<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/crypto, branch linux-2.6.32.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>crypto: testmgr - update LZO compression test vectors</title>
<updated>2015-09-18T11:51:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer</name>
<email>markus@oberhumer.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-14T13:39:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=435f34cb44936431d6b2d8525ba6beab2a9e6b03'/>
<id>435f34cb44936431d6b2d8525ba6beab2a9e6b03</id>
<content type='text'>
Update the LZO compression test vectors according to the latest compressor
version.

Signed-off-by: Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer &lt;markus@oberhumer.com&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 0ec7382036922be063b515b2a3f1d6f7a607392c)
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Update the LZO compression test vectors according to the latest compressor
version.

Signed-off-by: Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer &lt;markus@oberhumer.com&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 0ec7382036922be063b515b2a3f1d6f7a607392c)
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ansi_cprng - Fix off by one error in non-block size request</title>
<updated>2014-05-19T05:54:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neil Horman</name>
<email>nhorman@tuxdriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-17T12:33:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a35f8f7b89f6c91bae8aa46507556de4185e9e7a'/>
<id>a35f8f7b89f6c91bae8aa46507556de4185e9e7a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 714b33d15130cbb5ab426456d4e3de842d6c5b8a upstream

Stephan Mueller reported to me recently a error in random number generation in
the ansi cprng. If several small requests are made that are less than the
instances block size, the remainder for loop code doesn't increment
rand_data_valid in the last iteration, meaning that the last bytes in the
rand_data buffer gets reused on the subsequent smaller-than-a-block request for
random data.

The fix is pretty easy, just re-code the for loop to make sure that
rand_data_valid gets incremented appropriately

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;stephan.mueller@atsec.com&gt;
CC: Stephan Mueller &lt;stephan.mueller@atsec.com&gt;
CC: Petr Matousek &lt;pmatouse@redhat.com&gt;
CC: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
CC: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 714b33d15130cbb5ab426456d4e3de842d6c5b8a upstream

Stephan Mueller reported to me recently a error in random number generation in
the ansi cprng. If several small requests are made that are less than the
instances block size, the remainder for loop code doesn't increment
rand_data_valid in the last iteration, meaning that the last bytes in the
rand_data buffer gets reused on the subsequent smaller-than-a-block request for
random data.

The fix is pretty easy, just re-code the for loop to make sure that
rand_data_valid gets incremented appropriately

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;stephan.mueller@atsec.com&gt;
CC: Stephan Mueller &lt;stephan.mueller@atsec.com&gt;
CC: Petr Matousek &lt;pmatouse@redhat.com&gt;
CC: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
CC: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: api - Fix race condition in larval lookup</title>
<updated>2014-05-19T05:53:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nikola Pajkovsky</name>
<email>npajkovs@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-11T06:48:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8ec40cab58d3b334077ff0f7bbc0f667c43f1583'/>
<id>8ec40cab58d3b334077ff0f7bbc0f667c43f1583</id>
<content type='text'>
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1016108

64z is missing rhel6 commit 3af031a395c0 ("[crypto] algboss: Hold ref
count on larval") which is causing cosmetic fuzz, because crypto_alg_get
was move from crypto/api.c to crypto/internal.h.

From: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;

[ upstream commit 77dbd7a95e4a4f15264c333a9e9ab97ee27dc2aa ]

crypto_larval_lookup should only return a larval if it created one.
Any larval created by another entity must be processed through
crypto_larval_wait before being returned.

Otherwise this will lead to a larval being killed twice, which
will most likely lead to a crash.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Tested-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nikola Pajkovsky &lt;npajkovs@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1016108

64z is missing rhel6 commit 3af031a395c0 ("[crypto] algboss: Hold ref
count on larval") which is causing cosmetic fuzz, because crypto_alg_get
was move from crypto/api.c to crypto/internal.h.

From: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;

[ upstream commit 77dbd7a95e4a4f15264c333a9e9ab97ee27dc2aa ]

crypto_larval_lookup should only return a larval if it created one.
Any larval created by another entity must be processed through
crypto_larval_wait before being returned.

Otherwise this will lead to a larval being killed twice, which
will most likely lead to a crash.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Tested-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nikola Pajkovsky &lt;npajkovs@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: cryptd - disable softirqs in cryptd_queue_worker to prevent data corruption</title>
<updated>2013-06-10T09:42:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jussi Kivilinna</name>
<email>jussi.kivilinna@mbnet.fi</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-21T17:42:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e760d49b961785ee6bebe8b87832335b8e61c8a2'/>
<id>e760d49b961785ee6bebe8b87832335b8e61c8a2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9efade1b3e981f5064f9db9ca971b4dc7557ae42 upstream.

cryptd_queue_worker attempts to prevent simultaneous accesses to crypto
workqueue by cryptd_enqueue_request using preempt_disable/preempt_enable.
However cryptd_enqueue_request might be called from softirq context,
so add local_bh_disable/local_bh_enable to prevent data corruption and
panics.

Bug report at http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&amp;m=134858649616319&amp;w=2

v2:
 - Disable software interrupts instead of hardware interrupts

Reported-by: Gurucharan Shetty &lt;gurucharan.shetty@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna &lt;jussi.kivilinna@mbnet.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9efade1b3e981f5064f9db9ca971b4dc7557ae42 upstream.

cryptd_queue_worker attempts to prevent simultaneous accesses to crypto
workqueue by cryptd_enqueue_request using preempt_disable/preempt_enable.
However cryptd_enqueue_request might be called from softirq context,
so add local_bh_disable/local_bh_enable to prevent data corruption and
panics.

Bug report at http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&amp;m=134858649616319&amp;w=2

v2:
 - Disable software interrupts instead of hardware interrupts

Reported-by: Gurucharan Shetty &lt;gurucharan.shetty@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna &lt;jussi.kivilinna@mbnet.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: sha512 - Fix byte counter overflow in SHA-512</title>
<updated>2012-10-07T21:37:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kent Yoder</name>
<email>key@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-05T12:34:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=21f5d063fca7488c7bd3d6adec5aa0c2e5bc4ae0'/>
<id>21f5d063fca7488c7bd3d6adec5aa0c2e5bc4ae0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 25c3d30c918207556ae1d6e663150ebdf902186b upstream.

The current code only increments the upper 64 bits of the SHA-512 byte
counter when the number of bytes hashed happens to hit 2^64 exactly.

This patch increments the upper 64 bits whenever the lower 64 bits
overflows.

Signed-off-by: Kent Yoder &lt;key@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 25c3d30c918207556ae1d6e663150ebdf902186b upstream.

The current code only increments the upper 64 bits of the SHA-512 byte
counter when the number of bytes hashed happens to hit 2^64 exactly.

This patch increments the upper 64 bits whenever the lower 64 bits
overflows.

Signed-off-by: Kent Yoder &lt;key@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: sha512 - use standard ror64()</title>
<updated>2012-03-04T17:49:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-14T18:44:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ca24f59e757dda99b2544b908d3ec67e09167c91'/>
<id>ca24f59e757dda99b2544b908d3ec67e09167c91</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f2ea0f5f04c97b48c88edccba52b0682fbe45087 upstream.

Use standard ror64() instead of hand-written.
There is no standard ror64, so create it.

The difference is shift value being "unsigned int" instead of uint64_t
(for which there is no reason). gcc starts to emit native ROR instructions
which it doesn't do for some reason currently. This should make the code
faster.

Patch survives in-tree crypto test and ping flood with hmac(sha512) on.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f2ea0f5f04c97b48c88edccba52b0682fbe45087 upstream.

Use standard ror64() instead of hand-written.
There is no standard ror64, so create it.

The difference is shift value being "unsigned int" instead of uint64_t
(for which there is no reason). gcc starts to emit native ROR instructions
which it doesn't do for some reason currently. This should make the code
faster.

Patch survives in-tree crypto test and ping flood with hmac(sha512) on.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: sha512 - Avoid stack bloat on i386</title>
<updated>2012-03-04T17:49:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2012-02-05T04:09:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e200edb226a0357d554039c4ff1847c6c03724c7'/>
<id>e200edb226a0357d554039c4ff1847c6c03724c7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3a92d687c8015860a19213e3c102cad6b722f83c upstream.

Unfortunately in reducing W from 80 to 16 we ended up unrolling
the loop twice.  As gcc has issues dealing with 64-bit ops on
i386 this means that we end up using even more stack space (&gt;1K).

This patch solves the W reduction by moving LOAD_OP/BLEND_OP
into the loop itself, thus avoiding the need to duplicate it.

While the stack space still isn't great (&gt;0.5K) it is at least
in the same ball park as the amount of stack used for our C sha1
implementation.

Note that this patch basically reverts to the original code so
the diff looks bigger than it really is.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3a92d687c8015860a19213e3c102cad6b722f83c upstream.

Unfortunately in reducing W from 80 to 16 we ended up unrolling
the loop twice.  As gcc has issues dealing with 64-bit ops on
i386 this means that we end up using even more stack space (&gt;1K).

This patch solves the W reduction by moving LOAD_OP/BLEND_OP
into the loop itself, thus avoiding the need to duplicate it.

While the stack space still isn't great (&gt;0.5K) it is at least
in the same ball park as the amount of stack used for our C sha1
implementation.

Note that this patch basically reverts to the original code so
the diff looks bigger than it really is.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: sha512 - Use binary and instead of modulus</title>
<updated>2012-03-04T17:49:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-26T04:03:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3e15b23883776bb8c42bd5e5ee6e439ab4bd60df'/>
<id>3e15b23883776bb8c42bd5e5ee6e439ab4bd60df</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 58d7d18b5268febb8b1391c6dffc8e2aaa751fcd upstream.

The previous patch used the modulus operator over a power of 2
unnecessarily which may produce suboptimal binary code.  This
patch changes changes them to binary ands instead.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 58d7d18b5268febb8b1391c6dffc8e2aaa751fcd upstream.

The previous patch used the modulus operator over a power of 2
unnecessarily which may produce suboptimal binary code.  This
patch changes changes them to binary ands instead.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: sha512 - reduce stack usage to safe number</title>
<updated>2012-02-03T17:26:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-14T18:40:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4d385100b02a7b255797ac2066ea043a6f60e3dc'/>
<id>4d385100b02a7b255797ac2066ea043a6f60e3dc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 51fc6dc8f948047364f7d42a4ed89b416c6cc0a3 upstream.

For rounds 16--79, W[i] only depends on W[i - 2], W[i - 7], W[i - 15] and W[i - 16].
Consequently, keeping all W[80] array on stack is unnecessary,
only 16 values are really needed.

Using W[16] instead of W[80] greatly reduces stack usage
(~750 bytes to ~340 bytes on x86_64).

Line by line explanation:
* BLEND_OP
  array is "circular" now, all indexes have to be modulo 16.
  Round number is positive, so remainder operation should be
  without surprises.

* initial full message scheduling is trimmed to first 16 values which
  come from data block, the rest is calculated before it's needed.

* original loop body is unrolled version of new SHA512_0_15 and
  SHA512_16_79 macros, unrolling was done to not do explicit variable
  renaming. Otherwise it's the very same code after preprocessing.
  See sha1_transform() code which does the same trick.

Patch survives in-tree crypto test and original bugreport test
(ping flood with hmac(sha512).

See FIPS 180-2 for SHA-512 definition
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2withchangenotice.pdf

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 51fc6dc8f948047364f7d42a4ed89b416c6cc0a3 upstream.

For rounds 16--79, W[i] only depends on W[i - 2], W[i - 7], W[i - 15] and W[i - 16].
Consequently, keeping all W[80] array on stack is unnecessary,
only 16 values are really needed.

Using W[16] instead of W[80] greatly reduces stack usage
(~750 bytes to ~340 bytes on x86_64).

Line by line explanation:
* BLEND_OP
  array is "circular" now, all indexes have to be modulo 16.
  Round number is positive, so remainder operation should be
  without surprises.

* initial full message scheduling is trimmed to first 16 values which
  come from data block, the rest is calculated before it's needed.

* original loop body is unrolled version of new SHA512_0_15 and
  SHA512_16_79 macros, unrolling was done to not do explicit variable
  renaming. Otherwise it's the very same code after preprocessing.
  See sha1_transform() code which does the same trick.

Patch survives in-tree crypto test and original bugreport test
(ping flood with hmac(sha512).

See FIPS 180-2 for SHA-512 definition
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2withchangenotice.pdf

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: sha512 - make it work, undo percpu message schedule</title>
<updated>2012-02-03T17:26:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-14T18:27:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bef4c3bef7d6cbe3638d910b93483f7dfe03b5c2'/>
<id>bef4c3bef7d6cbe3638d910b93483f7dfe03b5c2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 84e31fdb7c797a7303e0cc295cb9bc8b73fb872d upstream.

commit f9e2bca6c22d75a289a349f869701214d63b5060
aka "crypto: sha512 - Move message schedule W[80] to static percpu area"
created global message schedule area.

If sha512_update will ever be entered twice, hash will be silently
calculated incorrectly.

Probably the easiest way to notice incorrect hashes being calculated is
to run 2 ping floods over AH with hmac(sha512):

	#!/usr/sbin/setkey -f
	flush;
	spdflush;
	add IP1 IP2 ah 25 -A hmac-sha512 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000025;
	add IP2 IP1 ah 52 -A hmac-sha512 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000052;
	spdadd IP1 IP2 any -P out ipsec ah/transport//require;
	spdadd IP2 IP1 any -P in  ipsec ah/transport//require;

XfrmInStateProtoError will start ticking with -EBADMSG being returned
from ah_input(). This never happens with, say, hmac(sha1).

With patch applied (on BOTH sides), XfrmInStateProtoError does not tick
with multiple bidirectional ping flood streams like it doesn't tick
with SHA-1.

After this patch sha512_transform() will start using ~750 bytes of stack on x86_64.
This is OK for simple loads, for something more heavy, stack reduction will be done
separatedly.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 84e31fdb7c797a7303e0cc295cb9bc8b73fb872d upstream.

commit f9e2bca6c22d75a289a349f869701214d63b5060
aka "crypto: sha512 - Move message schedule W[80] to static percpu area"
created global message schedule area.

If sha512_update will ever be entered twice, hash will be silently
calculated incorrectly.

Probably the easiest way to notice incorrect hashes being calculated is
to run 2 ping floods over AH with hmac(sha512):

	#!/usr/sbin/setkey -f
	flush;
	spdflush;
	add IP1 IP2 ah 25 -A hmac-sha512 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000025;
	add IP2 IP1 ah 52 -A hmac-sha512 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000052;
	spdadd IP1 IP2 any -P out ipsec ah/transport//require;
	spdadd IP2 IP1 any -P in  ipsec ah/transport//require;

XfrmInStateProtoError will start ticking with -EBADMSG being returned
from ah_input(). This never happens with, say, hmac(sha1).

With patch applied (on BOTH sides), XfrmInStateProtoError does not tick
with multiple bidirectional ping flood streams like it doesn't tick
with SHA-1.

After this patch sha512_transform() will start using ~750 bytes of stack on x86_64.
This is OK for simple loads, for something more heavy, stack reduction will be done
separatedly.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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