<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/crypto/testmgr.h, branch v5.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152</title>
<updated>2019-05-30T18:26:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-27T06:55:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2874c5fd284268364ece81a7bd936f3c8168e567'/>
<id>2874c5fd284268364ece81a7bd936f3c8168e567</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6</title>
<updated>2019-05-07T03:15:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-07T03:15:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=81ff5d2cba4f86cd850b9ee4a530cd221ee45aa3'/>
<id>81ff5d2cba4f86cd850b9ee4a530cd221ee45aa3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
 "API:
   - Add support for AEAD in simd
   - Add fuzz testing to testmgr
   - Add panic_on_fail module parameter to testmgr
   - Use per-CPU struct instead multiple variables in scompress
   - Change verify API for akcipher

  Algorithms:
   - Convert x86 AEAD algorithms over to simd
   - Forbid 2-key 3DES in FIPS mode
   - Add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm

  Drivers:
   - Set output IV with ctr-aes in crypto4xx
   - Set output IV in rockchip
   - Fix potential length overflow with hashing in sun4i-ss
   - Fix computation error with ctr in vmx
   - Add SM4 protected keys support in ccree
   - Remove long-broken mxc-scc driver
   - Add rfc4106(gcm(aes)) cipher support in cavium/nitrox"

* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (179 commits)
  crypto: ccree - use a proper le32 type for le32 val
  crypto: ccree - remove set but not used variable 'du_size'
  crypto: ccree - Make cc_sec_disable static
  crypto: ccree - fix spelling mistake "protedcted" -&gt; "protected"
  crypto: caam/qi2 - generate hash keys in-place
  crypto: caam/qi2 - fix DMA mapping of stack memory
  crypto: caam/qi2 - fix zero-length buffer DMA mapping
  crypto: stm32/cryp - update to return iv_out
  crypto: stm32/cryp - remove request mutex protection
  crypto: stm32/cryp - add weak key check for DES
  crypto: atmel - remove set but not used variable 'alg_name'
  crypto: picoxcell - Use dev_get_drvdata()
  crypto: crypto4xx - get rid of redundant using_sd variable
  crypto: crypto4xx - use sync skcipher for fallback
  crypto: crypto4xx - fix cfb and ofb "overran dst buffer" issues
  crypto: crypto4xx - fix ctr-aes missing output IV
  crypto: ecrdsa - select ASN1 and OID_REGISTRY for EC-RDSA
  crypto: ux500 - use ccflags-y instead of CFLAGS_&lt;basename&gt;.o
  crypto: ccree - handle tee fips error during power management resume
  crypto: ccree - add function to handle cryptocell tee fips error
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
 "API:
   - Add support for AEAD in simd
   - Add fuzz testing to testmgr
   - Add panic_on_fail module parameter to testmgr
   - Use per-CPU struct instead multiple variables in scompress
   - Change verify API for akcipher

  Algorithms:
   - Convert x86 AEAD algorithms over to simd
   - Forbid 2-key 3DES in FIPS mode
   - Add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm

  Drivers:
   - Set output IV with ctr-aes in crypto4xx
   - Set output IV in rockchip
   - Fix potential length overflow with hashing in sun4i-ss
   - Fix computation error with ctr in vmx
   - Add SM4 protected keys support in ccree
   - Remove long-broken mxc-scc driver
   - Add rfc4106(gcm(aes)) cipher support in cavium/nitrox"

* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (179 commits)
  crypto: ccree - use a proper le32 type for le32 val
  crypto: ccree - remove set but not used variable 'du_size'
  crypto: ccree - Make cc_sec_disable static
  crypto: ccree - fix spelling mistake "protedcted" -&gt; "protected"
  crypto: caam/qi2 - generate hash keys in-place
  crypto: caam/qi2 - fix DMA mapping of stack memory
  crypto: caam/qi2 - fix zero-length buffer DMA mapping
  crypto: stm32/cryp - update to return iv_out
  crypto: stm32/cryp - remove request mutex protection
  crypto: stm32/cryp - add weak key check for DES
  crypto: atmel - remove set but not used variable 'alg_name'
  crypto: picoxcell - Use dev_get_drvdata()
  crypto: crypto4xx - get rid of redundant using_sd variable
  crypto: crypto4xx - use sync skcipher for fallback
  crypto: crypto4xx - fix cfb and ofb "overran dst buffer" issues
  crypto: crypto4xx - fix ctr-aes missing output IV
  crypto: ecrdsa - select ASN1 and OID_REGISTRY for EC-RDSA
  crypto: ux500 - use ccflags-y instead of CFLAGS_&lt;basename&gt;.o
  crypto: ccree - handle tee fips error during power management resume
  crypto: ccree - add function to handle cryptocell tee fips error
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: testmgr - fuzz skciphers against their generic implementation</title>
<updated>2019-04-18T14:15:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-12T04:57:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d435e10e67be0a0df70502aee434cb62a9d65b10'/>
<id>d435e10e67be0a0df70502aee434cb62a9d65b10</id>
<content type='text'>
When the extra crypto self-tests are enabled, test each skcipher
algorithm against its generic implementation when one is available.
This involves: checking the algorithm properties for consistency, then
randomly generating test vectors using the generic implementation and
running them against the implementation under test.  Both good and bad
inputs are tested.

This has already detected a bug in the skcipher_walk API, a bug in the
LRW template, and an inconsistency in the cts implementations.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When the extra crypto self-tests are enabled, test each skcipher
algorithm against its generic implementation when one is available.
This involves: checking the algorithm properties for consistency, then
randomly generating test vectors using the generic implementation and
running them against the implementation under test.  Both good and bad
inputs are tested.

This has already detected a bug in the skcipher_walk API, a bug in the
LRW template, and an inconsistency in the cts implementations.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: testmgr - expand ability to test for errors</title>
<updated>2019-04-18T14:15:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-12T04:57:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5283a8ee9badf699bd4a5a622011f9d4d50fecde'/>
<id>5283a8ee9badf699bd4a5a622011f9d4d50fecde</id>
<content type='text'>
Update testmgr to support testing for specific errors from setkey() and
digest() for hashes; setkey() and encrypt()/decrypt() for skciphers and
ciphers; and setkey(), setauthsize(), and encrypt()/decrypt() for AEADs.
This is useful because algorithms usually restrict the lengths or format
of the message, key, and/or authentication tag in some way.  And bad
inputs should be tested too, not just good inputs.

As part of this change, remove the ambiguously-named 'fail' flag and
replace it with 'setkey_error = -EINVAL' for the only test vector that
used it -- the DES weak key test vector.  Note that this tightens the
test to require -EINVAL rather than any error code, but AFAICS this
won't cause any test failure.

Other than that, these new fields aren't set on any test vectors yet.
Later patches will do so.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Update testmgr to support testing for specific errors from setkey() and
digest() for hashes; setkey() and encrypt()/decrypt() for skciphers and
ciphers; and setkey(), setauthsize(), and encrypt()/decrypt() for AEADs.
This is useful because algorithms usually restrict the lengths or format
of the message, key, and/or authentication tag in some way.  And bad
inputs should be tested too, not just good inputs.

As part of this change, remove the ambiguously-named 'fail' flag and
replace it with 'setkey_error = -EINVAL' for the only test vector that
used it -- the DES weak key test vector.  Note that this tightens the
test to require -EINVAL rather than any error code, but AFAICS this
won't cause any test failure.

Other than that, these new fields aren't set on any test vectors yet.
Later patches will do so.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA test vectors to testmgr</title>
<updated>2019-04-18T14:15:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vitaly Chikunov</name>
<email>vt@altlinux.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-11T15:51:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=32fbdbd32e1caafd7ae9b750e12fe8f2ea038add'/>
<id>32fbdbd32e1caafd7ae9b750e12fe8f2ea038add</id>
<content type='text'>
Add testmgr test vectors for EC-RDSA algorithm for every of five
supported parameters (curves). Because there are no officially published
test vectors for the curves, the vectors are generated by gost-engine.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov &lt;vt@altlinux.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add testmgr test vectors for EC-RDSA algorithm for every of five
supported parameters (curves). Because there are no officially published
test vectors for the curves, the vectors are generated by gost-engine.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov &lt;vt@altlinux.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>X.509: parse public key parameters from x509 for akcipher</title>
<updated>2019-04-18T14:15:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vitaly Chikunov</name>
<email>vt@altlinux.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-11T15:51:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f1774cb8956a35269f539efcee99fe7eda838b77'/>
<id>f1774cb8956a35269f539efcee99fe7eda838b77</id>
<content type='text'>
Some public key algorithms (like EC-DSA) keep in parameters field
important data such as digest and curve OIDs (possibly more for
different EC-DSA variants). Thus, just setting a public key (as
for RSA) is not enough.

Append parameters into the key stream for akcipher_set_{pub,priv}_key.
Appended data is: (u32) algo OID, (u32) parameters length, parameters
data.

This does not affect current akcipher API nor RSA ciphers (they could
ignore it). Idea of appending parameters to the key stream is by Herbert
Xu.

Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Denis Kenzior &lt;denkenz@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov &lt;vt@altlinux.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior &lt;denkenz@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Some public key algorithms (like EC-DSA) keep in parameters field
important data such as digest and curve OIDs (possibly more for
different EC-DSA variants). Thus, just setting a public key (as
for RSA) is not enough.

Append parameters into the key stream for akcipher_set_{pub,priv}_key.
Appended data is: (u32) algo OID, (u32) parameters length, parameters
data.

This does not affect current akcipher API nor RSA ciphers (they could
ignore it). Idea of appending parameters to the key stream is by Herbert
Xu.

Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Denis Kenzior &lt;denkenz@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov &lt;vt@altlinux.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior &lt;denkenz@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: x86/poly1305 - fix overflow during partial reduction</title>
<updated>2019-04-08T06:43:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-31T20:04:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=678cce4019d746da6c680c48ba9e6d417803e127'/>
<id>678cce4019d746da6c680c48ba9e6d417803e127</id>
<content type='text'>
The x86_64 implementation of Poly1305 produces the wrong result on some
inputs because poly1305_4block_avx2() incorrectly assumes that when
partially reducing the accumulator, the bits carried from limb 'd4' to
limb 'h0' fit in a 32-bit integer.  This is true for poly1305-generic
which processes only one block at a time.  However, it's not true for
the AVX2 implementation, which processes 4 blocks at a time and
therefore can produce intermediate limbs about 4x larger.

Fix it by making the relevant calculations use 64-bit arithmetic rather
than 32-bit.  Note that most of the carries already used 64-bit
arithmetic, but the d4 -&gt; h0 carry was different for some reason.

To be safe I also made the same change to the corresponding SSE2 code,
though that only operates on 1 or 2 blocks at a time.  I don't think
it's really needed for poly1305_block_sse2(), but it doesn't hurt
because it's already x86_64 code.  It *might* be needed for
poly1305_2block_sse2(), but overflows aren't easy to reproduce there.

This bug was originally detected by my patches that improve testmgr to
fuzz algorithms against their generic implementation.  But also add a
test vector which reproduces it directly (in the AVX2 case).

Fixes: b1ccc8f4b631 ("crypto: poly1305 - Add a four block AVX2 variant for x86_64")
Fixes: c70f4abef07a ("crypto: poly1305 - Add a SSE2 SIMD variant for x86_64")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.3+
Cc: Martin Willi &lt;martin@strongswan.org&gt;
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi &lt;martin@strongswan.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The x86_64 implementation of Poly1305 produces the wrong result on some
inputs because poly1305_4block_avx2() incorrectly assumes that when
partially reducing the accumulator, the bits carried from limb 'd4' to
limb 'h0' fit in a 32-bit integer.  This is true for poly1305-generic
which processes only one block at a time.  However, it's not true for
the AVX2 implementation, which processes 4 blocks at a time and
therefore can produce intermediate limbs about 4x larger.

Fix it by making the relevant calculations use 64-bit arithmetic rather
than 32-bit.  Note that most of the carries already used 64-bit
arithmetic, but the d4 -&gt; h0 carry was different for some reason.

To be safe I also made the same change to the corresponding SSE2 code,
though that only operates on 1 or 2 blocks at a time.  I don't think
it's really needed for poly1305_block_sse2(), but it doesn't hurt
because it's already x86_64 code.  It *might* be needed for
poly1305_2block_sse2(), but overflows aren't easy to reproduce there.

This bug was originally detected by my patches that improve testmgr to
fuzz algorithms against their generic implementation.  But also add a
test vector which reproduces it directly (in the AVX2 case).

Fixes: b1ccc8f4b631 ("crypto: poly1305 - Add a four block AVX2 variant for x86_64")
Fixes: c70f4abef07a ("crypto: poly1305 - Add a SSE2 SIMD variant for x86_64")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.3+
Cc: Martin Willi &lt;martin@strongswan.org&gt;
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi &lt;martin@strongswan.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: adiantum - add 1536 and 4096-byte test vectors</title>
<updated>2019-02-22T04:47:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-14T18:29:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=333e664772c5b8cfd5c019e300b378cd9d1c5ae3'/>
<id>333e664772c5b8cfd5c019e300b378cd9d1c5ae3</id>
<content type='text'>
Add 1536 and 4096-byte Adiantum test vectors so that the case where
there are multiple NH hashes is tested.  This is already tested by the
nhpoly1305 test vectors, but it should be tested at the Adiantum level
too.  Moreover the 4096-byte case is especially important.

As with the other Adiantum test vectors, these were generated by the
reference Python implementation at https://github.com/google/adiantum
and then automatically formatted for testmgr by a script.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add 1536 and 4096-byte Adiantum test vectors so that the case where
there are multiple NH hashes is tested.  This is already tested by the
nhpoly1305 test vectors, but it should be tested at the Adiantum level
too.  Moreover the 4096-byte case is especially important.

As with the other Adiantum test vectors, these were generated by the
reference Python implementation at https://github.com/google/adiantum
and then automatically formatted for testmgr by a script.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: nhpoly1305 - add a test vector with len % 16 != 0</title>
<updated>2019-02-22T04:47:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-14T18:27:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=367ecc07314a650084f8a46fe3ce550a9cdabef3'/>
<id>367ecc07314a650084f8a46fe3ce550a9cdabef3</id>
<content type='text'>
This is needed to test that the end of the message is zero-padded when
the length is not a multiple of 16 (NH_MESSAGE_UNIT).  It's already
tested indirectly by the 31-byte Adiantum test vector, but it should be
tested directly at the nhpoly1305 level too.

As with the other nhpoly1305 test vectors, this was generated by the
reference Python implementation at https://github.com/google/adiantum
and then automatically formatted for testmgr by a script.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This is needed to test that the end of the message is zero-padded when
the length is not a multiple of 16 (NH_MESSAGE_UNIT).  It's already
tested indirectly by the 31-byte Adiantum test vector, but it should be
tested directly at the nhpoly1305 level too.

As with the other nhpoly1305 test vectors, this was generated by the
reference Python implementation at https://github.com/google/adiantum
and then automatically formatted for testmgr by a script.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: testmgr - add iv_out to all CTR test vectors</title>
<updated>2019-02-22T04:47:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-14T08:03:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e674dbc088e52be7cee3badc6f5f06c85e1d1710'/>
<id>e674dbc088e52be7cee3badc6f5f06c85e1d1710</id>
<content type='text'>
Test that all CTR implementations update the IV buffer to contain the
next counter block, aka the IV to continue the encryption/decryption of
a larger message.  When the length processed is a multiple of the block
size, users may rely on this for chaining.

When the length processed is *not* a multiple of the block size, simple
chaining doesn't work.  However, as noted in commit 88a3f582bea9
("crypto: arm64/aes - don't use IV buffer to return final keystream
block"), the generic CCM implementation assumes that the CTR IV is
handled in some sane way, not e.g. overwritten with part of the
keystream.  Since this was gotten wrong once already, it's desirable to
test for it.  And, the most straightforward way to do this is to enforce
that all CTR implementations have the same behavior as the generic
implementation, which returns the *next* counter following the final
partial block.  This behavior also has the advantage that if someone
does misuse this case for chaining, then the keystream won't be
repeated.  Thus, this patch makes the tests expect this behavior.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Test that all CTR implementations update the IV buffer to contain the
next counter block, aka the IV to continue the encryption/decryption of
a larger message.  When the length processed is a multiple of the block
size, users may rely on this for chaining.

When the length processed is *not* a multiple of the block size, simple
chaining doesn't work.  However, as noted in commit 88a3f582bea9
("crypto: arm64/aes - don't use IV buffer to return final keystream
block"), the generic CCM implementation assumes that the CTR IV is
handled in some sane way, not e.g. overwritten with part of the
keystream.  Since this was gotten wrong once already, it's desirable to
test for it.  And, the most straightforward way to do this is to enforce
that all CTR implementations have the same behavior as the generic
implementation, which returns the *next* counter following the final
partial block.  This behavior also has the advantage that if someone
does misuse this case for chaining, then the keystream won't be
repeated.  Thus, this patch makes the tests expect this behavior.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
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