linux-stable.git/crypto, branch v6.2.15

crypto: drbg - Only fail when jent is unavailable in FIPS mode

2023-05-11T14:11:12+00:00

[ Upstream commit 686cd976b6ddedeeb1a1fb09ba53a891d3cc9a03 ]

When jent initialisation fails for any reason other than ENOENT,
the entire drbg fails to initialise, even when we're not in FIPS
mode.  This is wrong because we can still use the kernel RNG when
we're not in FIPS mode.

Change it so that it only fails when we are in FIPS mode.

Fixes: 57225e679788 ("crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random readiness")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

crypto: testmgr - fix RNG performance in fuzz tests

2023-05-11T14:10:52+00:00

commit f900fde28883602b6c5e1027a6c912b673382aaf upstream.

The performance of the crypto fuzz tests has greatly regressed since
v5.18.  When booting a kernel on an arm64 dev board with all software
crypto algorithms and CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS enabled, the
fuzz tests now take about 200 seconds to run, or about 325 seconds with
lockdep enabled, compared to about 5 seconds before.

The root cause is that the random number generation has become much
slower due to commit d4150779e60f ("random32: use real rng for
non-deterministic randomness").  On my same arm64 dev board, at the time
the fuzz tests are run, get_random_u8() is about 345x slower than
prandom_u32_state(), or about 469x if lockdep is enabled.

Lockdep makes a big difference, but much of the rest comes from the
get_random_*() functions taking a *very* slow path when the CRNG is not
yet initialized.  Since the crypto self-tests run early during boot,
even having a hardware RNG driver enabled (CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QCOM_RNG in
my case) doesn't prevent this.  x86 systems don't have this issue, but
they still see a significant regression if lockdep is enabled.

Converting the "Fully random bytes" case in generate_random_bytes() to
use get_random_bytes() helps significantly, improving the test time to
about 27 seconds.  But that's still over 5x slower than before.

This is all a bit silly, though, since the fuzz tests don't actually
need cryptographically secure random numbers.  So let's just make them
use a non-cryptographically-secure RNG as they did before.  The original
prandom_u32() is gone now, so let's use prandom_u32_state() instead,
with an explicitly managed state, like various other self-tests in the
kernel source tree (rbtree_test.c, test_scanf.c, etc.) already do.  This
also has the benefit that no locking is required anymore, so performance
should be even better than the original version that used prandom_u32().

Fixes: d4150779e60f ("random32: use real rng for non-deterministic randomness")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

crypto: api - Demote BUG_ON() in crypto_unregister_alg() to a WARN_ON()

2023-05-11T14:10:52+00:00

commit a543ada7db729514ddd3ba4efa45f4c7b802ad85 upstream.

The crypto_unregister_alg() function expects callers to ensure that any
algorithm that is unregistered has a refcnt of exactly 1, and issues a
BUG_ON() if this is not the case. However, there are in fact drivers that
will call crypto_unregister_alg() without ensuring that the refcnt has been
lowered first, most notably on system shutdown. This causes the BUG_ON() to
trigger, which prevents a clean shutdown and hangs the system.

To avoid such hangs on shutdown, demote the BUG_ON() in
crypto_unregister_alg() to a WARN_ON() with early return. Cc stable because
this problem was observed on a 6.2 kernel, cf the link below.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87r0tyq8ph.fsf@toke.dk
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

asymmetric_keys: log on fatal failures in PE/pkcs7

2023-04-20T10:36:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3584c1dbfffdabf8e3dc1dd25748bb38dd01cd43 ]

These particular errors can be encountered while trying to kexec when
secureboot lockdown is in place.  Without this change, even with a
signed debug build, one still needs to reboot the machine to add the
appropriate dyndbg parameters (since lockdown blocks debugfs).

Accordingly, upgrade all pr_debug() before fatal error into pr_warn().

Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen 
cc: Eric Biederman 
cc: Herbert Xu 
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220171254.592347-3-rharwood@redhat.com/ # v2
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

verify_pefile: relax wrapper length check

2023-04-20T10:36:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4fc5c74dde69a7eda172514aaeb5a7df3600adb3 ]

The PE Format Specification (section "The Attribute Certificate Table
(Image Only)") states that `dwLength` is to be rounded up to 8-byte
alignment when used for traversal.  Therefore, the field is not required
to be an 8-byte multiple in the first place.

Accordingly, pesign has not performed this alignment since version
0.110.  This causes kexec failure on pesign'd binaries with "PEFILE:
Signature wrapper len wrong".  Update the comment and relax the check.

Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen 
cc: Eric Biederman 
cc: Herbert Xu 
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format#the-attribute-certificate-table-image-only
Link: https://github.com/rhboot/pesign
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220171254.592347-2-rharwood@redhat.com/ # v2
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Use akcipher_request_complete

2023-03-10T08:28:18+00:00

[ Upstream commit 564cabc0ca0bdfa8f0fc1ae74b24d0a7554522c5 ]

Use the akcipher_request_complete helper instead of calling the
completion function directly.  In fact the previous code was buggy
in that EINPROGRESS was never passed back to the original caller.

Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

crypto: xts - Handle EBUSY correctly

2023-03-10T08:28:11+00:00

[ Upstream commit 51c082514c2dedf2711c99d93c196cc4eedceb40 ]

As it is xts only handles the special return value of EINPROGRESS,
which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the
request.

However, as the caller of xts may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need
to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way.  Otherwise backlogged
requests will trigger a use-after-free.

Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

crypto: seqiv - Handle EBUSY correctly

2023-03-10T08:28:10+00:00

[ Upstream commit 32e62025e5e52fbe4812ef044759de7010b15dbc ]

As it is seqiv only handles the special return value of EINPROGERSS,
which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the
request.

However, as the caller of seqiv may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need
to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way.  Otherwise backlogged
requests will trigger a use-after-free.

Fixes: 0a270321dbf9 ("[CRYPTO] seqiv: Add Sequence Number IV Generator")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

crypto: essiv - Handle EBUSY correctly

2023-03-10T08:28:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit b5a772adf45a32c68bef28e60621f12617161556 ]

As it is essiv only handles the special return value of EINPROGERSS,
which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the
request.

However, as the caller of essiv may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need
to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way.  Otherwise backlogged
requests will trigger a use-after-free.

Fixes: be1eb7f78aa8 ("crypto: essiv - create wrapper template...")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

KEYS: asymmetric: Fix ECDSA use via keyctl uapi

2023-03-10T08:27:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit 10de7b54293995368c52d9aa153f3e7a359f04a1 ]

When support for ECDSA keys was added, constraints for data & signature
sizes were never updated.  This makes it impossible to use such keys via
keyctl API from userspace.

Update constraint on max_data_size to 64 bytes in order to support
SHA512-based signatures. Also update the signature length constraints
per ECDSA signature encoding described in RFC 5480.

Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys")
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior 
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger 
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen 
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin