<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/crypto, branch linux-6.15.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>crypto: jitter - fix intermediary handling</title>
<updated>2025-08-20T16:36:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Markus Theil</name>
<email>theil.markus@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-21T11:36:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=56774f81ad63bfa0fd214f7d0a9cd8ffc4d40884'/>
<id>56774f81ad63bfa0fd214f7d0a9cd8ffc4d40884</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 735b72568c73875269a6b73ab9543a70f6ac8a9f ]

The intermediary value was included in the wrong
hash state. While there, adapt to user-space by
setting the timestamp to 0 if stuck and inserting
the values nevertheless.

Acked-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Markus Theil &lt;theil.markus@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 735b72568c73875269a6b73ab9543a70f6ac8a9f ]

The intermediary value was included in the wrong
hash state. While there, adapt to user-space by
setting the timestamp to 0 if stuck and inserting
the values nevertheless.

Acked-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Markus Theil &lt;theil.markus@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: krb5 - Fix memory leak in krb5_test_one_prf()</title>
<updated>2025-08-15T10:16:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-09T07:11:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=605461861b543eff955a47d930a6a4256ca975d5'/>
<id>605461861b543eff955a47d930a6a4256ca975d5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b19f1ab8d5bf417e00d5855c62e061fb449b13c5 ]

Fix a leak reported by kmemleak:

    unreferenced object 0xffff8880093bf7a0 (size 32):
      comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294877529
      hex dump (first 32 bytes):
        9d 18 86 16 f6 38 52 fe 86 91 5b b8 40 b4 a8 86  .....8R...[.@...
        ff 3e 6b b0 f8 19 b4 9b 89 33 93 d3 93 85 42 95  .&gt;k......3....B.
      backtrace (crc 8ba12f3b):
        kmemleak_alloc+0x8d/0xa0
        __kmalloc_noprof+0x3cd/0x4d0
        prep_buf+0x36/0x70
        load_buf+0x10d/0x1c0
        krb5_test_one_prf+0x1e1/0x3c0
        krb5_selftest.cold+0x7c/0x54c
        crypto_krb5_init+0xd/0x20
        do_one_initcall+0xa5/0x230
        do_initcalls+0x213/0x250
        kernel_init_freeable+0x220/0x260
        kernel_init+0x1d/0x170
        ret_from_fork+0x301/0x410
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

Fixes: fc0cf10c04f4 ("crypto/krb5: Implement crypto self-testing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b19f1ab8d5bf417e00d5855c62e061fb449b13c5 ]

Fix a leak reported by kmemleak:

    unreferenced object 0xffff8880093bf7a0 (size 32):
      comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294877529
      hex dump (first 32 bytes):
        9d 18 86 16 f6 38 52 fe 86 91 5b b8 40 b4 a8 86  .....8R...[.@...
        ff 3e 6b b0 f8 19 b4 9b 89 33 93 d3 93 85 42 95  .&gt;k......3....B.
      backtrace (crc 8ba12f3b):
        kmemleak_alloc+0x8d/0xa0
        __kmalloc_noprof+0x3cd/0x4d0
        prep_buf+0x36/0x70
        load_buf+0x10d/0x1c0
        krb5_test_one_prf+0x1e1/0x3c0
        krb5_selftest.cold+0x7c/0x54c
        crypto_krb5_init+0xd/0x20
        do_one_initcall+0xa5/0x230
        do_initcalls+0x213/0x250
        kernel_init_freeable+0x220/0x260
        kernel_init+0x1d/0x170
        ret_from_fork+0x301/0x410
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

Fixes: fc0cf10c04f4 ("crypto/krb5: Implement crypto self-testing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto/krb5: Fix change to use SG miter to use offset</title>
<updated>2025-06-19T13:39:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-28T10:22:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f22ead0ca9ddee28be8f072e748c4dd1f5653b53'/>
<id>f22ead0ca9ddee28be8f072e748c4dd1f5653b53</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit eed848871c96d4b5a7b06307755b75abd0cc7a06 ]

The recent patch to make the rfc3961 simplified code use sg_miter rather
than manually walking the scatterlist to hash the contents of a buffer
described by that scatterlist failed to take the starting offset into
account.

This is indicated by the selftests reporting:

    krb5: Running aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128 mic
    krb5: !!! TESTFAIL crypto/krb5/selftest.c:446
    krb5: MIC mismatch

Fix this by calling sg_miter_skip() before doing the loop to advance
by the offset.

This only affects packet signing modes and not full encryption in RxGK
because, for full encryption, the message digest is handled inside the
authenc and krb5enc drivers.

Note: Nothing in linus/master uses the krb5lib, though the bug is there.
It is used by AF_RXRPC's RxGK implementation in -next, no need to backport.

Fixes: da6f9bf40ac2 ("crypto: krb5 - Use SG miter instead of doing it by hand")
Reported-by: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3824017.1745835726@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit eed848871c96d4b5a7b06307755b75abd0cc7a06 ]

The recent patch to make the rfc3961 simplified code use sg_miter rather
than manually walking the scatterlist to hash the contents of a buffer
described by that scatterlist failed to take the starting offset into
account.

This is indicated by the selftests reporting:

    krb5: Running aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128 mic
    krb5: !!! TESTFAIL crypto/krb5/selftest.c:446
    krb5: MIC mismatch

Fix this by calling sg_miter_skip() before doing the loop to advance
by the offset.

This only affects packet signing modes and not full encryption in RxGK
because, for full encryption, the message digest is handled inside the
authenc and krb5enc drivers.

Note: Nothing in linus/master uses the krb5lib, though the bug is there.
It is used by AF_RXRPC's RxGK implementation in -next, no need to backport.

Fixes: da6f9bf40ac2 ("crypto: krb5 - Use SG miter instead of doing it by hand")
Reported-by: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3824017.1745835726@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: api - Redo lookup on EEXIST</title>
<updated>2025-06-19T13:39:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-19T10:29:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8959b098e138bb87e85cc4cd93d6630a40c3e597'/>
<id>8959b098e138bb87e85cc4cd93d6630a40c3e597</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0a3cf32da469ff1df6e016f5f82b439a63d14461 ]

When two crypto algorithm lookups occur at the same time with
different names for the same algorithm, e.g., ctr(aes-generic)
and ctr(aes), they will both be instantiated.  However, only one
of them can be registered.  The second instantiation will fail
with EEXIST.

Avoid failing the second lookup by making it retry, but only once
because there are tricky names such as gcm_base(ctr(aes),ghash)
that will always fail, despite triggering instantiation and EEXIST.

Reported-by: Ingo Franzki &lt;ifranzki@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Fixes: 2825982d9d66 ("[CRYPTO] api: Added event notification")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0a3cf32da469ff1df6e016f5f82b439a63d14461 ]

When two crypto algorithm lookups occur at the same time with
different names for the same algorithm, e.g., ctr(aes-generic)
and ctr(aes), they will both be instantiated.  However, only one
of them can be registered.  The second instantiation will fail
with EEXIST.

Avoid failing the second lookup by making it retry, but only once
because there are tricky names such as gcm_base(ctr(aes),ghash)
that will always fail, despite triggering instantiation and EEXIST.

Reported-by: Ingo Franzki &lt;ifranzki@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Fixes: 2825982d9d66 ("[CRYPTO] api: Added event notification")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: xts - Only add ecb if it is not already there</title>
<updated>2025-06-19T13:39:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-15T08:34:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e2acafff6d0852ffba97c5c78a149986887fde01'/>
<id>e2acafff6d0852ffba97c5c78a149986887fde01</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 270b6f13454cb7f2f7058c50df64df409c5dcf55 ]

Only add ecb to the cipher name if it isn't already ecb.

Also use memcmp instead of strncmp since these strings are all
stored in an array of length CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.

Fixes: f1c131b45410 ("crypto: xts - Convert to skcipher")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 270b6f13454cb7f2f7058c50df64df409c5dcf55 ]

Only add ecb to the cipher name if it isn't already ecb.

Also use memcmp instead of strncmp since these strings are all
stored in an array of length CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.

Fixes: f1c131b45410 ("crypto: xts - Convert to skcipher")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: lrw - Only add ecb if it is not already there</title>
<updated>2025-06-19T13:39:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-15T08:28:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e71b6f780009861e4314e46b4ce4ec9f9ed64fbb'/>
<id>e71b6f780009861e4314e46b4ce4ec9f9ed64fbb</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3d73909bddc2ebb3224a8bc2e5ce00e9df70c15d ]

Only add ecb to the cipher name if it isn't already ecb.

Also use memcmp instead of strncmp since these strings are all
stored in an array of length CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.

Fixes: 700cb3f5fe75 ("crypto: lrw - Convert to skcipher")
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;oliver.sang@intel.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202505151503.d8a6cf10-lkp@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3d73909bddc2ebb3224a8bc2e5ce00e9df70c15d ]

Only add ecb to the cipher name if it isn't already ecb.

Also use memcmp instead of strncmp since these strings are all
stored in an array of length CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.

Fixes: 700cb3f5fe75 ("crypto: lrw - Convert to skcipher")
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;oliver.sang@intel.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202505151503.d8a6cf10-lkp@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecdsa - Fix NIST P521 key size reported by KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY</title>
<updated>2025-06-19T13:39:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lukas Wunner</name>
<email>lukas@wunner.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-07T19:32:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=40466ce607897f92a910ec2af67b3a543e0f4e2b'/>
<id>40466ce607897f92a910ec2af67b3a543e0f4e2b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6b7f9397c98c72902f9364056413c73fe6dee1d8 ]

When user space issues a KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY system call for a NIST P521
key, the key_size is incorrectly reported as 528 bits instead of 521.

That's because the key size obtained through crypto_sig_keysize() is in
bytes and software_key_query() multiplies by 8 to yield the size in bits.
The underlying assumption is that the key size is always a multiple of 8.
With the recent addition of NIST P521, that's no longer the case.

Fix by returning the key_size in bits from crypto_sig_keysize() and
adjusting the calculations in software_key_query().

The -&gt;key_size() callbacks of sig_alg algorithms now return the size in
bits, whereas the -&gt;digest_size() and -&gt;max_size() callbacks return the
size in bytes.  This matches with the units in struct keyctl_pkey_query.

Fixes: a7d45ba77d3d ("crypto: ecdsa - Register NIST P521 and extend test suite")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner &lt;lukas@wunner.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin &lt;ignat@cloudflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6b7f9397c98c72902f9364056413c73fe6dee1d8 ]

When user space issues a KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY system call for a NIST P521
key, the key_size is incorrectly reported as 528 bits instead of 521.

That's because the key size obtained through crypto_sig_keysize() is in
bytes and software_key_query() multiplies by 8 to yield the size in bits.
The underlying assumption is that the key size is always a multiple of 8.
With the recent addition of NIST P521, that's no longer the case.

Fix by returning the key_size in bits from crypto_sig_keysize() and
adjusting the calculations in software_key_query().

The -&gt;key_size() callbacks of sig_alg algorithms now return the size in
bits, whereas the -&gt;digest_size() and -&gt;max_size() callbacks return the
size in bytes.  This matches with the units in struct keyctl_pkey_query.

Fixes: a7d45ba77d3d ("crypto: ecdsa - Register NIST P521 and extend test suite")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner &lt;lukas@wunner.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin &lt;ignat@cloudflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecdsa - Fix enc/dec size reported by KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY</title>
<updated>2025-06-19T13:39:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lukas Wunner</name>
<email>lukas@wunner.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-07T19:32:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e8bb8220006871b00adc125238094a2451cfde7a'/>
<id>e8bb8220006871b00adc125238094a2451cfde7a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3828485e1c7b111290122ab6e083c2a37132b5c2 ]

KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY system calls for ecdsa keys return the key size as
max_enc_size and max_dec_size, even though such keys cannot be used for
encryption/decryption.  They're exclusively for signature generation or
verification.

Only rsa keys with pkcs1 encoding can also be used for encryption or
decryption.

Return 0 instead for ecdsa keys (as well as ecrdsa keys).

Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner &lt;lukas@wunner.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin &lt;ignat@cloudflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 6b7f9397c98c ("crypto: ecdsa - Fix NIST P521 key size reported by KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3828485e1c7b111290122ab6e083c2a37132b5c2 ]

KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY system calls for ecdsa keys return the key size as
max_enc_size and max_dec_size, even though such keys cannot be used for
encryption/decryption.  They're exclusively for signature generation or
verification.

Only rsa keys with pkcs1 encoding can also be used for encryption or
decryption.

Return 0 instead for ecdsa keys (as well as ecrdsa keys).

Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner &lt;lukas@wunner.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin &lt;ignat@cloudflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 6b7f9397c98c ("crypto: ecdsa - Fix NIST P521 key size reported by KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: algif_hash - fix double free in hash_accept</title>
<updated>2025-05-19T05:44:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ivan Pravdin</name>
<email>ipravdin.official@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-18T22:41:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b2df03ed4052e97126267e8c13ad4204ea6ba9b6'/>
<id>b2df03ed4052e97126267e8c13ad4204ea6ba9b6</id>
<content type='text'>
If accept(2) is called on socket type algif_hash with
MSG_MORE flag set and crypto_ahash_import fails,
sk2 is freed. However, it is also freed in af_alg_release,
leading to slab-use-after-free error.

Fixes: fe869cdb89c9 ("crypto: algif_hash - User-space interface for hash operations")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ivan Pravdin &lt;ipravdin.official@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If accept(2) is called on socket type algif_hash with
MSG_MORE flag set and crypto_ahash_import fails,
sk2 is freed. However, it is also freed in af_alg_release,
leading to slab-use-after-free error.

Fixes: fe869cdb89c9 ("crypto: algif_hash - User-space interface for hash operations")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ivan Pravdin &lt;ipravdin.official@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: scompress - increment scomp_scratch_users when already allocated</title>
<updated>2025-04-25T02:33:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sabrina Dubroca</name>
<email>sd@queasysnail.net</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-24T20:15:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a32f1923c6d6e9e727d00558a15ec0af6639de19'/>
<id>a32f1923c6d6e9e727d00558a15ec0af6639de19</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit ddd0a42671c0 only increments scomp_scratch_users when it was 0,
causing a panic when using ipcomp:

    Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
    KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
    CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 619 Comm: ping Tainted: G                 N  6.15.0-rc3-net-00032-ga79be02bba5c #41 PREEMPT(full)
    Tainted: [N]=TEST
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
    RIP: 0010:inflate_fast+0x5a2/0x1b90
    [...]
    Call Trace:
     &lt;IRQ&gt;
     zlib_inflate+0x2d60/0x6620
     deflate_sdecompress+0x166/0x350
     scomp_acomp_comp_decomp+0x45f/0xa10
     scomp_acomp_decompress+0x21/0x120
     acomp_do_req_chain+0x3e5/0x4e0
     ipcomp_input+0x212/0x550
     xfrm_input+0x2de2/0x72f0
    [...]
    Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
    Kernel Offset: disabled
    ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---

Instead, let's keep the old increment, and decrement back to 0 if the
scratch allocation fails.

Fixes: ddd0a42671c0 ("crypto: scompress - Fix scratch allocation failure handling")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit ddd0a42671c0 only increments scomp_scratch_users when it was 0,
causing a panic when using ipcomp:

    Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
    KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
    CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 619 Comm: ping Tainted: G                 N  6.15.0-rc3-net-00032-ga79be02bba5c #41 PREEMPT(full)
    Tainted: [N]=TEST
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
    RIP: 0010:inflate_fast+0x5a2/0x1b90
    [...]
    Call Trace:
     &lt;IRQ&gt;
     zlib_inflate+0x2d60/0x6620
     deflate_sdecompress+0x166/0x350
     scomp_acomp_comp_decomp+0x45f/0xa10
     scomp_acomp_decompress+0x21/0x120
     acomp_do_req_chain+0x3e5/0x4e0
     ipcomp_input+0x212/0x550
     xfrm_input+0x2de2/0x72f0
    [...]
    Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
    Kernel Offset: disabled
    ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---

Instead, let's keep the old increment, and decrement back to 0 if the
scratch allocation fails.

Fixes: ddd0a42671c0 ("crypto: scompress - Fix scratch allocation failure handling")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
