;to_proc is read under the t-&gt;lock.
However, once the t-&gt;lock is dropped, the to_proc can die in parallel.
This leads to a use-after-free error when we attempt to acquire its
inner lock right afterwards:

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0
  Write of size 4 at addr ffff00001125da70 by task B/672

  CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 672 Comm: B Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-00284-g8e65320d91cd #4 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
   _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0
   binder_free_transaction+0x8c/0x320
   binder_send_failed_reply+0x21c/0x2f8
   binder_thread_release+0x488/0x7e0
   binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x29a0
  [...]

  Allocated by task 675:
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444
   binder_open+0x118/0xb70
   do_dentry_open+0x374/0x1040
   vfs_open+0x58/0x3bc
  [...]

  Freed by task 212:
   __kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80
   kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4
   binder_proc_dec_tmpref+0x32c/0x5e0
   binder_deferred_func+0xc48/0x104c
   process_one_work+0x53c/0xbc0
  [...]
  ==================================================================

To prevent this, pin the target thread (t-&gt;to_thread) to guarantee the
target process remains alive. Undelivered transactions without a target
thread are already safe, as the target process can only be the current
context in those paths.

Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aikJKVuny_eOivwN@google.com/
Fixes: a370003cc301 ("binder: fix possible UAF when freeing buffer")
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260619185233.2194678-2-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f223d27a546c1e1f48d38fd67760e78f068fe8c4 upstream.

In binder_free_transaction(), the t-&gt;to_proc is read under the t-&gt;lock.
However, once the t-&gt;lock is dropped, the to_proc can die in parallel.
This leads to a use-after-free error when we attempt to acquire its
inner lock right afterwards:

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0
  Write of size 4 at addr ffff00001125da70 by task B/672

  CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 672 Comm: B Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-00284-g8e65320d91cd #4 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
   _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0
   binder_free_transaction+0x8c/0x320
   binder_send_failed_reply+0x21c/0x2f8
   binder_thread_release+0x488/0x7e0
   binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x29a0
  [...]

  Allocated by task 675:
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444
   binder_open+0x118/0xb70
   do_dentry_open+0x374/0x1040
   vfs_open+0x58/0x3bc
  [...]

  Freed by task 212:
   __kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80
   kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4
   binder_proc_dec_tmpref+0x32c/0x5e0
   binder_deferred_func+0xc48/0x104c
   process_one_work+0x53c/0xbc0
  [...]
  ==================================================================

To prevent this, pin the target thread (t-&gt;to_thread) to guarantee the
target process remains alive. Undelivered transactions without a target
thread are already safe, as the target process can only be the current
context in those paths.

Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aikJKVuny_eOivwN@google.com/
Fixes: a370003cc301 ("binder: fix possible UAF when freeing buffer")
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260619185233.2194678-2-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: fix UAF in binder_thread_release()</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T13:54:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Carlos Llamas</name>
<email>cmllamas@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-19T18:52:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=38e1a71728e5795b670cc159c18e286a40aeebb4'/>
<id>38e1a71728e5795b670cc159c18e286a40aeebb4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 114a116aaa5f0295376cdf12da743c5bce3b20ce upstream.

When a thread exits, binder_thread_release() walks its transaction stack
to clear the t-&gt;from and t-&gt;to_proc that correspond with the exiting
thread. However, a process dying in parallel might attempt to kfree some
of these transactions. And if one of them has no associated t-&gt;to_proc,
the t-&gt;to_proc-&gt;inner_lock will not be acquired.

This means that transaction accesses in binder_thread_release() after
t-&gt;to_proc has been cleared might race with binder_free_transaction()
and cause a use-after-free error as reported by KASAN:

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff000016627500 by task X/715

  CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 715 Comm: X Not tainted 7.1.0-rc5-00149-g8fde5d1d47f6 #30 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
   binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798
   binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x299c
   [...]

  Allocated by task 717 on cpu 18 at 67.267803s:
   __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xbc
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444
   binder_transaction+0x554/0x8150
   binder_thread_write+0xa30/0x4354
   binder_ioctl+0x20f0/0x299c
   [...]

  Freed by task 202 on cpu 18 at 90.416221s:
   __kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80
   kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4
   binder_free_transaction+0x150/0x294
   binder_send_failed_reply+0x398/0x6d8
   binder_release_work+0x3e4/0x4ec
   binder_deferred_func+0xbd8/0x104c
   [...]
  ==================================================================

In order to avoid this, make sure that binder_free_transaction() reads
the t-&gt;to_proc under the transaction lock. This will serialize the
transaction release with the accesses in binder_thread_release(). Plus,
it matches the documented locking rules for @to_proc.

Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 7a4408c6bd3e ("binder: make sure accesses to proc/thread are safe")
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260619185233.2194678-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 114a116aaa5f0295376cdf12da743c5bce3b20ce upstream.

When a thread exits, binder_thread_release() walks its transaction stack
to clear the t-&gt;from and t-&gt;to_proc that correspond with the exiting
thread. However, a process dying in parallel might attempt to kfree some
of these transactions. And if one of them has no associated t-&gt;to_proc,
the t-&gt;to_proc-&gt;inner_lock will not be acquired.

This means that transaction accesses in binder_thread_release() after
t-&gt;to_proc has been cleared might race with binder_free_transaction()
and cause a use-after-free error as reported by KASAN:

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff000016627500 by task X/715

  CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 715 Comm: X Not tainted 7.1.0-rc5-00149-g8fde5d1d47f6 #30 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
   binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798
   binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x299c
   [...]

  Allocated by task 717 on cpu 18 at 67.267803s:
   __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xbc
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444
   binder_transaction+0x554/0x8150
   binder_thread_write+0xa30/0x4354
   binder_ioctl+0x20f0/0x299c
   [...]

  Freed by task 202 on cpu 18 at 90.416221s:
   __kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80
   kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4
   binder_free_transaction+0x150/0x294
   binder_send_failed_reply+0x398/0x6d8
   binder_release_work+0x3e4/0x4ec
   binder_deferred_func+0xbd8/0x104c
   [...]
  ==================================================================

In order to avoid this, make sure that binder_free_transaction() reads
the t-&gt;to_proc under the transaction lock. This will serialize the
transaction release with the accesses in binder_thread_release(). Plus,
it matches the documented locking rules for @to_proc.

Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 7a4408c6bd3e ("binder: make sure accesses to proc/thread are safe")
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260619185233.2194678-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: don't use %pK through printk</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:20:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Weißschuh</name>
<email>thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-07T14:29:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ab845ee94366bfc2feefc0c633cbf689a8fc5335'/>
<id>ab845ee94366bfc2feefc0c633cbf689a8fc5335</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 56d21267663bad91e8b10121224ec46366a7937e ]

In the past %pK was preferable to %p as it would not leak raw pointer
values into the kernel log. Since commit ad67b74d2469 ("printk: hash
addresses printed with %p") the regular %p has been improved to avoid
this issue. Furthermore, restricted pointers ("%pK") were never meant
to be used through printk(). They can still unintentionally leak raw
pointers or acquire sleeping locks in atomic contexts.

Switch to the regular pointer formatting which is safer and
easier to reason about.

There are still a few users of %pK left, but these use it through
seq_file, for which its usage is safe.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh &lt;thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260107-restricted-pointers-binder-v1-1-181018bf3812@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 56d21267663bad91e8b10121224ec46366a7937e ]

In the past %pK was preferable to %p as it would not leak raw pointer
values into the kernel log. Since commit ad67b74d2469 ("printk: hash
addresses printed with %p") the regular %p has been improved to avoid
this issue. Furthermore, restricted pointers ("%pK") were never meant
to be used through printk(). They can still unintentionally leak raw
pointers or acquire sleeping locks in atomic contexts.

Switch to the regular pointer formatting which is safer and
easier to reason about.

There are still a few users of %pK left, but these use it through
seq_file, for which its usage is safe.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh &lt;thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260107-restricted-pointers-binder-v1-1-181018bf3812@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binderfs: fix ida_alloc_max() upper bound</title>
<updated>2026-02-11T12:37:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Carlos Llamas</name>
<email>cmllamas@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-27T23:55:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e6f17b99cca75481ae152d179a1160118567bac4'/>
<id>e6f17b99cca75481ae152d179a1160118567bac4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ec4ddc90d201d09ef4e4bef8a2c6d9624525ad68 upstream.

The 'max' argument of ida_alloc_max() takes the maximum valid ID and not
the "count". Using an ID of BINDERFS_MAX_MINOR (1 &lt;&lt; 20) for dev-&gt;minor
would exceed the limits of minor numbers (20-bits). Fix this off-by-one
error by subtracting 1 from the 'max'.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3ad20fe393b3 ("binder: implement binderfs")
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260127235545.2307876-2-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ec4ddc90d201d09ef4e4bef8a2c6d9624525ad68 upstream.

The 'max' argument of ida_alloc_max() takes the maximum valid ID and not
the "count". Using an ID of BINDERFS_MAX_MINOR (1 &lt;&lt; 20) for dev-&gt;minor
would exceed the limits of minor numbers (20-bits). Fix this off-by-one
error by subtracting 1 from the 'max'.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3ad20fe393b3 ("binder: implement binderfs")
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260127235545.2307876-2-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: fix BR_FROZEN_REPLY error log</title>
<updated>2026-02-11T12:37:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Carlos Llamas</name>
<email>cmllamas@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-23T17:57:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d472fd32e7d206112a51687a68d352dfde91c8e2'/>
<id>d472fd32e7d206112a51687a68d352dfde91c8e2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1769f90e5ba2a6d24bb46b85da33fe861c68f005 upstream.

The error logging for failed transactions is misleading as it always
reports "dead process or thread" even when the target is actually
frozen. Additionally, the pid and tid are reversed which can further
confuse debugging efforts. Fix both issues.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: Steven Moreland &lt;smoreland@google.com&gt;
Fixes: a15dac8b2286 ("binder: additional transaction error logs")
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260123175702.2154348-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1769f90e5ba2a6d24bb46b85da33fe861c68f005 upstream.

The error logging for failed transactions is misleading as it always
reports "dead process or thread" even when the target is actually
frozen. Additionally, the pid and tid are reversed which can further
confuse debugging efforts. Fix both issues.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: Steven Moreland &lt;smoreland@google.com&gt;
Fixes: a15dac8b2286 ("binder: additional transaction error logs")
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260123175702.2154348-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: remove "invalid inc weak" check</title>
<updated>2025-10-29T13:04:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alice Ryhl</name>
<email>aliceryhl@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-15T14:26:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d3cd3efadd088dc73d83cd5154e705247c25484a'/>
<id>d3cd3efadd088dc73d83cd5154e705247c25484a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d90eeb8ecd227c204ab6c34a17b372bd950b7aa2 upstream.

There are no scenarios where a weak increment is invalid on binder_node.
The only possible case where it could be invalid is if the kernel
delivers BR_DECREFS to the process that owns the node, and then
increments the weak refcount again, effectively "reviving" a dead node.

However, that is not possible: when the BR_DECREFS command is delivered,
the kernel removes and frees the binder_node. The fact that you were
able to call binder_inc_node_nilocked() implies that the node is not yet
destroyed, which implies that BR_DECREFS has not been delivered to
userspace, so incrementing the weak refcount is valid.

Note that it's currently possible to trigger this condition if the owner
calls BINDER_THREAD_EXIT while node-&gt;has_weak_ref is true. This causes
BC_INCREFS on binder_ref instances to fail when they should not.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 457b9a6f09f0 ("Staging: android: add binder driver")
Reported-by: Yu-Ting Tseng &lt;yutingtseng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251015-binder-weak-inc-v1-1-7914b092c371@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d90eeb8ecd227c204ab6c34a17b372bd950b7aa2 upstream.

There are no scenarios where a weak increment is invalid on binder_node.
The only possible case where it could be invalid is if the kernel
delivers BR_DECREFS to the process that owns the node, and then
increments the weak refcount again, effectively "reviving" a dead node.

However, that is not possible: when the BR_DECREFS command is delivered,
the kernel removes and frees the binder_node. The fact that you were
able to call binder_inc_node_nilocked() implies that the node is not yet
destroyed, which implies that BR_DECREFS has not been delivered to
userspace, so incrementing the weak refcount is valid.

Note that it's currently possible to trigger this condition if the owner
calls BINDER_THREAD_EXIT while node-&gt;has_weak_ref is true. This causes
BC_INCREFS on binder_ref instances to fail when they should not.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 457b9a6f09f0 ("Staging: android: add binder driver")
Reported-by: Yu-Ting Tseng &lt;yutingtseng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251015-binder-weak-inc-v1-1-7914b092c371@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: fix UAF caused by offsets overwrite</title>
<updated>2024-09-12T09:10:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Carlos Llamas</name>
<email>cmllamas@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-22T18:23:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4f79e0b80dc69bd5eaaed70f0df1b558728b4e59'/>
<id>4f79e0b80dc69bd5eaaed70f0df1b558728b4e59</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4df153652cc46545722879415937582028c18af5 upstream.

Binder objects are processed and copied individually into the target
buffer during transactions. Any raw data in-between these objects is
copied as well. However, this raw data copy lacks an out-of-bounds
check. If the raw data exceeds the data section size then the copy
overwrites the offsets section. This eventually triggers an error that
attempts to unwind the processed objects. However, at this point the
offsets used to index these objects are now corrupted.

Unwinding with corrupted offsets can result in decrements of arbitrary
nodes and lead to their premature release. Other users of such nodes are
left with a dangling pointer triggering a use-after-free. This issue is
made evident by the following KASAN report (trimmed):

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c
  Write of size 4 at addr ffff47fc91598f04 by task binder-util/743

  CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 743 Comm: binder-util Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4 #1
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
   _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c
   binder_free_buf+0x128/0x434
   binder_thread_write+0x8a4/0x3260
   binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c
  [...]

  Allocated by task 743:
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x110/0x270
   binder_new_node+0x50/0x700
   binder_transaction+0x413c/0x6da8
   binder_thread_write+0x978/0x3260
   binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c
  [...]

  Freed by task 745:
   kfree+0xbc/0x208
   binder_thread_read+0x1c5c/0x37d4
   binder_ioctl+0x16d8/0x258c
  [...]
  ==================================================================

To avoid this issue, let's check that the raw data copy is within the
boundaries of the data section.

Fixes: 6d98eb95b450 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying txn")
Cc: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240822182353.2129600-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4df153652cc46545722879415937582028c18af5 upstream.

Binder objects are processed and copied individually into the target
buffer during transactions. Any raw data in-between these objects is
copied as well. However, this raw data copy lacks an out-of-bounds
check. If the raw data exceeds the data section size then the copy
overwrites the offsets section. This eventually triggers an error that
attempts to unwind the processed objects. However, at this point the
offsets used to index these objects are now corrupted.

Unwinding with corrupted offsets can result in decrements of arbitrary
nodes and lead to their premature release. Other users of such nodes are
left with a dangling pointer triggering a use-after-free. This issue is
made evident by the following KASAN report (trimmed):

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c
  Write of size 4 at addr ffff47fc91598f04 by task binder-util/743

  CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 743 Comm: binder-util Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4 #1
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
   _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c
   binder_free_buf+0x128/0x434
   binder_thread_write+0x8a4/0x3260
   binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c
  [...]

  Allocated by task 743:
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x110/0x270
   binder_new_node+0x50/0x700
   binder_transaction+0x413c/0x6da8
   binder_thread_write+0x978/0x3260
   binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c
  [...]

  Freed by task 745:
   kfree+0xbc/0x208
   binder_thread_read+0x1c5c/0x37d4
   binder_ioctl+0x16d8/0x258c
  [...]
  ==================================================================

To avoid this issue, let's check that the raw data copy is within the
boundaries of the data section.

Fixes: 6d98eb95b450 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying txn")
Cc: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240822182353.2129600-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: fix hang of unregistered readers</title>
<updated>2024-08-03T06:49:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Carlos Llamas</name>
<email>cmllamas@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-11T20:14:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f0c7625f748bde42603ac781ef2a277772e2e757'/>
<id>f0c7625f748bde42603ac781ef2a277772e2e757</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 31643d84b8c3d9c846aa0e20bc033e46c68c7e7d upstream.

With the introduction of binder_available_for_proc_work_ilocked() in
commit 1b77e9dcc3da ("ANDROID: binder: remove proc waitqueue") a binder
thread can only "wait_for_proc_work" after its thread-&gt;looper has been
marked as BINDER_LOOPER_STATE_{ENTERED|REGISTERED}.

This means an unregistered reader risks waiting indefinitely for work
since it never gets added to the proc-&gt;waiting_threads. If there are no
further references to its waitqueue either the task will hang. The same
applies to readers using the (e)poll interface.

I couldn't find the rationale behind this restriction. So this patch
restores the previous behavior of allowing unregistered threads to
"wait_for_proc_work". Note that an error message for this scenario,
which had previously become unreachable, is now re-enabled.

Fixes: 1b77e9dcc3da ("ANDROID: binder: remove proc waitqueue")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Martijn Coenen &lt;maco@google.com&gt;
Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg &lt;arve@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240711201452.2017543-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 31643d84b8c3d9c846aa0e20bc033e46c68c7e7d upstream.

With the introduction of binder_available_for_proc_work_ilocked() in
commit 1b77e9dcc3da ("ANDROID: binder: remove proc waitqueue") a binder
thread can only "wait_for_proc_work" after its thread-&gt;looper has been
marked as BINDER_LOOPER_STATE_{ENTERED|REGISTERED}.

This means an unregistered reader risks waiting indefinitely for work
since it never gets added to the proc-&gt;waiting_threads. If there are no
further references to its waitqueue either the task will hang. The same
applies to readers using the (e)poll interface.

I couldn't find the rationale behind this restriction. So this patch
restores the previous behavior of allowing unregistered threads to
"wait_for_proc_work". Note that an error message for this scenario,
which had previously become unreachable, is now re-enabled.

Fixes: 1b77e9dcc3da ("ANDROID: binder: remove proc waitqueue")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Martijn Coenen &lt;maco@google.com&gt;
Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg &lt;arve@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240711201452.2017543-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: fix max_thread type inconsistency</title>
<updated>2024-05-25T14:21:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Carlos Llamas</name>
<email>cmllamas@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-21T17:37:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e78531e8cacec34f94eb65d1f466eb1e25408cb7'/>
<id>e78531e8cacec34f94eb65d1f466eb1e25408cb7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 42316941335644a98335f209daafa4c122f28983 upstream.

The type defined for the BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS ioctl was changed from
size_t to __u32 in order to avoid incompatibility issues between 32 and
64-bit kernels. However, the internal types used to copy from user and
store the value were never updated. Use u32 to fix the inconsistency.

Fixes: a9350fc859ae ("staging: android: binder: fix BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS declaration")
Reported-by: Arve Hjønnevåg &lt;arve@android.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240421173750.3117808-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 42316941335644a98335f209daafa4c122f28983 upstream.

The type defined for the BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS ioctl was changed from
size_t to __u32 in order to avoid incompatibility issues between 32 and
64-bit kernels. However, the internal types used to copy from user and
store the value were never updated. Use u32 to fix the inconsistency.

Fixes: a9350fc859ae ("staging: android: binder: fix BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS declaration")
Reported-by: Arve Hjønnevåg &lt;arve@android.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240421173750.3117808-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: check offset alignment in binder_get_object()</title>
<updated>2024-04-27T15:07:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Carlos Llamas</name>
<email>cmllamas@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-30T19:01:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a6d2a8b211c874971ee4cf3ddd167408177f6e76'/>
<id>a6d2a8b211c874971ee4cf3ddd167408177f6e76</id>
<content type='text'>
commit aaef73821a3b0194a01bd23ca77774f704a04d40 upstream.

Commit 6d98eb95b450 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying
txn") introduced changes to how binder objects are copied. In doing so,
it unintentionally removed an offset alignment check done through calls
to binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer() -&gt; check_buffer().

These calls were replaced in binder_get_object() with copy_from_user(),
so now an explicit offset alignment check is needed here. This avoids
later complications when unwinding the objects gets harder.

It is worth noting this check existed prior to commit 7a67a39320df
("binder: add function to copy binder object from buffer"), likely
removed due to redundancy at the time.

Fixes: 6d98eb95b450 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying txn")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240330190115.1877819-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit aaef73821a3b0194a01bd23ca77774f704a04d40 upstream.

Commit 6d98eb95b450 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying
txn") introduced changes to how binder objects are copied. In doing so,
it unintentionally removed an offset alignment check done through calls
to binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer() -&gt; check_buffer().

These calls were replaced in binder_get_object() with copy_from_user(),
so now an explicit offset alignment check is needed here. This avoids
later complications when unwinding the objects gets harder.

It is worth noting this check existed prior to commit 7a67a39320df
("binder: add function to copy binder object from buffer"), likely
removed due to redundancy at the time.

Fixes: 6d98eb95b450 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying txn")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240330190115.1877819-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
