<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/crypto/ecc.c, branch v5.15</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecc - Correct an error in the comments</title>
<updated>2021-03-26T09:15:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Meng Yu</name>
<email>yumeng18@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-19T09:13:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0193b32f565e14ef07ced5d6bf8986490ec8e0f1'/>
<id>0193b32f565e14ef07ced5d6bf8986490ec8e0f1</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove repeated word 'bit' in comments.

Signed-off-by: Meng Yu &lt;yumeng18@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Remove repeated word 'bit' in comments.

Signed-off-by: Meng Yu &lt;yumeng18@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'ecc'</title>
<updated>2021-03-26T08:55:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-26T08:55:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3877869d13a043a2dbab0d034e5eac3b21f4994d'/>
<id>3877869d13a043a2dbab0d034e5eac3b21f4994d</id>
<content type='text'>
This pulls in the NIST P384/256/192 x509 changes.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This pulls in the NIST P384/256/192 x509 changes.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecc - Add math to support fast NIST P384</title>
<updated>2021-03-26T08:41:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Saulo Alessandre</name>
<email>saulo.alessandre@tse.jus.br</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-16T21:07:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=149ca1611d92411b812756475cf471a081dcadad'/>
<id>149ca1611d92411b812756475cf471a081dcadad</id>
<content type='text'>
Add the math needed for NIST P384 and adapt certain functions'
parameters so that the ecc_curve is passed to vli_mmod_fast. This
allows to identify the curve by its name prefix and the appropriate
function for fast mmod calculation can be used.

Summary of changes:

* crypto/ecc.c
  - add vli_mmod_fast_384
  - change some routines to pass ecc_curve forward until vli_mmod_fast

* crypto/ecc.h
  - add ECC_CURVE_NIST_P384_DIGITS
  - change ECC_MAX_DIGITS to P384 size

Signed-off-by: Saulo Alessandre &lt;saulo.alessandre@tse.jus.br&gt;
Tested-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add the math needed for NIST P384 and adapt certain functions'
parameters so that the ecc_curve is passed to vli_mmod_fast. This
allows to identify the curve by its name prefix and the appropriate
function for fast mmod calculation can be used.

Summary of changes:

* crypto/ecc.c
  - add vli_mmod_fast_384
  - change some routines to pass ecc_curve forward until vli_mmod_fast

* crypto/ecc.h
  - add ECC_CURVE_NIST_P384_DIGITS
  - change ECC_MAX_DIGITS to P384 size

Signed-off-by: Saulo Alessandre &lt;saulo.alessandre@tse.jus.br&gt;
Tested-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecc - Add NIST P384 curve parameters</title>
<updated>2021-03-26T08:41:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Saulo Alessandre</name>
<email>saulo.alessandre@tse.jus.br</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-16T21:07:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=703c748d5f2c4f6d2b494405130d61b8275189cf'/>
<id>703c748d5f2c4f6d2b494405130d61b8275189cf</id>
<content type='text'>
Add the parameters for the NIST P384 curve and define a new curve ID
for it. Make the curve available in ecc_get_curve.

Summary of changes:

* crypto/ecc_curve_defs.h
  - add nist_p384 params

* include/crypto/ecdh.h
  - add ECC_CURVE_NIST_P384

* crypto/ecc.c
  - change ecc_get_curve to accept nist_p384

Signed-off-by: Saulo Alessandre &lt;saulo.alessandre@tse.jus.br&gt;
Tested-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add the parameters for the NIST P384 curve and define a new curve ID
for it. Make the curve available in ecc_get_curve.

Summary of changes:

* crypto/ecc_curve_defs.h
  - add nist_p384 params

* include/crypto/ecdh.h
  - add ECC_CURVE_NIST_P384

* crypto/ecc.c
  - change ecc_get_curve to accept nist_p384

Signed-off-by: Saulo Alessandre &lt;saulo.alessandre@tse.jus.br&gt;
Tested-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecdsa - Add support for ECDSA signature verification</title>
<updated>2021-03-26T08:41:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-16T21:07:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4e6602916bc692ee31ac5b8bd8195fb078556844'/>
<id>4e6602916bc692ee31ac5b8bd8195fb078556844</id>
<content type='text'>
Add support for parsing the parameters of a NIST P256 or NIST P192 key.
Enable signature verification using these keys. The new module is
enabled with CONFIG_ECDSA:
  Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (NIST P192, P256 etc.)
  is A NIST cryptographic standard algorithm. Only signature verification
  is implemented.

Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add support for parsing the parameters of a NIST P256 or NIST P192 key.
Enable signature verification using these keys. The new module is
enabled with CONFIG_ECDSA:
  Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (NIST P192, P256 etc.)
  is A NIST cryptographic standard algorithm. Only signature verification
  is implemented.

Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecc - add curve25519 params and expose them</title>
<updated>2021-03-12T13:04:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Meng Yu</name>
<email>yumeng18@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-04T06:35:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8fb9340e178ad32084fc189e6a2b2abfbc091df7'/>
<id>8fb9340e178ad32084fc189e6a2b2abfbc091df7</id>
<content type='text'>
1. Add curve 25519 parameters in 'crypto/ecc_curve_defs.h';
2. Add curve25519 interface 'ecc_get_curve25519_param' in
   'include/crypto/ecc_curve.h', to make its parameters be
   exposed to everyone in kernel tree.

Signed-off-by: Meng Yu &lt;yumeng18@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu &lt;xuzaibo@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
1. Add curve 25519 parameters in 'crypto/ecc_curve_defs.h';
2. Add curve25519 interface 'ecc_get_curve25519_param' in
   'include/crypto/ecc_curve.h', to make its parameters be
   exposed to everyone in kernel tree.

Signed-off-by: Meng Yu &lt;yumeng18@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu &lt;xuzaibo@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecc - expose ecc curves</title>
<updated>2021-03-12T13:04:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Meng Yu</name>
<email>yumeng18@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-04T06:35:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=14bb76768275a056a91d249525a717019fd46663'/>
<id>14bb76768275a056a91d249525a717019fd46663</id>
<content type='text'>
Move 'ecc_get_curve' to 'include/crypto/ecc_curve.h', so everyone
in kernel tree can easily get ecc curve params;

Signed-off-by: Meng Yu &lt;yumeng18@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu &lt;xuzaibo@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move 'ecc_get_curve' to 'include/crypto/ecc_curve.h', so everyone
in kernel tree can easily get ecc curve params;

Signed-off-by: Meng Yu &lt;yumeng18@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Zaibo Xu &lt;xuzaibo@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()</title>
<updated>2020-08-07T18:33:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Waiman Long</name>
<email>longman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-07T06:18:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=453431a54934d917153c65211b2dabf45562ca88'/>
<id>453431a54934d917153c65211b2dabf45562ca88</id>
<content type='text'>
As said by Linus:

  A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
  Otherwise it's actively misleading.

  In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
  caller wants.

  In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
  future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
  something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.

The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.

Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.

The renaming is done by using the command sequence:

  git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
  xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'

followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]

Suggested-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As said by Linus:

  A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
  Otherwise it's actively misleading.

  In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
  caller wants.

  In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
  future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
  something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.

The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.

Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.

The renaming is done by using the command sequence:

  git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
  xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'

followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]

Suggested-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecc - SP800-56A rev 3 local public key validation</title>
<updated>2020-07-31T08:08:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephan Müller</name>
<email>smueller@chronox.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-20T17:09:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6914dd53eb7af7cbc66edf7992d600b1e952c40d'/>
<id>6914dd53eb7af7cbc66edf7992d600b1e952c40d</id>
<content type='text'>
After the generation of a local public key, SP800-56A rev 3 section
5.6.2.1.3 mandates a validation of that key with a full validation
compliant to section 5.6.2.3.3.

Only if the full validation passes, the key is allowed to be used.

The patch adds the full key validation compliant to 5.6.2.3.3 and
performs the required check on the generated public key.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
After the generation of a local public key, SP800-56A rev 3 section
5.6.2.1.3 mandates a validation of that key with a full validation
compliant to section 5.6.2.3.3.

Only if the full validation passes, the key is allowed to be used.

The patch adds the full key validation compliant to 5.6.2.3.3 and
performs the required check on the generated public key.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ecdh - check validity of Z before export</title>
<updated>2020-07-31T08:08:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephan Müller</name>
<email>smueller@chronox.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-20T17:07:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e7d2b41e5c773c1e00f0f30519b9790ba7e4a58c'/>
<id>e7d2b41e5c773c1e00f0f30519b9790ba7e4a58c</id>
<content type='text'>
SP800-56A rev3 section 5.7.1.2 step 2 mandates that the validity of the
calculated shared secret is verified before the data is returned to the
caller. Thus, the export function and the validity check functions are
reversed. In addition, the sensitive variables of priv and rand_z are
zeroized.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov &lt;vt@altlinux.org&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
SP800-56A rev3 section 5.7.1.2 step 2 mandates that the validity of the
calculated shared secret is verified before the data is returned to the
caller. Thus, the export function and the validity check functions are
reversed. In addition, the sensitive variables of priv and rand_z are
zeroized.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov &lt;vt@altlinux.org&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
