<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/crypto, branch v6.1.136</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>crypto: null - Use spin lock instead of mutex</title>
<updated>2025-05-02T05:47:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-12T06:10:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e27244cbe10658a66b8775be7f0acc4ad2f618d6'/>
<id>e27244cbe10658a66b8775be7f0acc4ad2f618d6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dcc47a028c24e793ce6d6efebfef1a1e92f80297 ]

As the null algorithm may be freed in softirq context through
af_alg, use spin locks instead of mutexes to protect the default
null algorithm.

Reported-by: syzbot+b3e02953598f447d4d2a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit dcc47a028c24e793ce6d6efebfef1a1e92f80297 ]

As the null algorithm may be freed in softirq context through
af_alg, use spin locks instead of mutexes to protect the default
null algorithm.

Reported-by: syzbot+b3e02953598f447d4d2a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: api - Add crypto_clone_tfm</title>
<updated>2024-12-14T18:53:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-13T06:24:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f688979e42508552e05c72e4f45b828eef01b2c3'/>
<id>f688979e42508552e05c72e4f45b828eef01b2c3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3c3a24cb0ae46c9c45e4ce2272f84f0504831f59 ]

This patch adds the helper crypto_clone_tfm.  The purpose is to
allocate a tfm object with GFP_ATOMIC.  As we cannot sleep, the
object has to be cloned from an existing tfm object.

This allows code paths that cannot otherwise allocate a crypto_tfm
object to do so.  Once a new tfm has been obtained its key could
then be changed without impacting other users.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@corigine.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 1465036b10be ("llc: Improve setsockopt() handling of malformed user input")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3c3a24cb0ae46c9c45e4ce2272f84f0504831f59 ]

This patch adds the helper crypto_clone_tfm.  The purpose is to
allocate a tfm object with GFP_ATOMIC.  As we cannot sleep, the
object has to be cloned from an existing tfm object.

This allows code paths that cannot otherwise allocate a crypto_tfm
object to do so.  Once a new tfm has been obtained its key could
then be changed without impacting other users.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@corigine.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 1465036b10be ("llc: Improve setsockopt() handling of malformed user input")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: api - Add crypto_tfm_get</title>
<updated>2024-12-14T18:53:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-13T06:24:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e470d423b0f6ffd3977e74d1d1eef70cc58f18dd'/>
<id>e470d423b0f6ffd3977e74d1d1eef70cc58f18dd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ae131f4970f0778f35ed06aeb15bde2fbc1d9619 ]

Add a crypto_tfm_get interface to allow tfm objects to be shared.
They can still be freed in the usual way.

This should only be done with tfm objects with no keys.  You must
also not modify the tfm flags in any way once it becomes shared.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@corigine.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 1465036b10be ("llc: Improve setsockopt() handling of malformed user input")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ae131f4970f0778f35ed06aeb15bde2fbc1d9619 ]

Add a crypto_tfm_get interface to allow tfm objects to be shared.
They can still be freed in the usual way.

This should only be done with tfm objects with no keys.  You must
also not modify the tfm flags in any way once it becomes shared.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@corigine.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 1465036b10be ("llc: Improve setsockopt() handling of malformed user input")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: pcrypt - Call crypto layer directly when padata_do_parallel() return -EBUSY</title>
<updated>2024-12-14T18:53:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yi Yang</name>
<email>yiyang13@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-15T02:09:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=92834692a539b5b7f409e467a14667d64713b732'/>
<id>92834692a539b5b7f409e467a14667d64713b732</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 662f2f13e66d3883b9238b0b96b17886179e60e2 ]

Since commit 8f4f68e788c3 ("crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for
PADATA_RESET"), the pcrypt encryption and decryption operations return
-EAGAIN when the CPU goes online or offline. In alg_test(), a WARN is
generated when pcrypt_aead_decrypt() or pcrypt_aead_encrypt() returns
-EAGAIN, the unnecessary panic will occur when panic_on_warn set 1.
Fix this issue by calling crypto layer directly without parallelization
in that case.

Fixes: 8f4f68e788c3 ("crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for PADATA_RESET")
Signed-off-by: Yi Yang &lt;yiyang13@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 662f2f13e66d3883b9238b0b96b17886179e60e2 ]

Since commit 8f4f68e788c3 ("crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for
PADATA_RESET"), the pcrypt encryption and decryption operations return
-EAGAIN when the CPU goes online or offline. In alg_test(), a WARN is
generated when pcrypt_aead_decrypt() or pcrypt_aead_encrypt() returns
-EAGAIN, the unnecessary panic will occur when panic_on_warn set 1.
Fix this issue by calling crypto layer directly without parallelization
in that case.

Fixes: 8f4f68e788c3 ("crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for PADATA_RESET")
Signed-off-by: Yi Yang &lt;yiyang13@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: api - Fix liveliness check in crypto_alg_tested</title>
<updated>2024-11-17T14:07:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-06T01:18:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1bc59a7c0773a6bfbd4cc9760ee3633549fe6ee7'/>
<id>1bc59a7c0773a6bfbd4cc9760ee3633549fe6ee7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b81e286ba154a4e0f01a94d99179a97f4ba3e396 ]

As algorithm testing is carried out without holding the main crypto
lock, it is always possible for the algorithm to go away during the
test.

So before crypto_alg_tested updates the status of the tested alg,
it checks whether it's still on the list of all algorithms.  This
is inaccurate because it may be off the main list but still on the
list of algorithms to be removed.

Updating the algorithm status is safe per se as the larval still
holds a reference to it.  However, killing spawns of other algorithms
that are of lower priority is clearly a deficiency as it adds
unnecessary churn.

Fix the test by checking whether the algorithm is dead.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b81e286ba154a4e0f01a94d99179a97f4ba3e396 ]

As algorithm testing is carried out without holding the main crypto
lock, it is always possible for the algorithm to go away during the
test.

So before crypto_alg_tested updates the status of the tested alg,
it checks whether it's still on the list of all algorithms.  This
is inaccurate because it may be off the main list but still on the
list of algorithms to be removed.

Updating the algorithm status is safe per se as the larval still
holds a reference to it.  However, killing spawns of other algorithms
that are of lower priority is clearly a deficiency as it adds
unnecessary churn.

Fix the test by checking whether the algorithm is dead.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: simd - Do not call crypto_alloc_tfm during registration</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T13:21:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-17T06:58:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a3dde0782166d2d8e80d70d7766bfdfa4c038996'/>
<id>a3dde0782166d2d8e80d70d7766bfdfa4c038996</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3c44d31cb34ce4eb8311a2e73634d57702948230 ]

Algorithm registration is usually carried out during module init,
where as little work as possible should be carried out.  The SIMD
code violated this rule by allocating a tfm, this then triggers a
full test of the algorithm which may dead-lock in certain cases.

SIMD is only allocating the tfm to get at the alg object, which is
in fact already available as it is what we are registering.  Use
that directly and remove the crypto_alloc_tfm call.

Also remove some obsolete and unused SIMD API.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3c44d31cb34ce4eb8311a2e73634d57702948230 ]

Algorithm registration is usually carried out during module init,
where as little work as possible should be carried out.  The SIMD
code violated this rule by allocating a tfm, this then triggers a
full test of the algorithm which may dead-lock in certain cases.

SIMD is only allocating the tfm to get at the alg object, which is
in fact already available as it is what we are registering.  Use
that directly and remove the crypto_alloc_tfm call.

Also remove some obsolete and unused SIMD API.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: prevent NULL pointer dereference in find_asymmetric_key()</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T13:21:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roman Smirnov</name>
<email>r.smirnov@omp.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-17T15:54:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3322fa8f2aa40b0b3651034cd541647a600cc6c0'/>
<id>3322fa8f2aa40b0b3651034cd541647a600cc6c0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 70fd1966c93bf3bfe3fe6d753eb3d83a76597eef upstream.

In find_asymmetric_key(), if all NULLs are passed in the id_{0,1,2}
arguments, the kernel will first emit WARN but then have an oops
because id_2 gets dereferenced anyway.

Add the missing id_2 check and move WARN_ON() to the final else branch
to avoid duplicate NULL checks.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static
analysis tool.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.17+
Fixes: 7d30198ee24f ("keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKID")
Suggested-by: Sergey Shtylyov &lt;s.shtylyov@omp.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov &lt;r.smirnov@omp.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov &lt;s.shtylyov@omp.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 70fd1966c93bf3bfe3fe6d753eb3d83a76597eef upstream.

In find_asymmetric_key(), if all NULLs are passed in the id_{0,1,2}
arguments, the kernel will first emit WARN but then have an oops
because id_2 gets dereferenced anyway.

Add the missing id_2 check and move WARN_ON() to the final else branch
to avoid duplicate NULL checks.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static
analysis tool.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.17+
Fixes: 7d30198ee24f ("keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKID")
Suggested-by: Sergey Shtylyov &lt;s.shtylyov@omp.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov &lt;r.smirnov@omp.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov &lt;s.shtylyov@omp.ru&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: xor - fix template benchmarking</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T13:20:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Helge Deller</name>
<email>deller@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-08T12:24:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=df95378d40bd72ad91bc7dca5085f1961c5256ce'/>
<id>df95378d40bd72ad91bc7dca5085f1961c5256ce</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ab9a244c396aae4aaa34b2399b82fc15ec2df8c1 ]

Commit c055e3eae0f1 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking")
switched from using jiffies to ktime-based performance benchmarking.

This works nicely on machines which have a fine-grained ktime()
clocksource as e.g. x86 machines with TSC.
But other machines, e.g. my 4-way HP PARISC server, don't have such
fine-grained clocksources, which is why it seems that 800 xor loops
take zero seconds, which then shows up in the logs as:

 xor: measuring software checksum speed
    8regs           : -1018167296 MB/sec
    8regs_prefetch  : -1018167296 MB/sec
    32regs          : -1018167296 MB/sec
    32regs_prefetch : -1018167296 MB/sec

Fix this with some small modifications to the existing code to improve
the algorithm to always produce correct results without introducing
major delays for architectures with a fine-grained ktime()
clocksource:
a) Delay start of the timing until ktime() just advanced. On machines
with a fast ktime() this should be just one additional ktime() call.
b) Count the number of loops. Run at minimum 800 loops and finish
earliest when the ktime() counter has progressed.

With that the throughput can now be calculated more accurately under all
conditions.

Fixes: c055e3eae0f1 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking")
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Tested-by: John David Anglin &lt;dave.anglin@bell.net&gt;

v2:
- clean up coding style (noticed &amp; suggested by Herbert Xu)
- rephrased &amp; fixed typo in commit message

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ab9a244c396aae4aaa34b2399b82fc15ec2df8c1 ]

Commit c055e3eae0f1 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking")
switched from using jiffies to ktime-based performance benchmarking.

This works nicely on machines which have a fine-grained ktime()
clocksource as e.g. x86 machines with TSC.
But other machines, e.g. my 4-way HP PARISC server, don't have such
fine-grained clocksources, which is why it seems that 800 xor loops
take zero seconds, which then shows up in the logs as:

 xor: measuring software checksum speed
    8regs           : -1018167296 MB/sec
    8regs_prefetch  : -1018167296 MB/sec
    32regs          : -1018167296 MB/sec
    32regs_prefetch : -1018167296 MB/sec

Fix this with some small modifications to the existing code to improve
the algorithm to always produce correct results without introducing
major delays for architectures with a fine-grained ktime()
clocksource:
a) Delay start of the timing until ktime() just advanced. On machines
with a fast ktime() this should be just one additional ktime() call.
b) Count the number of loops. Run at minimum 800 loops and finish
earliest when the ktime() counter has progressed.

With that the throughput can now be calculated more accurately under all
conditions.

Fixes: c055e3eae0f1 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking")
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Tested-by: John David Anglin &lt;dave.anglin@bell.net&gt;

v2:
- clean up coding style (noticed &amp; suggested by Herbert Xu)
- rephrased &amp; fixed typo in commit message

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: aead,cipher - zeroize key buffer after use</title>
<updated>2024-07-11T10:47:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hailey Mothershead</name>
<email>hailmo@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-15T22:19:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=28c8d274848feba552e95c5c2a7e3cfe8f15c534'/>
<id>28c8d274848feba552e95c5c2a7e3cfe8f15c534</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 23e4099bdc3c8381992f9eb975c79196d6755210 ]

I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding
cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer
needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that
previously held the private key.

Signed-off-by: Hailey Mothershead &lt;hailmo@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 23e4099bdc3c8381992f9eb975c79196d6755210 ]

I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding
cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer
needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that
previously held the private key.

Signed-off-by: Hailey Mothershead &lt;hailmo@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecdh - explicitly zeroize private_key</title>
<updated>2024-07-05T07:31:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joachim Vandersmissen</name>
<email>git@jvdsn.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-28T16:24:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fd7ef325911eba1b7191b83cb580463242f2090d'/>
<id>fd7ef325911eba1b7191b83cb580463242f2090d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 73e5984e540a76a2ee1868b91590c922da8c24c9 ]

private_key is overwritten with the key parameter passed in by the
caller (if present), or alternatively a newly generated private key.
However, it is possible that the caller provides a key (or the newly
generated key) which is shorter than the previous key. In that
scenario, some key material from the previous key would not be
overwritten. The easiest solution is to explicitly zeroize the entire
private_key array first.

Note that this patch slightly changes the behavior of this function:
previously, if the ecc_gen_privkey failed, the old private_key would
remain. Now, the private_key is always zeroized. This behavior is
consistent with the case where params.key is set and ecc_is_key_valid
fails.

Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen &lt;git@jvdsn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 73e5984e540a76a2ee1868b91590c922da8c24c9 ]

private_key is overwritten with the key parameter passed in by the
caller (if present), or alternatively a newly generated private key.
However, it is possible that the caller provides a key (or the newly
generated key) which is shorter than the previous key. In that
scenario, some key material from the previous key would not be
overwritten. The easiest solution is to explicitly zeroize the entire
private_key array first.

Note that this patch slightly changes the behavior of this function:
previously, if the ecc_gen_privkey failed, the old private_key would
remain. Now, the private_key is always zeroized. This behavior is
consistent with the case where params.key is set and ecc_is_key_valid
fails.

Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen &lt;git@jvdsn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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